Compare commits
106 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9e6d1a8cb7 | |||
| 63e45eb884 | |||
| 28bc84eda0 | |||
| 7f7f2500dc | |||
| 4f220b48cf | |||
| a9ca154a92 | |||
| 65672fb26f | |||
| 155eb4e675 | |||
| 14d5869019 | |||
| 28ca3b2837 | |||
| 52b0ac9377 | |||
| 8bc182cb37 | |||
| fb3c140d4c | |||
| 52d23604f7 | |||
| 15f8b797bf | |||
| 3b544a4076 | |||
| 36a7dce2e5 | |||
| a418f34491 | |||
| ba5854fc91 | |||
| a0878320fa | |||
| d1583d88c9 | |||
| 3ad67bd33b | |||
| eb2e730b5d | |||
| daa1eacff3 | |||
| aaf23f35f8 | |||
| 25b6378631 | |||
| c6ac3ddad8 | |||
| b3dce26928 | |||
| fcd85dbfb5 | |||
| 3a1c964f0d | |||
| 36ae390f01 | |||
| 4c0cf4fb95 | |||
| 8f8de8fa97 | |||
| bc516456c1 | |||
| a50194d07f | |||
| 1cf272ceb0 | |||
| d2dc09f979 | |||
| ea82d6d608 | |||
| ace3e13685 | |||
| 78ea2e2263 | |||
| d34efa39bb | |||
| 36b5b4e6d4 | |||
| 04874d6e35 | |||
| 073f87dcc7 | |||
| 7ab5ddf053 | |||
| d6ef1a4007 | |||
| 2a4ab4e87c | |||
| 241717b0e2 | |||
| bd8fabae0f | |||
| d119af1a3e | |||
| f1f082fe8a | |||
| b0286bff22 | |||
| a9663a23d7 | |||
| 8df5cd026e | |||
| 0cbfc0d249 | |||
| 46ad2794f1 | |||
| 8fef702522 | |||
| 62b33bd964 | |||
| ffcadf6c01 | |||
| 9f7d52118a | |||
| 95b24f7663 | |||
| db0f1095e5 | |||
| f749b6f2cd | |||
| 23485978fc | |||
| e1f4744a22 | |||
| ef413913d0 | |||
| 8ad4b16156 | |||
| b28a56ea37 | |||
| e3b18d61c9 | |||
| 5335e18925 | |||
| e2f1587832 | |||
| febf56b031 | |||
| e9f6773096 | |||
| 2276762c52 | |||
| a142fefb19 | |||
| 900b7ef3fb | |||
| d07e536f44 | |||
| 2d291d35f6 | |||
| a94f82d8f3 | |||
| 124747c309 | |||
| 4c659c7f87 | |||
| 3e47952438 | |||
| a01c5d31f1 | |||
| 493741c81e | |||
| 9a969e8f60 | |||
| 3d7003a638 | |||
| f643cafc04 | |||
| 09582a2e86 | |||
| 7eb2fb09ef | |||
| 07c56ce667 | |||
| ecb870acaa | |||
| e99117e8f6 | |||
| 0283c20eef | |||
| bdc6b71845 | |||
| 053734d435 | |||
| 56f1f58be8 | |||
| 5d6ceaefe4 | |||
| 1d10bb172f | |||
| 8e93d4be38 | |||
| ea81a31044 | |||
| 2ad3e1cd6e | |||
| b056551e16 | |||
| 6277f05e6a | |||
| 19ad88b6b2 | |||
| e688112eed | |||
| c510c4576f |
@@ -5,8 +5,11 @@ wrapper (Milter.py) that handles attachments, did lots of testing, packaged
|
||||
it with distutils, and generally transformed it from a quick hack to a
|
||||
real, usable Python extension.
|
||||
|
||||
Other contributors:
|
||||
Other contributors (in random order):
|
||||
|
||||
Dave MacQuigg
|
||||
for noticing that smfi_insheader wasn't supported, and creating
|
||||
a template to help first time pymilter users create their own milter.
|
||||
Terence Way
|
||||
for providing a Python port of SPF
|
||||
Scott Kitterman
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
||||
Step one. Which DSPAM is right for you?
|
||||
|
||||
The DSPAM project makes dspam part of the LDA (Local Delivery Agent).
|
||||
Pydspam puts dspam into the MTA (Mail Transfer Agent - sendmail with pymilter).
|
||||
|
||||
The advantage of doing dspam in the LDA is that any aliasing has already been
|
||||
resolved. You need only configure mailboxes.
|
||||
|
||||
The advantage of doing dspam in the MTA is it can screen an entire
|
||||
company as a gateway with multiple domains. Unfortunately, this
|
||||
means you have to tell it about all the aliases that comprise each
|
||||
account. (Also, pydspam is still uses dspam-2.6.5.2 - the Dspam API
|
||||
has changed for newer versions.)
|
||||
|
||||
If the LDA is right for you, you'll want to use the official Dspam
|
||||
package. http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/
|
||||
|
||||
If the MTA approach is what you want, then pydspam is what you want.
|
||||
|
||||
In either case, you will still want pymilter to block forgeries, Windows
|
||||
executables, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
So, lets assume you want to install pymilter, and may or may not
|
||||
wish to install pydspam.
|
||||
|
||||
Step two. Obtaining RPMS.
|
||||
|
||||
For basic pymilter you'll need:
|
||||
|
||||
python-2.4
|
||||
milter-0.8.2 (the RH9 rpm should work on Fedora Core - let me know)
|
||||
sendmail-8.13.x (with milter support enabled)
|
||||
|
||||
and for SPF you'll need:
|
||||
|
||||
pydns-2.3.0-2.4
|
||||
|
||||
and for SRS you'll need:
|
||||
|
||||
pysrs-0.30.9-1.py24
|
||||
|
||||
I'm pretty sure you will want to have SPF and SRS available.
|
||||
|
||||
Step three. Activate basic milter.
|
||||
|
||||
Activate the basic milter by editing /etc/mail/sendmail.mc and adding:
|
||||
|
||||
INPUT_MAIL_FILTER(`pythonfilter', `S=local:/var/run/milter/pythonsock, F=T, T=C:5m;S:20s;R:5m;E:5m')
|
||||
|
||||
You can then "make sendmail.cf" and restart sendmail.
|
||||
|
||||
Tail /var/log/milter/milter.log while SMTP clients connect to your
|
||||
sendmail instance. This should show you what the milter is doing.
|
||||
|
||||
By default, milter-0.8.2 rejects on SPF fail, except for listed domains
|
||||
(that are known to be broken). Some admins don't like that, and 0.8.3 will use
|
||||
the /etc/mail/access database to configure SPF responses. For now,
|
||||
if you don't like SPF, you can disable spf by replacing "import spf"
|
||||
with "spf = None" around line 285 in /var/log/milter/bms.py.
|
||||
|
||||
Step four. Tweaking the basic config.
|
||||
|
||||
Most pymilter configuration is in /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg.
|
||||
|
||||
By default, milter scans attachments for executable extensions. You can
|
||||
turn this off by setting banned_exts to the empty list. There are options
|
||||
to scan ZIP attachments and rfc822 attachments. When it finds a banned
|
||||
file type, milter saves the original message in /var/log/milter/save,
|
||||
and replaces the attachment with a plain text warning message.
|
||||
|
||||
Configure hello_blacklist with your own helo name and domains - which
|
||||
you know cannot legitimately be used by external MTAs.
|
||||
|
||||
Configure trusted_relay with your secondary MX servers, if any. These
|
||||
should also run pymilter with similar policies. (But this isn't
|
||||
needed for initial testing.)
|
||||
|
||||
Configure internal_connect with subnets of your internal SMTP clients.
|
||||
Internal connections skip SPF testing and other policies.
|
||||
|
||||
Configure internal_domains with domains used by your internal SMTP clients.
|
||||
If they attempt to use any other domain, the attempt is blocked and the
|
||||
client is logged as a "zombie". Conversely, any attempt by an external
|
||||
MTA to use one of your internal domains is treated as a forgery and
|
||||
blocked (a simplified form of local SPF).
|
||||
|
||||
Adjust porn_words and spam_words - these block emails with a Subject
|
||||
containing the listed strings. They can be empty to disable Subject
|
||||
string blocking.
|
||||
|
||||
Advanced SPF configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
The sendmail access file, or another readonly database with that
|
||||
format, can be used for detail spf policy. SPF access policy
|
||||
record are tagged with "SPF-{Result}:". Results are
|
||||
Pass, Neutral, Softfail, Fail, PermError. Currently supported
|
||||
policy keywords are OK, CBV, REJECT. Currently, TempError always
|
||||
results in TEMPFAIL.
|
||||
|
||||
The default policies are set in pymilter.cfg. The defaults
|
||||
if none of the config options are set are as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
SPF-Fail: REJECT
|
||||
SPF-Softfail: CBV
|
||||
SPF-Neutral: OK
|
||||
SPF-PermError: REJECT
|
||||
SPF-Pass: OK
|
||||
|
||||
The tag may be followed by a specific domain. For instance, to
|
||||
require a Pass from aol.com:
|
||||
|
||||
SPF-Neutral:aol.com REJECT
|
||||
SPF-Softfail:aol.com REJECT
|
||||
|
||||
The CBV policy requires a valid HELO name. If the EHLO name is
|
||||
RFC2822 compliant, then a DSN is sent to the alleged sender. The
|
||||
template for the DSN is selected according to the SPF result:
|
||||
|
||||
Fail: softfail.txt
|
||||
SoftFail: softfail.txt
|
||||
Neutral: neutral.txt
|
||||
PermError: permerror.txt
|
||||
None: strike3.txt
|
||||
|
||||
An SPF-Pass is always accepted by the milter. Domains can be blacklisted
|
||||
via sendmail in the access file or via a RHS DNS blacklist.
|
||||
|
||||
To be continued.
|
||||
|
||||
Forthcoming topics:
|
||||
|
||||
SRS config
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
pydspam config
|
||||
wiretap config
|
||||
+5
-2
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
||||
include COPYING
|
||||
include TODO
|
||||
include NEWS
|
||||
include HOWTO
|
||||
include CREDITS
|
||||
include README
|
||||
include MANIFEST.in
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +10,7 @@ include testmime.py
|
||||
include testbms.py
|
||||
include testdspam.py
|
||||
include rejects.py
|
||||
include report.py
|
||||
include bms.py
|
||||
include spf.py
|
||||
include cid2spf.py
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +18,7 @@ include spfquery.py
|
||||
include test.py
|
||||
include sample.py
|
||||
include test/*
|
||||
include doc/*
|
||||
include Milter/*.py
|
||||
include *.spec
|
||||
include start.sh
|
||||
@@ -23,5 +26,5 @@ include milter.rc
|
||||
include milter.rc7
|
||||
include milter.cfg
|
||||
include rhsbl.m4
|
||||
include softfail.txt
|
||||
include strike3.txt
|
||||
include *.txt
|
||||
include *.html
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
|
||||
|
||||
# Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
|
||||
# Copyright 2001 Business Management Systems, Inc.
|
||||
# This code is under GPL. See COPYING for details.
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import milter
|
||||
import thread
|
||||
|
||||
from milter import ACCEPT,CONTINUE,REJECT,DISCARD,TEMPFAIL, \
|
||||
set_flags, setdbg, setbacklog, settimeout, \
|
||||
ADDHDRS, CHGBODY, ADDRCPT, DELRCPT, CHGHDRS, \
|
||||
V1_ACTS, V2_ACTS, CURR_ACTS
|
||||
|
||||
try: from milter import QUARANTINE
|
||||
except: pass
|
||||
|
||||
_seq_lock = thread.allocate_lock()
|
||||
_seq = 0
|
||||
|
||||
def uniqueID():
|
||||
"""Return a sequence number unique to this process.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _seq
|
||||
_seq_lock.acquire()
|
||||
seqno = _seq = _seq + 1
|
||||
_seq_lock.release()
|
||||
return seqno
|
||||
|
||||
class Milter:
|
||||
"""A simple class interface to the milter module.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
def _setctx(self,ctx):
|
||||
self.__ctx = ctx
|
||||
if ctx:
|
||||
ctx.setpriv(self)
|
||||
|
||||
# user replaceable callbacks
|
||||
def log(self,*msg):
|
||||
print 'Milter:',
|
||||
for i in msg: print i,
|
||||
print
|
||||
|
||||
def connect(self,hostname,unused,hostaddr):
|
||||
"Called for each connection to sendmail."
|
||||
self.log("connect from %s at %s" % (hostname,hostaddr))
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def hello(self,hostname):
|
||||
"Called after the HELO command."
|
||||
self.log("hello from %s" % hostname)
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def envfrom(self,f,*str):
|
||||
"""Called to begin each message.
|
||||
f -> string message sender
|
||||
str -> tuple additional ESMTP parameters
|
||||
"""
|
||||
self.log("mail from",f,str)
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def envrcpt(self,to,*str):
|
||||
"Called for each message recipient."
|
||||
self.log("rcpt to",to,str)
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def header(self,field,value):
|
||||
"Called for each message header."
|
||||
self.log("%s: %s" % (field,value))
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def eoh(self):
|
||||
"Called after all headers are processed."
|
||||
self.log("eoh")
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def body(self,unused):
|
||||
"Called to transfer the message body."
