Revert a bunch of rsafp stuff now that DCRUP isn't going to do rsafp
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,21 +1,14 @@
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UNRELEASED Version 0.7.0
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- Updated ARC implementation to support https://tools.ietf.org/html/
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draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-08
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- Authres module now required for ARC
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- Ported dkimsign.py to use argparse; now gives standard usage message and
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- Port dkimsign.py to use argparse; now gives standard usage message and
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is more extensible
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- Added command line options to dkimsign.py to select header and body
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- Add command line options to dkimsign.py to select header and body
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canonicalization algorithmns (LP: #1272724)
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- Added command line option to dkimsign.py to select signing algorithm
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- For dknewkey.py made default to include h=sha256 in the DNS record to
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- Add command line option to dkimsign.py to select signing algorithm
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- For dknewkey.py make default to include h=sha256 in the DNS record to
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exclude usage with sha1. Can be overriden.
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- Updated dknewkey.py to use argparse. Add --ktype option to specify
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- Update dknewkey.py to use argparse. Add --ktype option to specify
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different key type options in anticipation of the DCRUP WG output.
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- Added generation of rsafp DNS records per
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draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto-02
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- Added generation of rsafp DKIM signatures per
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draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto-02
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- Add generation of rsafp DNS records per draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto-02
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2017-05-30 Version 0.6.2
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- Fixed problem with header folding that caused the first line to be
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folded too long (Updated test test_add_body_length since l= tag is no
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@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ REQUIREMENTS
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and python 3.1 - 3.3.
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- dnspython or pydns. dnspython is preferred if both are present.
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- argparse. Standard library in python2.7 and later.
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- authres. Needed only for ARC.
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INSTALLATION
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@@ -96,8 +95,6 @@ Received Chain):
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https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-01
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Updated to support -08 for 0.7.
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This new functionality is marked experimental because the protocol is still
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under development. There are no guarantees about API stability or
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compatibility.
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+23
-99
@@ -38,13 +38,6 @@ import logging
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import re
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import time
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# only needed for arc
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try:
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from authres import AuthenticationResultsHeader
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except:
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pass
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from dkim.canonicalization import (
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CanonicalizationPolicy,
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InvalidCanonicalizationPolicyError,
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@@ -56,7 +49,6 @@ from dkim.crypto import (
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HASH_ALGORITHMS,
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parse_pem_private_key,
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parse_public_key,
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get_rsa_pubkey,
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RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_sign,
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RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_verify,
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UnparsableKeyError,
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@@ -149,10 +141,6 @@ class ValidationError(DKIMException):
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"""Validation error."""
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pass
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class AuthresNotFoundError(DKIMException):
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""" Authres Package not installed, needed for ARC """
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pass
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def select_headers(headers, include_headers):
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"""Select message header fields to be signed/verified.
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@@ -373,7 +361,7 @@ class DomainSigner(object):
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#: @param logger: a logger to which debug info will be written (default None)
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#: @param signature_algorithm: the signing algorithm to use when signing
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def __init__(self,message=None,logger=None,signature_algorithm=b'rsa-sha256',
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minkey=1024,ktype=b'rsa'):
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minkey=1024):
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self.set_message(message)
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if logger is None:
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logger = get_default_logger()
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@@ -394,8 +382,6 @@ class DomainSigner(object):
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#: Minimum public key size. Shorter keys raise KeyFormatError. The
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#: default is 1024
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self.minkey = minkey
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#: Key type to use. rsa, rsafp (DCRUP)
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self.ktype = ktype
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#: Header fields to protect from additions by default.
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#:
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@@ -634,16 +620,12 @@ class DKIM(DomainSigner):
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#: @raise DKIMException: when the message, include_headers, or key are badly
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#: formed.
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def sign(self, selector, domain, privkey, identity=None,
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canonicalize=(b'relaxed',b'simple'), include_headers=None,
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length=False):
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canonicalize=(b'relaxed',b'simple'), include_headers=None, length=False):
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try:
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pk = parse_pem_private_key(privkey)
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except UnparsableKeyError as e:
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raise KeyFormatError(str(e))
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if self.ktype == b'rsafp':
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pubkey = get_rsa_pubkey(privkey)
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else:
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pubkey = False
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if identity is not None and not identity.endswith(domain):
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raise ParameterError("identity must end with domain")
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@@ -671,13 +653,10 @@ class DKIM(DomainSigner):
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h = self.hasher()
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h.update(body)
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bodyhash = base64.b64encode(h.digest())
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if self.ktype == b'rsafp':
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atag = b'rsafp-sha256'
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else:
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atag = self.signature_algorithm
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sigfields = [x for x in [
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(b'v', b"1"),
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(b'a', atag),
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(b'a', self.signature_algorithm),
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(b'c', canon_policy.to_c_value()),
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(b'd', domain),
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(b'i', identity or b"@"+domain),
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@@ -686,7 +665,6 @@ class DKIM(DomainSigner):
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(b's', selector),
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(b't', str(int(time.time())).encode('ascii')),
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(b'h', b" : ".join(include_headers)),
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pubkey and (b'k', pubkey),
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(b'bh', bodyhash),
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# Force b= to fold onto it's own line so that refolding after
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# adding sig doesn't change whitespace for previous tags.
