This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create tag 'milter-0_8_2'.

Sprout from bmsi 2005-05-31 18:23:49 UTC Stuart Gathman <stuart@gathman.org> 'Development changes since 0.7.2' Cherrypick from master 2005-07-20 14:56:38 UTC Stuart Gathman <stuart@gathman.org> 'Handle corrupt ZIP attachments': COPYING CREDITS MANIFEST.in Milter/__init__.py Milter/dsn.py Milter/dynip.py NEWS TODO bms.py faq.html milter.cfg milter.html milter.spec miltermodule.c mime.py setup.cfg setup.py softfail.txt spf.py spfquery.py strike3.txt test/zip1 test/zip2 test/zip3 test/ziploop testmime.py
2005-07-20 14:56:39 +00:00
38 changed files with 2584 additions and 2749 deletions
@@ -5,11 +5,8 @@ wrapper (Milter.py) that handles attachments, did lots of testing, packaged
 it with distutils, and generally transformed it from a quick hack to a
 real, usable Python extension.
-Other contributors (in random order):
+Other contributors:
 Dave MacQuigg 
  for noticing that smfi_insheader wasn't supported, and creating
  a template to help first time pymilter users create their own milter.
 Terence Way
  for providing a Python port of SPF
 Scott Kitterman
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
 # Revision 1.69  2006/11/04 22:09:39  customdesigned
 # Another lame DSN heuristic.  Block PTR cache poisoning attack.
 #
 # Revision 1.68  2006/10/04 03:46:01  customdesigned
 # Fix defaults.
 #
 # Revision 1.67  2006/10/01 01:44:06  customdesigned
 # case_sensitive_localpart option, more delayed bounce heuristics,
 # optional smart_alias section.
 #
 # Revision 1.66  2006/07/26 16:42:26  customdesigned
 # Support CBV timeout
 #
 # Revision 1.65  2006/06/21 22:22:00  customdesigned
 # Handle multi-line headers in delayed dsns.
 #
 # Revision 1.64  2006/06/21 21:12:04  customdesigned
 # More delayed reject token headers.
 # Don't require HELO pass for CBV.
 #
 # Revision 1.63  2006/05/21 03:41:44  customdesigned
 # Fail dsn
 #
 # Revision 1.61  2006/05/17 21:28:07  customdesigned
 # Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
 #
 # Revision 1.60  2006/05/12 16:14:48  customdesigned
 # Don't require SPF pass for white/black listing mail from trusted relay.
 # Support localpart wildcard for white and black lists.
 #
 # Revision 1.59  2006/04/06 18:14:17  customdesigned
 # Check whitelist/blacklist even when not checking SPF (e.g. trusted relay).
 #
 # Revision 1.58  2006/03/10 20:52:49  customdesigned
 # Use re to recognize failure DSNs.
 #
 # Revision 1.57  2006/03/07 20:50:54  customdesigned
 # Use signed Message-ID in delayed reject to blacklist senders
 #
 # Revision 1.56  2006/02/24 02:12:54  customdesigned
 # Properly report hard PermError (lax mode fails also) by always setting
 # perm_error attribute with PermError exception.  Improve reporting of
 # invalid domain PermError.
 #
 # Revision 1.55  2006/02/17 05:04:29  customdesigned
 # Use SRS sign domain list.
 # Accept but do not use for training whitelisted senders without SPF pass.
 # Immediate rejection of unsigned bounces.
 #
 # Revision 1.54  2006/02/16 02:16:36  customdesigned
 # User specific SPF receiver policy.
 #
 # Revision 1.53  2006/02/12 04:15:01  customdesigned
 # Remove spf dependency for iniplist
 #
 # Revision 1.52  2006/02/12 02:12:08  customdesigned
 # Use CIDR notation for internal connect list.
 #
 # Revision 1.51  2006/02/12 01:13:58  customdesigned
 # Don't check rcpt user list when signed MFROM.
 #
 # Revision 1.50  2006/02/09 20:39:43  customdesigned
 # Use CIDR notation for trusted_relay iplist
 #
 # Revision 1.49  2006/01/30 23:14:48  customdesigned
 # put back eom condition
 #
 # Revision 1.48  2006/01/12 20:31:24  customdesigned
 # Accelerate training via whitelist and blacklist.
 #
 # Revision 1.47  2005/12/29 04:49:10  customdesigned
 # Do not auto-whitelist autoreplys
 #
 # Revision 1.46  2005/12/28 20:17:29  customdesigned
 # Expire and renew AddrCache entries
 #
 # Revision 1.45  2005/12/23 22:34:46  customdesigned
 # Put guessed result in separate header.
 #
 # Revision 1.44  2005/12/23 21:47:07  customdesigned
 # Move Received-SPF header to top.
 #
 # Revision 1.43  2005/12/09 16:54:01  customdesigned
 # Select neutral DSN template for best_guess
 #
 # Revision 1.42  2005/12/01 22:42:32  customdesigned
 # improve gossip support.
 # Initialize srs_domain from srs.srs config property.  Should probably
 # always block unsigned DSN when signing all.
 #
 # Revision 1.41  2005/12/01 18:59:25  customdesigned
 # Fix neutral policy.  pobox.com -> openspf.org
 #
 # Revision 1.40  2005/11/07 21:22:35  customdesigned
 # GOSSiP support, local database only.
 #
 # Revision 1.39  2005/10/31 00:04:58  customdesigned
 # Simple implementation of trusted_forwarder list.  Inefficient for
 # more than 1 or 2 entries.
 #
 # Revision 1.38  2005/10/28 19:36:54  customdesigned
 # Don't check internal_domains for trusted_relay.
 #
 # Revision 1.37  2005/10/28 09:30:49  customdesigned
 # Do not send quarantine DSN when sender is DSN.
 #
 # Revision 1.36  2005/10/23 16:01:29  customdesigned
 # Consider MAIL FROM a match for supply_sender when a subdomain of From or Sender
 #
 # Revision 1.35  2005/10/20 18:47:27  customdesigned
 # Configure auto_whitelist senders.
 #
 # Revision 1.34  2005/10/19 21:07:49  customdesigned
 # access.db stores keys in lower case
 #
 # Revision 1.33  2005/10/19 19:37:50  customdesigned
 # Train screener on whitelisted messages.
 #
 # Revision 1.32  2005/10/14 16:17:31  customdesigned
 # Auto whitelist refinements.
 #
 # Revision 1.31  2005/10/14 01:14:08  customdesigned
 # Auto whitelist feature.
 #
 # Revision 1.30  2005/10/12 16:36:30  customdesigned
 # Release 0.8.3
 #
 # Revision 1.29  2005/10/11 22:50:07  customdesigned
 # Always check HELO except for SPF pass, temperror.
 #
 # Revision 1.28  2005/10/10 23:50:20  customdesigned
 # Use logging module to make logging threadsafe (avoid splitting log lines)
 #
 # Revision 1.27  2005/10/10 20:15:33  customdesigned
 # Configure SPF policy via sendmail access file.
 #
 # Revision 1.26  2005/10/07 03:23:40  customdesigned
 # Banned users option.  Experimental feature to supply Sender when
 # missing and MFROM domain doesn't match From.  Log cipher bits for
 # SMTP AUTH.  Sketch access file feature.
 #
 # Revision 1.25  2005/09/08 03:55:08  customdesigned
 # Handle perverse MFROM quoting.
 #
 # Revision 1.24  2005/08/18 03:36:54  customdesigned
 # Don't innoculate with SCREENED mail.
 #
 # Revision 1.23  2005/08/17 19:35:27  customdesigned
 # Send DSN before adding message to quarantine.
 #
 # Revision 1.22  2005/08/11 22:17:58  customdesigned
 # Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
 #
 # Revision 1.21  2005/08/04 21:21:31  customdesigned
 # Treat fail like softfail for selected (braindead) domains.
 # Treat mail according to extended processing results, but
 # report any PermError that would officially result via DSN.
 #
 # Revision 1.20  2005/08/02 18:04:35  customdesigned
 # Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
 #
 # Revision 1.19  2005/07/20 03:30:04  customdesigned
 # Check pydspam version for honeypot, include latest pyspf changes.
 #
 # Revision 1.18  2005/07/17 01:25:44  customdesigned
 # Log as well as use extended result for best guess.
 #
 # Revision 1.17  2005/07/15 20:25:36  customdesigned
 # Use extended results processing for best_guess.
 #
 # Revision 1.16  2005/07/14 03:23:33  customdesigned
 # Make SES package optional.  Initial honeypot support.
 #
 # Revision 1.15  2005/07/06 04:05:40  customdesigned
 # Initial SES integration.
 #
 # Revision 1.14  2005/07/02 23:27:31  customdesigned
 # Don't match hostnames for internal connects.
 #
 # Revision 1.13  2005/07/01 16:30:24  customdesigned
 # Always log trusted Received and Received-SPF headers.
 #
 # Revision 1.12  2005/06/20 22:35:35  customdesigned
 # Setreply for rejectvirus.
 #
 # Revision 1.11  2005/06/17 02:07:20  customdesigned
 # Release 0.8.1
 #
 # Revision 1.10  2005/06/16 18:35:51  customdesigned
 # Ignore HeaderParseError decoding header
 #
 # Revision 1.9  2005/06/14 21:55:29  customdesigned
 # Check internal_domains for outgoing mail.
 #
 # Revision 1.8  2005/06/06 18:24:59  customdesigned
 # Properly log exceptions from pydspam
 #
 # Revision 1.7  2005/06/04 19:41:16  customdesigned
 # Fix bugs from testing RPM
 #
 # Revision 1.6  2005/06/03 04:57:05  customdesigned
 # Organize config reader by section.  Create defang section.
 #
 # Revision 1.5  2005/06/02 15:00:17  customdesigned
 # Configure banned extensions.  Scan zipfile option with test case.
 #
 # Revision 1.4  2005/06/02 04:18:55  customdesigned
 # Update copyright notices after reading article on /.
 #
 # Revision 1.3  2005/06/02 02:09:00  customdesigned
 # Record timestamp in send_dsn.log
 #
 # Revision 1.2  2005/06/02 01:00:36  customdesigned
 # Support configurable templates for DSNs.
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
 	Step one.  Which DSPAM is right for you?
 The DSPAM project makes dspam part of the LDA (Local Delivery Agent).
 Pydspam puts dspam into the MTA (Mail Transfer Agent - sendmail with pymilter).
 The advantage of doing dspam in the LDA is that any aliasing has already been
 resolved.  You need only configure mailboxes.
 The advantage of doing dspam in the MTA is it can screen an entire 
 company as a gateway with multiple domains.  Unfortunately, this
 means you have to tell it about all the aliases that comprise each
 account.  (Also, pydspam is still uses dspam-2.6.5.2 - the Dspam API
 has changed for newer versions.)
 If the LDA is right for you, you'll want to use the official Dspam 
 package.  http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/
 If the MTA approach is what you want, then pydspam is what you want.
 In either case, you will still want pymilter to block forgeries, Windows 
 executables, etc.
 So, lets assume you want to install pymilter, and may or may not
 wish to install pydspam.
 	Step two.  Obtaining RPMS.
 For basic pymilter you'll need:
 python-2.4
 milter-0.8.2	(the RH9 rpm should work on Fedora Core - let me know)
 sendmail-8.13.x	(with milter support enabled)
 and for SPF you'll need:
 pydns-2.3.0-2.4
 and for SRS you'll need:
 pysrs-0.30.9-1.py24
 I'm pretty sure you will want to have SPF and SRS available.
 	Step three.  Activate basic milter.
 Activate the basic milter by editing /etc/mail/sendmail.mc and adding:
 INPUT_MAIL_FILTER(`pythonfilter', `S=local:/var/run/milter/pythonsock, F=T, T=C:5m;S:20s;R:5m;E:5m')
 You can then "make sendmail.cf" and restart sendmail.
 Tail /var/log/milter/milter.log while SMTP clients connect to your
 sendmail instance.  This should show you what the milter is doing.
 By default, milter-0.8.2 rejects on SPF fail, except for listed domains
 (that are known to be broken).  Some admins don't like that, and 0.8.3 will use
 the /etc/mail/access database to configure SPF responses.  For now,
 if you don't like SPF, you can disable spf by replacing "import spf"
 with "spf = None" around line 285 in /var/log/milter/bms.py.
 	Step four.  Tweaking the basic config.
 Most pymilter configuration is in /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg.
 By default, milter scans attachments for executable extensions.  You can
 turn this off by setting banned_exts to the empty list.  There are options
 to scan ZIP attachments and rfc822 attachments.  When it finds a banned
 file type, milter saves the original message in /var/log/milter/save,
 and replaces the attachment with a plain text warning message.
 Configure hello_blacklist with your own helo name and domains - which
 you know cannot legitimately be used by external MTAs.
 Configure trusted_relay with your secondary MX servers, if any.  These
 should also run pymilter with similar policies.  (But this isn't
 needed for initial testing.)
 Configure internal_connect with subnets of your internal SMTP clients.
 Internal connections skip SPF testing and other policies.
 Configure internal_domains with domains used by your internal SMTP clients.
 If they attempt to use any other domain, the attempt is blocked and the
 client is logged as a "zombie".  Conversely, any attempt by an external
 MTA to use one of your internal domains is treated as a forgery and
 blocked (a simplified form of local SPF).
 Adjust porn_words and spam_words - these block emails with a Subject
 containing the listed strings.  They can be empty to disable Subject
 string blocking.
 	Advanced SPF configuration.
 The sendmail access file, or another readonly database with that
 format, can be used for detail spf policy.  SPF access policy
 record are tagged with "SPF-{Result}:".  Results are
 Pass, Neutral, Softfail, Fail, PermError.  Currently supported
 policy keywords are OK, CBV, REJECT.  Currently, TempError always
 results in TEMPFAIL.
 The default policies are set in pymilter.cfg.  The defaults
 if none of the config options are set are as follows:
 SPF-Fail:	REJECT
 SPF-Softfail:	CBV
 SPF-Neutral:	OK
 SPF-PermError:	REJECT
 SPF-Pass:	OK
 The tag may be followed by a specific domain.  For instance, to
 require a Pass from aol.com:
 SPF-Neutral:aol.com	REJECT
 SPF-Softfail:aol.com	REJECT
 The CBV policy requires a valid HELO name.  If the EHLO name is 
 RFC2822 compliant, then a DSN is sent to the alleged sender.  The 
 template for the DSN is selected according to the SPF result:
 Fail:		fail.txt
 SoftFail:	softfail.txt
 Neutral:	neutral.txt
 PermError:	permerror.txt
 None:		strike3.txt
 An SPF-Pass is always accepted by the milter.  Domains can be blacklisted 
 via sendmail in the access file or via a RHS DNS blacklist.
 	To be continued.