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def eom(self):
|
||||
"Called at the end of message."
|
||||
self.log("eom")
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def abort(self):
|
||||
"Called if the connection is terminated abnormally."
|
||||
self.log("abort")
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
def close(self):
|
||||
"Called at the end of connection, even if aborted."
|
||||
self.log("close")
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
|
||||
# Milter methods which can be invoked from callbacks
|
||||
def getsymval(self,sym):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.getsymval(sym)
|
||||
|
||||
# If sendmail does not support setmlreply, then only the
|
||||
# first msg line is used.
|
||||
def setreply(self,rcode,xcode=None,msg=None,*ml):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.setreply(rcode,xcode,msg,*ml)
|
||||
|
||||
# Milter methods which can only be called from eom callback.
|
||||
def addheader(self,field,value):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value)
|
||||
|
||||
def chgheader(self,field,idx,value):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.chgheader(field,idx,value)
|
||||
|
||||
def addrcpt(self,rcpt):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.addrcpt(rcpt)
|
||||
|
||||
def delrcpt(self,rcpt):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.delrcpt(rcpt)
|
||||
|
||||
def replacebody(self,body):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.replacebody(body)
|
||||
|
||||
# When quarantined, a message goes into the mailq as if to be delivered,
|
||||
# but delivery is deferred until the message is unquarantined.
|
||||
def quarantine(self,reason):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.quarantine(reason)
|
||||
|
||||
def progress(self):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.progress()
|
||||
|
||||
factory = Milter
|
||||
|
||||
def connectcallback(ctx,hostname,family,hostaddr):
|
||||
m = factory()
|
||||
m._setctx(ctx)
|
||||
return m.connect(hostname,family,hostaddr)
|
||||
|
||||
def closecallback(ctx):
|
||||
m = ctx.getpriv()
|
||||
if not m: return CONTINUE
|
||||
rc = m.close()
|
||||
m._setctx(None) # release milterContext
|
||||
return rc
|
||||
|
||||
def envcallback(c,args):
|
||||
"""Convert ESMTP parms to keyword parameters.
|
||||
Can be used in the envfrom and/or envrcpt callbacks to process
|
||||
ESMTP parameters as python keyword parameters."""
|
||||
kw = {}
|
||||
for s in args[1:]:
|
||||
pos = s.find('=')
|
||||
if pos > 0:
|
||||
kw[s[:pos]] = s[pos+1:]
|
||||
return apply(c,args,kw)
|
||||
|
||||
def runmilter(name,socketname,timeout = 0):
|
||||
# This bit is here on the assumption that you will be starting this filter
|
||||
# before sendmail. If sendmail is not running and the socket already exists,
|
||||
# libmilter will throw a warning. If sendmail is running, this is still
|
||||
# safe if there are no messages currently being processed. It's safer to
|
||||
# shutdown sendmail, kill the filter process, restart the filter, and then
|
||||
# restart sendmail.
|
||||
pos = socketname.find(':')
|
||||
if pos > 1:
|
||||
s = socketname[:pos]
|
||||
fname = socketname[pos+1:]
|
||||
else:
|
||||
s = "unix"
|
||||
fname = socketname
|
||||
if s == "unix" or s == "local":
|
||||
print "Removing %s" % fname
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.unlink(fname)
|
||||
except:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
# The default flags set include everything
|
||||
# milter.set_flags(milter.ADDHDRS)
|
||||
milter.set_connect_callback(connectcallback)
|
||||
milter.set_helo_callback(lambda ctx, host: ctx.getpriv().hello(host))
|
||||
milter.set_envfrom_callback(lambda ctx,*str:
|
||||
ctx.getpriv().envfrom(*str))
|
||||
# envcallback(ctx.getpriv().envfrom,str))
|
||||
milter.set_envrcpt_callback(lambda ctx,*str:
|
||||
ctx.getpriv().envrcpt(*str))
|
||||
# envcallback(ctx.getpriv().envrcpt,str))
|
||||
milter.set_header_callback(lambda ctx,fld,val:
|
||||
ctx.getpriv().header(fld,val))
|
||||
milter.set_eoh_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().eoh())
|
||||
milter.set_body_callback(lambda ctx,chunk: ctx.getpriv().body(chunk))
|
||||
milter.set_eom_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().eom())
|
||||
milter.set_abort_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().abort())
|
||||
milter.set_close_callback(closecallback)
|
||||
|
||||
milter.setconn(socketname)
|
||||
if timeout > 0: milter.settimeout(timeout)
|
||||
# The name *must* match the X line in sendmail.cf (supposedly)
|
||||
milter.register(name)
|
||||
start_seq = _seq
|
||||
try:
|
||||
milter.main()
|
||||
except milter.error:
|
||||
if start_seq == _seq: raise # couldn't start
|
||||
# milter has been running for a while, but now it can't start new threads
|
||||
raise milter.error("out of thread resources")
|
||||
+6
-4
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ from milter import ACCEPT,CONTINUE,REJECT,DISCARD,TEMPFAIL, \
|
||||
try: from milter import QUARANTINE
|
||||
except: pass
|
||||
|
||||
__version__ = '0.8.5'
|
||||
|
||||
_seq_lock = thread.allocate_lock()
|
||||
_seq = 0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@ class Milter:
|
||||
for i in msg: print i,
|
||||
print
|
||||
|
||||
def connect(self,hostname,unused,hostaddr):
|
||||
def connect(self,hostname,family,hostaddr):
|
||||
"Called for each connection to sendmail."
|
||||
self.log("connect from %s at %s" % (hostname,hostaddr))
|
||||
return CONTINUE
|
||||
@@ -104,8 +106,8 @@ class Milter:
|
||||
return self.__ctx.setreply(rcode,xcode,msg,*ml)
|
||||
|
||||
# Milter methods which can only be called from eom callback.
|
||||
def addheader(self,field,value):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value)
|
||||
def addheader(self,field,value,idx=-1):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value,idx)
|
||||
|
||||
def chgheader(self,field,idx,value):
|
||||
return self.__ctx.chgheader(field,idx,value)
|
||||
@@ -215,6 +217,6 @@ def runmilter(name,socketname,timeout = 0):
|
||||
raise milter.error("out of thread resources")
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = globals().copy()
|
||||
for priv in ('os','milter','thread','factory','_seq','_seq_lock'):
|
||||
for priv in ('os','milter','thread','factory','_seq','_seq_lock','__version__'):
|
||||
del __all__[priv]
|
||||
__all__ = __all__.keys()
|
||||
|
||||
+14
-7
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import smtplib
|
||||
import spf
|
||||
import socket
|
||||
from email.Message import Message
|
||||
import Milter
|
||||
|
||||
nospf_msg = """Subject: Critical mail server configuration error
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None):
|
||||
q = spf.query(None,None,None)
|
||||
mxlist = q.dns(domain,'MX')
|
||||
if not mxlist:
|
||||
mxlist = (0,domain),
|
||||
mxlist = (0,domain), # fallback to A record when no MX
|
||||
else:
|
||||
mxlist.sort()
|
||||
smtp = smtplib.SMTP()
|
||||
@@ -112,8 +113,11 @@ def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None):
|
||||
smtp.connect(host)
|
||||
code,resp = smtp.helo(receiver)
|
||||
# some wiley spammers have MX records that resolve to 127.0.0.1
|
||||
if resp.split()[0] == receiver:
|
||||
return (553,'Fraudulent MX for %s' % domain)
|
||||
a = resp.split()
|
||||
if not a:
|
||||
return (553,'MX for %s has no hostname in banner: %s' % (domain,host))
|
||||
if a[0] == receiver:
|
||||
return (553,'Fraudulent MX for %s: %s' % (domain,host))
|
||||
if not (200 <= code <= 299):
|
||||
raise smtplib.SMTPHeloError(code, resp)
|
||||
if msg:
|
||||
@@ -151,13 +155,13 @@ def create_msg(q,rcptlist,origmsg=None,template=None):
|
||||
connectip = q.i
|
||||
receiver = q.r
|
||||
sender_domain = q.o
|
||||
result = q.result
|
||||
perm_error = q.perm_error
|
||||
rcpt = '\n\t'.join(rcptlist)
|
||||
try: subject = origmsg['Subject']
|
||||
except: subject = '(none)'
|
||||
try:
|
||||
spf_result = origmsg['Received-SPF']
|
||||
if not spf_result.startswith('softfail'):
|
||||
spf_result = None
|
||||
except: spf_result = None
|
||||
|
||||
msg = Message()
|
||||
@@ -165,11 +169,14 @@ def create_msg(q,rcptlist,origmsg=None,template=None):
|
||||
msg.add_header('To',sender)
|
||||
msg.add_header('From','postmaster@%s'%receiver)
|
||||
msg.add_header('Auto-Submitted','auto-generated (configuration error)')
|
||||
msg.add_header('X-Mailer','PyMilter-'+Milter.__version__)
|
||||
msg.set_type('text/plain')
|
||||
|
||||
if not template:
|
||||
if spf_result: template = softfail_msg
|
||||
else: template = nospf_msg
|
||||
if spf_result and spf_result.startswith('softfail'):
|
||||
template = softfail_msg
|
||||
else:
|
||||
template = nospf_msg
|
||||
hdrs,body = template.split('\n',1)
|
||||
for ln in hdrs.splitlines():
|
||||
name,val = ln.split(':',1)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,28 @@
|
||||
Here is a history of user visible changes to Python milter.
|
||||
|
||||
0.8.5 Simple trusted_forwarder implementation.
|
||||
Fix access_file neutral policy
|
||||
Move Received-SPF header to beginning of headers
|
||||
Supply keyword info for all results in Received-SPF header.
|
||||
Move guessed SPF result to separate header
|
||||
Activate smfi_insheader only when SMFIR_INSHEADER defined
|
||||
Handle NULL MX in spf.py
|
||||
in-process GOSSiP server support (to be extended later)
|
||||
Expire CBV cache and renew auto-whitelist entries
|
||||
0.8.4 Auto-whitelist recipients of outgoing email.
|
||||
Fix SPF policy via sendmail access map (case insensitive keys).
|
||||
Train screener on whitelisted messages
|
||||
Optional idx parameter to addheader to invoke smfi_insheader
|
||||
Activate progress API when SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
|
||||
0.8.3 Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
|
||||
spf_accept_fail option for braindead SPF senders
|
||||
(treats fail like softfail)
|
||||
Option to set SPF policy via sendmail access map.
|
||||
Option to supply Sender header from MAIL FROM when missing.
|
||||
Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
|
||||
Send DSN for SPF errors corrected by extended processing.
|
||||
Send DSN before SCREENED mail is quarantined
|
||||
Use logging package to keep log lines atomic.
|
||||
0.8.2 Strict processing limits per SPF RFC
|
||||
Fixed several parsing bugs under RFC
|
||||
Support official IANA SPF record (type99)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,54 +1,46 @@
|
||||
Require signed MFROM for all incoming bounces when signing all outgoing mail -
|
||||
except from trusted relays.
|
||||
|
||||
Send DSN for permerror before processing extended result. An additional
|
||||
DSN may be sent based on extended result.
|
||||
|
||||
Rescind whitelist for banned extensions, in case sender is infected.
|
||||
|
||||
Train honeypot on error only.
|
||||
|
||||
Find rfc2822 policy for MFROM quoting.
|
||||
|
||||
Support explicit errors for SPF policy in access file:
|
||||
SPF-Neutral:aol.com ERROR:"550 AOL mail must get SPF PASS"
|
||||
|
||||
Defer TEMPERROR in SPF evaluation - give precedence to security
|
||||
(only defer for PASS mechanisms).
|
||||
|
||||
Option to add Received-SPF header, but never reject on SPF.
|
||||
I think the above will handle this.
|
||||
|
||||
Create null config that does nothing - except maybe add Received-SPF
|
||||
headers. Many admins would like to turn features on one at a time.
|
||||
|
||||
Checking in mime.py;
|
||||
/bms/cvs/milter/mime.py,v <-- mime.py
|
||||
new revision: 1.56; previous revision: 1.55
|
||||
done
|
||||
Checking in spf.py;
|
||||
/bms/cvs/milter/spf.py,v <-- spf.py
|
||||
new revision: 1.18; previous revision: 1.17
|
||||
done
|
||||
Checking in testmime.py;
|
||||
/bms/cvs/milter/testmime.py,v <-- testmime.py
|
||||
new revision: 1.19; previous revision: 1.18
|
||||
|
||||
Auto whitelist based on outgoing email - perhaps with magic subject
|
||||
or recipient prefix.
|
||||
|
||||
Can't output messages with malformed rfc822 attachments.
|
||||
|
||||
Example malformed SPF:
|
||||
onvunvuvvx.usafisnews.org text "v=spf1 mx ptr ip4:207.44.199.970 -all"
|
||||
|
||||
Move milter,Milter,mime,spf modules to pymilter
|
||||
milter package will have bms.py application
|
||||
|
||||
Support SMTP AUTH and disable SPF checks when connection is authorized.
|
||||
Web admin interface
|
||||
Check valid domains allowed by internal senders to detect PCs infected
|
||||
with spam trojans.
|
||||
Do CBV (callback verification) for mail with no published SPF record.
|
||||
message log for automated stats and blacklisting
|
||||
Skip dspam when SPF pass?
|
||||
Skip dspam when SPF pass? NO
|
||||
Report 551 with rcpt on SPF fail?
|
||||
check spam keywords with character classes, e.g.
|
||||
{a}=[a@ãä], {i}=[i1í], {e}=[eë], {o}=[o0ö]
|
||||
|
||||
Implement RRS - a backdoor for non-SRS forwarders. User lists non-SRS
|
||||
forwarder accounts, and a util provides a special local alias for the
|
||||
user to give to the forwarder. Alias only works for mail from that
|
||||
user to give to the forwarder. (Or user just adds arbitrary alias
|
||||
unique to that forwarder to a database.) Alias only works for mail from that
|
||||
forwarder. Milter gets forwarder domain from alias and uses it to
|
||||
SPF check forwarder.
|
||||
|
||||
Another special dspam user, 'honeypot', can be listed in innoculations.
|
||||
All email to those addresses is treated as known spam.
|
||||
|
||||
Framework for modular Python milter components within a single VM.
|
||||
Python milters can be already be composed through sendmail by running each in
|
||||
a separate process. However, a significant amount of memory is wasted
|
||||
@@ -57,8 +49,7 @@ is cumbersome (e.g., adding mail headers, writing external files).
|
||||
|
||||
Backup copies for outgoing/incoming mail.
|
||||
|
||||
Allow multiple wiretap groups, each with its own destination. Perhaps
|
||||
also copy incoming wiretap mail, even though sendmail alias works perfectly
|
||||
Copy incoming wiretap mail, even though sendmail alias works perfectly
|
||||
for the purpose, to avoid having to change two configs for a wiretap.
|
||||
|
||||
Provide a way to reload milter.cfg without stopping/restarting milter.
|
||||
@@ -72,10 +63,6 @@ Keep separate ismodified flag for headers and body. This is important
|
||||
when rejecting outgoing mail with viruses removed (so as not to
|
||||
embarrass yourself), and also removing Received headers with hidepath.
|
||||
|
||||
Wrap smfi_setbacklog(int) - but it is only available in sendmail >= 8.12.3,
|
||||
so how can we detect whether to wrap it?
|
||||
|
||||
Need a test module to feed sample messages to a milter though a live
|
||||
sendmail and SMTP. The mockup currently used is probably not very accurate,
|
||||
and doesn't test the threading code.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 32 KiB |
BIN
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 1.6 KiB |
+173
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
|
||||
Title: Recent Changes
|
||||
|
||||
<h2> Recent Changes </h2>
|
||||
|
||||
Python milter has been moved to
|
||||
<a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/pymilter/">pymilter Sourceforge
|
||||
project</a> for development and release downloads.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> 0.8.5 </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
Release 0.8.5 fixes some build bugs reported by Stephen Figgins. It
|
||||
fixes many small things, like not auto-whitelisting recipients of
|
||||
outgoing mail when the subject contains "autoreply:". There is a
|
||||
simple trusted forwarder implementation. If you have more than
|
||||
2 or so forwarders, we will need a way to "compile" SPF records into an
|
||||
IP set and TTL for it to be efficient (like libspf2 does).