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@@ -787,59 +765,27 @@ class ARC(DomainSigner):
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#: @param selector: the DKIM selector value for the signature
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#: @param domain: the DKIM domain value for the signature
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#: @param privkey: a PKCS#1 private key in base64-encoded text form
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#: @param srv_id: an srv_id for identitfying AR headers to sign & extract cv from
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#: @param auth_results: RFC 7601 Authentication-Results header value for the message
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#: @param chain_validation_status: CV_Pass, CV_Fail, CV_None
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#: @param include_headers: a list of strings indicating which headers
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#: are to be signed (default rfc4871 recommended headers)
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#: @return: list of ARC set header fields
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#: @raise DKIMException: when the message, include_headers, or key are badly
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#: formed.
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def sign(self, selector, domain, privkey, srv_id, include_headers=None,
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timestamp=None, standardize=False):
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# check if authres has been imported
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try:
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AuthenticationResultsHeader
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except:
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self.logger.debug("authres package not installed")
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raise AuthresNotFoundError
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def sign(self, selector, domain, privkey, auth_results, chain_validation_status,
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include_headers=None, timestamp=None, standardize=False):
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try:
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pk = parse_pem_private_key(privkey)
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except UnparsableKeyError as e:
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raise KeyFormatError(str(e))
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# extract, parse, filter & group AR headers
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ar_headers = [res.strip() for [ar, res] in self.headers if ar == b'Authentication-Results']
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grouped_headers = [(res, AuthenticationResultsHeader.parse('Authentication-Results: ' + res.decode('utf-8')))
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for res in ar_headers]
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auth_headers = [res for res in grouped_headers if res[1].authserv_id == srv_id.decode('utf-8')]
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if len(auth_headers) == 0:
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self.logger.debug("no AR headers found, chain terminated")
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return b''
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# consolidate headers
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results_lists = [raw.replace(srv_id + b';', b'').strip() for (raw, parsed) in auth_headers]
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results_lists = [tags.split(b';') for tags in results_lists]
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results = [tag.strip() for sublist in results_lists for tag in sublist]
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auth_results = srv_id + b'; ' + b';\r\n '.join(results)
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# extract cv
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parsed_auth_results = AuthenticationResultsHeader.parse('Authentication-Results: ' + auth_results.decode('utf-8'))
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arc_results = [res for res in parsed_auth_results.results if res.method == 'arc']
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if len(arc_results) == 0:
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self.logger.debug("no AR arc stamps found, chain terminated")
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return b''
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elif len(arc_results) != 1:
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self.logger.debug("multiple AR arc stamps found, failing chain")
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chain_validation_status = CV_Fail
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else:
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chain_validation_status = arc_results[0].result.lower().encode('utf-8')
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# Setup headers
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if include_headers is None:
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include_headers = self.default_sign_headers()
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if b'arc-authentication-results' not in include_headers:
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include_headers.append(b'arc-authentication-results')
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include_headers = tuple([x.lower() for x in include_headers])
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# record what verify should extract
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@@ -865,10 +811,7 @@ class ARC(DomainSigner):
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raise ParameterError("cv=none not allowed on instance %d" % instance)
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new_arc_set = []
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if chain_validation_status != CV_Fail:
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arc_headers = [y for x,y in arc_headers_w_instance]
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else: # don't include previous sets for a failed/invalid chain
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arc_headers = []
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# Compute ARC-Authentication-Results
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aar_value = ("i=%d; " % instance).encode('utf-8') + auth_results
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@@ -926,11 +869,6 @@ class ARC(DomainSigner):
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as_include_headers = [x[0].lower() for x in arc_headers]
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as_include_headers.reverse()
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# if our chain is failing or invalid, we only grab the most recent set
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# reversing the order of the headers accomplishes this
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if chain_validation_status == CV_Fail:
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self.headers.reverse()
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res = self.gen_header(as_fields, as_include_headers, canon_policy,
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b"ARC-Seal", pk, standardize)
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@@ -949,7 +887,7 @@ class ARC(DomainSigner):
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#: @param dnsfunc: an optional function to lookup TXT resource records
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#: for a DNS domain. The default uses dnspython or pydns.