 Forthcoming topics:
 SRS config
 pydspam config
 wiretap config
@@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
 include COPYING
 include TODO
 include NEWS
 include HOWTO
 include CREDITS
 include README
 include ChangeLog
 include MANIFEST.in
 include testsample.py
 include testmime.py
 include testbms.py
 include testdspam.py
 include rejects.py
 include report.py
 include bms.py
 include spf.py
 include cid2spf.py
@@ -19,7 +16,6 @@ include spfquery.py
 include test.py
 include sample.py
 include test/*
 include doc/*
 include Milter/*.py
 include *.spec
 include start.sh
@@ -27,5 +23,5 @@ include milter.rc
 include milter.rc7
 include milter.cfg
 include rhsbl.m4
-include *.txt
+include softfail.txt
-include *.html
+include strike3.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
 # Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 # Copyright 2001 Business Management Systems, Inc.
 # This code is under GPL.  See COPYING for details.
 import os
 import milter
 import thread
 from milter import ACCEPT,CONTINUE,REJECT,DISCARD,TEMPFAIL,	\
  set_flags, setdbg, setbacklog, settimeout, \
  ADDHDRS, CHGBODY, ADDRCPT, DELRCPT, CHGHDRS,	\
  V1_ACTS, V2_ACTS, CURR_ACTS
 try: from milter import QUARANTINE
 except: pass
 _seq_lock = thread.allocate_lock()
 _seq = 0
 def uniqueID():
  """Return a sequence number unique to this process.
  """
  global _seq
  _seq_lock.acquire()
  seqno = _seq = _seq + 1
  _seq_lock.release()
  return seqno
 class Milter:
  """A simple class interface to the milter module.
  """
  def _setctx(self,ctx):
    self.__ctx = ctx
    if ctx:
      ctx.setpriv(self)
  # user replaceable callbacks
  def log(self,*msg):
    print 'Milter:',
    for i in msg: print i,
    print
  def connect(self,hostname,unused,hostaddr):
    "Called for each connection to sendmail."
    self.log("connect from %s at %s" % (hostname,hostaddr))
    return CONTINUE
  def hello(self,hostname):
    "Called after the HELO command."
    self.log("hello from %s" % hostname)
    return CONTINUE
  def envfrom(self,f,*str):
    """Called to begin each message.
    f -> string		message sender
    str -> tuple	additional ESMTP parameters
    """
    self.log("mail from",f,str)
    return CONTINUE
  def envrcpt(self,to,*str):
    "Called for each message recipient."
    self.log("rcpt to",to,str)
    return CONTINUE
  def header(self,field,value):
    "Called for each message header."
    self.log("%s: %s" % (field,value))
    return CONTINUE
  def eoh(self):
    "Called after all headers are processed."
    self.log("eoh")
    return CONTINUE
  def body(self,unused):
    "Called to transfer the message body."
    return CONTINUE
  def eom(self):
    "Called at the end of message."
    self.log("eom")
    return CONTINUE
  def abort(self):
    "Called if the connection is terminated abnormally."
    self.log("abort")
    return CONTINUE
  def close(self):
    "Called at the end of connection, even if aborted."
    self.log("close")
    return CONTINUE
  # Milter methods which can be invoked from callbacks
  def getsymval(self,sym):
    return self.__ctx.getsymval(sym)
  # If sendmail does not support setmlreply, then only the
  # first msg line is used.
  def setreply(self,rcode,xcode=None,msg=None,*ml):
    return self.__ctx.setreply(rcode,xcode,msg,*ml)
  # Milter methods which can only be called from eom callback.
  def addheader(self,field,value):
    return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value)
  def chgheader(self,field,idx,value):
    return self.__ctx.chgheader(field,idx,value)
  def addrcpt(self,rcpt):
    return self.__ctx.addrcpt(rcpt)
  def delrcpt(self,rcpt):
    return self.__ctx.delrcpt(rcpt)
  def replacebody(self,body):
    return self.__ctx.replacebody(body)
  # When quarantined, a message goes into the mailq as if to be delivered,
  # but delivery is deferred until the message is unquarantined.
  def quarantine(self,reason):
    return self.__ctx.quarantine(reason)
  def progress(self):
    return self.__ctx.progress()
 factory = Milter
 def connectcallback(ctx,hostname,family,hostaddr):
  m = factory()
  m._setctx(ctx)
  return m.connect(hostname,family,hostaddr)
 def closecallback(ctx):
  m = ctx.getpriv()
  if not m: return CONTINUE
  rc = m.close()
  m._setctx(None)	# release milterContext
  return rc
 def envcallback(c,args):
  """Convert ESMTP parms to keyword parameters.
  Can be used in the envfrom and/or envrcpt callbacks to process
  ESMTP parameters as python keyword parameters."""
  kw = {}
  for s in args[1:]:
    pos = s.find('=')
    if pos > 0:
      kw[s[:pos]] = s[pos+1:]
  return apply(c,args,kw)
 def runmilter(name,socketname,timeout = 0):
  # This bit is here on the assumption that you will be starting this filter
  # before sendmail.  If sendmail is not running and the socket already exists,
  # libmilter will throw a warning.  If sendmail is running, this is still
  # safe if there are no messages currently being processed.  It's safer to
  # shutdown sendmail, kill the filter process, restart the filter, and then
  # restart sendmail.
  pos = socketname.find(':')
  if pos > 1:
    s = socketname[:pos]
    fname = socketname[pos+1:]
  else:
    s = "unix"
    fname = socketname
  if s == "unix" or s == "local":
    print "Removing %s" % fname
    try:
      os.unlink(fname)
    except:
      pass
  # The default flags set include everything
  # milter.set_flags(milter.ADDHDRS)
  milter.set_connect_callback(connectcallback)
  milter.set_helo_callback(lambda ctx, host: ctx.getpriv().hello(host))
  milter.set_envfrom_callback(lambda ctx,*str:
  	ctx.getpriv().envfrom(*str))
 #  	envcallback(ctx.getpriv().envfrom,str))
  milter.set_envrcpt_callback(lambda ctx,*str:
  	ctx.getpriv().envrcpt(*str))
 #  	envcallback(ctx.getpriv().envrcpt,str))
  milter.set_header_callback(lambda ctx,fld,val:
  	ctx.getpriv().header(fld,val))
  milter.set_eoh_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().eoh())
  milter.set_body_callback(lambda ctx,chunk: ctx.getpriv().body(chunk))
  milter.set_eom_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().eom())
  milter.set_abort_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().abort())
  milter.set_close_callback(closecallback)
  milter.setconn(socketname)
  if timeout > 0: milter.settimeout(timeout)
  # The name *must* match the X line in sendmail.cf (supposedly)
  milter.register(name)
  start_seq = _seq
  try:
    milter.main()
  except milter.error:
    if start_seq == _seq: raise	# couldn't start
    # milter has been running for a while, but now it can't start new threads
    raise milter.error("out of thread resources")
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ from milter import ACCEPT,CONTINUE,REJECT,DISCARD,TEMPFAIL,	\
 try: from milter import QUARANTINE
 except: pass
 __version__ = '0.8.5'
 _seq_lock = thread.allocate_lock()
 _seq = 0
@@ -44,7 +42,7 @@ class Milter:
    for i in msg: print i,
    print
-  def connect(self,hostname,family,hostaddr):
+  def connect(self,hostname,unused,hostaddr):
    "Called for each connection to sendmail."
    self.log("connect from %s at %s" % (hostname,hostaddr))
    return CONTINUE
@@ -106,8 +104,8 @@ class Milter:
    return self.__ctx.setreply(rcode,xcode,msg,*ml)
  # Milter methods which can only be called from eom callback.
-  def addheader(self,field,value,idx=-1):
+  def addheader(self,field,value):
-    return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value,idx)
+    return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value)
  def chgheader(self,field,idx,value):
    return self.__ctx.chgheader(field,idx,value)
@@ -217,6 +215,6 @@ def runmilter(name,socketname,timeout = 0):
    raise milter.error("out of thread resources")
 __all__ = globals().copy()
-for priv in ('os','milter','thread','factory','_seq','_seq_lock','__version__'):
+for priv in ('os','milter','thread','factory','_seq','_seq_lock'):
  del __all__[priv]
 __all__ = __all__.keys()
@@ -4,25 +4,97 @@
 # Send DSNs, do call back verification,
 # and generate DSN messages from a template
 # $Log$
 # Revision 1.12  2006/07/26 16:37:35  customdesigned
 # Support timeout.
 #
 # Revision 1.11  2006/06/21 21:07:11  customdesigned
 # Include header fields in DSN template.
 #
 # Revision 1.10  2006/05/24 20:56:35  customdesigned
 # Remove default templates.  Scrub test.
 #
 import smtplib
 import spf
 import socket
 from email.Message import Message
 import Milter
 import time
-def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None,timeout=600):
+nospf_msg = """Subject: Critical mail server configuration error
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
 	%(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s 
 Someone at IP address %(connectip)s sent an email claiming
 to be from %(sender)s.  
 If that wasn't you, then your domain, %(sender_domain)s,
 was forged - i.e. used without your knowlege or authorization by
 someone attempting to steal your mail identity.  This is a very
 serious problem, and you need to provide authentication for your
 SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
 domain.  The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
 with your Sender Policy.  
 For more information, see: http://spfhelp.net
 I hate to annoy you with a DSN (Delivery Status
 Notification) from a possibly forged email, but since you
 have not published a sender policy, there is no other way
 of bringing this to your attention.
 If it *was* you that sent the email, then your email domain
 or configuration is in error.  If you don't know anything
 about mail servers, then pass this on to your SMTP (mail)
 server administrator.  We have accepted the email anyway, in
 case it is important, but we couldn't find anything about
 the mail submitter at %(connectip)s to distinguish it from a
 zombie (compromised/infected computer - usually a Windows
 PC).  There was no PTR record for its IP address (PTR names
 that contain the IP address don't count).  RFC2821 requires
 that your hello name be a FQN (Fully Qualified domain Name,
 i.e. at least one dot) that resolves to the IP address of
 the mail sender.  In addition, just like for PTR, we don't
 accept a helo name that contains the IP, since this doesn't
 help to identify you.  The hello name you used,
 %(heloname)s, was invalid.
 Furthermore, there was no SPF record for the sending domain
 %(sender_domain)s.  We even tried to find its IP in any A or
 MX records for your domain, but that failed also.  We really
 should reject mail from anonymous mail clients, but in case
 it is important, we are accepting it anyway.
 We are sending you this message to alert you to the fact that
 Either - Someone is forging your domain.
 Or - You have problems with your email configuration.
 Or - Possibly both.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to
 contact me again.
 Kind regards,
 postmaster@%(receiver)s
 """
 softfail_msg = """Subject: SPF softfail (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
       %(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 """
 def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None):
  """Send DSN.  If msg is None, do callback verification.
     Mailfrom is original sender we are sending DSN or CBV to.
     Receiver is the MTA sending the DSN.
@@ -31,21 +103,17 @@ def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None,timeout=600):
  q = spf.query(None,None,None)
  mxlist = q.dns(domain,'MX')
  if not mxlist:
-    mxlist = (0,domain),	# fallback to A record when no MX
+    mxlist = (0,domain),
  else:
    mxlist.sort()
  smtp = smtplib.SMTP()
  toolate = time.time() + timeout
  for prior,host in mxlist:
    try:
      smtp.connect(host)
      code,resp = smtp.helo(receiver)
      # some wiley spammers have MX records that resolve to 127.0.0.1
-      a = resp.split()
+      if resp.split()[0] == receiver:
-      if not a:
+        return (553,'Fraudulent MX for %s' % domain)
        return (553,'MX for %s has no hostname in banner: %s' % (domain,host))
      if a[0] == receiver:
        return (553,'Fraudulent MX for %s: %s' % (domain,host))
      if not (200 <= code <= 299):
 	raise smtplib.SMTPHeloError(code, resp)
      if msg:
@@ -73,64 +141,48 @@ def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None,timeout=600):
      pass		# any other error, try next MX
    except socket.error:
      pass		# MX didn't accept connections, try next one
    except socket.timeout:
      pass		# MX too slow, try next one
    smtp.close()
    if time.time() > toolate:
      return (450,'No MX response within %f minutes'%(timeout/60.0))
  return (450,'No MX servers available')	# temp error
 def create_msg(q,rcptlist,origmsg=None,template=None):
  "Create a DSN message from a template.  Template must be '\n' separated."
  if not template:
    return None
  heloname = q.h
  sender = q.s
  connectip = q.i
  receiver = q.r
  sender_domain = q.o
  result = q.result
  perm_error = q.perm_error
  rcpt = '\n\t'.join(rcptlist)
  try: subject = origmsg['Subject']
  except: subject = '(none)'
  try:
    spf_result = origmsg['Received-SPF']
    if not spf_result.startswith('softfail'):
      spf_result = None
  except: spf_result = None
  msg = Message()
-  msg.add_header('X-Mailer','PyMilter-'+Milter.__version__)
+  msg.add_header('To',sender)
  msg.add_header('From','postmaster@%s'%receiver)
  msg.add_header('Auto-Submitted','auto-generated (configuration error)')
  msg.set_type('text/plain')
-  hdrs,body = template.split('\n\n',1)
+  if not template:
    if spf_result: template = softfail_msg
    else: template = nospf_msg
  hdrs,body = template.split('\n',1)
  for ln in hdrs.splitlines():
    name,val = ln.split(':',1)
    msg.add_header(name,(val % locals()).strip())
  msg.set_payload(body % locals())
-  # add headers if missing from old template
+
  if 'to' not in msg:
    msg.add_header('To',sender)
  if 'from' not in msg:
    msg.add_header('From','postmaster@%s'%receiver)
  if 'auto-submitted' not in msg:
    msg.add_header('Auto-Submitted','auto-generated')
  return msg
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  q = spf.query('192.168.9.50',
-  'SRS0=pmeHL=RH==stuart@example.com',
+  'SRS0=pmeHL=RH=bmsi.com=stuart@bmsi.com',
-  'red.example.com',receiver='mail.example.com')
+  'bmsred.bmsi.com',receiver='mail.bmsi.com')
-  q.result = 'softfail'
+  msg = create_msg(q,['charlie@jsconnor.com'],None,None)
  q.perm_error = None
  msg = create_msg(q,['charlie@example.com'],None,
 """From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 To: %(sender)s
 Subject: Test
 Test DSN template
 """
  )
  print msg.as_string()
  # print send_dsn(f,msg.as_string())
-  # print send_dsn(q.s,'mail.example.com',msg.as_string())
+  print send_dsn(q.s,'mail.bmsi.com',msg.as_string())
@@ -1,49 +1,5 @@
 Here is a history of user visible changes to Python milter.
-0.8.7	Move spf module to pyspf
+
 	Prevent PTR cache poisoning
 	More lame bounce heuristics
 	Do plain CBV when template is missing
 0.8.6	Support CBV timeout
 	Support fail template, headers in templates
 	Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
 	More SPF lax heuristics
 	Don't require SPF pass for white/black listing mail from trusted relay.
 	Support localpart wildcard for white and black lists.