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> GOSSiP </h3>
|
||||
An alpha release of <a href="pygossip.html">pygossip</a> has been commited to
|
||||
CVS, module pygossip. A version of the bms.py milter has been commited to CVS
|
||||
which supports calling GOSSiP to track domain reputation in a local database.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> New website design </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
Hey, I'm no artist, so I just used the
|
||||
<a href="http://ht2html.sourceforge.net/">ht2html</a> package
|
||||
by <a href="http://barry.wooz.org/">Barry Warsaw</a>. The mascot
|
||||
is by <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/lebl.htm">Christian Hafner</a>,
|
||||
or maybe his wife. I chose Maxwell's daemon because it tirelessly
|
||||
and invisibly sorts molecules, just as milters sort mail.
|
||||
Christian has also provided a fun
|
||||
<a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/PPS/PPS2002/Maxwell/simulation.htm">
|
||||
simulation</a> that lets you try your hand at sorting molecules.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> 0.8.4 </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
Release 0.8.4 makes configuring SPF policy via access.db actually work.
|
||||
The honeypot idea is enhanced by auto-whitelisting recipients of
|
||||
email sent from selected domains. Whitelisted messages are then used
|
||||
to train the honeypot. This makes the honeypot screener entirely self
|
||||
training. The smfi_progress() API is now automatically supported when present.
|
||||
An optional idx parameter to milter.addheader() invokes smfi_insheader().
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> 0.8.3 </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
Release 0.8.3 uses the standard logging module, and supports configuring
|
||||
more detailed SPF policy via the sendmail access map. SMTP AUTH connections
|
||||
are considered INTERNAL. Preventing forgery between internal domains is
|
||||
just a matter of specifying the user-domain map - I'll define something
|
||||
for the next version. We now send DSNs when mail is quarantined (rejecting
|
||||
if DSN fails) and for SPF syntax errors (PermError). There is an
|
||||
experimental option to add a Sender header when it is missing and the From
|
||||
domain doesn't match the MAIL FROM domain. Next release, we may start
|
||||
renaming and replacing an existing Sender header when neither it nor the
|
||||
From domain matches MAIL FROM. Since bogus MAIL FROMs are rejected
|
||||
(to varying degrees depending on the configured SPF policy), and
|
||||
both Sender and From and displayed by default in many email clients,
|
||||
this provides some phishing protection without rejecting mail based
|
||||
on headers.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> 0.8.2 </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
Release 0.8.2 has changes to <a href="http://openspf.net">SPF</a> to bring it
|
||||
in line with the newly official RFC. It adds
|
||||
<a href="http://ses.codeshare.ca/">SES</a>
|
||||
support (the original SES without body hash) for pysrs-0.30.10, and honeypot
|
||||
support for pydspam-1.1.9. There is a new method in the base milter module.
|
||||
milter.set_exception_policy(i) lets you choose a policy of CONTINUE, REJECT, or
|
||||
TEMPFAIL (default) for untrapped exceptions encountered in a milter callback.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> 0.8.0 </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
Release 0.8.0 is the first <a href="http://sourceforge.net/">Sourceforge</a>
|
||||
release. It supports Python-2.4, and provides an option to accept mail
|
||||
that gets an SPF softfail or fails the 3 strikes rule, provided the
|
||||
alleged sender accepts a DSN explaining the problem. Python-2.3 is
|
||||
no longer supported by the reworked mime.py module, although API changes
|
||||
could be backported. There are too many incompatible changes to the
|
||||
python email package.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> Older Releases </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
Release 0.7.2 tightens the authentication screws with a "3 strikes and
|
||||
you're out" policy. A sender must have a valid PTR, HELO, or SPF record
|
||||
to send email. Specific senders can be whitelisted using the
|
||||
"delegate" option in the spf configuration section by adding a
|
||||
default SPF record for them. The PTR and HELO are required
|
||||
by RFC anyway, so this is not an unreasonable requirement.
|
||||
There is now a coherent policy for an SPF softfail result. A softfail
|
||||
is accepted if there is a valid PTR or HELO, or if the domain
|
||||
is listed in the "accept_softfail" option of the spf configuration section.
|
||||
A neutral result is accepted by default if there is a valid PTR or
|
||||
HELO, (and the SPF record was not guessed), unless the domain is listed in the
|
||||
"reject_neutral" option. Common forms of PTR records for dynamic IPs are
|
||||
recognized, and do not count as a valid PTR. This does not prevent anyone
|
||||
from sending mail from a dynamic IP - they just need to configure a
|
||||
valid HELO name or publish an SPF record.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
As SPF adoption continues to rise, forged spam is not getting through. So
|
||||
spammers are publishing their SPF records as predicted. The 0.7.2 RPM
|
||||
now provides the <code>rhsbl</code> sendmail hack so that spammer domains
|
||||
can be blacklisted. With the RPM installed, add a line like the following
|
||||
to your <code>sendmail.mc</code>.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
HACK(rhsbl,`blackholes.example.com',"550 Rejected: " $&{RHS} " has been spamming our customers.")dnl
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Of course, spammers are now starting to register
|
||||
throwaway domains. The next thing we need is a custom DNS server,
|
||||
in Python, that
|
||||
can recognize patterns. For instance, one spammer registers ded304.com,
|
||||
ded305.com, ded306.com, etc. We also need the custom DNS server to
|
||||
let SPF classic clients check SES (which will be part of pysrs).
|
||||
The <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/products/twisted">Twisted Python</a>
|
||||
framework provides a custom DNS server - but I
|
||||
would like a smaller implementation for our use.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
The RPM for release 0.7.0 moves the config file and socket locations to
|
||||
/etc/mail and /var/run/milter respectively. We now parse Microsoft CID records
|
||||
- but only hotmail.com uses them. They seem to have applied for a patent on
|
||||
the brilliant idea of examining the mail headers to see who the message is
|
||||
from. We aren't doing that here, so not to worry - but I am not a lawyer, so
|
||||
if you are worried, change spf.py around line 626 to return None instead of
|
||||
calling CIDParser(). There is a new option to reject mail with no PTR
|
||||
and no SPF.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Microsoft is pushing an anti-opensource license for their pending patent
|
||||
along with their sender-ID proposal before the IETF.
|
||||
It is royalty free - but requires anyone distributing a binary they've
|
||||
compiled from source to sign a license agreement. The Apache Software
|
||||
Foundation <a
|
||||
href="http://www.apache.org/foundation/docs/sender-id-position.html"> explains
|
||||
the problem with sender-ID</a>, and Debian <a
|
||||
href="http://www.debian.org/News/2004/20040904">concurs</a>. Since
|
||||
the <a href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/3/9/439b024b-09fd-44ee-8ff0-10e834004c36/senderid_FAQ.PDF">Microsoft license</a> is
|
||||
<a href="http://www.circleid.com/article/732_0_1_0_C/">incompatible with free
|
||||
software in general</a> and the <a
|
||||
href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-mxcomp/mail-archive/msg03678.html">GPL in
|
||||
particular</a>, Python milter will not be able to implement sender-ID in its
|
||||
current form. This was, no doubt, Microsoft's intent all along.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Sender-ID attempts to do for RFC2822 headers what SPF does for RFC2821 headers.
|
||||
Unlike SPF, it has never been tried, and is encumbered by a stupid patent. I
|
||||
recommend ignoring it and continuing to implement and improve SPF until a
|
||||
working and unencumbered proposal for RFC2822 headers surfaces.
|
||||
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
<a href="http://openspf.com">
|
||||
<img src="SPF.gif" align=left alt="SPF logo"></a>
|
||||
Release 0.6.6 adds support for <a href="http://openspf.com/">SPF</a>,
|
||||
a protocol to prevent forging of the envelope from address.
|
||||
SPF support requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">pydns</a>.
|
||||
The included spf.py module is an updated version of the original 1.6
|
||||
version at <a href="http://www.wayforward.net/spf/">wayforward.net</a>.
|
||||
The updated version tracks the draft RFC and test suite.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
The FAQ addresses <a href="faq.html#spf">how to get started with SPF</a>.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Release 0.6.1 adds a full milter based dspam application.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
I have selected the <a href="http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/">
|
||||
dspam bayes filter project</a> and <a href="dspam.html">
|
||||
packaged it for python</a>.
|
||||
Release 0.6.0 offers a simple application of dspam I call "header triage",
|
||||
which rejects messages with spammy headers.
|
||||
To use header triage, you must have <a href="dspam.html">DSPAM</a> installed,
|
||||
and select a dictionary that is well moderated by someone who gets
|
||||
lots of spam. That dictionary can be used to block spam that is
|
||||
obvious from the headers (e.g. X-Mailer and Subject) before it ties
|
||||
up any more resources. I have yet to see any false positives from this
|
||||
approach (check the milter log), but if there are, the sender will
|
||||
get a REJECT with the message "Your message looks spammy."
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
Title: Credits
|
||||
|
||||
<h1> CREDITS </h1>
|
||||
|
||||
<a href="mailto:Jim Niemira <urmane@urmane.org>">Jim Niemira</a>
|
||||
wrote the original C module and some quick
|
||||
and dirty python to use it.
|
||||
<a href="mailto:Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>">Stuart D. Gathman</a>
|
||||
took that kludge and added threading and context objects to it, wrote a proper
|
||||
OO wrapper (Milter.py) that handles attachments, did lots of testing, packaged
|
||||
it with distutils, and generally transformed it from a quick hack to a
|
||||
real, usable Python extension.
|
||||
|
||||
<h2>Other contributors (in random order):</h2>
|
||||
|
||||
<dl>
|
||||
<dt> <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/lebl.htm">Christian Hafner</a>
|
||||
<dd>for the pymilter mascot image of
|
||||
<a href="http://maxwelld.netfirms.com/">
|
||||
Maxwell's daemon</a>
|
||||
<dt>Stephen Figgins
|
||||
<dd>for reporting problems building with sendmail-8.12, and when
|
||||
building milter.so for the first time.
|
||||
<dt>Dave MacQuigg
|
||||
<dd>for noticing that smfi_insheader wasn't supported, and creating
|
||||
a template to help first time pymilter users create their own milter.
|
||||
<dt>Terence Way
|
||||
<dd>for providing a Python port of SPF
|
||||
<dt>Scott Kitterman
|
||||
<dd>for doing lots of testing and debugging of SPF against draft standard,
|
||||
and for putting up a <a href="http://www.kitterman.com/spf/validate.html">
|
||||
web page that validates SPF</a> records using spf.py
|
||||
<dt>Alexander Kourakos
|
||||
<dd>for plugging several memory leaks
|
||||
<dt>George Graf at Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration
|
||||
<dd>for handling None passed to setreply and chgheader.
|
||||
<dt>Deron Meranda
|
||||
<dd>for IPv6 patches
|
||||
<dt>Jason Erikson
|
||||
<dd>for handling NULL hostaddr in connect callback.
|
||||
<dt>John Draper
|
||||
<dd>for porting Python milter to OpenBSD, and starting to work on tutorials
|
||||
then pointing out that it would be easier to just write the MTA in Python.
|
||||
<dt>Eric S. Johansson
|
||||
<dd>for helpful design discussions while working on camram
|
||||
<dt>Alex Savguira
|
||||
<dd>for finding bugs with international headers and
|
||||
suggesting the scan_zip option.
|
||||
<dt><a href="http://www.bmsi.com">Business Management Systems</a>
|
||||
<dd>for hosting the website, and providing paying clients who need milter
|
||||
service so I can work on it as part of my day job.
|
||||
</dl>
|
||||
|
||||
If I have left anybody out, send me a reminder:
|
||||
<a href="mailto:Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>">stuart@bmsi.com</a>
|
||||
+14
-13
@@ -1,8 +1,4 @@
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">
|
||||
<html>
|
||||
<head>
|
||||
<title>Python Milter FAQ</title>
|
||||
</head><body>
|
||||
Title: Python Milter FAQ
|
||||
|
||||
<h1> Python Milter <a name=faq>FAQ</a> </h1>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +18,7 @@ shows you how to install libmilter with a separate invocation of make.
|
||||
<li> Q. Why is mfapi.h not found when I try to compile Python milter on
|
||||
RedHat 7.2?
|
||||
<p> A. RedHat forgot to include the header in the RPM. See the
|
||||
<a href="milter.html#rh72">RedHat 7.2 requirements</a>.
|
||||
<a href="requirements.html#rh72">RedHat 7.2 requirements</a>.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> Running Python Milter </h3>
|
||||
@@ -103,13 +99,14 @@ If you are running bms.py, then the block_chinese option in
|
||||
|
||||
<li> Q. Why does sendmail coredump with milters on OpenBSD?
|
||||
<p> A. Sendmail has a problem with unix sockets on old versions of OpenBSD.
|
||||
Use an internet domain socket instead. For example, in
|
||||
OpenBSD users report that this problem has been fixed, so upgrading
|
||||
OpenBSD will fix this. Otherwise, you can
|
||||
use an internet domain socket instead. For example, in
|
||||
<code>sendmail.cf</code> use
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
Xpythonfilter, S=inet:1234@localhost
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
and change sample.py accordingly.
|
||||
<p> OpenBSD users report that this problem has been fixed.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
|
||||
<li> Q. How can I change the bounce message for an invalid recipient?
|
||||
@@ -143,10 +140,15 @@ Xpythonfilter, S=local:/var/log/milter/pythonsock, F=T, T=C:5m;S:20s;R:60s;E:5m
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<li> Q. There is a Python traceback in the log file! What happened to
|
||||
my email?
|
||||
<p> A. When the milter fails with an untrapped exception, a TEMPFAIL
|
||||
result (451) is returned to the sender. The sender will then retry every
|
||||
hour or so for several days. Hopefully, someone will notice the
|
||||
traceback, and workaround or fix the problem.
|
||||
<p> A. By default, when the milter fails with an untrapped exception, a
|
||||
TEMPFAIL result (451) is returned to the sender. The sender will then retry
|
||||
every hour or so for several days. Hopefully, someone will notice the
|
||||
traceback, and workaround or fix the problem. Beginning with milter-0.8.2,
|
||||
you can call <code>milter.set_exception_policy(milter.CONTINUE)</code>
|
||||
to cause an untrapped exception to continue processing with the
|
||||
next callback or milter instead. For
|
||||
completeness, you can also set the exception policy to
|
||||
<code>milter.REJECT</code>.
|
||||
|
||||
<li> Q. I read some notes such as "Check valid domains allowed by internal
|
||||
senders to detect PCs infected with spam trojans." but could not
|
||||
@@ -194,4 +196,3 @@ everything up for you. For other systems:
|
||||
</ol>
|
||||
|
||||
</ol>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
Title: Python Milter Log Documentation
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
DT { font-weight: bolder; padding-top: 1em }
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
|
||||
<h1> Milter Log Documentation </h1>
|
||||
|
||||
The milter log from the bms.py application has a variety of "tags" in it that
|
||||
indicate what it did.
|
||||
|
||||
<dl>
|
||||
<dt> DSPAM: honeypot SCREENED
|
||||
<dd> message was quarantined to the honeypot quarantine
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: hello SPF: fail 550 access denied
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: hello SPF: softfail 550 domain in transition
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: hello SPF: neutral 550 access neither permitted nor denied
|
||||
<dd> message was rejected because there was an SPF policy for the
|
||||
HELO name, and it did not pass.