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#: @return: True if signature verifies or False otherwise
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#: @return: three-tuple of (CV Result (CV_Pass, CV_Fail, CV_None or None, for a chain that has ended), list of
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#: @return: three-tuple of (CV Result (CV_Pass, CV_Fail or CV_None), list of
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#: result dictionaries, result reason)
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#: @raise DKIMException: when the message, signature, or key are badly formed
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def verify(self,dnsfunc=get_txt):
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@@ -969,10 +907,10 @@ class ARC(DomainSigner):
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if not result_data[0]['ams-valid']:
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return CV_Fail, result_data, "Most recent ARC-Message-Signature did not validate"
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for result in result_data:
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if result['cv'] == CV_Fail:
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return None, result_data, "ARC-Seal[%d] reported failure, the chain is terminated" % result['instance']
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elif not result['as-valid']:
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if not result['as-valid']:
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return CV_Fail, result_data, "ARC-Seal[%d] did not validate" % result['instance']
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if result['cv'] == CV_Fail:
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return CV_Fail, result_data, "ARC-Seal[%d] reported failure" % result['instance']
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elif (result['instance'] == 1) and (result['cv'] != CV_None):
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return CV_Fail, result_data, "ARC-Seal[%d] reported invalid status %s" % (result['instance'], result['cv'])
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elif (result['instance'] != 1) and (result['cv'] == CV_None):
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@@ -1039,18 +977,7 @@ class ARC(DomainSigner):
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raise ParameterError("The Arc-Message-Signature MUST NOT sign ARC-Seal")
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ams_header = (b'ARC-Message-Signature', b' ' + ams_value)
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# we can't use the AMS provided above, as it's already been canonicalized relaxed
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# for use in validating the AS. However the AMS is included in the AMS itself,
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# and this can use simple canonicalization
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raw_ams_header = [(x, y) for (x, y) in self.headers if x.lower() == b'arc-message-signature'][0]
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try:
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ams_valid = self.verify_sig(sig, include_headers, raw_ams_header, dnsfunc)
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except DKIMException as e:
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self.logger.error("%s" % e)
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ams_valid = False
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ams_valid = self.verify_sig(sig, include_headers, ams_header, dnsfunc)
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output['ams-valid'] = ams_valid
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self.logger.debug("ams valid: %r" % ams_valid)
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@@ -1071,11 +998,7 @@ class ARC(DomainSigner):
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as_include_headers = [x[0].lower() for x in arc_headers]
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as_include_headers.reverse()
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as_header = (b'ARC-Seal', b' ' + as_value)
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try:
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as_valid = self.verify_sig(sig, as_include_headers[:-1], as_header, dnsfunc)
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except DKIMException as e:
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self.logger.error("%s" % e)
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as_valid = False
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output['as-valid'] = as_valid
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self.logger.debug("as valid: %r" % as_valid)
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@@ -1122,7 +1045,8 @@ dkim_sign = sign
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dkim_verify = verify
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def arc_sign(message, selector, domain, privkey,
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srv_id, signature_algorithm=b'rsa-sha256',
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auth_results, chain_validation_status,
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signature_algorithm=b'rsa-sha256',
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include_headers=None, timestamp=None,
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logger=None, standardize=False):
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"""Sign an RFC822 message and return the ARC set header lines for the next instance
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@@ -1130,19 +1054,19 @@ def arc_sign(message, selector, domain, privkey,
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@param selector: the DKIM selector value for the signature
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@param domain: the DKIM domain value for the signature
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@param privkey: a PKCS#1 private key in base64-encoded text form
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@param srv_id: the authserv_id used to identify the ADMD's AR headers
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@param auth_results: the RFC 7601 authentication-results header field value for this instance
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@param chain_validation_status: the validation status of the existing chain on the message (P (pass), F (fail)) or N (none) for no existing chain
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@param signature_algorithm: the signing algorithm to use when signing
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@param include_headers: a list of strings indicating which headers are to be signed (default all headers not listed as SHOULD NOT sign)
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@param logger: a logger to which debug info will be written (default None)
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@return: A list containing the ARC set of header fields for the next instance
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@raise DKIMException: when the message, include_headers, or key are badly formed.