 	Delay reject of unsigned RCPT for postmaster and abuse only
 	Fix dsn reporting of hard permerror
 	Resolve FIXME for wrap_close in miltermodule.c
 	Add Message-ID to DSNs
 	Use signed Message-ID in delayed reject to blacklist senders
 	Auto-train via blacklist and auto-whitelist
 	Don't check userlist for signed MFROM
 	Accept but skip DSPAM training for whitelisted senders without SPF PASS
 	Report GC stats 
 	Support CIDR matching for IP lists
 	Support pysrs sign feature
 	Support localpart specific SPF policy in access file
 0.8.5	Simple trusted_forwarder implementation.
 	Fix access_file neutral policy
 	Move Received-SPF header to beginning of headers
 	Supply keyword info for all results in Received-SPF header.
 	Move guessed SPF result to separate header
 	Activate smfi_insheader only when SMFIR_INSHEADER defined
 	Handle NULL MX in spf.py
 	in-process GOSSiP server support (to be extended later)
 	Expire CBV cache and renew auto-whitelist entries
 0.8.4	Auto-whitelist recipients of outgoing email.
 	Fix SPF policy via sendmail access map (case insensitive keys).
 	Train screener on whitelisted messages
 	Optional idx parameter to addheader to invoke smfi_insheader
 	Activate progress API when SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
 0.8.3   Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
 	spf_accept_fail option for braindead SPF senders 
 	  (treats fail like softfail)
 	Option to set SPF policy via sendmail access map.
 	Option to supply Sender header from MAIL FROM when missing.
 	Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
 	Send DSN for SPF errors corrected by extended processing.
 	Send DSN before SCREENED mail is quarantined
 	Use logging package to keep log lines atomic.
 0.8.2	Strict processing limits per SPF RFC
 	Fixed several parsing bugs under RFC 
 	Support official IANA SPF record (type99)
@@ -1,146 +1,54 @@
 When bms.py can't find templates, it passes None to dsn.create_msg(),
 which uses local variable as backup, which no longer exist.
 Purge old GOSSiP records nightly.
 Find and use X-GOSSiP: header for SPAM: and FP: submissions.  Would need to 
 keep tags longer.
 Generate DSNs according to RFC 3464
 Parse incoming 3464 DSNs for "Action: failed" to recognize delayed
 failures.  This works regardless of Subject.
 Get temperror policy from access file.
 When training with spam, REJECT after data so that mistakenly blacklisted
 senders at least get an error.
 Reporting explanation for failure should show source if sender
 provided explanation.
 Reports PROBATION even when rejecting message (works, but confusing in log).
 Bug in Auto-whitelist.  Recent Auto-whitelist doesn't override expired entry.
 DONE Delayed_failure detection needs to handle multi-line header fields.  
 Also, delayed_failure should be recognized when addressed to
 postmaster@helodomain 
 Need to use wildcards in blacklist.log: *.madcowsrecord.net
 Need to exclude emails like !*-admin@example.com in whitelist_sender.
 SPF permerror diagnostics should include corrected mechanism.
 Delay SPF check until RCPT TO.  Cache result to avoid repeating
 for multiple RCPT.  This avoids overhead for invalid RCPT, and
 allows for per RCPT local policy.
 Add auto-blacklisted senders to blacklist.log with timestamp.
 Received-SPF header field should show identity that was checked.
 Check SPF for outgoing mail (including local policy for internal addresses).
 This could also solve the second part of the mail from relay problem below.
 Whitelisted sender from trusted relay get PROBATION.  Need to extracted
 SPF result from headers - and in the case of mail internal to relay
 (e.g. bmsi.com), supply 'pass' result.  
 FIXME: DSN for Permerror shows 'None' for error under some condition.
 Another metaDSN format:
 Subject: Delivery Report
 ...
 Original-Envelope-ID: SRS0...@...
 For selected domains, check rcpts via CBV before accepting mail.  Cache
 results.  This will kick out dictonary attacks against a mail domain
 behind a gateway sooner.
 Allow blacklisted emails as well as domains in blacklist.log.  Use same
 data structure as autowhitelist.log.  Add emails blacklisted via CBV
 so that they are remembered across milter restarts.
 Make all dictionaries work like honeypot.  Do not train as ham unless
 whitelisted.  Train on blacklisted messages, or spam feedback.  This
 can be called Train On Error.  Should be possible to startup
 with training on everything to get dictionary built fast, then switch
 to train on error to minimize labor.
 Allow unsigned DSNs from selected domains (that don't accept signed MFROM,
 e.g. verizon.net).
 Added Message-ID header to DSN with SRS signed sender.  When seen on incoming
 rfc ignorant failure message, blacklist sender.
 Allow verified hostnames for trusted_relay.  E.g. HELO name that
 passes SPF.
 Table of sendmail macros for documentation.
 When do we get two hello calls?  STARTTLS is one reason.
 Option: accept mail from auto-whitelisted senders even with spf-fail,
 but do not update dspam.  This can be done for individual senders or domains 
 using the access file.
 pysrs: SRS doesn't get applied to proper recipients when there are
 multiple recipients.  This requires debugging cf scripts - yuk.
 auto_whitelist false_positives from quarantine - perhaps only when
 user selects special button (use special header to communicate
 that from dspamcgi.py to milter.)
 Use send_dsn.log for blacklist also.  AddrCache needs localpart
 wildcard (e.g. empty localpart).
 Quarantined mail is missing headers modified/added by milter after
 checking dspam.
 Require signed MFROM for all incoming bounces when signing all outgoing mail -
 except from trusted relays.
 Send DSN for permerror before processing extended result.  An additional
 DSN may be sent based on extended result.
 Rescind whitelist for banned extensions, in case sender is infected.
 Train honeypot on error only.
 Find rfc2822 policy for MFROM quoting.
 Support explicit errors for SPF policy in access file:
 SPF-Neutral:aol.com	ERROR:"550 AOL mail must get SPF PASS"
 Defer TEMPERROR in SPF evaluation - give precedence to security
 (only defer for PASS mechanisms).
 Option to add Received-SPF header, but never reject on SPF.
  I think the above will handle this.
 Create null config that does nothing - except maybe add Received-SPF
 headers.  Many admins would like to turn features on one at a time.
 Checking in mime.py;
 /bms/cvs/milter/mime.py,v  <--  mime.py
 new revision: 1.56; previous revision: 1.55
 done
 Checking in spf.py;
 /bms/cvs/milter/spf.py,v  <--  spf.py
 new revision: 1.18; previous revision: 1.17
 done
 Checking in testmime.py;
 /bms/cvs/milter/testmime.py,v  <--  testmime.py
 new revision: 1.19; previous revision: 1.18
 Auto whitelist based on outgoing email - perhaps with magic subject
 or recipient prefix.
 Can't output messages with malformed rfc822 attachments.
 Example malformed SPF:
 onvunvuvvx.usafisnews.org text "v=spf1 mx ptr ip4:207.44.199.970 -all"
 Move milter,Milter,mime,spf modules to pymilter
 milter package will have bms.py application
 Support SMTP AUTH and disable SPF checks when connection is authorized.
 Web admin interface
 Check valid domains allowed by internal senders to detect PCs infected
 with spam trojans.
 Do CBV (callback verification) for mail with no published SPF record.
 message log for automated stats and blacklisting
-Skip dspam when SPF pass? NO
+Skip dspam when SPF pass?
 Report 551 with rcpt on SPF fail?
 check spam keywords with character classes, e.g.
 	{a}=[a@ãä], {i}=[i1í], {e}=[eë], {o}=[o0ö]
 Implement RRS - a backdoor for non-SRS forwarders.  User lists non-SRS 
 forwarder accounts, and a util provides a special local alias for the
-user to give to the forwarder.  (Or user just adds arbitrary alias
+user to give to the forwarder.  Alias only works for mail from that
 unique to that forwarder to a database.)  Alias only works for mail from that
 forwarder.  Milter gets forwarder domain from alias and uses it to
 SPF check forwarder.
 Another special dspam user, 'honeypot', can be listed in innoculations.
 All email to those addresses is treated as known spam.
 Framework for modular Python milter components within a single VM.
 Python milters can be already be composed through sendmail by running each in
 a separate process.  However, a significant amount of memory is wasted
@@ -149,7 +57,8 @@ is cumbersome (e.g., adding mail headers, writing external files).
 Backup copies for outgoing/incoming mail.
-Copy incoming wiretap mail, even though sendmail alias works perfectly
+Allow multiple wiretap groups, each with its own destination.  Perhaps 
 also copy incoming wiretap mail, even though sendmail alias works perfectly
 for the purpose, to avoid having to change two configs for a wiretap.
 Provide a way to reload milter.cfg without stopping/restarting milter.
@@ -163,6 +72,10 @@ Keep separate ismodified flag for headers and body.  This is important
 when rejecting outgoing mail with viruses removed (so as not to
 embarrass yourself), and also removing Received headers with hidepath.
 Wrap smfi_setbacklog(int) - but it is only available in sendmail >= 8.12.3,
  so how can we detect whether to wrap it?
 Need a test module to feed sample messages to a milter though a live 
 sendmail and SMTP.  The mockup currently used is probably not very accurate,
 and doesn't test the threading code.
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
 #!/usr/bin/python2.3
 # Convert a MS Caller-ID entry (XML) to a SPF entry
 #
 # (c) 2004 by Ernesto Baschny
 # (c) 2004 Python version by Stuart Gathman
 #
 # Date: 2004-02-25
 # Version: 1.0
 #
 # Usage:
 #  ./cid2spf.pl "<ep xmlns='http://ms.net/1'>...</ep>"
 #
 # Note that the 'include' directives will also have to be checked and
 # "translated". Future versions of this script might be able to get a
 # domain name as an argument and "crawl" the DNS for the necessary
 # information.
 #
 # A complete reverse translation (SPF -> CID) might be impossible, since
 # there are no way to handle:
 # - PTR and EXISTS mechanism 
 # - MX mechanism with an different domain as argument
 # - macros
 # 
 # References:
 # http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/privacy/spam_callerid.mspx
 # http://spf.pobox.com/
 #
 # Known bugs:
 # - Currently it won't handle the exclusions provided in the A and R
 #   tags (prefix '!'). They will show up "as-is" in the SPF record
 # - I really haven't read the MS-CID specs in-depth, so there are probably
 #   other bugs too :)
 #
 # Ernesto Baschny <ernst@baschny.de>
 #
 import xml.sax
 import spf
 # -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 class CIDParser(xml.sax.ContentHandler):
  "Convert a MS Caller-ID entry (XML) to a SPF entry"
  def __init__(self,q=None):
    self.spf = []
    self.action = '-all'
    self.has_servers = None
    self.spf_entry = None
    if q:
      self.spf_query = q
    else:
      self.spf_query = spf.query(i='127.0.0.1', s='localhost', h='unknown')
  def startElement(self,tag,attr):
      if tag == 'm':
 	if self.has_servers != None and not self.has_servers:
 	  raise ValueError(
    "Declared <noMailServers\> and later <m>, this CID entry is not valid."
 	  )
 	self.has_servers = True
      elif tag == 'noMailServers':
 	if self.has_servers:
 	  raise ValueError(
    "Declared <m> and later <noMailServers\>, this CID entry is not valid."
 	  )
 	self.has_servers = False
      elif tag == 'ep':
 	if attr.has_key('testing') and attr.getValue('testing') == 'true':
 	  # A CID with 'testing' found:
 	  # From the MS-specs:
 	  #  "Documents in which such attribute is present with a true
 	  #  value SHOULD be entirely ignored (one should act as if the
 	  #  document were absent)"
 	  # From the SPF-specs:
 	  #  "Neutral (?): The SPF client MUST proceed as if a domain did
 	  #  not publish SPF data."
 	  # So we set SPF action to "neutral":
 	  self.action = '?all'
      elif tag == 'mx':
 	  # The empty MX-tag, same as SPF's MX-mechanism
 	  self.spf.append('mx')
      self.tag = tag
  def characters(self,text):
 	tag = self.tag
 	# Remove starting and trailing spaces from text:
 	text = text.strip()
 	if tag == 'a' or tag == 'r':
 	    # The A and R tags from MS-CID are both handled by the 
 	    # ipv4/6-mechanisms from SPF:
 	    if text.find(':') < 0:
 	      mechanism = 'ip4'
 	    else:
 	      mechanism = 'ip6'
 	    self.spf.append(mechanism + ':' + text)
 	elif tag == 'indirect':
 	    # MS-CID's indirect is "sort of" the include from SPF:
 	    # Not really true, because the <indirect> tag from MS-CID also 
 	    # provides a fallback in case the included domain doesn't provide
 	    # _ep-records: The inbound MX-servers of the included domains
 	    # are added to the list of allowed outgoing mailservers for the
 	    # domain that declared the _ep-record with the <indirect> tag.
 	    # In SPF you would use the 'mx:domain' to handle this, but this
 	    # wouldn't depend on referred domain having or not SPF-records.
 	    cid_xml = self.cid_txt(text)
 	    if cid_xml:
 	      p = CIDParser()
 	      xml.sax.parseString(cid_xml,p)
 	      if p.has_servers != False:
 		self.spf += p.spf
 	    else:
 	      self.spf.append('mx:' + text)
  def cid_txt(self,domain):
    q = self.spf_query
    domain='_ep.' + domain
    a = q.dns_txt(domain)
    if not a: return None
    if a[0].lower().startswith('<ep ') and a[-1].lower().endswith('</ep>'):
      return ''.join(a)
    return None
  def endElement(self,tag):
      if tag == 'ep':
 	# This is the end... assemble what we've got
 	spf_entry = ['v=spf1']
 	if self.has_servers != False:
 	  spf_entry += self.spf
 	spf_entry.append(self.action)
 	self.spf_entry = ' '.join(spf_entry)
  def spf_txt(self,cid_xml):
    if not cid_xml.startswith('<'):
      cid_xml = self.cid_txt(cid_xml)
      if not cid_xml: return None
    # Parse the beast. Any XML-problem will be reported by xlm.sax
    self.spf_entry = None
    xml.sax.parseString(cid_xml,self)
    return self.spf_entry
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  import sys
  if len(sys.argv) < 2:
    print >>sys.stderr, \
      """Usage: %s "<ep xmlns='http://ms.net/1'>...</ep>" """ % sys.argv[0]
    sys.exit(1)
  cid_xml = sys.argv[1]
  p = CIDParser()
  print p.spf_txt(cid_xml)
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
 Title: Recent Changes
 <h2> Recent Changes </h2>
 Python milter has been moved to 
 <a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/pymilter/">pymilter Sourceforge
 project</a> for development and release downloads.
 <h3> 0.8.5 </h3>
 Release 0.8.5 fixes some build bugs reported by Stephen Figgins.  It
 fixes many small things, like not auto-whitelisting recipients of
 outgoing mail when the subject contains "autoreply:".  There is a 
 simple trusted forwarder implementation.  If you have more than
 2 or so forwarders, we will need a way to "compile" SPF records into an
 IP set and TTL for it to be efficient (like libspf2 does).