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> CBV: sender-17-44662668-643@bluepenmagic.com
|
||||
<dd> we performed a call back verification
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> dspam
|
||||
<dd> dspam identifier was added to the message
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: spam from self: jsconnor.com
|
||||
<dd> message was reject because HELO was us (jsconnor.com)
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> INNOC: richh
|
||||
<dd> message was used to update richh's dspam dictionary
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> HONEYPOT: michaelb@jsconnor.com
|
||||
<dd> message was sent to a honeypot address (michaelb@jsconnor.com), the
|
||||
message was added to the honeypot dspam dictionary as spam
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: numeric hello name: 63.217.19.146
|
||||
<dd> message was rejected because helo name was invalid (numeric)
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> eom
|
||||
<dd> message was successfully received
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> TEMPFAIL: CBV: 450 No MX servers available
|
||||
<dd> we tried to do a call back verification but could not look up
|
||||
MX record, we told the sender to try again later
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> CBV: info@emailpizzahut.com (cached)
|
||||
<dd> call back verification was needed, we had already done it recently
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> abort after 0 body chars
|
||||
<dd> sender hung up on us
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: SPF fail 550 SPF fail: see
|
||||
http://openspf.com/why.html?sender=m.hendersonxk@163.net&ip=213.47.161.100
|
||||
<dd> message was reject because its sender's spf policy said to
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: Subject: Cialis - No prescription needed!
|
||||
<dd> message was rejected because its subject contained a bad expression
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> DSPAM: tonyc tonyc@jsconnor.com
|
||||
<dd> message was sent to tonyc@jsconnor.com and it was identified as spam
|
||||
and placed in the tonyc dspam quarantine
|
||||
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: CBV: 550 calvinalstonis@ix.netcom.com...User unknown
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: CBV: 553 sorry, that domain isn't in my list
|
||||
<dt> REJECT: CBV: 554 delivery error: dd This user doesn't have an account
|
||||
<dd> message was rejected because call back verification gave us a fatal
|
||||
error
|
||||
</dl>
|
||||
|
||||
Please add more tags to this list if you know of any. Thanks.
|
||||
+56
-251
@@ -1,33 +1,29 @@
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">
|
||||
<html>
|
||||
<head>
|
||||
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
|
||||
<title>Python Milters</title>
|
||||
</head><body>
|
||||
Title: Python Milters
|
||||
|
||||
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><A HREF="http://www.anybrowser.org/campaign/">
|
||||
<IMG SRC="/art/brain1.gif"
|
||||
<IMG SRC="http://bmsi.com/art/brain1.gif"
|
||||
ALT="Viewable With Any Browser" BORDER="0"></A>
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="/art/banner_4.gif" width="468" height="60" border="0"
|
||||
<img src="http://bmsi.com/art/banner_4.gif" width="468" height="60" border="0"
|
||||
usemap="#banner_4" alt="Your vote?">
|
||||
<map name="banner_4">
|
||||
<area shape="rect" coords="330,25,426,59"
|
||||
href="http://education-survey.org/" alt="I Disagree">
|
||||
<area shape="rect" coords="234,28,304,57" href="http://www.honestEd.com/" alt="I Agree">
|
||||
</map>
|
||||
|
||||
</P>
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="Maxwells.gif" alt="Maxwell's Daemon: pymilter mascot" align=left>
|
||||
<h1 align=center>Sendmail Milters in Python</h1>
|
||||
<h4 align=center>by <a href="mailto:%75%72%6D%61%6E%65%40%6E%65%75%72%61l%61%63%63%65%73%73%2E%63%6F%6D">Jim Niemira</a>
|
||||
and <a href="mailto:%73%74%75%61%72%74%40%62%6D%73%69%2E%63%6F%6D">
|
||||
Stuart D. Gathman</a><br>
|
||||
This web page is written by Stuart D. Gathman<br>and<br>sponsored by
|
||||
<a href="http://www.bmsi.com">Business Management Systems, Inc.</a> <br>
|
||||
Last updated Jun 09, 2005</h4>
|
||||
Last updated Dec 29, 2005</h4>
|
||||
|
||||
See the <a href="faq.html">FAQ</a> | <a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=139894">Download now</a> |
|
||||
<a href="/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Subscribe to mailing list</a> |
|
||||
<a href="http://bmsi.com/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Subscribe to mailing list</a> |
|
||||
<a href="#overview">Overview</a> |
|
||||
<a href="/python/dspam.html">pydspam</a> |
|
||||
<a href="/libdspam/dspam.html">libdspam</a>
|
||||
@@ -45,151 +41,6 @@ separation features to enhance security. Even better, sendmail 8.13
|
||||
supports socket maps, which makes <a href="pysrs.html">pysrs</a> much more
|
||||
efficient and secure. I recommend upgrading.
|
||||
|
||||
<h2> Recent Changes </h2>
|
||||
|
||||
Python milter is being moved to
|
||||
<a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/pymilter/">pymilter Sourceforge
|
||||
project</a> for development.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Release 0.8.0 is the first <a href="http://sourceforge.net/">Sourceforge</a>
|
||||
release. It supports Python-2.4, and provides an option to accept mail
|
||||
that gets an SPF softfail or fails the 3 strikes rule, provided the
|
||||
alleged sender accepts a DSN explaining the problem. Python-2.3 is
|
||||
no longer supported by the reworked mime.py module, although API changes
|
||||
could be backported. There are too many incompatible changes to the
|
||||
python email package.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Release 0.7.2 tightens the authentication screws with a "3 strikes and
|
||||
you're out" policy. A sender must have a valid PTR, HELO, or SPF record
|
||||
to send email. Specific senders can be whitelisted using the
|
||||
"delegate" option in the spf configuration section by adding a
|
||||
default SPF record for them. The PTR and HELO are required
|
||||
by RFC anyway, so this is not an unreasonable requirement.
|
||||
There is now a coherent policy for an SPF softfail result. A softfail
|
||||
is accepted if there is a valid PTR or HELO, or if the domain
|
||||
is listed in the "accept_softfail" option of the spf configuration section.
|
||||
A neutral result is accepted by default if there is a valid PTR or
|
||||
HELO, (and the SPF record was not guessed), unless the domain is listed in the
|
||||
"reject_neutral" option. Common forms of PTR records for dynamic IPs are
|
||||
recognized, and do not count as a valid PTR. This does not prevent anyone
|
||||
from sending mail from a dynamic IP - they just need to configure a
|
||||
valid HELO name or publish an SPF record.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
As SPF adoption continues to rise, forged spam is not getting through. So
|
||||
spammers are publishing their SPF records as predicted. The 0.7.2 RPM
|
||||
now provides the <code>rhsbl</code> sendmail hack so that spammer domains
|
||||
can be blacklisted. With the RPM installed, add a line like the following
|
||||
to your <code>sendmail.mc</code>.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
HACK(rhsbl,`blackholes.example.com',"550 Rejected: " $&{RHS} " has been spamming our customers.")dnl
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Of course, spammers are now starting to register
|
||||
throwaway domains. The next thing we need is a custom DNS server,
|
||||
in Python, that
|
||||
can recognize patterns. For instance, one spammer registers ded304.com,
|
||||
ded305.com, ded306.com, etc. We also need the custom DNS server to
|
||||
let SPF classic clients check SES (which will be part of pysrs).
|
||||
The <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/products/twisted">Twisted Python</a>
|
||||
framework provides a custom DNS server - but I
|
||||
would like a smaller implementation for our use.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
The RPM for release 0.7.0 moves the config file and socket locations to
|
||||
/etc/mail and /var/run/milter respectively. We now parse Microsoft CID records
|
||||
- but only hotmail.com uses them. They seem to have applied for a patent on
|
||||
the brilliant idea of examining the mail headers to see who the message is
|
||||
from. We aren't doing that here, so not to worry - but I am not a lawyer, so
|
||||
if you are worried, change spf.py around line 626 to return None instead of
|
||||
calling CIDParser(). There is a new option to reject mail with no PTR
|
||||
and no SPF.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Microsoft is pushing an anti-opensource license for their pending patent
|
||||
along with their sender-ID proposal before the IETF.
|
||||
It is royalty free - but requires anyone distributing a binary they've
|
||||
compiled from source to sign a license agreement. The Apache Software
|
||||
Foundation <a
|
||||
href="http://www.apache.org/foundation/docs/sender-id-position.html"> explains
|
||||
the problem with sender-ID</a>, and Debian <a
|
||||
href="http://www.debian.org/News/2004/20040904">concurs</a>. Since
|
||||
the <a href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/3/9/439b024b-09fd-44ee-8ff0-10e834004c36/senderid_FAQ.PDF">Microsoft license</a> is
|
||||
<a href="http://www.circleid.com/article/732_0_1_0_C/">incompatible with free
|
||||
software in general</a> and the <a
|
||||
href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-mxcomp/mail-archive/msg03678.html">GPL in
|
||||
particular</a>, Python milter will not be able to implement sender-ID in its
|
||||
current form. This was, no doubt, Microsoft's intent all along.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Sender-ID attempts to do for RFC2822 headers what SPF does for RFC2821 headers.
|
||||
Unlike SPF, it has never been tried, and is encumbered by a stupid patent. I
|
||||
recommend ignoring it and continuing to implement and improve SPF until a
|
||||
working and unencumbered proposal for RFC2822 headers surfaces.
|
||||
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
<a href="http://openspf.com">
|
||||
<img src="SPF.gif" align=left alt="SPF logo"></a>
|
||||
Release 0.6.6 adds support for <a href="http://openspf.com/">SPF</a>,
|
||||
a protocol to prevent forging of the envelope from address.
|
||||
SPF support requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">pydns</a>.
|
||||
The included spf.py module is an updated version of the original 1.6
|
||||
version at <a href="http://www.wayforward.net/spf/">wayforward.net</a>.
|
||||
The updated version tracks the draft RFC and test suite.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
The FAQ addresses <a href="faq.html#spf">how to get started with SPF</a>.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Release 0.6.1 adds a full milter based dspam application.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
I have selected the <a href="http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/">
|
||||
dspam bayes filter project</a> and <a href="dspam.html">
|
||||
packaged it for python</a>.
|
||||
Release 0.6.0 offers a simple application of dspam I call "header triage",
|
||||
which rejects messages with spammy headers.
|
||||
To use header triage, you must have <a href="dspam.html">DSPAM</a> installed,
|
||||
and select a dictionary that is well moderated by someone who gets
|
||||
lots of spam. That dictionary can be used to block spam that is
|
||||
obvious from the headers (e.g. X-Mailer and Subject) before it ties
|
||||
up any more resources. I have yet to see any false positives from this
|
||||
approach (check the milter log), but if there are, the sender will
|
||||
get a REJECT with the message "Your message looks spammy."
|
||||
|
||||
<h2> Enough Already! </h2>
|
||||
|
||||
Nearly a dozen people have emailed me begging for a feature to copy
|
||||
outgoing and/or incoming mail to a backup directory by user. Ok, it
|
||||
looks like this is a most requested feature for 0.5.6. In the meantime,
|
||||
here are some things to consider:
|
||||
<ul>
|
||||
<li> If you want to equivalent of a Bcc added to each message, this
|
||||
is very easy to do in the python code for bms.py. See below.
|
||||
<li> If you want to copy to a file in a directory (thus avoiding having to
|
||||
set up aliases), this is slightly more involved. The bms.py milter already
|
||||
copies the message to a temporary file for use in replacing the message body
|
||||
when banned attachments are found. You have to open a file, and copy the
|
||||
Mesage object to it in eom().
|
||||
<li> Finally, you are probably aware that most email clients already
|
||||
keep a copy of outgoing mail? Presumably there is a good reason for
|
||||
keeping another copy on the server.
|
||||
</ul>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
To Bcc a message, call <code>self.add_recipient(rcpt)</code> in envfrom after
|
||||
determining whether you want to copy (e.g. whether the sender is local). For
|
||||
example,
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
def envfrom(...
|
||||
...
|
||||
if len(t) == 2:
|
||||
self.rejectvirus = t[1] in reject_virus_from
|
||||
if t[0] in wiretap_users.get(t[1],()):
|
||||
self.add_recipient(wiretap_dest)
|
||||
if t[1] == 'mydomain.com':
|
||||
self.add_recipient('<copy-%s>' % t[0])
|
||||
...
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
To make this a generic feature requires thinking about how the configuration
|
||||
would look. Feel free to make specific suggestions about config file
|
||||
entries. Be sure to handle both Bcc and file copies, and designating what
|
||||
mail should be copied. How should "outgoing" be defined? Implementing it is
|
||||
easy once the configuration is designed.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3><a name=overview>Overview</a></h3>
|
||||
|
||||
This package provides a robust toolkit for Python <a
|
||||
@@ -237,6 +88,8 @@ content filtering. SPF checking
|
||||
requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">
|
||||
pydns</a>. Configuration documentation is currently included as comments
|
||||
in the <a href="milter.cfg">sample config file</a> for the bms.py milter.
|
||||
See also the <a href="HOWTO">HOWTO</a> and <a href="logmsgs.html">
|
||||
Milter Log Message Tags</a>.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Python milter is under GPL. The authors can probably be convinced to
|
||||
change this to LGPL if needed.
|
||||
@@ -368,8 +221,14 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
|
||||
<td>0.5.5</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.3.3</td><td>8.13.1</td>
|
||||
<td>0.7.2</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.5</td>
|
||||
<td>0.8.4</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>RedHat 8.0</td><td>gcc-3.2</td><td>2.2.1</td><td>8.12.6</td>
|
||||
<td>0.5.2</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>RedHat 9.0</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.1</td>
|
||||
<td>0.8.2</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>RedHat EL3</td><td>gcc-3.2.3</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.5</td>
|
||||
<td>0.8.4</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>Debian Linux</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.1</td><td>8.12.0</td>
|
||||
<td>0.3.7</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>Debian Linux</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>8.12.7</td>
|
||||
@@ -380,8 +239,8 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
|
||||
<td>0.3.4</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.3</td><td>8.12.3</td>
|
||||
<td>0.4.2</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.2.3</td><td>8.13.1</td>
|
||||
<td>0.7.1</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.1</td>
|
||||
<td>0.8.4</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>Slackware 7.1</td><td>?</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.1</td>
|
||||
<td>0.3.8</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>Slackware 9.0</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.2.3</td><td>8.12.9</td>
|
||||
@@ -395,108 +254,54 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
|
||||
<td>FreeBSD</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>?</td>
|
||||
<td>0.5.5</td><tr>
|
||||
<td>FreeBSD 4.4</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.10</td>
|
||||
<td>0.6.6</td><tr>
|
||||
|
||||
<td>0.6.6</td>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> Requirements </h3>
|
||||
<h2> Enough Already! </h2>
|
||||
|
||||
<menu>
|
||||
<li> While the miltermodule will work with python 1.5, you probably
|
||||
want to use python 2.0 or better. The python code uses a number of
|
||||
python 2 features.
|
||||
<li> Python must be configured with thread support. This is because
|
||||
sendmail's libmilter requires thread support.
|
||||
<li> You must compile sendmail with libmilter enabled. In versions of
|
||||
sendmail prior to 8.12 libmilter is marked FFR (For Future Release) and
|
||||
is not installed by default.
|
||||
Sendmail 8.12 still does not enable libmilter by default. You must
|
||||
explicitly select the "MILTER" option when compiling.
|
||||
<li> Python milter has been tested against sendmail-8.11 and sendmail-8.12.