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"""
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a = ARC(message,logger=logger,signature_algorithm=signature_algorithm)
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if not include_headers:
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include_headers = a.default_sign_headers()
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return a.sign(selector, domain, privkey, srv_id, include_headers=include_headers,
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timestamp=timestamp, standardize=standardize)
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return a.sign(selector, domain, privkey, auth_results, chain_validation_status,
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include_headers=include_headers, timestamp=timestamp, standardize=standardize)
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def arc_verify(message, logger=None, dnsfunc=get_txt, minkey=1024):
|
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"""Verify the ARC chain on an RFC822 formatted message.
|
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|
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@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ __all__ = [
|
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'parse_pem_private_key',
|
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'parse_private_key',
|
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'parse_public_key',
|
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'get_rsa_pubkey',
|
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'RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_sign',
|
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'RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_verify',
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'UnparsableKeyError',
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@@ -34,7 +33,6 @@ __all__ = [
|
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import base64
|
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import hashlib
|
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import re
|
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import rsa
|
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|
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from dkim.asn1 import (
|
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ASN1FormatError,
|
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@@ -235,14 +233,6 @@ def rsa_decrypt(message, pk, mlen):
|
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|
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return int2str(m2 + h * pk['prime2'], mlen)
|
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|
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def get_rsa_pubkey(privkey):
|
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"""Extract RSA public key from PEM encoded RSA private key for use with
|
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rsafp. Returns base64 encoded public key suitable for use in DKIM key
|
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records. Using python-rsa instead of making a stack of custom code.
|
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@since: 0.7"""
|
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pkobj = rsa.PrivateKey.load_pkcs1(privkey, 'PEM')
|
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pubobj = rsa.key.PublicKey(pkobj.n, pkobj.e)
|
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return(base64.b64encode(rsa.PublicKey.save_pkcs1(pubobj, 'DER')))
|
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|
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def rsa_encrypt(message, pk, mlen):
|
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"""Perform RSA encryption/verification
|
||||
|
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@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ def test_suite():
|
||||
test_canonicalization,
|
||||
test_crypto,
|
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test_dkim,
|
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test_rsafp,
|
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test_util,
|
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test_arc,
|
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test_dnsplug,
|
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@@ -37,7 +36,6 @@ def test_suite():
|
||||