 <h3> GOSSiP </h3>
 An alpha release of <a href="pygossip.html">pygossip</a> has been commited to
 CVS, module pygossip. A version of the bms.py milter has been commited to CVS
 which supports calling GOSSiP to track domain reputation in a local database.
 <h3> New website design </h3>
 Hey, I'm no artist, so I just used the
 <a href="http://ht2html.sourceforge.net/">ht2html</a> package
 by <a href="http://barry.wooz.org/">Barry Warsaw</a>.  The mascot
 is by <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/lebl.htm">Christian Hafner</a>,
 or maybe his wife.  I chose Maxwell's daemon because it tirelessly
 and invisibly sorts molecules, just as milters sort mail.
 Christian has also provided a fun 
 <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/PPS/PPS2002/Maxwell/simulation.htm">
 simulation</a> that lets you try your hand at sorting molecules.
 <h3> 0.8.4 </h3>
 Release 0.8.4 makes configuring SPF policy via access.db actually work.
 The honeypot idea is enhanced by auto-whitelisting recipients of
 email sent from selected domains.  Whitelisted messages are then used
 to train the honeypot.  This makes the honeypot screener entirely self
 training.  The smfi_progress() API is now automatically supported when present.
 An optional idx parameter to milter.addheader() invokes smfi_insheader().
 <h3> 0.8.3 </h3>
 Release 0.8.3 uses the standard logging module, and supports configuring
 more detailed SPF policy via the sendmail access map.  SMTP AUTH connections
 are considered INTERNAL.  Preventing forgery between internal domains is
 just a matter of specifying the user-domain map - I'll define something
 for the next version.  We now send DSNs when mail is quarantined (rejecting
 if DSN fails) and for SPF syntax errors (PermError).  There is an
 experimental option to add a Sender header when it is missing and the From
 domain doesn't match the MAIL FROM domain.  Next release, we may start
 renaming and replacing an existing Sender header when neither it nor the
 From domain matches MAIL FROM.  Since bogus MAIL FROMs are rejected
 (to varying degrees depending on the configured SPF policy), and
 both Sender and From and displayed by default in many email clients,
 this provides some phishing protection without rejecting mail based
 on headers.
 <h3> 0.8.2 </h3>
 Release 0.8.2 has changes to <a href="http://openspf.net">SPF</a> to bring it
 in line with the newly official RFC.  It adds 
 <a href="http://ses.codeshare.ca/">SES</a>
 support (the original SES without body hash) for pysrs-0.30.10, and honeypot
 support for pydspam-1.1.9.  There is a new method in the base milter module.
 milter.set_exception_policy(i) lets you choose a policy of CONTINUE, REJECT, or
 TEMPFAIL (default) for untrapped exceptions encountered in a milter callback.
 <h3> 0.8.0 </h3>
 Release 0.8.0 is the first <a href="http://sourceforge.net/">Sourceforge</a>
 release.  It supports Python-2.4, and provides an option to accept mail
 that gets an SPF softfail or fails the 3 strikes rule, provided the
 alleged sender accepts a DSN explaining the problem.  Python-2.3 is
 no longer supported by the reworked mime.py module, although API changes
 could be backported.  There are too many incompatible changes to the
 python email package.
 <h3> Older Releases </h3>
 Release 0.7.2 tightens the authentication screws with a "3 strikes and
 you're out" policy.  A sender must have a valid PTR, HELO, or SPF record
 to send email.  Specific senders can be whitelisted using the
 "delegate" option in the spf configuration section by adding a
 default SPF record for them.  The PTR and HELO are required
 by RFC anyway, so this is not an unreasonable requirement.
 There is now a coherent policy for an SPF softfail result.  A softfail
 is accepted if there is a valid PTR or HELO, or if the domain
 is listed in the "accept_softfail" option of the spf configuration section.
 A neutral result is accepted by default if there is a valid PTR or
 HELO, (and the SPF record was not guessed), unless the domain is listed in the
 "reject_neutral" option.  Common forms of PTR records for dynamic IPs are
 recognized, and do not count as a valid PTR.  This does not prevent anyone
 from sending mail from a dynamic IP - they just need to configure a
 valid HELO name or publish an SPF record.
 <p>
 As SPF adoption continues to rise, forged spam is not getting through.  So
 spammers are publishing their SPF records as predicted.  The 0.7.2 RPM
 now provides the <code>rhsbl</code> sendmail hack so that spammer domains
 can be blacklisted.  With the RPM installed, add a line like the following
 to your <code>sendmail.mc</code>.
 <pre>
 HACK(rhsbl,`blackholes.example.com',"550 Rejected: " $&{RHS} " has been spamming our customers.")dnl
 </pre>
 <p>
 Of course, spammers are now starting to register
 throwaway domains.  The next thing we need is a custom DNS server,
 in Python, that
 can recognize patterns.  For instance, one spammer registers ded304.com,
 ded305.com, ded306.com, etc.  We also need the custom DNS server to
 let SPF classic clients check SES (which will be part of pysrs).  
 The <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/products/twisted">Twisted Python</a>
 framework provides a custom DNS server - but I
 would like a smaller implementation for our use.
 <p>
 The RPM for release 0.7.0 moves the config file and socket locations to
 /etc/mail and /var/run/milter respectively.  We now parse Microsoft CID records
 - but only hotmail.com uses them.  They seem to have applied for a patent on
 the brilliant idea of examining the mail headers to see who the message is
 from.  We aren't doing that here, so not to worry - but I am not a lawyer, so
 if you are worried, change spf.py around line 626 to return None instead of
 calling CIDParser().  There is a new option to reject mail with no PTR
 and no SPF.
 <p>
 Microsoft is pushing an anti-opensource license for their pending patent
 along with their sender-ID proposal before the IETF.
 It is royalty free - but requires anyone distributing a binary they've
 compiled from source to sign a license agreement.  The Apache Software
 Foundation <a
 href="http://www.apache.org/foundation/docs/sender-id-position.html"> explains
 the problem with sender-ID</a>, and Debian <a
 href="http://www.debian.org/News/2004/20040904">concurs</a>.  Since 
 the <a href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/3/9/439b024b-09fd-44ee-8ff0-10e834004c36/senderid_FAQ.PDF">Microsoft license</a> is
 <a href="http://www.circleid.com/article/732_0_1_0_C/">incompatible with free
 software in general</a> and the <a
 href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-mxcomp/mail-archive/msg03678.html">GPL in
 particular</a>, Python milter will not be able to implement sender-ID in its
 current form.  This was, no doubt, Microsoft's intent all along.
 <p>
 Sender-ID attempts to do for RFC2822 headers what SPF does for RFC2821 headers.
 Unlike SPF, it has never been tried, and is encumbered by a stupid patent.  I
 recommend ignoring it and continuing to implement and improve SPF until a
 working and unencumbered proposal for RFC2822 headers surfaces.
 <p>
 <a href="http://openspf.com">
 <img src="SPF.gif" align=left alt="SPF logo"></a>
 Release 0.6.6 adds support for <a href="http://openspf.com/">SPF</a>,
 a protocol to prevent forging of the envelope from address.  
 SPF support requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">pydns</a>.
 The included spf.py module is an updated version of the original 1.6
 version at <a href="http://www.wayforward.net/spf/">wayforward.net</a>.
 The updated version tracks the draft RFC and test suite.
 <p>
 The FAQ addresses <a href="faq.html#spf">how to get started with SPF</a>.
 <p>
 Release 0.6.1 adds a full milter based dspam application.
 <p>
 I have selected the <a href="http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/">
 dspam bayes filter project</a> and <a href="dspam.html">
 packaged it for python</a>.
 Release 0.6.0 offers a simple application of dspam I call "header triage",
 which rejects messages with spammy headers.  
 To use header triage, you must have <a href="dspam.html">DSPAM</a> installed,
 and select a dictionary that is well moderated by someone who gets
 lots of spam.  That dictionary can be used to block spam that is 
 obvious from the headers (e.g. X-Mailer and Subject) before it ties
 up any more resources.  I have yet to see any false positives from this
 approach (check the milter log), but if there are, the sender will
 get a REJECT with the message "Your message looks spammy."
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
 Title: Credits
 <h1> CREDITS </h1>
 <a href="mailto:Jim Niemira <urmane@urmane.org>">Jim Niemira</a>
 wrote the original C module and some quick
 and dirty python to use it.  
 <a href="mailto:Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>">Stuart D. Gathman</a>
 took that kludge and added threading and context objects to it, wrote a proper
 OO wrapper (Milter.py) that handles attachments, did lots of testing, packaged
 it with distutils, and generally transformed it from a quick hack to a
 real, usable Python extension.
 <h2>Other contributors (in random order):</h2>
 <dl>
 <dt> <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/lebl.htm">Christian Hafner</a>
  <dd>for the pymilter mascot image of 
  <a href="http://maxwelld.netfirms.com/">
  Maxwell's daemon</a>
 <dt>Stephen Figgins
  <dd>for reporting problems building with sendmail-8.12, and when
  building milter.so for the first time.
 <dt>Dave MacQuigg 
  <dd>for noticing that smfi_insheader wasn't supported, and creating
  a template to help first time pymilter users create their own milter.
 <dt>Terence Way
  <dd>for providing a Python port of SPF
 <dt>Scott Kitterman
  <dd>for doing lots of testing and debugging of SPF against draft standard,
  and for putting up a <a href="http://www.kitterman.com/spf/validate.html">
  web page that validates SPF</a> records using spf.py
 <dt>Alexander Kourakos
  <dd>for plugging several memory leaks
 <dt>George Graf at Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration
  <dd>for handling None passed to setreply and chgheader.
 <dt>Deron Meranda
  <dd>for IPv6 patches
 <dt>Jason Erikson
  <dd>for handling NULL hostaddr in connect callback.
 <dt>John Draper
  <dd>for porting Python milter to OpenBSD, and starting to work on tutorials
  then pointing out that it would be easier to just write the MTA in Python.
 <dt>Eric S. Johansson
  <dd>for helpful design discussions while working on camram
 <dt>Alex Savguira
  <dd>for finding bugs with international headers and
  suggesting the scan_zip option.
 <dt><a href="http://www.bmsi.com">Business Management Systems</a>
  <dd>for hosting the website, and providing paying clients who need milter
  service so I can work on it as part of my day job.
 </dl>
 If I have left anybody out, send me a reminder: 
 <a href="mailto:Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>">stuart@bmsi.com</a>
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
 <!-- -*- html -*- -->
 <h3>Subsections</h3>
 <li><a href="milter.html">Introduction</a>
 <li><a href="changes.html">Changes</a>
 <li><a href="requirements.html">Requirements</a>
 <li><a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=139894">Download</a>
 <li><a href="faq.html">FAQ</a>
 <li><a href="policy.html">Policies</a>
 <li><a href="logmsgs.html">Log&nbsp;Messages</a>
 <li><a href="http://bmsi.com/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Mailing&nbsp;List</a>
 <li><a href="credits.html">CREDITS</a>
 <h3>Links</h3>
 <li><a href="http://www.milter.org/milter_api/api.html">C&nbsp;API</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.milter.org/">Milter.Org</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.python.org/">Python.Org</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.sendmail.org/">Sendmail.Org</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.openspf.org/">SPF</a>
 <li><a href="pysrs.html">pysrs</a>
 <li><a href="http://cheeseshop.python.org/pypi/pyspf">pyspf</a>
 <li><a href="http://bmsi.com/python/dspam.html">pydspam</a>
 <li><a href="http://bmsi.com/libdspam/dspam.html">libdspam</a>
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
 Title: Python Milter Log Documentation
 <style>
 DT              { font-weight: bolder; padding-top: 1em }
 </style>
 <h1> Milter Log Documentation </h1>
 The milter log from the bms.py application has a variety of "tags" in it that
 indicate what it did.
 <dl>
 <dt> DSPAM: honeypot SCREENED
 <dd> message was quarantined to the honeypot quarantine
 <dt> REJECT: hello SPF: fail 550 access denied
 <dt> REJECT: hello SPF: softfail 550 domain in transition
 <dt> REJECT: hello SPF: neutral 550 access neither permitted nor denied
 <dd> message was rejected because there was an SPF policy for the
 HELO name, and it did not pass.
 <dt> CBV: sender-17-44662668-643@bluepenmagic.com
 <dd> we performed a call back verification
 <dt> dspam
 <dd> dspam identifier was added to the message
 <dt> REJECT: spam from self: jsconnor.com
 <dd> message was reject because HELO was us (jsconnor.com)
 <dt> INNOC: richh
 <dd> message was used to update richh's dspam dictionary
 <dt> HONEYPOT: pooh@bwicorp.com
 <dd> message was sent to a honeypot address (pooh@bwicorp.com), the 
 message was added to the honeypot dspam dictionary as spam
 <dt> REJECT: numeric hello name: 63.217.19.146
 <dd> message was rejected because helo name was invalid (numeric)
 <dt> eom
 <dd> message was successfully received
 <dt> TEMPFAIL: CBV: 450 No MX servers available
 <dd> we tried to do a call back verification but could not look up 
 MX record, we told the sender to try again later
 <dt> CBV: info@emailpizzahut.com (cached)
 <dd> call back verification was needed, we had already done it recently
 <dt> abort after 0 body chars
 <dd> sender hung up on us
 <dt> REJECT: SPF fail 550 SPF fail: see 
  http://openspf.com/why.html?sender=m.hendersonxk@163.net&ip=213.47.161.100
 <dd> message was reject because its sender's spf policy said to
 <dt> REJECT: Subject: Cialis - No prescription needed!
 <dd> message was rejected because its subject contained a bad expression
 <dt> REJECT: zombie PC at  192.168.3.37  sending MAIL FROM  seajdr@amritind.com
 <dd> message was rejected because the connect ip was internal, but the
 sender was not.  This is usually because a Windows PC is infected with
 malware.
 <dt> X-Guessed-SPF: pass
 <dd> When the SPF result is NONE, we guess a result based on the generic
 SPF policy "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr".
 <dt> DSPAM: tonyc tonyc@example.com
 <dd> message was sent to tonyc@example.com and it was identified as spam 
 and placed in the tonyc dspam quarantine
 <dt> REJECT: CBV: 550 calvinalstonis@ix.netcom.com...User unknown
 <dt> REJECT: CBV: 553 sorry, that domain isn't in my list
 <dt> REJECT: CBV: 554 delivery error: dd This user doesn't have an account 
 <dd> message was rejected because call back verification gave us a fatal
 error
 <dt> Auto-Whitelist: user@example.com
 <dd> recipient has been added to auto_whitelist.log because the message
 was sent from an internal IP and the recipient is not internal.
 <dt> WHITELIST user@example.com
 <dd> message is whitelisted because sender appears in auto_whitelist.log
 <dt> BLACKLIST user@example.com
 <dd> message is blacklisted because sender appears in blacklist.log or
     failed a CBV test.