|
||||
<li> Python milter must be compiled for the specific version of sendmail
|
||||
it will run with. (Since the result is dynamically loaded, there could
|
||||
conceivably be multiple versions available and selected at startup - but
|
||||
that will have to wait.) This situation may only exist for sendmail
|
||||
versions prior to 8.12. The protocol seems designed for backward
|
||||
compatibility - and 8.12 is the first official milter release.
|
||||
<li> Mea Culpa! After reading the Python Style guide, I realize that
|
||||
my Python code is not up to snuff. Apparently mixed tabs and spaces
|
||||
are anathema to those using Windows editors, where tabs can be expanded using
|
||||
any arbitrary algorithm. Other than that, my
|
||||
intuition matched Guido's pretty well - although I like to indent by 2
|
||||
rather than 4. I will arrange to have tabs expanded to spaces when
|
||||
exporting new versions. Until then, beware!
|
||||
</menu>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> <a name="aix4"> AIX 4.1.5 Requirements </a> </h3>
|
||||
To create sendmail RPMs for AIX, you can download my AIX 4.1.5 spec files
|
||||
for <a href="/aix/sendmail.spec">sendmail-8.11.5</a>
|
||||
or <a href="/aix/sendmail12.spec">sendmail-8.12.3</a>. If you have
|
||||
not already set it up, I use a <a href="/aix/aix.spec">dummy RPM package</a>
|
||||
to represent the stuff that comes with AIX. You might also want
|
||||
my <a href="/aix/python.spec">python-2.1.1</a> spec file for AIX. It
|
||||
does not include Tk or curses modules, sorry. If y'all trust me, you can
|
||||
download rpms for AIX 4.x from my <a href="/aix">AIX RPM directory</a>.
|
||||
Nearly a dozen people have emailed me begging for a feature to copy
|
||||
outgoing and/or incoming mail to a backup directory by user. Ok, it
|
||||
looks like this is a most requested feature for 0.5.6. In the meantime,
|
||||
here are some things to consider:
|
||||
<ul>
|
||||
<li> If you want to equivalent of a Bcc added to each message, this
|
||||
is very easy to do in the python code for bms.py. See below.
|
||||
<li> If you want to copy to a file in a directory (thus avoiding having to
|
||||
set up aliases), this is slightly more involved. The bms.py milter already
|
||||
copies the message to a temporary file for use in replacing the message body
|
||||
when banned attachments are found. You have to open a file, and copy the
|
||||
Mesage object to it in eom().
|
||||
<li> Finally, you are probably aware that most email clients already
|
||||
keep a copy of outgoing mail? Presumably there is a good reason for
|
||||
keeping another copy on the server.
|
||||
</ul>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Sendmail-8.12 renames
|
||||
libsmutil.a to libsm.a. Unfortunately, libsm.a is an important AIX system
|
||||
shared library. Therefore, I rename libsm.a back to libsmutil.a for
|
||||
AIX. This presents a problem for setup.py.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> <a name="rh72"> RedHat 7.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are running Redhat 7.2, the distributed version of sendmail
|
||||
now enables libmilter by default. RedHat 7.2 bundles
|
||||
the development libraries with the main sendmail package, so
|
||||
there is no sendmail-devel package. However, they forgot to include the
|
||||
headers! So you'll have to get the SRPM and modify it. I suggest
|
||||
moving the static libs to a devel package and adding the headers. If
|
||||
this is too much trouble, you can get the <a href="mfapi.h">mfapi.h</a>
|
||||
header for sendmail-8.6.11 from here and manually install it as
|
||||
<code>/usr/include/libmilter/mfapi.h</code>.
|
||||
To Bcc a message, call <code>self.add_recipient(rcpt)</code> in envfrom after
|
||||
determining whether you want to copy (e.g. whether the sender is local). For
|
||||
example,
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
def envfrom(...
|
||||
...
|
||||
if len(t) == 2:
|
||||
self.rejectvirus = t[1] in reject_virus_from
|
||||
if t[0] in wiretap_users.get(t[1],()):
|
||||
self.add_recipient(wiretap_dest)
|
||||
if t[1] == 'mydomain.com':
|
||||
self.add_recipient('<copy-%s>' % t[0])
|
||||
...
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
If you do modify the SRPM, I suggest renaming libsmutil.a
|
||||
to libsm.a - just like sendmail-8.12 will. If you manually install
|
||||
mfapi.h or don't rename libsmutil.a, you'll
|
||||
need to force <code>libs = ["milter", "smutil"]</code> in setup.py.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
If you have installed python2, and want
|
||||
python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
|
||||
and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.
|
||||
To make this a generic feature requires thinking about how the configuration
|
||||
would look. Feel free to make specific suggestions about config file
|
||||
entries. Be sure to handle both Bcc and file copies, and designating what
|
||||
mail should be copied. How should "outgoing" be defined? Implementing it is
|
||||
easy once the configuration is designed.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> <a name="rh62"> Redhat 6.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are running Redhat 6.2, the distributed version of sendmail
|
||||
does not enable libmilter. You can download the Redhat 7.2 sendmail.spec
|
||||
modified to compile on RedHat 6.2:
|
||||
<a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62/sendmail-rhmilter.spec">
|
||||
sendmail-rhmilter.spec</a>. The <a
|
||||
href="ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/SRPMS/sendmail-8.11.6-1.7.0.src.rpm">
|
||||
SRPM for sendmail-8.11.6</a> is available from
|
||||
<a href="http://www.redhat.com">Redhat</a> under
|
||||
<a href="http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-106.html">
|
||||
Errata for RH6.2</a>. But that doesn't include the latest security
|
||||
patches since RH6.2 is no longer supported.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
If y'all trust me, you can pick up source and binary sendmail RPMs for RH6.2
|
||||
from my <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62">linux downloads</a> directory.
|
||||
The lastest RPMs were built by taking a RH7.2 SRPMS and removing some
|
||||
RPM features from the spec file that RH6.2 doesn't support, then
|
||||
recompiling on RH6.2. You can check this by installing the RH7.2 SRPM,
|
||||
then diffing my sendmail.spec with theirs. Then run
|
||||
"rpm -bb sendmail-rhmilter.spec" when you are satisfied.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
If you have installed python2, and want
|
||||
python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
|
||||
and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.
|
||||
You'll need to install the sendmail-devel package to compile milter.
|
||||
|
||||
<hr>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
<a href="http://validator.w3.org/check/referer">
|
||||
<img border=0 src="/vh32.png" alt=" [ Valid HTML 3.2! ] " height=31 width=88></a>
|
||||
<img border=0 src="http://bmsi.com/vh32.png" alt=" [ Valid HTML 3.2! ] " height=31 width=88></a>
|
||||
<a href="http://www.redhat.com">
|
||||
<img src="/art/powered_by.gif" width="88" height="31" alt=" [ Powered By Red Hat Linux ] " border="0"></a>
|
||||
<img src="http://bmsi.com/art/powered_by.gif" width="88" height="31" alt=" [ Powered By Red Hat Linux ] " border="0"></a>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
|
||||
</body></html>
|
||||
+237
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
|
||||
Title: Python Milter Mail Policy
|
||||
|
||||
<h1> Python Milter Mail Policy </h1>
|
||||
|
||||
These are the policies implemented by the <code>bms.py</code> milter
|
||||
application. The milter and Milter modules do not implement any policies
|
||||
by themselves. Eventually, I'll get the bms.py milter moved to its
|
||||
own package.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> Classify connection </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
When the SMTP client connects, the connection IP address is
|
||||
saved for later verification, and the connection
|
||||
is classified as INTERNAL or EXTERNAL by matching the ip
|
||||
address against the <code>internal_connect</code> configuration.
|
||||
IP addresses with no PTR, and PTR names that look like
|
||||
the kind assigned to dynamic IPs (as determined by a heuristic
|
||||
algorithm) are flagged as DYNAMIC. IPs that match the
|
||||
<code>trusted_relay</code> configuration are flagged as TRUSTED.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Examples from the log file (<i>not</i> the SMTP error message returned):
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul29 13:56:53 [71207] connect from p50863492.dip0.t-ipconnect.de at ('80.134.52.146', 1858) EXTERNAL DYN
|
||||
2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74511] connect from foopub at ('1.2.3.4', 46513) EXTERNAL TRUSTED
|
||||
2005Jul29 14:41:00 [71805] connect from foobar at ('192.168.0.1', 41205) INTERNAL
|
||||
2005Jul29 14:41:15 [71806] connect from cncln.online.ln.cn at ('218.25.240.137', 35992) EXTERNAL
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Certain obviously evil PTR names are blocked at this point:
|
||||
"localhost" (when IP is not 127.*) and ".".
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul29 14:49:50 [71918] connect from localhost at ('221.132.0.6', 50507) EXTERNAL
|
||||
2005Jul29 14:49:50 [71918] REJECT: PTR is localhost
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> HELO Check </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
The HELO name provided by the client is saved for later verification
|
||||
(for example by SPF). We could validate the HELO at this point
|
||||
by verifying that an A record for the HELO name matches the connect ip.
|
||||
However, currently we only block certain obvious problems.
|
||||
HELO names that look like an IP4 address
|
||||
and ones that match the <code>hello_blacklist</code> configuration
|
||||
are immediately rejected. The hello_blacklist typically contains
|
||||
the current MTAs own HELO name or email domains.
|
||||
Clients that attempt to skip HELO are immediately rejected.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74512] hello from example.com
|
||||
2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74512] REJECT: spam from self: example.com
|
||||
2005Jul29 18:17:09 [74581] hello from 80.191.244.69
|
||||
2005Jul29 18:17:09 [74581] REJECT: numeric hello name: 80.191.244.69
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> MAIL FROM Check </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
Before calling our milter, sendmail checks a DNS blacklist to
|
||||
block banned sender domains. We never see a blocked domain.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
The MAIL FROM address is saved for possible use by the smart-alias
|
||||
feature. First, the <code>internal_domains</code> is used for
|
||||
a simple screening if defined. If the MAIL FROM for an INTERNAL connection
|
||||
is NOT in <code>internal_domains</code>, then it is rejected (the
|
||||
PC is most likely infected and attempting to send out spam).
|
||||
If the MAIL FROM for an EXTERNAL connection IS in
|
||||
<code>internal_domains</code>, then the message is immediately rejected.
|
||||
This is quick and effective for most small company MTAs. For more
|
||||
complex mail networks, it is too simplistic, and should not be defined.
|
||||
SPF will handle the complex cases.
|
||||
|
||||
<h4> wiretap </h4>
|
||||
|
||||
The wiretap feature can screen and/or monitor mail to/from certain
|
||||
users. If the MAIL FROM is being wiretapped, the recipients are
|
||||
altered accordingly.
|
||||
|
||||
<!--table-stop-->
|
||||
|
||||
<h2> SPF check </h2>
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, the MAIL FROM, connect IP, and HELO name are checked against
|
||||
any SPF records published via DNS for the alleged sender (MAIL FROM).
|
||||
If there is no SPF record, we check for a local substitute under the
|
||||
domain defined in the <code>[spf]delegate</code> configuration.
|
||||
Further checks depend on the result.
|
||||
|
||||
<table border=1>
|
||||
<tr><th>NONE</th><td>
|
||||
If there is no SPF record (official or delegated), then we
|
||||
initiate a "three strikes and your out" regime, which looks for
|
||||
<b>some</b> form of validated identification.
|
||||
<ol>
|
||||
<li>We try a "best guess" SPF record of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr". If this
|
||||
passes, good.
|
||||
<li> We try to validate the HELO name. First check for an SPF record.
|
||||
Otherwise, check whether the connect IP matches any A record for
|
||||
the HELO name, or any A record for any MX name for the HELO name,
|
||||
or is at least in the same /24 subnet as any of the above.
|
||||
(In other words, a HELO SPF "best guess" of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24".)
|
||||
If so, good. We consider the HELO validated. If the HELO SPF
|
||||
check fails, we reject the email.
|
||||
</ol>
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul30 19:45:16 [93991] connect from [221.200.41.54] at ('221.200.41.54', 3581) EXTERNAL DYN
|
||||
2005Jul30 19:45:18 [93991] hello from adelphia.net
|
||||
2005Jul30 19:45:19 [93991] mail from <wendy.stubbsua@link-it.com> ()
|
||||
2005Jul30 19:45:19 [93991] REJECT: hello SPF: fail 550 access denied
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<ol>
|
||||
<li> If there is a validated PTR name, and it doesn't look
|
||||
like a dynamic name, good. We consider the connection validated.
|
||||
</ol>
|
||||
If any of the above can be validated, we continue on.
|
||||
If none of the above can be validated, and the <code>[SPF]reject_noptr</code>
|
||||
option is true, we reject the message immediately with the explanation
|
||||
that we need some form of valid identification before we accept an email.
|
||||
If <code>[SPF]reject_noptr</code> is false, we flag the message as
|
||||
needing Call Back Validation.
|
||||
The Call Back Valildation sends a DSN to the purported sender informing
|
||||
them of the lack of identification. If the message is legitimate, the
|
||||
sender needs to know that their email setup is broken and should be corrected.
|
||||
If the message is forged, the sender is informed of the forgery,
|
||||
and their need to publish an SPF record or at least use a valid HELO name.
|
||||
If the purported sender does not accept the DSN,
|
||||
then the message is rejected. The CBV status is cached to avoid
|
||||
annoying the purported sender with too many DSNs. Currently, the DSN
|
||||
is repeated to the same sender once per month.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
In this example, although 3com.com has no SPF record, we assume that
|
||||
any legitimate mail from them will at least have a valid HELO or PTR.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul30 23:52:03 [96777] connect from [222.252.233.200] at ('222.252.233.200', 29934) EXTERNAL DYN
|
||||
2005Jul30 23:52:03 [96777] hello from 3mail.3com.com
|
||||
2005Jul30 23:52:04 [96777] mail from <etec_nic_family@3mail.3com.com> ()
|
||||
2005Jul30 23:52:04 [96777] REJECT: no PTR, HELO or SPF
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
</td></tr>
|
||||
|
||||
<tr><th>PASS</th><td>
|
||||
A pass result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is
|
||||
tracked for reputation (and may be blocked), and may skip content scanning if
|
||||
it matches a whitelist.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul24 17:44:26 [2104] mail from <gnucash-devel-bounces@gnucash.org> ('SIZE=4410',)
|
||||
2005Jul24 17:44:26 [2104] Received-SPF: pass (mail.bmsi.com: domain of gnucash.org
|
||||
designates 204.107.200.65 as permitted sender)
|
||||
client-ip=204.107.200.65; envelope-from=gnucash-devel-bounces@gnucash.org; helo=cvs.gnucash.org;
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
</td></tr>
|
||||
|
||||
<tr><th>NEUTRAL</th><td>
|
||||
A neutral result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is not
|
||||
tracked for reputation or matched against any whitelists.