test_canonicalization,
|
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test_crypto,
|
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test_dkim,
|
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test_rsafp,
|
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test_util,
|
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test_arc,
|
||||
test_dnsplug,
|
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|
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
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k=rsafp; p=VO1v0Ybphw9AlrLvHB2ly/x6RD/1zJxEhYeWT/v/RtY=
|
||||
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
|
||||
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
||||
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA0EGLyxVqSMvpQ/THu4XH+0sbqQrnGRu36/TBcsJc7p5vGKIY
|
||||
f7lfAiaxceGGVX1NzBoE8SEqmLlNuRtdHSsnItC82m5hGDhTec8ZcGonfnOCPJvd
|
||||
Dou8mDXhtX9knES4PC/Uup3HL84RnsXZ0GWpUtB+fIsHlZryFjsTJtOZVdJSH5H5
|
||||
B0arJCitLVJqPqF5bluIVuXmwXD2Wi0hQkpmSm+SJJQ1efTkpK2UYkJvu8cMF7aA
|
||||
7Lgxzimatqg4oDg9ED5VCHFz82wacjNrnQRnezeOcWF8q76dfCDo5MLUO+CWChFC
|
||||
H897B6kjMmCo3IavLTHB8Dc7q70I8lxn2qAZzwIDAQABAoIBAQCU+R5oExSpqHxg
|
||||
KV0rbqLEx1CtFuiD1Ik32Cj9z72s0FcGlwXRcChfoJA0t7BhvTYGt+IrH5+aCoxn
|
||||
ywRL1k+znwBJfMYmDjzgmN5IxRclZLmYY6K5QgqSE5E3RT8SbjIgk9KoAC+5qb5/
|
||||
BmcupVp/rDefHdE6GtHsRywHDTzV30f8zXb/51w30FkcSQS85v8W4VbyqpGcAgq1
|
||||
ah1gEuSd7HtxQ4HWyvFiMdw+0bBh8gt14Dh3nq8i6tDhlPtykbM4etm16fcpl5cz
|
||||
DOg5srIOKxW4vGOng68v6KQ/gz8/BQMAPbZHgFd5l2grejC9p27hwTYer909AfEO
|
||||
EUcn5oJhAoGBAPVoqvcqA4AL3G46SrYeAnXz/bpaPiBhKat1YgnPQc+5cuGauJIN
|
||||
YtiCv5xza1u8Gc5rRfEn/41mSpDAXcix0d95qpUAToNVRJUA23e28EoKGL8rWaXF
|
||||
lc2IecGNI7HF7XL0V+BF59dAPH4q44mKval6U/wTo0hDAFfBnRy0V03RAoGBANk+
|
||||
Z9G7dYaQpw/nCxVouCeGOX4LECt4m4Y+LIhFPqI8mnTM8S97dnySW3OpafwF6RIk
|
||||
UDMzXSJc6BPOMEk9WVI+1ztKXssjbvVa3fSHZEBMP9d1xFJw4/SRSp3uFjGzLa4u
|
||||
pea8DFRz5jBR2uyGh0+/1E9v+hem7WD6pwJGwrWfAoGAVeiEIO4GN6bvTW7+hG5Q
|
||||
8jWtlrTMls0spyb6YPC62xrSSoO9JPOmrKBorz4AUSax6f7Hhzo3TaqHY9DTg9Qr
|
||||
4g1XV725vmP1FCwup+PUjjamnxVv1oYqgL7L0KO14R+mld1PfeU62bFU+93LtXRq
|
||||
HJAEInRFbqB12EKg21GOVmECgYA6Lox/j0UalQMpLye4xCMN8tTS/QOHoPWGLoCe
|
||||
vmzX5oM3ZOvzW42QL2Jux6Cq7qpNQYx5Kfh3i4pcQ4yLEPMrI8lhB7n7jbHZ5Ewt
|
||||
gVVIIyO2AMRjj/h9N6xUP7+R7/r7+2JTOWnT9HZh2opXbnAu26Fw5PyF+R76Kicw
|
||||
ZOMg4QKBgQDMAJ9nENCiZw7CkYRm+z5UoMeSR3jwEPj1gK3KKhIYWeOw99i2XmBt
|
||||
1aN0UgAeEidleguqeZWxVXJkdVqvxfAPqpPfhGneN5GgEh2gOfFTDrvHhqoMblsw
|
||||
uuNlIixfy4w1ENApV2n7qcBzptMHV2uPDUHCctAZ9+ACg7nkiJEaCw==
|
||||
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0EGLyxVqSMvpQ/THu4XH+0sbqQrnGRu36/TBcsJc7p5vGKIYf7lfAiaxceGGVX1NzBoE8SEqmLlNuRtdHSsnItC82m5hGDhTec8ZcGonfnOCPJvdDou8mDXhtX9knES4PC/Uup3HL84RnsXZ0GWpUtB+fIsHlZryFjsTJtOZVdJSH5H5B0arJCitLVJqPqF5bluIVuXmwXD2Wi0hQkpmSm+SJJQ1efTkpK2UYkJvu8cMF7aA7Lgxzimatqg4oDg9ED5VCHFz82wacjNrnQRnezeOcWF8q76dfCDo5MLUO+CWChFCH897B6kjMmCo3IavLTHB8Dc7q70I8lxn2qAZzwIDAQAB
|
||||
+1
-5
@@ -47,9 +47,6 @@ parser.add_argument('--bcanon', choices=['simple', 'relaxed'],
|
||||
parser.add_argument('--signalg', choices=['rsa-sha256', 'rsa-sha1'],
|
||||
default='rsa-sha256',
|
||||
help='Signature algorithm: default=rsa-sha256')
|
||||
parser.add_argument('--ktype', choices=['rsa', 'rsafp'],
|
||||
default='rsa',
|
||||
help='DKIM key type: Default is rsa')
|
||||
parser.add_argument('--identity', help='Optional value for i= tag.')
|
||||
args=parser.parse_args(arguments)
|
||||
include_headers = None
|
||||
@@ -64,7 +61,6 @@ if sys.version_info[0] >= 3:
|
||||
args.hcanon = bytes(args.hcanon, encoding='UTF-8')
|
||||
args.bcanon = bytes(args.bcanon, encoding='UTF-8')
|
||||
args.signalg = bytes(args.signalg, encoding='UTF-8')
|
||||
args.ktype = bytes(args.ktype, encoding='UTF-8')
|
||||
# Make sys.stdin and stdout binary streams.
|
||||
sys.stdin = sys.stdin.detach()
|
||||
sys.stdout = sys.stdout.detach()
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +69,7 @@ canonicalize = (args.hcanon, args.bcanon)
|
||||
message = sys.stdin.read()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
d = dkim.DKIM(message,logger=logger,
|
||||
signature_algorithm=args.signalg, ktype=args.ktype)
|
||||
signature_algorithm=args.signalg)
|
||||
sig = d.sign(args.selector, args.domain, open(
|
||||
args.privatekeyfile, "rb").read(), identity = args.identity,
|
||||
canonicalize=canonicalize, include_headers=include_headers,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user