 <dt> TRAINSPAM: honeypot X-Dspam-Score: 0.002278
 <dd> message was used to train screener dictionary as spam
 <dt> TRAIN: honeypot X-Dspam-Score: 0.980203
 <dd> message was used to train screener dictionary as ham
 </dl>
 <br>
@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
 Title: Python Milter Mail Policy
 <h1> Python Milter Mail Policy </h1>
 These are the policies implemented by the <code>bms.py</code> milter
 application.  The milter and Milter modules do not implement any policies
 by themselves.  Eventually, I'll get the bms.py milter moved to its
 own package.
 <h3> Classify connection </h3>
 When the SMTP client connects, the connection IP address is
 saved for later verification, and the connection
 is classified as INTERNAL or EXTERNAL by matching the ip
 address against the <code>internal_connect</code> configuration.
 IP addresses with no PTR, and PTR names that look like
 the kind assigned to dynamic IPs (as determined by a heuristic
 algorithm) are flagged as DYNAMIC.  IPs that match the
 <code>trusted_relay</code> configuration are flagged as TRUSTED.
 <p>
 Examples from the log file (<i>not</i> the SMTP error message returned):
 <pre>
 2005Jul29 13:56:53 [71207] connect from p50863492.dip0.t-ipconnect.de at ('80.134.52.146', 1858) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74511] connect from foopub at ('1.2.3.4', 46513) EXTERNAL TRUSTED
 2005Jul29 14:41:00 [71805] connect from foobar at ('192.168.0.1', 41205) INTERNAL
 2005Jul29 14:41:15 [71806] connect from cncln.online.ln.cn at ('218.25.240.137', 35992) EXTERNAL
 </pre>
 <p>
 Certain obviously evil PTR names are blocked at this point:
 "localhost" (when IP is not 127.*) and ".".
 <pre>
 2005Jul29 14:49:50 [71918] connect from localhost at ('221.132.0.6', 50507) EXTERNAL
 2005Jul29 14:49:50 [71918] REJECT: PTR is localhost
 </pre>
 <h3> HELO Check </h3>
 The HELO name provided by the client is saved for later verification
 (for example by SPF).  We could validate the HELO at this point
 by verifying that an A record for the HELO name matches the connect ip.
 However, currently we only block certain obvious problems.  
 HELO names that look like an IP4 address 
 and ones that match the <code>hello_blacklist</code> configuration
 are immediately rejected.  The hello_blacklist typically contains
 the current MTAs own HELO name or email domains.
 Clients that attempt to skip HELO are immediately rejected.
 <pre>
 2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74512] hello from example.com
 2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74512] REJECT: spam from self: example.com
 2005Jul29 18:17:09 [74581] hello from 80.191.244.69
 2005Jul29 18:17:09 [74581] REJECT: numeric hello name: 80.191.244.69
 </pre>
 <h3> MAIL FROM Check </h3>
 Before calling our milter, sendmail checks a DNS blacklist to 
 block banned sender domains.  We never see a blocked domain.
 <p>
 The MAIL FROM address is saved for possible use by the smart-alias
 feature.  First, the <code>internal_domains</code> is used for
 a simple screening if defined.  If the MAIL FROM for an INTERNAL connection 
 is NOT in <code>internal_domains</code>, then it is rejected (the
 PC is most likely infected and attempting to send out spam).
 If the MAIL FROM for an EXTERNAL connection IS in
 <code>internal_domains</code>, then the message is immediately rejected.
 This is quick and effective for most small company MTAs.  For more
 complex mail networks, it is too simplistic, and should not be defined.
 SPF will handle the complex cases.
 <h4> wiretap </h4>
 The wiretap feature can screen and/or monitor mail to/from certain
 users.  If the MAIL FROM is being wiretapped, the recipients are
 altered accordingly.
 <!--table-stop-->
 <h2> SPF check </h2>
 Finally, the MAIL FROM, connect IP, and HELO name are checked against
 any SPF records published via DNS for the alleged sender (MAIL FROM).
 If there is no SPF record, we check for a local substitute under the
 domain defined in the <code>[spf]delegate</code> configuration.
 Further checks depend on the result.
 <table border=1>
 <tr><th>NONE</th><td>
 If there is no SPF record (official or delegated), then we 
 initiate a "three strikes and your out" regime, which looks for
 <b>some</b> form of validated identification.
 <ol>
 <li>We try a "best guess" SPF record of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr".  If this
    passes, good.  
 <li> We try to validate the HELO name. First check for an SPF record.
   Otherwise, check whether the connect IP matches any A record for
   the HELO name, or any A record for any MX name for the HELO name,
   or is at least in the same /24 subnet as any of the above.
   (In other words, a HELO SPF "best guess" of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24".)
   If so, good.  We consider the HELO validated.  If the HELO SPF
   check fails, we reject the email.
 </ol>
 <pre>
 2005Jul30 19:45:16 [93991] connect from [221.200.41.54] at ('221.200.41.54', 3581) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul30 19:45:18 [93991] hello from adelphia.net
 2005Jul30 19:45:19 [93991] mail from <wendy.stubbsua@link-it.com> ()
 2005Jul30 19:45:19 [93991] REJECT: hello SPF: fail 550 access denied
 </pre>
 <ol>
 <li> If there is a validated PTR name, and it doesn't look
   like a dynamic name, good.  We consider the connection validated.
 </ol>
 If any of the above can be validated, we continue on.
 If none of the above can be validated, and the <code>[SPF]reject_noptr</code>
 option is true, we reject the message immediately with the explanation
 that we need some form of valid identification before we accept an email.
 If <code>[SPF]reject_noptr</code> is false, we flag the message as
 needing Call Back Validation.  
 The Call Back Valildation sends a DSN to the purported sender informing
 them of the lack of identification.  If the message is legitimate, the
 sender needs to know that their email setup is broken and should be corrected.
 If the message is forged, the sender is informed of the forgery, 
 and their need to publish an SPF record or at least use a valid HELO name.
 If the purported sender does not accept the DSN,
 then the message is rejected.  The CBV status is cached to avoid
 annoying the purported sender with too many DSNs.  Currently, the DSN
 is repeated to the same sender once per month.
 <p>
 In this example, although 3com.com has no SPF record, we assume that 
 any legitimate mail from them will at least have a valid HELO or PTR.
 <pre>
 2005Jul30 23:52:03 [96777] connect from [222.252.233.200] at ('222.252.233.200', 29934) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul30 23:52:03 [96777] hello from 3mail.3com.com
 2005Jul30 23:52:04 [96777] mail from <etec_nic_family@3mail.3com.com> ()
 2005Jul30 23:52:04 [96777] REJECT: no PTR, HELO or SPF
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>PASS</th><td>
 A pass result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is 
 tracked for reputation (and may be blocked), and may skip content scanning if
 it matches a whitelist.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 17:44:26 [2104] mail from <gnucash-devel-bounces@gnucash.org> ('SIZE=4410',)
 2005Jul24 17:44:26 [2104] Received-SPF: pass (mail.bmsi.com: domain of gnucash.org
 	designates 204.107.200.65 as permitted sender)
 	client-ip=204.107.200.65; envelope-from=gnucash-devel-bounces@gnucash.org; helo=cvs.gnucash.org;
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>NEUTRAL</th><td>
 A neutral result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is not
 tracked for reputation or matched against any whitelists. 
 Highly forged domains listed in <code>[SPF]reject_neutral</code> are
 rejected.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 17:41:37 [2070] connect from cp500627-a.dbsch1.nb.home.nl at ('84.27.225.3', 3465) EXTERNAL
 2005Jul24 17:41:37 [2070] hello from cp500627-a.dbsch1.nb.home.nl
 2005Jul24 17:41:38 [2070] mail from <nwarjejkw@yahoo.com> ()
 2005Jul24 17:41:38 [2070] REJECT: SPF neutral for nwarjejkw@yahoo.com
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>SOFTFAIL</th><td>
 A softfail result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is not
 tracked for reputation or matched against any whitelists.  Furthermore,
 the message is flagged as needing Call Back Validation,
 and the highly forged domains listed in <code>[SPF]reject_neutral</code> are
 rejected as well.  
 <p>
 At present, we also require a valid HELO or PTR to avoid rejecting 
 a softfail.  But this should probably change to only require a
 successful CBV.
 <p>
 The Call Back Valildation sends a DSN to the purported sender informing
 them of the softfail.  If the message is legitimate, the sender needs
 to know about the softfail so that their email setup can be corrected.
 If the message is forged, the sender is informed of the forgery, confirming
 that SPF is protecting their reputation and encouraging a rapid transition
 to a strict policy.  If the purported sender does not accept the DSN,
 then the message is rejected.  The CBV status is cached to avoid
 annoying the purported sender with too many DSNs.  Currently, the DSN
 is repeated to the same sender once per month.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] mail from <Aitp@horafeliz.com> ()
 2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] Received-SPF: softfail (mail.bmsi.com: transitioning domain of horafeliz.com
 	does not designate 221.184.83.185 as permitted sender)
 	client-ip=221.184.83.185; envelope-from=Aitp@horafeliz.com;
 	helo=p8185-ipad30funabasi.chiba.ocn.ne.jp;
 2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] rcpt to <david@example.com> ()
 2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] Subject: Microsoft, Adobe, Macromedia, Corel software. Up to 80% discount.
 2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2605
 2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] CBV: Aitp@horafeliz.com
 2005Jul24 15:41:38 [801] REJECT: CBV: 550 <Aitp@horafeliz.com>: User unknown
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>FAIL</th><td>
 The message is rejected with a reference the SPF why page.
 <pre>
 2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] connect from [212.70.52.16] at ('212.70.52.16', 3192) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] hello from winzip.com
 2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] mail from <dan@winzip.com> ()
 2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] REJECT: SPF fail 550 SPF fail:
 	see http://openspf.com/why.html?sender=dan@winzip.com&ip=212.70.52.16
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>PERMERROR</th><td>
 Permanent errors were called "unknown", and are still show that way
 in the log.  The message is rejected.  Previously, we enabled "lax" parsing
 of the SPF record, but rejecting is better because it informs the
 sender about their problem.  The next milter version will 
 look for a local substitute SPF record (as for a missing SPF record)
 before rejecting.  This will inform the sender of their problem, but
 also let the receiver install a temporary workaround.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 18:05:37 [2312] mail from <b-mihdbcgaacaa-becibijh-000-@msg.euxiphipops.com> () 
 2005Jul24 18:05:37 [2312] REJECT: SPF unknown 550 SPF Permanent Error:
 	include mechanism missing domain: include
 </pre>
 The SPF record for msg.euxiphipops.com looked like this at the time of the
 above error:
 <pre>
 msg.euxiphipops.com	TXT "v=spf1 mx ptr a include"
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>TEMPERROR</th><td>
 Temporary errors result in a 451 "Try again later" response.  The sender
 should retry the message at a later time.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 07:33:13 [29846] mail from <quickenloans@rate.quicken.com> ('SIZE=73775', 'BODY=8BITMIME')
 2005Jul24 07:33:43 [29846] TEMPFAIL: SPF error 450 SPF Temporary Error: DNS Timeout
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 </table>
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
 Title: Requirements
 <h2> Requirements </h2>
 <menu>
 <li> While the miltermodule will work with python 1.5, you probably
 want to use python 2.0 or better.  The python code uses a number of
 python 2 features.  The email support requires python 2.4.
 <li> Python must be configured with thread support.  This is because
 pymilter uses sendmail's libmilter which requires thread support.
 <li> You must compile sendmail with libmilter enabled.  In versions of
 sendmail prior to 8.12 libmilter is marked FFR (For Future Release) and
 is not installed by default.  
 Sendmail 8.12 still does not enable libmilter by default.  You must 
 explicitly select the "MILTER" option when compiling.  
 <li> When compiling Python milter against sendmail versions earlier than
 8.13, you must set MAX_ML_REPLY to 1 in setup.py.  There is no way to tell from
 the libmilter includes that smfi_setmlreply is not supported.
 <li> You probably want to use sendmail-8.13, since that supports multi-line
 SMTP error descriptions and SOCKETMAP.  You want SOCKETMAP for use with
 pysrs.
 <li> Python milter has been tested against sendmail-8.11 through sendmail-8.13.
 <li> Python milter must be compiled for the specific version of sendmail
 it will run with.  (Since the result is dynamically loaded, there could 
 conceivably be multiple versions available and selected at startup - but
 that will have to wait.)  This situation may only exist for sendmail
 versions prior to 8.12.  The protocol seems designed for backward 
 compatibility - and 8.12 is the first official milter release.
 <li> Mea Culpa!  After reading the Python Style guide, I realize that
 my Python code is not up to snuff.  Apparently mixed tabs and spaces
 are anathema to those using Windows editors, where tabs can be expanded using
 any arbitrary algorithm.  Other than that, my
 intuition matched Guido's pretty well - although I like to indent by 2
 rather than 4.  I will arrange to have tabs expanded to spaces when
 exporting new versions.  Until then, beware!
 </menu>
 <h3> <a name="aix4"> AIX 4.1.5 Requirements </a> </h3>
 To create sendmail RPMs for AIX, you can download my AIX 4.1.5 spec files 
 for <a href="/aix/sendmail.spec">sendmail-8.11.5</a> 
 or <a href="/aix/sendmail12.spec">sendmail-8.12.3</a>.  If you have
 not already set it up, I use a <a href="/aix/aix.spec">dummy RPM package</a>
 to represent the stuff that comes with AIX.  You might also want
 my <a href="/aix/python.spec">python-2.1.1</a> spec file for AIX.  It
 does not include Tk or curses modules, sorry.  If y'all trust me, you can
 download rpms for AIX 4.x from my <a href="/aix">AIX RPM directory</a>.
 <p>
 Sendmail-8.12 renames 
 libsmutil.a to libsm.a.  Unfortunately, libsm.a is an important AIX system
 shared library.  Therefore, I rename libsm.a back to libsmutil.a for
 AIX.  This presents a problem for setup.py.
 <h3> <a name="rh72"> RedHat 7.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
 If you are running Redhat 7.2, the distributed version of sendmail
 now enables libmilter by default.  RedHat 7.2 bundles
 the development libraries with the main sendmail package, so
 there is no sendmail-devel package.  However, they forgot to include the
 headers!  So you'll have to get the SRPM and modify it.  I suggest
 moving the static libs to a devel package and adding the headers.  If
 this is too much trouble, you can get the <a href="mfapi.h">mfapi.h</a>
 header for sendmail-8.6.11 from here and manually install it as
 <code>/usr/include/libmilter/mfapi.h</code>.
 <p>
 If you do modify the SRPM, I suggest renaming libsmutil.a
 to libsm.a - just like sendmail-8.12 will.  If you manually install
 mfapi.h or don't rename libsmutil.a, you'll
 need to force <code>libs = ["milter", "smutil"]</code> in setup.py.
 <p>
 If you have installed python2, and want
 python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
 and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.   