|
||||
Highly forged domains listed in <code>[SPF]reject_neutral</code> are
|
||||
rejected.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul24 17:41:37 [2070] connect from cp500627-a.dbsch1.nb.home.nl at ('84.27.225.3', 3465) EXTERNAL
|
||||
2005Jul24 17:41:37 [2070] hello from cp500627-a.dbsch1.nb.home.nl
|
||||
2005Jul24 17:41:38 [2070] mail from <nwarjejkw@yahoo.com> ()
|
||||
2005Jul24 17:41:38 [2070] REJECT: SPF neutral for nwarjejkw@yahoo.com
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
</td></tr>
|
||||
|
||||
<tr><th>SOFTFAIL</th><td>
|
||||
A softfail result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is not
|
||||
tracked for reputation or matched against any whitelists. Furthermore,
|
||||
the message is flagged as needing Call Back Validation,
|
||||
and the highly forged domains listed in <code>[SPF]reject_neutral</code> are
|
||||
rejected as well.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
At present, we also require a valid HELO or PTR to avoid rejecting
|
||||
a softfail. But this should probably change to only require a
|
||||
successful CBV.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
The Call Back Valildation sends a DSN to the purported sender informing
|
||||
them of the softfail. If the message is legitimate, the sender needs
|
||||
to know about the softfail so that their email setup can be corrected.
|
||||
If the message is forged, the sender is informed of the forgery, confirming
|
||||
that SPF is protecting their reputation and encouraging a rapid transition
|
||||
to a strict policy. If the purported sender does not accept the DSN,
|
||||
then the message is rejected. The CBV status is cached to avoid
|
||||
annoying the purported sender with too many DSNs. Currently, the DSN
|
||||
is repeated to the same sender once per month.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] mail from <Aitp@horafeliz.com> ()
|
||||
2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] Received-SPF: softfail (mail.bmsi.com: transitioning domain of horafeliz.com
|
||||
does not designate 221.184.83.185 as permitted sender)
|
||||
client-ip=221.184.83.185; envelope-from=Aitp@horafeliz.com;
|
||||
helo=p8185-ipad30funabasi.chiba.ocn.ne.jp;
|
||||
2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] rcpt to <david@example.com> ()
|
||||
2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] Subject: Microsoft, Adobe, Macromedia, Corel software. Up to 80% discount.
|
||||
2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2605
|
||||
2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] CBV: Aitp@horafeliz.com
|
||||
2005Jul24 15:41:38 [801] REJECT: CBV: 550 <Aitp@horafeliz.com>: User unknown
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
</td></tr>
|
||||
|
||||
<tr><th>FAIL</th><td>
|
||||
The message is rejected with a reference the SPF why page.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] connect from [212.70.52.16] at ('212.70.52.16', 3192) EXTERNAL DYN
|
||||
2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] hello from winzip.com
|
||||
2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] mail from <dan@winzip.com> ()
|
||||
2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] REJECT: SPF fail 550 SPF fail:
|
||||
see http://openspf.com/why.html?sender=dan@winzip.com&ip=212.70.52.16
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
</td></tr>
|
||||
|
||||
<tr><th>PERMERROR</th><td>
|
||||
Permanent errors were called "unknown", and are still show that way
|
||||
in the log. The message is rejected. Previously, we enabled "lax" parsing
|
||||
of the SPF record, but rejecting is better because it informs the
|
||||
sender about their problem. The next milter version will
|
||||
look for a local substitute SPF record (as for a missing SPF record)
|
||||
before rejecting. This will inform the sender of their problem, but
|
||||
also let the receiver install a temporary workaround.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul24 18:05:37 [2312] mail from <b-mihdbcgaacaa-becibijh-000-@msg.euxiphipops.com> ()
|
||||
2005Jul24 18:05:37 [2312] REJECT: SPF unknown 550 SPF Permanent Error:
|
||||
include mechanism missing domain: include
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
The SPF record for msg.euxiphipops.com looked like this at the time of the
|
||||
above error:
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
msg.euxiphipops.com TXT "v=spf1 mx ptr a include"
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
</td></tr>
|
||||
|
||||
<tr><th>TEMPERROR</th><td>
|
||||
Temporary errors result in a 451 "Try again later" response. The sender
|
||||
should retry the message at a later time.
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
2005Jul24 07:33:13 [29846] mail from <quickenloans@rate.quicken.com> ('SIZE=73775', 'BODY=8BITMIME')
|
||||
2005Jul24 07:33:43 [29846] TEMPFAIL: SPF error 450 SPF Temporary Error: DNS Timeout
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
</td></tr>
|
||||
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 2.7 KiB |
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
|
||||
Title: Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
<h2> Requirements </h2>
|
||||
|
||||
<menu>
|
||||
<li> While the miltermodule will work with python 1.5, you probably
|
||||
want to use python 2.0 or better. The python code uses a number of
|
||||
python 2 features. The email support requires python 2.4.
|
||||
<li> Python must be configured with thread support. This is because
|
||||
pymilter uses sendmail's libmilter which requires thread support.
|
||||
<li> You must compile sendmail with libmilter enabled. In versions of
|
||||
sendmail prior to 8.12 libmilter is marked FFR (For Future Release) and
|
||||
is not installed by default.
|
||||
Sendmail 8.12 still does not enable libmilter by default. You must
|
||||
explicitly select the "MILTER" option when compiling.
|
||||
<li> When compiling Python milter against sendmail versions earlier than
|
||||
8.13, you must set MAX_ML_REPLY to 1 in setup.py. There is no way to tell from
|
||||
the libmilter includes that smfi_setmlreply is not supported.
|
||||
<li> You probably want to use sendmail-8.13, since that supports multi-line
|
||||
SMTP error descriptions and SOCKETMAP. You want SOCKETMAP for use with
|
||||
pysrs.
|
||||
<li> Python milter has been tested against sendmail-8.11 through sendmail-8.13.
|
||||
<li> Python milter must be compiled for the specific version of sendmail
|
||||
it will run with. (Since the result is dynamically loaded, there could
|
||||
conceivably be multiple versions available and selected at startup - but
|
||||
that will have to wait.) This situation may only exist for sendmail
|
||||
versions prior to 8.12. The protocol seems designed for backward
|
||||
compatibility - and 8.12 is the first official milter release.
|
||||
<li> Mea Culpa! After reading the Python Style guide, I realize that
|
||||
my Python code is not up to snuff. Apparently mixed tabs and spaces
|
||||
are anathema to those using Windows editors, where tabs can be expanded using
|
||||
any arbitrary algorithm. Other than that, my
|
||||
intuition matched Guido's pretty well - although I like to indent by 2
|
||||
rather than 4. I will arrange to have tabs expanded to spaces when
|
||||
exporting new versions. Until then, beware!
|
||||
</menu>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> <a name="aix4"> AIX 4.1.5 Requirements </a> </h3>
|
||||
To create sendmail RPMs for AIX, you can download my AIX 4.1.5 spec files
|
||||
for <a href="/aix/sendmail.spec">sendmail-8.11.5</a>
|
||||
or <a href="/aix/sendmail12.spec">sendmail-8.12.3</a>. If you have
|
||||
not already set it up, I use a <a href="/aix/aix.spec">dummy RPM package</a>
|
||||
to represent the stuff that comes with AIX. You might also want
|
||||
my <a href="/aix/python.spec">python-2.1.1</a> spec file for AIX. It
|
||||
does not include Tk or curses modules, sorry. If y'all trust me, you can
|
||||
download rpms for AIX 4.x from my <a href="/aix">AIX RPM directory</a>.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Sendmail-8.12 renames
|
||||
libsmutil.a to libsm.a. Unfortunately, libsm.a is an important AIX system
|
||||
shared library. Therefore, I rename libsm.a back to libsmutil.a for
|
||||
AIX. This presents a problem for setup.py.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> <a name="rh72"> RedHat 7.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are running Redhat 7.2, the distributed version of sendmail
|
||||
now enables libmilter by default. RedHat 7.2 bundles
|
||||
the development libraries with the main sendmail package, so
|
||||
there is no sendmail-devel package. However, they forgot to include the
|
||||
headers! So you'll have to get the SRPM and modify it. I suggest
|
||||
moving the static libs to a devel package and adding the headers. If
|
||||
this is too much trouble, you can get the <a href="mfapi.h">mfapi.h</a>
|
||||
header for sendmail-8.6.11 from here and manually install it as
|
||||
<code>/usr/include/libmilter/mfapi.h</code>.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
If you do modify the SRPM, I suggest renaming libsmutil.a
|
||||
to libsm.a - just like sendmail-8.12 will. If you manually install
|
||||
mfapi.h or don't rename libsmutil.a, you'll
|
||||
need to force <code>libs = ["milter", "smutil"]</code> in setup.py.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
If you have installed python2, and want
|
||||
python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
|
||||
and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.
|
||||
|
||||
<h3> <a name="rh62"> Redhat 6.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are running Redhat 6.2, the distributed version of sendmail
|
||||
does not enable libmilter. You can download the Redhat 7.2 sendmail.spec
|
||||
modified to compile on RedHat 6.2:
|
||||
<a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62/sendmail-rhmilter.spec">
|
||||
sendmail-rhmilter.spec</a>. The <a
|
||||
href="ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/SRPMS/sendmail-8.11.6-1.7.0.src.rpm">
|
||||
SRPM for sendmail-8.11.6</a> is available from
|
||||
<a href="http://www.redhat.com">Redhat</a> under
|
||||
<a href="http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-106.html">
|
||||
Errata for RH6.2</a>. But that doesn't include the latest security
|
||||
patches since RH6.2 is no longer supported.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
If y'all trust me, you can pick up source and binary sendmail RPMs for RH6.2
|
||||
from my <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62">linux downloads</a> directory.
|
||||
The lastest RPMs were built by taking a RH7.2 SRPMS and removing some
|
||||
RPM features from the spec file that RH6.2 doesn't support, then
|
||||
recompiling on RH6.2. You can check this by installing the RH7.2 SRPM,
|
||||
then diffing my sendmail.spec with theirs. Then run
|
||||
"rpm -bb sendmail-rhmilter.spec" when you are satisfied.
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
If you have installed python2, and want
|
||||
python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
|
||||
and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.
|
||||
You'll need to install the sendmail-devel package to compile milter.
|
||||
+33
-4
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tempdir = /var/log/milter/save
|
||||
log_headers = 0
|
||||
# connection ips and hostnames are matched against this glob style list
|
||||
# to recognize internal senders.
|
||||
;internal_connect = 192.168.*.*
|
||||
;internal_connect = 192.168.*.*,127.*
|
||||
|
||||
# mail that is not an internal_connect and claims to be from an
|
||||
# internal domain is rejected. Furthermore, internal mail that
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ log_headers = 0
|
||||
# flexible. However, SPF is not currently checked for outgoing
|
||||
# (internal_connect) mail because it doesn't yet handle authorizing
|
||||
# internal IPs locally.
|
||||
;internal_domains = mycorp.com
|
||||
;internal_domains = mycorp.com,localhost.localdomain
|
||||
|
||||
# connections from a trusted relay can trust the first Received header
|
||||
# SPF checks are bypassed for internal connections and trusted relays.
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ config=/etc/mail/pysrs.cfg
|
||||
;fwdomain = mydomain.com
|
||||
# turn this on after a grace period to reject spoofed DSNs
|
||||
reject_spoofed = 0
|
||||
# Many braindead MTAs send DSNs with a non-DSN MFROM (e.g. to report that
|
||||
# some virus claiming to be sent by you). This heuristic
|
||||
# refuses mail from user names commonly abused in that way.
|
||||
;banned_users = postmaster, mailer-daemon, clamav
|
||||
|
||||
# See http://spf.pobox.com for more info on SPF.
|
||||
[spf]
|
||||
@@ -85,6 +89,21 @@ reject_spoofed = 0
|
||||
;reject_noptr = 0
|
||||
# always accept softfail from these domains, or send DSN otherwise
|
||||
;accept_softfail = bounces.amazon.com
|
||||
# Treat fail from these domains like softfail: because their SPF record
|
||||
# or an important sender is screwed up. Must have valid HELO, however.
|
||||
;accept_fail = custhelp.com
|
||||
# Use sendmail access map or similar format for detailed spf policy.
|
||||
# SPF entries in the access map will override any defaults set above.
|
||||
;access_file = /etc/mail/access.db
|
||||
# Add MAIL FROM as Sender when Sender is missing and From domain
|
||||
# doesn't match MAIL FROM. Outlook and other email clients will then display
|
||||
# something like: "Sent by sender@domain.com on behalf of from@example.com"
|
||||
;supply_sender = 0
|
||||
# Connections that get an SPF pass for a pretend MAIL FROM of
|
||||
# postmaster@sometrustedforwarder.com skip SPF checks for the real MAIL FROM.
|
||||
# This is for non-SRS forwarders. It is a simple implementation that
|
||||
# is inefficient for more than a few entries.
|
||||
;trusted_forwarder = careerbuilder.com
|
||||
|
||||
# features intended to clean up outgoing mail
|
||||
[scrub]
|
||||
@@ -101,6 +120,7 @@ blind = 1
|
||||
# (sendmail aliases let you monitor incoming mail)
|
||||
#
|
||||
;users = disloyal@bigcorp.com, bigmouth@bigcorp.com
|
||||
# multiple destinations can use smart_alias
|
||||
;dest = spy@bigcorp.com
|
||||
# discard outgoing mail without alerting sender
|
||||
# can be used in conjunction with wiretap to censor outgoing mail
|
||||
@@ -108,7 +128,10 @@ blind = 1
|
||||
#
|
||||
# smart aliases trigger on both sender and recipient
|
||||
#
|
||||
;smart_alias = copycust,walter
|
||||
;smart_alias = copycust,walter,spy1,spy2
|
||||
# multiple wiretap monitors
|
||||
;spy1 = disloyal@bigcorp.com,spy@bigcorp.com
|
||||
;spy2 = bigmouth@bigcorp.com,spy@bigcorp.com
|
||||
# mail from client@clientcorp.com to sue@bigcorp.com is redirected to
|
||||
# local alias copycust
|
||||
;copycust = client@clientcorp.com,sue@bigcorp.com
|
||||
@@ -128,7 +151,13 @@ blind = 1
|
||||
# only EXTERNAL messages are dspam filtered
|
||||
;dspam_dict=/var/lib/dspam/moderator.dict
|
||||
|
||||
# Opt-opt recipients from dspam screening and header triage
|
||||
# Recipients of mail sent from these senders are added to the auto_whitelist.
|
||||
# Auto_whitelisted senders with an SPF PASS are never rejected by dspam, and
|
||||
# messages from auto_whitelisted senders will be used to train screener
|
||||
# dictionaries as innocent mail.
|
||||
;whitelist_senders = @mycorp.com
|
||||
|
||||
# Opt-out recipients entirely from dspam screening and header triage
|
||||
;dspam_exempt=getitall@mycorp.com
|
||||
# Do not scan mail (ostensibly) from these senders
|
||||
;dspam_whitelist=getitall@sender.com
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
||||
# chkconfig: 2345 80 30
|
||||
# description: Milter is a process that filters messages sent through sendmail.
|
||||
# processname: milter
|
||||
# config: /var/log/milter/bms.py
|
||||
# config: /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
|
||||
# pidfile: /var/run/milter/milter.pid
|
||||
|
||||
python="python2.3"
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
||||
# chkconfig: 2345 80 30
|
||||
# description: Milter is a process that filters messages sent through sendmail.
|
||||
# processname: milter
|
||||
# config: /var/log/milter/bms.py
|
||||
# config: /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
|
||||
# pidfile: /var/run/milter/milter.pid
|
||||
|
||||
python="python2.3"
|
||||
|
||||
+52
-11
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
%define name milter
|
||||
%define version 0.8.2
|
||||
%define release 2.RH7
|
||||
%define version 0.8.5
|
||||
%define release 1.RH7
|
||||
# what version of RH are we building for?
|
||||
%define redhat9 0
|
||||
%define redhat7 1
|
||||
@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ Prefix: %{_prefix}
|
||||
Vendor: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
|
||||
Packager: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
|
||||
Url: http://www.bmsi.com/python/milter.html
|
||||
Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.12.10
|
||||
Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.13
|
||||
%ifos Linux
|
||||
Requires: chkconfig
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
BuildRequires: %{python}-devel , sendmail-devel >= 8.12.10
|
||||
BuildRequires: %{python}-devel , sendmail-devel >= 8.13
|
||||
|
||||
%description
|
||||
This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
|
||||
@@ -52,10 +52,15 @@ modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts.