 <h3> <a name="rh62"> Redhat 6.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
 If you are running Redhat 6.2, the distributed version of sendmail
 does not enable libmilter.  You can download the Redhat 7.2 sendmail.spec
 modified to compile on RedHat 6.2:
 <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62/sendmail-rhmilter.spec">
 sendmail-rhmilter.spec</a>.  The <a
 href="ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/SRPMS/sendmail-8.11.6-1.7.0.src.rpm">
 SRPM for sendmail-8.11.6</a> is available from
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com">Redhat</a> under 
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-106.html">
 Errata for RH6.2</a>.  But that doesn't include the latest security
 patches since RH6.2 is no longer supported.
 <p>
 If y'all trust me, you can pick up source and binary sendmail RPMs for RH6.2
 from my <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62">linux downloads</a> directory.
 The lastest RPMs were built by taking a RH7.2 SRPMS and removing some
 RPM features from the spec file that RH6.2 doesn't support, then
 recompiling on RH6.2.  You can check this by installing the RH7.2 SRPM,
 then diffing my sendmail.spec with theirs.  Then run
 "rpm -bb sendmail-rhmilter.spec" when you are satisfied.
 <p>
 If you have installed python2, and want
 python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
 and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.
 You'll need to install the sendmail-devel package to compile milter.
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
-Title: Python Milter FAQ
+<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">
 <html>
 <head>
 <title>Python Milter FAQ</title>
 </head><body>
 <h1> Python Milter <a name=faq>FAQ</a> </h1>
@@ -18,23 +22,8 @@ shows you how to install libmilter with a separate invocation of make.
 <li> Q. Why is mfapi.h not found when I try to compile Python milter on
 RedHat 7.2?
 <p>  A. RedHat forgot to include the header in the RPM.  See the
-<a href="requirements.html#rh72">RedHat 7.2 requirements</a>.
+<a href="milter.html#rh72">RedHat 7.2 requirements</a>.
 <p>
 <li> Q. Python milter compiles ok, but I get an error like this when
 	I try to import the milter module:
 <pre>
 ImportError: /usr/lib/python2.4/site-packages/milter.so: undefined symbol: smfi_setmlreply
 </pre>
 <p>  A. Your libmilter.a is from sendmail-8.12 or earlier.  You need
 	sendmail-8.13 or later to support setmlreply.  You can disable
 	setmlreply by changing setup.py.  Change:
 <pre>
            define_macros = [ ('MAX_ML_REPLY',32) ]
 </pre>
 in setup.py to
 <pre>
            define_macros = [ ('MAX_ML_REPLY',1) ]
 </pre>
 <h3> Running Python Milter </h3>
@@ -114,14 +103,13 @@ If you are running bms.py, then the block_chinese option in
 <li> Q. Why does sendmail coredump with milters on OpenBSD?
 <p>  A. Sendmail has a problem with unix sockets on old versions of OpenBSD.
-OpenBSD users report that this problem has been fixed, so upgrading
+Use an internet domain socket instead.  For example, in
 OpenBSD will fix this.  Otherwise, you can
 use an internet domain socket instead.  For example, in
 <code>sendmail.cf</code> use
 <pre>
 Xpythonfilter, S=inet:1234@localhost
 </pre>
 and change sample.py accordingly.
 <p> OpenBSD users report that this problem has been fixed.
 <p>
 <li> Q. How can I change the bounce message for an invalid recipient?
@@ -155,15 +143,10 @@ Xpythonfilter, S=local:/var/log/milter/pythonsock, F=T, T=C:5m;S:20s;R:60s;E:5m
 </pre>
 <li> Q. There is a Python traceback in the log file!  What happened to
 	my email?
-<p>  A. By default, when the milter fails with an untrapped exception, a
+<p>  A. When the milter fails with an untrapped exception, a TEMPFAIL
-TEMPFAIL result (451) is returned to the sender.  The sender will then retry
+result (451) is returned to the sender.  The sender will then retry every
-every hour or so for several days.  Hopefully, someone will notice the 
+hour or so for several days.  Hopefully, someone will notice the 
-traceback, and workaround or fix the problem.  Beginning with milter-0.8.2,
+traceback, and workaround or fix the problem.
 you can call <code>milter.set_exception_policy(milter.CONTINUE)</code>
 to cause an untrapped exception to continue processing with the
 next callback or milter instead.  For
 completeness, you can also set the exception policy to
 <code>milter.REJECT</code>.
 <li> Q. I read some notes such as "Check valid domains allowed by internal
 	senders to detect PCs infected with spam trojans." but could not
@@ -211,3 +194,4 @@ everything up for you.  For other systems:
 </ol>
 </ol>
 </html>
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tempdir = /var/log/milter/save
 log_headers = 0
 # connection ips and hostnames are matched against this glob style list
 # to recognize internal senders.
-;internal_connect = 192.168.*.*,127.*
+;internal_connect = 192.168.*.*
 # mail that is not an internal_connect and claims to be from an
 # internal domain is rejected.  Furthermore, internal mail that
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ log_headers = 0
 # flexible.  However, SPF is not currently checked for outgoing
 # (internal_connect) mail because it doesn't yet handle authorizing 
 # internal IPs locally.
-;internal_domains = mycorp.com,localhost.localdomain
+;internal_domains = mycorp.com
 # connections from a trusted relay can trust the first Received header
 # SPF checks are bypassed for internal connections and trusted relays.
@@ -31,20 +31,17 @@ log_headers = 0
 # Reject mail for domains mentioned unless user is mentioned here also
 ;check_user = joe@mycorp.com, mary@mycorp.com, file:bigcorp.com
 # Treat localparts in milter.cfg as case-insensitive
 case_sensitive_localpart = true
 # features intended to filter or block incoming mail
 [defang]
 # do virus scanning on attached messages also
-scan_rfc822 = 0
+scan_rfc822 = 1
 # do virus scanning on attached zipfiles also
 scan_zip = 0
 # Comment out scripts in HTML attachments.  Can be CPU intensive.
 scan_html = 0
 # reject messages with asian fonts because we can't read them
-block_chinese = 0
+block_chinese = 1
 # list users who hate forwarded mail
 ;block_forward = egghead@mycorp.com, busybee@mycorp.com
 # reject mail with these case insensitive strings in the subject
@@ -73,10 +70,6 @@ config=/etc/mail/pysrs.cfg
 ;fwdomain = mydomain.com
 # turn this on after a grace period to reject spoofed DSNs
 reject_spoofed = 0
 # Many braindead MTAs send DSNs with a non-DSN MFROM (e.g. to report that
 # some virus claiming to be sent by you).  This heuristic
 # refuses mail from user names commonly abused in that way.
 ;banned_users = postmaster, mailer-daemon, clamav
 # See http://spf.pobox.com for more info on SPF.
 [spf]
@@ -92,21 +85,6 @@ reject_spoofed = 0
 ;reject_noptr = 0
 # always accept softfail from these domains, or send DSN otherwise
 ;accept_softfail = bounces.amazon.com
 # Treat fail from these domains like softfail: because their SPF record
 # or an important sender is screwed up.  Must have valid HELO, however.
 ;accept_fail = custhelp.com
 # Use sendmail access map or similar format for detailed spf policy.
 # SPF entries in the access map will override any defaults set above.
 ;access_file = /etc/mail/access.db
 # Add MAIL FROM as Sender when Sender is missing and From domain
 # doesn't match MAIL FROM.  Outlook and other email clients will then display
 # something like: "Sent by sender@domain.com on behalf of from@example.com"
 ;supply_sender = 0
 # Connections that get an SPF pass for a pretend MAIL FROM of 
 # postmaster@sometrustedforwarder.com skip SPF checks for the real MAIL FROM.
 # This is for non-SRS forwarders.  It is a simple implementation that
 # is inefficient for more than a few entries.
 ;trusted_forwarder = careerbuilder.com
 # features intended to clean up outgoing mail
 [scrub]
@@ -123,22 +101,14 @@ blind = 1
 # (sendmail aliases let you monitor incoming mail)
 #
 ;users = disloyal@bigcorp.com, bigmouth@bigcorp.com
 # multiple destinations can use smart_alias
 ;dest = spy@bigcorp.com
 # discard outgoing mail without alerting sender
 # can be used in conjunction with wiretap to censor outgoing mail
 ;discard_users = canned@bigcorp.com
 # archive copies all delivered mail to a file
 ;mail_archive = /var/log/mail_archive
 #
 # smart aliases trigger on both sender and recipient
 #   alias = sender, recipient[, destination]
 #
-[smart_alias]
+;smart_alias = copycust,walter
 # multiple wiretap monitors.  Smart aliases are applied after wiretap.
 ;spy1 = disloyal@bigcorp.com,spy@bigcorp.com
 ;spy2 = bigmouth@bigcorp.com,spy@bigcorp.com
 # mail from client@clientcorp.com to sue@bigcorp.com is redirected to 
 # local alias copycust
 ;copycust = client@clientcorp.com,sue@bigcorp.com
@@ -149,7 +119,7 @@ blind = 1
 ;walter1 = cust@othercorp.com,walter@bigcorp.com,boss@bigcorp.com,
 ;	walter@bigcorp.com
 ;bulk = soruce@telex.com,bob@jsconnor.com
-;bulk1 = soruce@telex.com,larry@jsconnor.com,bulk
+;bulk = soruce@telex.com,larry@jsconnor.com
 # See http://bmsi.com/python/dspam.html
 [dspam]
@@ -158,13 +128,7 @@ blind = 1
 # only EXTERNAL messages are dspam filtered
 ;dspam_dict=/var/lib/dspam/moderator.dict
-# Recipients of mail sent from these senders are added to the auto_whitelist.
+# Opt-opt recipients from dspam screening and header triage
 # Auto_whitelisted senders with an SPF PASS are never rejected by dspam, and
 # messages from auto_whitelisted senders will be used to train screener
 # dictionaries as innocent mail.
 ;whitelist_senders = @mycorp.com
 # Opt-out recipients entirely from dspam screening and header triage
 ;dspam_exempt=getitall@mycorp.com
 # Do not scan mail (ostensibly) from these senders
 ;dspam_whitelist=getitall@sender.com
@@ -1,29 +1,33 @@
-Title: Python Milters
+<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
 <title>Python Milters</title>
 </head><body>
 <P ALIGN="CENTER"><A HREF="http://www.anybrowser.org/campaign/">
-<IMG SRC="http://bmsi.com/art/brain1.gif"
+<IMG SRC="/art/brain1.gif"
 ALT="Viewable With Any Browser" BORDER="0"></A>
-<img src="http://bmsi.com/art/banner_4.gif" width="468" height="60" border="0"
+<img src="/art/banner_4.gif" width="468" height="60" border="0"
 	usemap="#banner_4" alt="Your vote?">
 <map name="banner_4">
  <area shape="rect" coords="330,25,426,59"
  	href="http://education-survey.org/" alt="I Disagree">
  <area shape="rect" coords="234,28,304,57" href="http://www.honestEd.com/" alt="I Agree">
 </map>
 </P>
-<img src="Maxwells.gif" alt="Maxwell's Daemon: pymilter mascot" align=left>
+</P>
 <h1 align=center>Sendmail Milters in Python</h1>
 <h4 align=center>by <a href="mailto:%75%72%6D%61%6E%65%40%6E%65%75%72%61l%61%63%63%65%73%73%2E%63%6F%6D">Jim Niemira</a>
  and <a href="mailto:%73%74%75%61%72%74%40%62%6D%73%69%2E%63%6F%6D">
  Stuart D. Gathman</a><br>
 This web page is written by Stuart D. Gathman<br>and<br>sponsored by
 <a href="http://www.bmsi.com">Business Management Systems, Inc.</a> <br>
-Last updated Dec 29, 2005</h4>
+Last updated Jun 09, 2005</h4>
 See the <a href="faq.html">FAQ</a> | <a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=139894">Download now</a> |
-<a href="http://bmsi.com/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Subscribe to mailing list</a> |
+<a href="/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Subscribe to mailing list</a> |
 <a href="#overview">Overview</a> |
 <a href="/python/dspam.html">pydspam</a> |
 <a href="/libdspam/dspam.html">libdspam</a>
@@ -41,6 +45,151 @@ separation features to enhance security.  Even better, sendmail 8.13
 supports socket maps, which makes <a href="pysrs.html">pysrs</a> much more
 efficient and secure.  I recommend upgrading.
 <h2> Recent Changes </h2>
 Python milter is being moved to 
 <a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/pymilter/">pymilter Sourceforge
 project</a> for development.
 <p>
 Release 0.8.0 is the first <a href="http://sourceforge.net/">Sourceforge</a>
 release.  It supports Python-2.4, and provides an option to accept mail
 that gets an SPF softfail or fails the 3 strikes rule, provided the
 alleged sender accepts a DSN explaining the problem.  Python-2.3 is
 no longer supported by the reworked mime.py module, although API changes
 could be backported.  There are too many incompatible changes to the
 python email package.
 <p>
 Release 0.7.2 tightens the authentication screws with a "3 strikes and
 you're out" policy.  A sender must have a valid PTR, HELO, or SPF record
 to send email.  Specific senders can be whitelisted using the
 "delegate" option in the spf configuration section by adding a
 default SPF record for them.  The PTR and HELO are required
 by RFC anyway, so this is not an unreasonable requirement.
 There is now a coherent policy for an SPF softfail result.  A softfail
 is accepted if there is a valid PTR or HELO, or if the domain
 is listed in the "accept_softfail" option of the spf configuration section.
 A neutral result is accepted by default if there is a valid PTR or
 HELO, (and the SPF record was not guessed), unless the domain is listed in the
 "reject_neutral" option.  Common forms of PTR records for dynamic IPs are
 recognized, and do not count as a valid PTR.  This does not prevent anyone
 from sending mail from a dynamic IP - they just need to configure a
 valid HELO name or publish an SPF record.
 <p>
 As SPF adoption continues to rise, forged spam is not getting through.  So
 spammers are publishing their SPF records as predicted.  The 0.7.2 RPM
 now provides the <code>rhsbl</code> sendmail hack so that spammer domains
 can be blacklisted.  With the RPM installed, add a line like the following
 to your <code>sendmail.mc</code>.
 <pre>
 HACK(rhsbl,`blackholes.example.com',"550 Rejected: " $&{RHS} " has been spamming our customers.")dnl
 </pre>
 <p>
 Of course, spammers are now starting to register
 throwaway domains.  The next thing we need is a custom DNS server,
 in Python, that
 can recognize patterns.  For instance, one spammer registers ded304.com,
 ded305.com, ded306.com, etc.  We also need the custom DNS server to
 let SPF classic clients check SES (which will be part of pysrs).  
 The <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/products/twisted">Twisted Python</a>
 framework provides a custom DNS server - but I
 would like a smaller implementation for our use.
 <p>
 The RPM for release 0.7.0 moves the config file and socket locations to
 /etc/mail and /var/run/milter respectively.  We now parse Microsoft CID records
 - but only hotmail.com uses them.  They seem to have applied for a patent on
 the brilliant idea of examining the mail headers to see who the message is
 from.  We aren't doing that here, so not to worry - but I am not a lawyer, so
 if you are worried, change spf.py around line 626 to return None instead of
 calling CIDParser().  There is a new option to reject mail with no PTR
 and no SPF.
 <p>
 Microsoft is pushing an anti-opensource license for their pending patent
 along with their sender-ID proposal before the IETF.
 It is royalty free - but requires anyone distributing a binary they've
 compiled from source to sign a license agreement.  The Apache Software
 Foundation <a
 href="http://www.apache.org/foundation/docs/sender-id-position.html"> explains
 the problem with sender-ID</a>, and Debian <a
 href="http://www.debian.org/News/2004/20040904">concurs</a>.  Since 
 the <a href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/3/9/439b024b-09fd-44ee-8ff0-10e834004c36/senderid_FAQ.PDF">Microsoft license</a> is
 <a href="http://www.circleid.com/article/732_0_1_0_C/">incompatible with free
 software in general</a> and the <a
 href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-mxcomp/mail-archive/msg03678.html">GPL in
 particular</a>, Python milter will not be able to implement sender-ID in its
 current form.  This was, no doubt, Microsoft's intent all along.
 <p>
 Sender-ID attempts to do for RFC2822 headers what SPF does for RFC2821 headers.
 Unlike SPF, it has never been tried, and is encumbered by a stupid patent.  I
 recommend ignoring it and continuing to implement and improve SPF until a
 working and unencumbered proposal for RFC2822 headers surfaces.
 <p>
 <a href="http://openspf.com">
 <img src="SPF.gif" align=left alt="SPF logo"></a>
 Release 0.6.6 adds support for <a href="http://openspf.com/">SPF</a>,
 a protocol to prevent forging of the envelope from address.  
 SPF support requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">pydns</a>.
 The included spf.py module is an updated version of the original 1.6
 version at <a href="http://www.wayforward.net/spf/">wayforward.net</a>.
 The updated version tracks the draft RFC and test suite.
 <p>
 The FAQ addresses <a href="faq.html#spf">how to get started with SPF</a>.
 <p>
 Release 0.6.1 adds a full milter based dspam application.
 <p>
 I have selected the <a href="http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/">
 dspam bayes filter project</a> and <a href="dspam.html">
 packaged it for python</a>.
 Release 0.6.0 offers a simple application of dspam I call "header triage",
 which rejects messages with spammy headers.  
 To use header triage, you must have <a href="dspam.html">DSPAM</a> installed,
 and select a dictionary that is well moderated by someone who gets
 lots of spam.  That dictionary can be used to block spam that is 
 obvious from the headers (e.g. X-Mailer and Subject) before it ties
 up any more resources.  I have yet to see any false positives from this
 approach (check the milter log), but if there are, the sender will
 get a REJECT with the message "Your message looks spammy."
 <h2> Enough Already! </h2>
 Nearly a dozen people have emailed me begging for a feature to copy
 outgoing and/or incoming mail to a backup directory by user.  Ok, it
 looks like this is a most requested feature for 0.5.6.  In the meantime,
 here are some things to consider:
 <ul>
 <li> If you want to equivalent of a Bcc added to each message, this
 is very easy to do in the python code for bms.py.   See below.
 <li> If you want to copy to a file in a directory (thus avoiding having to
 set up aliases), this is slightly more involved.  The bms.py milter already
 copies the message to a temporary file for use in replacing the message body
 when banned attachments are found.  You have to open a file, and copy the
 Mesage object to it in eom().
 <li> Finally, you are probably aware that most email clients already
 keep a copy of outgoing mail?  Presumably there is a good reason for
 keeping another copy on the server.
 </ul>
 <p>
 To Bcc a message, call <code>self.add_recipient(rcpt)</code> in envfrom after
 determining whether you want to copy (e.g. whether the sender is local).  For
 example,
 <pre>
  def envfrom(...
    ...
    if len(t) == 2:
      self.rejectvirus = t[1] in reject_virus_from
      if t[0] in wiretap_users.get(t[1],()):
 	self.add_recipient(wiretap_dest)
      if t[1] == 'mydomain.com':
        self.add_recipient('&lt;copy-%s&gt;' % t[0])
      ...
 </pre>
 <p>
 To make this a generic feature requires thinking about how the configuration
 would look.  Feel free to make specific suggestions about config file
 entries.  Be sure to handle both Bcc and file copies, and designating what
 mail should be copied.  How should "outgoing" be defined?  Implementing it is
 easy once the configuration is designed.
 <h3><a name=overview>Overview</a></h3>
 This package provides a robust toolkit for Python <a
@@ -88,8 +237,6 @@ content filtering.  SPF checking
 requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">
 pydns</a>.  Configuration documentation is currently included as comments
 in the <a href="milter.cfg">sample config file</a> for the bms.py milter.
 See also the <a href="HOWTO">HOWTO</a> and <a href="logmsgs.html">
 Milter Log Message Tags</a>.
 <p>
 Python milter is under GPL.  The authors can probably be convinced to
 change this to LGPL if needed.
@@ -221,14 +368,8 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
 <td>0.5.5</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.3.3</td><td>8.13.1</td>
 <td>0.7.2</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.5</td>
 <td>0.8.4</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat 8.0</td><td>gcc-3.2</td><td>2.2.1</td><td>8.12.6</td>
 <td>0.5.2</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat 9.0</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.1</td>
 <td>0.8.2</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat EL3</td><td>gcc-3.2.3</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.5</td>
 <td>0.8.4</td><tr>
 <td>Debian Linux</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.1</td><td>8.12.0</td>
 <td>0.3.7</td><tr>
 <td>Debian Linux</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>8.12.7</td>
@@ -239,8 +380,8 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
 <td>0.3.4</td><tr>
 <td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.3</td><td>8.12.3</td>
 <td>0.4.2</td><tr>
-<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.1</td>
+<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.2.3</td><td>8.13.1</td>
-<td>0.8.4</td><tr>
+<td>0.7.1</td><tr>
 <td>Slackware 7.1</td><td>?</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.1</td>
 <td>0.3.8</td><tr>
 <td>Slackware 9.0</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.2.3</td><td>8.12.9</td>
@@ -254,54 +395,108 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
 <td>FreeBSD</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>?</td>
 <td>0.5.5</td><tr>
 <td>FreeBSD 4.4</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.10</td>
-<td>0.6.6</td>
+<td>0.6.6</td><tr>
 </table>
-<h2> Enough Already! </h2>
+<h3> Requirements </h3>
-Nearly a dozen people have emailed me begging for a feature to copy
+<menu>
-outgoing and/or incoming mail to a backup directory by user.  Ok, it
+<li> While the miltermodule will work with python 1.5, you probably
-looks like this is a most requested feature for 0.5.6.  In the meantime,
+want to use python 2.0 or better.  The python code uses a number of
-here are some things to consider:
+python 2 features.
-<ul>
+<li> Python must be configured with thread support.  This is because
-<li> If you want to equivalent of a Bcc added to each message, this
+sendmail's libmilter requires thread support.
-is very easy to do in the python code for bms.py.   See below.
+<li> You must compile sendmail with libmilter enabled.  In versions of
-<li> If you want to copy to a file in a directory (thus avoiding having to
+sendmail prior to 8.12 libmilter is marked FFR (For Future Release) and
-set up aliases), this is slightly more involved.  The bms.py milter already
+is not installed by default.  
-copies the message to a temporary file for use in replacing the message body
+Sendmail 8.12 still does not enable libmilter by default.  You must 
-when banned attachments are found.  You have to open a file, and copy the
+explicitly select the "MILTER" option when compiling.  
-Mesage object to it in eom().
+<li> Python milter has been tested against sendmail-8.11 and sendmail-8.12.
-<li> Finally, you are probably aware that most email clients already
+<li> Python milter must be compiled for the specific version of sendmail
-keep a copy of outgoing mail?  Presumably there is a good reason for
+it will run with.  (Since the result is dynamically loaded, there could 
-keeping another copy on the server.
+conceivably be multiple versions available and selected at startup - but
-</ul>
+that will have to wait.)  This situation may only exist for sendmail
-<p>
+versions prior to 8.12.  The protocol seems designed for backward 
-To Bcc a message, call <code>self.add_recipient(rcpt)</code> in envfrom after
+compatibility - and 8.12 is the first official milter release.
-determining whether you want to copy (e.g. whether the sender is local).  For
+<li> Mea Culpa!  After reading the Python Style guide, I realize that
-example,
+my Python code is not up to snuff.  Apparently mixed tabs and spaces
-<pre>
+are anathema to those using Windows editors, where tabs can be expanded using
-  def envfrom(...
+any arbitrary algorithm.  Other than that, my
-    ...
+intuition matched Guido's pretty well - although I like to indent by 2
-    if len(t) == 2:
+rather than 4.  I will arrange to have tabs expanded to spaces when
-      self.rejectvirus = t[1] in reject_virus_from
+exporting new versions.  Until then, beware!
-      if t[0] in wiretap_users.get(t[1],()):
+</menu>
 	self.add_recipient(wiretap_dest)
      if t[1] == 'mydomain.com':
        self.add_recipient('&lt;copy-%s&gt;' % t[0])
      ...
 </pre>
 <p>
 To make this a generic feature requires thinking about how the configuration
 would look.  Feel free to make specific suggestions about config file
 entries.  Be sure to handle both Bcc and file copies, and designating what
 mail should be copied.  How should "outgoing" be defined?  Implementing it is
 easy once the configuration is designed.
 <h3> <a name="aix4"> AIX 4.1.5 Requirements </a> </h3>
 To create sendmail RPMs for AIX, you can download my AIX 4.1.5 spec files 
 for <a href="/aix/sendmail.spec">sendmail-8.11.5</a> 
 or <a href="/aix/sendmail12.spec">sendmail-8.12.3</a>.  If you have
 not already set it up, I use a <a href="/aix/aix.spec">dummy RPM package</a>
 to represent the stuff that comes with AIX.  You might also want
 my <a href="/aix/python.spec">python-2.1.1</a> spec file for AIX.  It
 does not include Tk or curses modules, sorry.  If y'all trust me, you can
 download rpms for AIX 4.x from my <a href="/aix">AIX RPM directory</a>.
 <p>
 Sendmail-8.12 renames 
 libsmutil.a to libsm.a.  Unfortunately, libsm.a is an important AIX system
 shared library.  Therefore, I rename libsm.a back to libsmutil.a for
 AIX.  This presents a problem for setup.py.
 <h3> <a name="rh72"> RedHat 7.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
 If you are running Redhat 7.2, the distributed version of sendmail
 now enables libmilter by default.  RedHat 7.2 bundles
 the development libraries with the main sendmail package, so
 there is no sendmail-devel package.  However, they forgot to include the
 headers!  So you'll have to get the SRPM and modify it.  I suggest
 moving the static libs to a devel package and adding the headers.  If
 this is too much trouble, you can get the <a href="mfapi.h">mfapi.h</a>
 header for sendmail-8.6.11 from here and manually install it as
 <code>/usr/include/libmilter/mfapi.h</code>.
 <p>
 If you do modify the SRPM, I suggest renaming libsmutil.a
 to libsm.a - just like sendmail-8.12 will.  If you manually install
 mfapi.h or don't rename libsmutil.a, you'll
 need to force <code>libs = ["milter", "smutil"]</code> in setup.py.
 <p>
 If you have installed python2, and want
 python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
 and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.   
 <h3> <a name="rh62"> Redhat 6.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
 If you are running Redhat 6.2, the distributed version of sendmail
 does not enable libmilter.  You can download the Redhat 7.2 sendmail.spec
 modified to compile on RedHat 6.2:
 <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62/sendmail-rhmilter.spec">
 sendmail-rhmilter.spec</a>.  The <a
 href="ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/SRPMS/sendmail-8.11.6-1.7.0.src.rpm">
 SRPM for sendmail-8.11.6</a> is available from
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com">Redhat</a> under 
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-106.html">
 Errata for RH6.2</a>.  But that doesn't include the latest security
 patches since RH6.2 is no longer supported.
 <p>
 If y'all trust me, you can pick up source and binary sendmail RPMs for RH6.2
 from my <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62">linux downloads</a> directory.
 The lastest RPMs were built by taking a RH7.2 SRPMS and removing some
 RPM features from the spec file that RH6.2 doesn't support, then
 recompiling on RH6.2.  You can check this by installing the RH7.2 SRPM,
 then diffing my sendmail.spec with theirs.  Then run
 "rpm -bb sendmail-rhmilter.spec" when you are satisfied.
 <p>
 If you have installed python2, and want
 python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
 and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.
 You'll need to install the sendmail-devel package to compile milter.
 <hr>
 <p>
 <a href="http://validator.w3.org/check/referer">
-<img border=0 src="http://bmsi.com/vh32.png" alt=" [ Valid HTML 3.2! ] " height=31 width=88></a>
+<img border=0 src="/vh32.png" alt=" [ Valid HTML 3.2! ] " height=31 width=88></a>
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com">
-<img src="http://bmsi.com/art/powered_by.gif" width="88" height="31" alt=" [ Powered By Red Hat Linux ] " border="0"></a>
+<img src="/art/powered_by.gif" width="88" height="31" alt=" [ Powered By Red Hat Linux ] " border="0"></a>
 </p>
 </body></html>
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # chkconfig: 2345 80 30
 # description: Milter is a process that filters messages sent through sendmail.
 # processname: milter
-# config: /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
+# config: /var/log/milter/bms.py
 # pidfile: /var/run/milter/milter.pid
 python="python2.3"
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # chkconfig: 2345 80 30
 # description: Milter is a process that filters messages sent through sendmail.
 # processname: milter
-# config: /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
+# config: /var/log/milter/bms.py
 # pidfile: /var/run/milter/milter.pid
 python="python2.3"
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
 %define name milter
-%define version 0.8.7
+%define version 0.8.2
-%define release 1
+%define release 2.RH7
 # what version of RH are we building for?
-%define redhat7 0
+%define redhat9 0
 %define redhat7 1
 %define redhat6 0
 # Options for Redhat version 6.x:
-# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh7 1"
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh6 1"
-%{?rh7:%define redhat7 1}
+%{?rh6:%define redhat7 0}
 %{?rh6:%define redhat6 1}
 # some systems dont have initrddir defined
 %{?_initrddir:%define _initrddir /etc/rc.d/init.d}
-%if %{redhat7} # Redhat 7.x and earlier (multiple ps lines per thread)
+%if %{redhat9}
 %define sysvinit milter.rc7
 %else	
 %define sysvinit milter.rc
 %else	# Redhat 7.x and earlier (multiple ps lines per thread)
 %define sysvinit milter.rc7
 %endif
 # RH9, other systems (single ps line per process)
 %ifos Linux
@@ -36,29 +39,23 @@ Prefix: %{_prefix}
 Vendor: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 Packager: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 Url: http://www.bmsi.com/python/milter.html
-Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.13
+Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.12.10
 %ifos Linux
 Requires: chkconfig
 %endif
-BuildRequires: %{python}-devel >= 2.4, sendmail-devel >= 8.13
+BuildRequires: %{python}-devel , sendmail-devel >= 8.12.10
 %description
 This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
 attach to sendmail's libmilter functionality.  Additional python
-modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts, sending
+modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts.