|
||||
|
||||
%prep
|
||||
%setup
|
||||
#%patch -p1
|
||||
#%patch -p0 -b .bms
|
||||
|
||||
%build
|
||||
env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" %{python} setup.py build
|
||||
if %{redhat9}; then
|
||||
LDFLAGS="-g"
|
||||
else
|
||||
LDFLAGS="-s"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" %{python} setup.py build
|
||||
|
||||
%install
|
||||
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +68,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
|
||||
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
|
||||
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail
|
||||
mkdir $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter/save
|
||||
cp bms.py strike3.txt softfail.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
|
||||
cp bms.py *.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
|
||||
cp milter.cfg $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
|
||||
|
||||
# logfile rotation
|
||||
@@ -146,7 +151,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
|
||||
|
||||
%files -f INSTALLED_FILES
|
||||
%defattr(-,root,root)
|
||||
%doc README NEWS TODO CREDITS sample.py
|
||||
%doc README HOWTO NEWS TODO CREDITS sample.py
|
||||
/etc/logrotate.d/milter
|
||||
/etc/cron.daily/milter
|
||||
%ifos aix4.1
|
||||
@@ -160,12 +165,49 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
|
||||
%dir /var/log/milter/save
|
||||
%config /var/log/milter/start.sh
|
||||
%config /var/log/milter/bms.py
|
||||
%config /var/log/milter/strike3.txt
|
||||
%config /var/log/milter/softfail.txt
|
||||
%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/strike3.txt
|
||||
%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/softfail.txt
|
||||
%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/neutral.txt
|
||||
%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/quarantine.txt
|
||||
%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/permerror.txt
|
||||
%config(noreplace) /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
|
||||
/usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack/rhsbl.m4
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Thu Dec 29 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.5-1
|
||||
- Simple trusted_forwarder implementation.
|
||||
- Fix access_file neutral policy
|
||||
- Move Received-SPF header to beginning of headers
|
||||
- Supply keyword info for all results in Received-SPF header.
|
||||
- Move guessed SPF result to separate header
|
||||
- Activate smfi_insheader only when SMFIR_INSHEADER defined
|
||||
- Handle NULL MX in spf.py
|
||||
- in-process GOSSiP server support (to be extended later)
|
||||
- Expire CBV cache and renew auto-whitelist entries
|
||||
* Fri Oct 21 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.4-2
|
||||
- Don't supply sender when MFROM is subdomain of header from/sender.
|
||||
- Don't send quarantine DSN for DSNs
|
||||
- Skip dspam for replies/DSNs to signed MFROM
|
||||
* Thu Oct 20 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.4-1
|
||||
- Fix SPF policy via sendmail access map (case insensitive keys).
|
||||
- Auto whitelist senders, train screener on whitelisted messages
|
||||
- Optional idx parameter to addheader to invoke smfi_insheader
|
||||
- Activate progress when SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
|
||||
* Wed Oct 12 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.3-1
|
||||
- Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
|
||||
- spf_accept_fail option for braindead SPF senders (treats fail like softfail)
|
||||
- Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
|
||||
- Send DSN for SPF errors corrected by extended processing.
|
||||
- Send DSN before SCREENED mail is quarantined
|
||||
- Option to set SPF policy via sendmail access map.
|
||||
- Option to supply Sender header from MAIL FROM when missing.
|
||||
- Use logging package to keep log lines atomic.
|
||||
* Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-4
|
||||
- Limit each CNAME chain independently like PTR and MX
|
||||
* Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-3
|
||||
- Limit CNAME lookups (regression)
|
||||
* Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-2
|
||||
- Handle corrupt ZIP attachments
|
||||
* Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-1
|
||||
- Strict processing limits per SPF RFC
|
||||
- Fixed several parsing bugs under RFC
|
||||
@@ -174,7 +216,6 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
|
||||
- Extended SPF processing results beyond strict RFC limits
|
||||
- Support original SES for local bounce protection (requires pysrs-0.30.10)
|
||||
- Callback exception processing option in milter module
|
||||
- Handle corrupt ZIP attachments
|
||||
* Thu Jun 16 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.1-1
|
||||
- Fix zip in zip loop in mime.py
|
||||
- Fix HeaderParseError in bms.py header callback
|
||||
|
||||
+26
-6
@@ -34,6 +34,15 @@ $ python setup.py help
|
||||
libraries=["milter","smutil","resolv"]
|
||||
|
||||
* $Log$
|
||||
* Revision 1.8 2005/10/20 23:23:36 customdesigned
|
||||
* Include smfi_progress is SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Revision 1.7 2005/10/20 23:04:46 customdesigned
|
||||
* Add optional idx for position of added header.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Revision 1.6 2005/07/15 22:18:17 customdesigned
|
||||
* Support callback exception policy
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Revision 1.5 2005/06/24 04:20:07 customdesigned
|
||||
* Report context allocation error.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -967,28 +976,39 @@ milter_setreply(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static char milter_addheader__doc__[] =
|
||||
"addheader(field, value) -> None\n\
|
||||
"addheader(field, value, idx=-1) -> None\n\
|
||||
Add a header to the message. This header is not passed to other\n\
|
||||
filters. It is not checked for standards compliance;\n\
|
||||
the mail filter must ensure that no protocols are violated\n\
|
||||
as a result of adding this header.\n\
|
||||
field - header field name\n\
|
||||
value - header field value\n\
|
||||
idx - optional position in internal header list to insert new header\n\
|
||||
Both are strings. This function can only be called from the EOM callback.";
|
||||
|
||||
static PyObject *
|
||||
milter_addheader(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
|
||||
char *headerf;
|
||||
char *headerv;
|
||||
int idx = -1;
|
||||
SMFICTX *ctx;
|
||||
PyThreadState *t;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "ss:addheader", &headerf, &headerv)) return NULL;
|
||||
if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "ss|i:addheader", &headerf, &headerv, &idx))
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
ctx = _find_context(self);
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL) return NULL;
|
||||
t = PyEval_SaveThread();
|
||||
return _thread_return(t,smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv),
|
||||
"cannot add header");
|
||||
#ifdef SMFIR_INSHEADER
|
||||
return _thread_return(t, (idx < 0) ? smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv) :
|
||||
smfi_insheader(ctx, idx, headerf, headerv), "cannot add header");
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if (idx < 0)
|
||||
return _thread_return(t, smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv),
|
||||
"cannot add header");
|
||||
PyErr_SetString(MilterError, "insheader not supported");
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static char milter_chgheader__doc__[] =
|
||||
@@ -1143,7 +1163,7 @@ milter_quarantine(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if _FFR_SMFI_PROGRESS
|
||||
#ifdef SMFIR_PROGRESS
|
||||
static char milter_progress__doc__[] =
|
||||
"progress() -> None\n\
|
||||
Notify the MTA that we are working on a message so it will reset timeouts.";
|
||||
@@ -1174,7 +1194,7 @@ static PyMethodDef context_methods[] = {
|
||||
#ifdef SMFIF_QUARANTINE
|
||||
{ "quarantine", milter_quarantine, METH_VARARGS, milter_quarantine__doc__},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if _FFR_SMFI_PROGRESS
|
||||
#ifdef SMFIR_PROGRESS
|
||||
{ "progress", milter_progress, METH_VARARGS, milter_progress__doc__},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{ NULL, NULL }
|
||||
|
||||
+34
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
||||
Subject: SPF %(result)s (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
|
||||
|
||||
This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
|
||||
|
||||
THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
|
||||
|
||||
YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
|
||||
|
||||
Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
|
||||
|
||||
%(rcpt)s
|
||||
|
||||
Subject: %(subject)s
|
||||
Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
|
||||
|
||||
Your sender policy (or lack thereof) indicated that the above email was not
|
||||
sent via an authorized SMTP server, but may still be legitimate. Since there
|
||||
is no positive confirmation that the message is really from you, we have
|
||||
to give it extra scrutiny - including verifying that the sender really
|
||||
exists by sending you this DSN. We will remember this sender and not
|
||||
bother you again for a while. You can avoid this message entirely for
|
||||
legitimate mail by using an authorized SMTP server. Contact your mail
|
||||
administrator and ask how to configure your email client to use an
|
||||
authorized server.
|
||||
|
||||
If you never sent the above message, then your domain has been forged.
|
||||
Your mail admin needs to publish a strict SPF record so that I can reject
|
||||
those forgeries instead of bugging you about them.
|
||||
|
||||
If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
|
||||
|
||||
Kind regards,
|
||||
|
||||
postmaster@%(receiver)s
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
Subject: Critical SPF configuration error
|
||||
|
||||
This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
|
||||
|
||||
THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
|
||||
|
||||
YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
|
||||
|
||||
Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
|
||||
|
||||
%(rcpt)s
|
||||
|
||||
Subject: %(subject)s
|
||||
|
||||
Your spf record has a permanent error. The error was:
|
||||
|
||||
%(perm_error)s
|
||||
|
||||
We will reinterpret your record using "lax" processing heuristics
|
||||
which may result in your mail being accepted anyway. But you or your
|
||||
mail administrator need to fix your SPF record as soon as possible.
|
||||
|
||||
We are sending you this message to alert you to the fact that
|
||||
you have problems with your email configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to
|
||||
contact me again.
|
||||
|
||||
Kind regards,
|
||||
|
||||
postmaster@%(receiver)s
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
||||
Subject: DELIVERY STATUS (POSSIBLE SPAM)
|
||||
|
||||
This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
|
||||
|
||||
THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
|
||||
|
||||
YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
|
||||
|
||||
Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
|
||||
|
||||
%(rcpt)s
|
||||
|
||||
Subject: %(subject)s
|
||||
Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
|
||||
|
||||
A statistical analysis of your message has classified it as junk mail,
|
||||
and it has been quarantined. Eventually, the recipients will review
|
||||
their quarantined mail and may notice your message. If your message is
|
||||
important, please contact them via other means. You may also try sending
|
||||
them a simple plain text message.
|
||||
|
||||
If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
|
||||
|
||||
Kind regards,
|
||||
|
||||
postmaster@%(receiver)s
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
|
||||
# Analyze milter log to find abusers
|
||||
import traceback
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_addr(a):
|
||||
beg = a.find('<')
|
||||
end = a.find('>')
|
||||
if beg >= 0:
|
||||
if end > beg: return a[beg+1:end]
|
||||
return a
|
||||
|
||||
class Connection(object):
|
||||
def __init__(self,dt,tm,id,ip=None,conn=None):
|
||||
self.dt = dt
|
||||
self.tm = tm
|
||||
self.id = id
|
||||
if ip:
|
||||
_,self.host,self.ip = ip.split(None,2)
|
||||
elif conn:
|
||||
self.ip = conn.ip
|
||||
self.host = conn.host
|
||||
self.helo = conn.helo
|
||||
self.subject = None
|
||||
self.rcpt = []
|
||||
self.mfrom = None
|
||||
self.helo = None
|
||||
self.innoc = []
|
||||
self.whitelist = False
|
||||
|
||||
def connections(fp):
|
||||
conndict = {}
|
||||
termdict = {}
|
||||
for line in fp:
|
||||
if line.startswith('{'): continue
|
||||
a = line.split(None,4)
|
||||
if len(a) < 4: continue
|
||||
dt,tm,id,op = a[:4]
|
||||
if (id,op) == ('bms','milter'):
|
||||
# FIXME: optionally yield all partial connections in conndict
|
||||
conndict = {}
|
||||
termdict = {}
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if id[0] == '[' and id[-1] == ']':
|
||||
try:
|
||||
key = int(id[1:-1])
|
||||
except:
|
||||
print >>sys.stderr,'bad id:',line.rstrip()
|
||||
continue
|
||||
else: continue
|
||||
if op == 'connect':
|
||||
ip = a[4].rstrip()
|
||||
conn = Connection(dt,tm,id,ip=ip)
|
||||
conndict[key] = conn
|
||||
elif op in (
|
||||
'DISCARD:','TAG:','CBV:','Large','No',
|
||||
'NOTE:','From:','Sender:','TRAIN:'):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
else:
|
||||
op = op.lower()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn = conndict[key]
|
||||
except KeyError:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn = termdict[key]
|
||||
del termdict[key]
|
||||
conndict[key] = conn
|
||||
except KeyError:
|
||||
print >>sys.stderr,'key error:',line.rstrip()
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if op == 'subject:':
|
||||
if len(a) > 4:
|
||||
conn.subject = a[4].rstrip()
|
||||
elif op == 'innoc:':
|
||||
conn.innoc.append(a[4].rstrip())
|
||||
elif op == 'whitelist':
|
||||
conn.whitelist = True
|
||||
elif op == 'x-mailer:':
|
||||
if len(a) > 4:
|
||||
conn.mailer = a[4].rstrip()
|
||||
elif op == 'x-guessed-spf:':
|
||||
conn.spfguess = a[4]
|
||||
elif op == 'received-spf:':
|
||||
conn.spfres,conn.spfmsg = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
|
||||
elif op == 'received:':
|
||||
conn.received = a[4].rstrip()
|
||||
elif op == 'temp':
|
||||
_,conn.tempfile = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
|
||||
elif op == 'srs':
|
||||
_,conn.srsrcpt = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
|
||||
elif op == 'mail':
|
||||
_,conn.mfrom = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
|
||||
elif op == 'rcpt':
|
||||
_,rcpt = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
|
||||
conn.rcpt.append(rcpt)
|
||||
elif op == 'hello':
|
||||
_,conn.helo = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
|
||||
elif op in ('eom','dspam','abort'):
|
||||
del conndict[key]
|
||||
conn.enddt = dt
|
||||
conn.endtm = tm
|
||||
conn.result = op
|
||||
yield conn
|
||||
termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
|
||||
elif op in ('reject:','dspam:','tempfail:','reject','fail:','honeypot:'):
|
||||
del conndict[key]
|
||||
conn.enddt = dt
|
||||
conn.endtm = tm
|
||||
conn.result = op
|
||||
conn.resmsg = a[4].rstrip()
|
||||
yield conn
|
||||
termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
|
||||
elif op in ('fp:','spam:'):
|
||||
del conndict[key]
|
||||
termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
print >>sys.stderr,'unknown op:',line.rstrip()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
print >>sys.stderr,'error:',line.rstrip()
|
||||
traceback.print_exc()
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
import gzip
|
||||
for fn in sys.argv[1:]:
|
||||
if fn.endswith('.gz'):
|
||||
fp = gzip.open(fn)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
fp = open(fn)
|
||||
for conn in connections(fp):
|
||||
if conn.rcpt and conn.mfrom:
|
||||
for r in conn.rcpt:
|
||||
if r.lower().find('iancarter') > 0: break
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if conn.mfrom.lower().find('iancarter') < 0: continue
|
||||
print >>sys.stderr,conn.result,conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn.subject,parse_addr(conn.mfrom),
|
||||
for a in conn.rcpt:
|
||||
print parse_addr(a),
|
||||
print
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
[bdist_rpm]
|
||||
python=python2
|
||||
python=python2.4
|
||||
doc_files=README NEWS TODO
|
||||
packager=Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
|
||||
release=2.4
|
||||
release=1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ if sys.version < '2.2.3':
|
||||
DistributionMetadata.classifiers = None
|
||||
DistributionMetadata.download_url = None
|
||||
|
||||
setup(name = "milter", version = "0.8.2",
|
||||
# NOTE: importing Milter to obtain version fails when milter.so not built
|
||||
setup(name = "milter", version = '0.8.5',
|
||||
description="Python interface to sendmail milter API",
|
||||
long_description="""\
|
||||
This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ querying SPF records.
|
||||
ext_modules=[
|
||||
Extension("milter", ["miltermodule.c"],
|
||||
libraries=libs,
|
||||
# set MAX_ML_REPLY to 1 for sendmail < 8.13
|
||||
define_macros = [ ('MAX_ML_REPLY',32) ]
|
||||
),
|
||||
],
|
||||
|
||||
+4
-2
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
Subject: SPF softfail (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
|
||||
Subject: SPF %(result)s (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
|
||||
|
||||
This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ Subject: %(subject)s
|
||||
Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
|
||||
|
||||
Your sender policy indicated that the above email was likely forged and that
|
||||
feedback was desired.
|
||||
feedback was desired. If you are sending from a foreign ISP,
|
||||
then you may need to follow your home ISPs instructions for configuring
|
||||
your outgoing mail server.
|
||||
|
||||
If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ AND THERE IS NO OBLIGATION WHATSOEVER TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE,
|
||||
SUPPORT, UPDATES, ENHANCEMENTS, OR MODIFICATIONS.
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about SPF, a tool against email forgery, see
|
||||
http://spf.pobox.com/
|
||||
http://openspf.org/
|
||||
|
||||
For news, bugfixes, etc. visit the home page for this implementation at
|
||||
http://www.wayforward.net/spf/
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +47,42 @@ For news, bugfixes, etc. visit the home page for this implementation at
|
||||
# Terrence is not responding to email.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# $Log$
|
||||
# Revision 1.17 2005/12/23 21:44:15 customdesigned
|
||||
# Always include keyword data in Received-SPF header.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.16 2005/12/01 22:42:32 customdesigned
|
||||
# improve gossip support.
|
||||
# Initialize srs_domain from srs.srs config property. Should probably
|
||||
# always block unsigned DSN when signing all.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.15 2005/10/30 01:08:14 customdesigned
|
||||
# Ignore records missing spaces.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.14 2005/08/12 17:36:51 customdesigned
|
||||
# Trean non-existant include as no match in "lax" mode.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.13 2005/07/22 16:00:23 customdesigned
|
||||
# Limit CNAME chains independently of DNS lookup limit
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.31 2005/07/22 02:11:50 customdesigned
|
||||
# Use dictionary to check for CNAME loops. Check limit independently for
|
||||
# each top level name, just like for PTR.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.30 2005/07/21 20:07:31 customdesigned
|
||||
# Translate DNS error in DNSLookup. This completely isolates DNS
|
||||
# dependencies to the DNSLookup method.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.29 2005/07/21 17:49:39 customdesigned
|
||||
# My best guess at what RFC intended for limiting CNAME loops.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.28 2005/07/21 17:37:08 customdesigned
|
||||
# Break out external DNSLookup method so that test suite can
|
||||
# duplicate CNAME loop bug. Test zone data dictionary now
|
||||
# mirrors structure of real DNS.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.27 2005/07/21 15:26:06 customdesigned
|
||||
# First cut at updating docs. Test suite is obsolete.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Revision 1.26 2005/07/20 03:12:40 customdesigned
|
||||
# When not in strict mode, don't give PermErr for bad mechanism until
|
||||
# encountered during evaluation.
|
||||
@@ -253,6 +289,20 @@ if not hasattr(DNS.Type,'SPF'):
|
||||
DNS.Type.typemap[99] = 'SPF'
|
||||
DNS.Lib.RRunpacker.getSPFdata = DNS.Lib.RRunpacker.getTXTdata
|
||||
|
||||
def DNSLookup(name,qtype):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
req = DNS.DnsRequest(name, qtype=qtype)
|
||||
resp = req.req()
|
||||
#resp.show()
|
||||
# key k: ('wayforward.net', 'A'), value v
|
||||
return [((a['name'], a['typename']), a['data']) for a in resp.answers]
|
||||
except DNS.DNSError,x:
|
||||
raise TempError,'DNS ' + str(x)
|
||||
|
||||
def isSPF(txt):
|
||||
"Return True if txt has SPF record signature."
|
||||
return txt.startswith('v=spf1 ') or txt == 'v=spf1'
|
||||
|
||||
# 32-bit IPv4 address mask
|
||||
MASK = 0xFFFFFFFFL
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -305,6 +355,7 @@ DEFAULT_SPF = 'v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr'
|
||||
MAX_LOOKUP = 10 #draft-schlitt-spf-classic-02 Para 10.1
|
||||
MAX_MX = 10 #draft-schlitt-spf-classic-02 Para 10.1
|
||||
MAX_PTR = 10 #draft-schlitt-spf-classic-02 Para 10.1
|
||||
MAX_CNAME = 10 # analogous interpretation to MAX_PTR
|
||||
MAX_RECURSION = 20
|
||||
ALL_MECHANISMS = ('a', 'mx', 'ptr', 'exists', 'include', 'ip4', 'ip6', 'all')
|
||||
COMMON_MISTAKES = { 'prt': 'ptr', 'ip': 'ip4', 'ipv4': 'ip4', 'ipv6': 'ip6' }
|
||||
@@ -409,6 +460,9 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 ?all moo')
|
||||
('unknown', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown mechanism found: moo')
|
||||
|
||||
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 =a ?all moo')
|
||||
('unknown', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown qualifier, IETF draft para 4.6.1, found in: =a')
|
||||
|
||||
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 ~all')
|
||||
('pass', 250, 'sender SPF verified')
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -450,8 +504,6 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
self.perm_error.ext = rc
|
||||
raise self.perm_error
|
||||
return rc
|
||||
except DNS.DNSError,x:
|
||||
return ('error', 450, 'SPF DNS Error: ' + str(x))
|
||||
except TempError,x:
|
||||
return ('error', 450, 'SPF Temporary Error: ' + str(x))
|
||||
except PermError,x:
|
||||
@@ -555,8 +607,15 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
return ('none', 250, EXPLANATIONS['none'])
|
||||
|
||||
# split string by whitespace, drop the 'v=spf1'
|
||||
#
|
||||
spf = spf.split()[1:]
|
||||
spf = spf.split()
|
||||
# Catch case where SPF record has no spaces
|
||||
# Can never happen with conforming dns_spf(), however
|
||||
# in the future we might want to give permerror
|
||||
# for common mistakes like IN TXT "v=spf1" "mx" "-all"
|
||||
# in relaxed mode.
|
||||
if spf[0] != 'v=spf1':
|
||||
raise PermError('Invalid SPF record in', self.d)
|
||||
spf = spf[1:]
|
||||
|
||||
# copy of explanations to be modified by exp=
|
||||
exps = self.exps
|
||||
@@ -601,9 +660,15 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
if res == 'pass':
|
||||
break
|
||||
if res == 'none':
|
||||
raise PermError(
|
||||
'No valid SPF record for included domain: %s'%arg,
|
||||
mech)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if self.strict or not self.perm_error:
|
||||
raise PermError(
|
||||
'No valid SPF record for included domain: %s'%arg,
|
||||
mech)
|
||||
except PermError,x:
|
||||
if self.strict:
|
||||
raise x
|
||||
self.perm_error = x
|
||||
continue
|
||||
elif m == 'all':
|
||||
break
|
||||
@@ -775,11 +840,11 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
is found.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# for performance, check for most common case of TXT first
|
||||
a = [t for t in self.dns_txt(domain) if t.startswith('v=spf1')]
|
||||
a = [t for t in self.dns_txt(domain) if isSPF(t)]
|
||||
if len(a) == 1 and self.strict < 2:
|
||||
return a[0]
|
||||
# check official SPF type first when it becomes more popular
|
||||
b = [t for t in self.dns_99(domain) if t.startswith('v=spf1')]
|
||||
b = [t for t in self.dns_99(domain) if isSPF(t)]
|
||||
if len(b) == 1:
|
||||
# FIXME: really must fully parse each record
|
||||
# and compare with appropriate parts case insensitive.
|
||||
@@ -792,7 +857,7 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
if DELEGATE: # use local record if neither found
|
||||
a = [t
|
||||
for t in self.dns_txt(domain+'._spf.'+DELEGATE)
|
||||
if t.startswith('v=spf1')
|
||||
if isSPF(t)
|
||||
]
|
||||
if len(a) == 1: return a[0]
|
||||
return None
|
||||
@@ -823,7 +888,9 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
|
||||
def dns_a(self, domainname):
|
||||
"""Get a list of IP addresses for a domainname."""
|
||||
return self.dns(domainname, 'A')
|
||||
if domainname:
|
||||
return self.dns(domainname, 'A')
|
||||
return []
|
||||
|
||||
def dns_aaaa(self, domainname):
|
||||
"""Get a list of IPv6 addresses for a domainname."""
|
||||
@@ -844,7 +911,7 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
"""Get a list of domain names for an IP address."""
|
||||
return self.dns(reverse_dots(i) + ".in-addr.arpa", 'PTR')
|
||||
|
||||
def dns(self, name, qtype):
|
||||
def dns(self, name, qtype, cnames=None):
|
||||
"""DNS query.
|
||||
|
||||
If the result is in cache, return that. Otherwise pull the
|
||||
@@ -861,31 +928,33 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
result = self.cache.get( (name, qtype) )
|
||||
cname = None
|
||||
if not result:
|
||||
req = DNS.DnsRequest(name, qtype=qtype)
|
||||
resp = req.req()
|
||||
#resp.show()
|
||||
for a in resp.answers:
|
||||
# key k: ('wayforward.net', 'A'), value v
|
||||
k, v = (a['name'], a['typename']), a['data']
|
||||
for k,v in DNSLookup(name,qtype):
|
||||
if k == (name, 'CNAME'):
|
||||
cname = v
|
||||
cname = v
|
||||
self.cache.setdefault(k, []).append(v)
|
||||
result = self.cache.get( (name, qtype), [])
|
||||
if not result and cname:
|
||||
result = self.dns(cname, qtype)
|
||||
if not cnames:
|
||||
cnames = {}
|
||||
elif len(cnames) >= MAX_CNAME:
|
||||
raise PermError(
|
||||
'Length of CNAME chain exceeds %d' % MAX_CNAME)
|
||||
cnames[name] = cname
|
||||
if cname in cnames:
|
||||
raise PermError,'CNAME loop'
|
||||
result = self.dns(cname, qtype, cnames=cnames)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
def get_header(self,res,receiver=None):
|
||||
if not receiver:
|
||||
receiver = self.r
|
||||
if res in ('pass','fail','softfail'):
|
||||
return '%s (%s: %s) client-ip=%s; envelope-from=%s; helo=%s;' % (
|
||||
res,receiver,self.get_header_comment(res),self.i,
|
||||
if res in ('unknown','permerror'):
|
||||
txt = ' '.join([res] + self.mech)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
txt = res
|
||||
return '%s (%s: %s) client-ip=%s; envelope-from=%s; helo=%s;' % (
|
||||
txt,receiver,self.get_header_comment(res),self.i,
|
||||
self.l + '@' + self.o, self.h)
|
||||
if res == 'unknown':
|
||||
return '%s (%s: %s)' % (' '.join([res] + self.mech),
|
||||
receiver,self.get_header_comment(res))
|
||||
return '%s (%s: %s)' % (res,receiver,self.get_header_comment(res))
|
||||
|
||||
def get_header_comment(self,res):
|
||||
"""Return comment for Received-SPF header.
|
||||
@@ -907,10 +976,10 @@ class query(object):
|
||||
"%s is neither permitted nor denied by domain of %s" \
|
||||
% (self.i,sender)
|
||||
#"%s does not designate permitted sender hosts" % sender
|
||||
elif res == 'unknown': return \
|
||||
elif res in ('unknown','permerror'): return \
|
||||
"permanent error in processing domain of %s: %s" \
|
||||
% (sender, self.prob)
|
||||
elif res == 'error': return \
|
||||
elif res in ('error','temperror'): return \
|
||||
"temporary error in processing during lookup of %s" % sender
|
||||
elif res == 'fail': return \
|
||||
"domain of %s does not designate %s as permitted sender" \
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
|
||||
domain. The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
|
||||
with your Sender Policy.
|
||||
|
||||
For more information, see: http://openspf.com
|
||||
For more information, see: http://openspf.org
|
||||
|
||||
I hate to annoy you with a DSN (Delivery Status
|
||||
Notification) from a possibly forged email, but since you
|
||||
|
||||
+8
-3
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
import doctest
|
||||
import Milter
|
||||
import bms
|
||||
import mime
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ class TestMilter(bms.bmsMilter):
|
||||
|
||||
def getsymval(self,name):
|
||||
if name == 'j': return 'test.milter.org'
|
||||
return bms.bmsMilter.getsymval(self,name)
|
||||
return ''
|
||||
|
||||
def replacebody(self,chunk):
|
||||
if self._body:
|
||||
@@ -284,7 +285,10 @@ class BMSMilterTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# self.failUnless(rc == Milter.REJECT)
|
||||
# milter.close();
|
||||
|
||||
def suite(): return unittest.makeSuite(BMSMilterTestCase,'test')
|
||||
def suite():
|
||||
s = unittest.makeSuite(BMSMilterTestCase,'test')
|
||||
s.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(bms))
|
||||
return s
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
if len(sys.argv) > 1:
|
||||
@@ -296,4 +300,5 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
fp = milter._body
|
||||
sys.stdout.write(fp.getvalue())
|
||||
else:
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
#unittest.main()
|
||||
unittest.TextTestRunner().run(suite())
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user