 DSNs, and doing CBV.
 %prep
 %setup
-#patch -p0 -b .bms
+#%patch -p1
 %build
-%if %{redhat7}
+env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" %{python} setup.py build
  LDFLAGS="-s"
 %else # Redhat builds debug packages after 7.3
  LDFLAGS="-g"
 %endif
 env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" %{python} setup.py build
 %install
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
@@ -66,7 +63,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail
 mkdir $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter/save
-cp bms.py *.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
+cp bms.py strike3.txt softfail.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
 cp milter.cfg $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
 # logfile rotation
@@ -89,8 +86,6 @@ cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/cron.daily/milter <<'EOF'
 #!/bin/sh
 find /var/log/milter/save -mtime +7 | xargs $R rm
 # work around memory leak
 /etc/init.d/milter condrestart
 EOF
 chmod a+x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/cron.daily/milter
@@ -151,7 +146,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %files -f INSTALLED_FILES
 %defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc README HOWTO ChangeLog NEWS TODO CREDITS sample.py
+%doc README NEWS TODO CREDITS sample.py
 /etc/logrotate.d/milter
 /etc/cron.daily/milter
 %ifos aix4.1
@@ -165,74 +160,12 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %dir /var/log/milter/save
 %config /var/log/milter/start.sh
 %config /var/log/milter/bms.py
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/strike3.txt
+%config /var/log/milter/strike3.txt
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/softfail.txt
+%config /var/log/milter/softfail.txt
 %config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/neutral.txt
 %config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/quarantine.txt
 %config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/permerror.txt
 %config(noreplace) /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
 /usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack/rhsbl.m4
 %changelog
 * Sat Nov 04 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.7-1
 - More lame bounce heuristics
 - SPF moved to pyspf RPM
 - wiretap archive option
 - Do plain CBV if missing template
 * Tue May 23 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.6-2
 - Support CBV timeout
 - Support fail template, headers in templates
 - Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
 - More SPF lax heuristics
 - Don't require SPF pass for white/black listing mail from trusted relay.
 - Support localpart wildcard for white and black lists.
 * Thu Feb 23 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.6-1
 - Delay reject of unsigned RCPT for postmaster and abuse only
 - Fix dsn reporting of hard permerror
 - Resolve FIXME for wrap_close in miltermodule.c
 - Add Message-ID to DSNs
 - Use signed Message-ID in delayed reject to blacklist senders
 - Auto-train via blacklist and auto-whitelist
 - Don't check userlist for signed MFROM
 - Accept but skip DSPAM and training for whitelisted senders without SPF PASS
 - Report GC stats 
 - Support CIDR matching for IP lists
 - Support pysrs sign feature
 - Support localpart specific SPF policy in access file
 * Thu Dec 29 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.5-1
 - Simple trusted_forwarder implementation.
 - Fix access_file neutral policy
 - Move Received-SPF header to beginning of headers
 - Supply keyword info for all results in Received-SPF header.
 - Move guessed SPF result to separate header
 - Activate smfi_insheader only when SMFIR_INSHEADER defined
 - Handle NULL MX in spf.py
 - in-process GOSSiP server support (to be extended later)
 - Expire CBV cache and renew auto-whitelist entries
 * Fri Oct 21 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.4-2
 - Don't supply sender when MFROM is subdomain of header from/sender.
 - Don't send quarantine DSN for DSNs
 - Skip dspam for replies/DSNs to signed MFROM
 * Thu Oct 20 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.4-1
 - Fix SPF policy via sendmail access map (case insensitive keys).
 - Auto whitelist senders, train screener on whitelisted messages
 - Optional idx parameter to addheader to invoke smfi_insheader
 - Activate progress when SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
 * Wed Oct 12 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.3-1
 - Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
 - spf_accept_fail option for braindead SPF senders (treats fail like softfail)
 - Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
 - Send DSN for SPF errors corrected by extended processing.
 - Send DSN before SCREENED mail is quarantined
 - Option to set SPF policy via sendmail access map.
 - Option to supply Sender header from MAIL FROM when missing.
 - Use logging package to keep log lines atomic.
 * Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-4
 - Limit each CNAME chain independently like PTR and MX
 * Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-3
 - Limit CNAME lookups (regression)
 * Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-2
 - Handle corrupt ZIP attachments
 * Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-1
 - Strict processing limits per SPF RFC
 - Fixed several parsing bugs under RFC 
@@ -241,6 +174,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 - Extended SPF processing results beyond strict RFC limits
 - Support original SES for local bounce protection (requires pysrs-0.30.10)
 - Callback exception processing option in milter module
 - Handle corrupt ZIP attachments
 * Thu Jun 16 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.1-1
 - Fix zip in zip loop in mime.py
 - Fix HeaderParseError in bms.py header callback
@@ -34,18 +34,6 @@ $ python setup.py help
     libraries=["milter","smutil","resolv"]
 * $Log$
 * Revision 1.9  2005/12/23 21:46:36  customdesigned
 * Compile on sendmail-8.12 (ifdef SMFIR_INSHEADER)
 *
 * Revision 1.8  2005/10/20 23:23:36  customdesigned
 * Include smfi_progress is SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
 *
 * Revision 1.7  2005/10/20 23:04:46  customdesigned
 * Add optional idx for position of added header.
 *
 * Revision 1.6  2005/07/15 22:18:17  customdesigned
 * Support callback exception policy
 *
 * Revision 1.5  2005/06/24 04:20:07  customdesigned
 * Report context allocation error.
 *
@@ -289,7 +277,7 @@ _find_context(PyObject *c) {
  if (c->ob_type == &milter_ContextType) {
    milter_ContextObject *self = (milter_ContextObject *)c;
    ctx = self->ctx;
-    if (ctx != NULL && smfi_getpriv(ctx) != self)
+    if (smfi_getpriv(ctx) != self)
      ctx = NULL;
  }
  if (ctx == NULL)
@@ -297,6 +285,23 @@ _find_context(PyObject *c) {
  return ctx;
 }
 /* Release the Python Context for a SMFICTX.  */
 static void
 _clear_context(SMFICTX *ctx) {
  milter_ContextObject *self = smfi_getpriv(ctx);
  if (self) {
    PyThreadState *t = self->t;
    PyEval_AcquireThread(t);
    self->t = 0;
    self->ctx = 0;
    smfi_setpriv(ctx,0);
    Py_DECREF(self);
    PyThreadState_Clear(t);
    PyEval_ReleaseThread(t);
    PyThreadState_Delete(t);
  }
 }
 static void
 milter_Context_dealloc(PyObject *s) {
  milter_ContextObject *self = (milter_ContextObject *)s;
@@ -530,19 +535,13 @@ milter_set_exception_policy(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
  return NULL;
 }
 static void
 _release_thread(PyThreadState *t) {
  if (t != NULL)
    PyEval_ReleaseThread(t);
 }
 /** Report and clear any python exception before returning to libmilter. 
  The interpreter is locked when we are called, and we unlock it.  */
 static int _report_exception(milter_ContextObject *self) {
  if (PyErr_Occurred()) {
    PyErr_Print();
    PyErr_Clear();	/* must clear since not returning to python */
-    _release_thread(self->t);
+    PyEval_ReleaseThread(self->t);
    switch (exception_policy) {
      case SMFIS_REJECT:
 	smfi_setreply(self->ctx, "554", "5.3.0", "Filter failure");
@@ -553,7 +552,7 @@ static int _report_exception(milter_ContextObject *self) {
    }
    return SMFIS_CONTINUE;
  }
-  _release_thread(self->t);
+  PyEval_ReleaseThread(self->t);
  return SMFIS_CONTINUE;
 }
@@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ _generic_wrapper(milter_ContextObject *self, PyObject *cb, PyObject *arglist) {
  retval = PyInt_AsLong(result);
  Py_DECREF(result);
  if (PyErr_Occurred()) return _report_exception(self);
-  _release_thread(self->t);
+  PyEval_ReleaseThread(self->t);
  return retval;
 }
@@ -769,23 +768,17 @@ milter_wrap_close(SMFICTX *ctx) {
  PyObject *cb = close_callback;
  milter_ContextObject *self = smfi_getpriv(ctx);
  int r = SMFIS_CONTINUE;
-  if (self != NULL) {
+  if (self != NULL && cb != NULL && self->ctx == ctx) {
-    PyThreadState *t = self->t;
+    PyObject *arglist;
-    PyEval_AcquireThread(t);
+    PyEval_AcquireThread(self->t);
-    self->t = 0;
+    arglist = Py_BuildValue("(O)", self);
    if (cb != NULL && self->ctx == ctx) {
      PyObject *arglist = Py_BuildValue("(O)", self);
      /* Call python close callback, but do not ReleaseThread, because
       * self->t is NULL */
    r = _generic_wrapper(self, cb, arglist);
  }
-    self->ctx = 0;
+  /* FIXME: It is inefficient to have released the interp lock only to
-    smfi_setpriv(ctx,0);
+     acquire it again in _clear_context.  We can tell _generic_return and
-    Py_DECREF(self);
+     friends not to release the lock by, for instance, setting self->t to NULL.
-    PyThreadState_Clear(t);
+     However, first we make it work. */
-    PyEval_ReleaseThread(t);
+  _clear_context(ctx);
    PyThreadState_Delete(t);
  }
  return r;
 }
@@ -974,39 +967,28 @@ milter_setreply(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
 }
 static char milter_addheader__doc__[] =
-"addheader(field, value, idx=-1) -> None\n\
+"addheader(field, value) -> None\n\
 Add a header to the message. This header is not passed to other\n\
 filters. It is not checked for standards compliance;\n\
 the mail filter must ensure that no protocols are violated\n\
 as a result of adding this header.\n\
 field - header field name\n\
 value - header field value\n\
 idx - optional position in internal header list to insert new header\n\
 Both are strings.  This function can only be called from the EOM callback.";
 static PyObject *
 milter_addheader(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
  char *headerf;
  char *headerv;
  int idx = -1;
  SMFICTX *ctx;
  PyThreadState *t;
-  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "ss|i:addheader", &headerf, &headerv, &idx))
+  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "ss:addheader", &headerf, &headerv)) return NULL;
    return NULL;
  ctx = _find_context(self);
  if (ctx == NULL) return NULL;
  t = PyEval_SaveThread();
-#ifdef SMFIR_INSHEADER
+  return _thread_return(t,smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv),
  return _thread_return(t, (idx < 0) ? smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv) :
      smfi_insheader(ctx, idx, headerf, headerv), "cannot add header");
 #else
  if (idx < 0)
    return _thread_return(t, smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv),
 			 "cannot add header");
  PyErr_SetString(MilterError, "insheader not supported");
  return NULL;
 #endif
 }
 static char milter_chgheader__doc__[] =
@@ -1161,7 +1143,7 @@ milter_quarantine(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
 }
 #endif
-#ifdef SMFIR_PROGRESS
+#if _FFR_SMFI_PROGRESS
 static char milter_progress__doc__[] =
 "progress() -> None\n\
 Notify the MTA that we are working on a message so it will reset timeouts.";
@@ -1192,7 +1174,7 @@ static PyMethodDef context_methods[] = {
 #ifdef SMFIF_QUARANTINE
  { "quarantine",  milter_quarantine,  METH_VARARGS, milter_quarantine__doc__},
 #endif
-#ifdef SMFIR_PROGRESS
+#if _FFR_SMFI_PROGRESS
  { "progress",  milter_progress,  METH_VARARGS, milter_progress__doc__},
 #endif
  { NULL, NULL }
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
 To: %(sender)s
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: SPF %(result)s (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (sender verification)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
       %(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 Your sender policy (or lack thereof) indicated that the above email was not
 sent via an authorized SMTP server, but may still be legitimate.  Since there
 is no positive confirmation that the message is really from you, we have
 to give it extra scrutiny - including verifying that the sender really
 exists by sending you this DSN.  We will remember this sender and not
 bother you again for a while.  You can avoid this message entirely for
 legitimate mail by using an authorized SMTP server.  Contact your mail
 administrator and ask how to configure your email client to use an
 authorized server.  
 If you never sent the above message, then your domain has been forged.
 Your mail admin needs to publish a strict SPF record so that I can reject
 those forgeries instead of bugging you about them.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
 Kind regards,
 postmaster@%(receiver)s
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
 To: %(sender)s
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: Critical SPF configuration error
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
 	%(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s 
 Your spf record has a permanent error.  The error was:
 	%(perm_error)s
 We will reinterpret your record using "lax" processing heuristics
 which may result in your mail being accepted anyway.  But you or your
 mail administrator need to fix your SPF record as soon as possible.
 We are sending you this message to alert you to the fact that
 you have problems with your email configuration.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to
 contact me again.
 Kind regards,
 postmaster@%(receiver)s
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
 To: %(sender)s
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: DELIVERY STATUS (POSSIBLE SPAM)
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (content analysis)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
       %(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 A statistical analysis of your message has classified it as junk mail,
 and it has been quarantined.  Eventually, the recipients will review
 their quarantined mail and may notice your message.  If your message is
 important, please contact them via other means.  You may also try sending
 them a simple plain text message.
 If you never sent the above message, then your domain, %(sender_domain)s,
 was forged - i.e. used without your knowlege or authorization by
 someone attempting to steal your mail identity.  This is a very
 serious problem, and you need to provide authentication for your
 SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
 domain.  The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
 with your Sender Policy.  
 For more information, see: http://www.openspf.org
 Your mail admin needs to publish a strict SPF record so that I can reject
 those forgeries instead of bugging you with them.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
 Kind regards,
 postmaster@%(receiver)s
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
 # Analyze milter log to find abusers
 import traceback
 import sys
 def parse_addr(a):
  beg = a.find('<')
  end = a.find('>')
  if beg >= 0:
    if end > beg: return a[beg+1:end]
  return a
 class Connection(object):
  def __init__(self,dt,tm,id,ip=None,conn=None):
    self.dt = dt
    self.tm = tm
    self.id = id
    if ip:
      _,self.host,self.ip = ip.split(None,2)
    elif conn:
      self.ip = conn.ip
      self.host = conn.host
      self.helo = conn.helo
    self.subject = None
    self.rcpt = []
    self.mfrom = None
    self.helo = None
    self.innoc = []
    self.whitelist = False
 def connections(fp):
  conndict = {}
  termdict = {}
  for line in fp:
    if line.startswith('{'): continue
    a = line.split(None,4)
    if len(a) < 4: continue
    dt,tm,id,op = a[:4]
    if (id,op) == ('bms','milter'):
      # FIXME: optionally yield all partial connections in conndict
      conndict = {}
      termdict = {}
      continue
    if id[0] == '[' and id[-1] == ']':
      try:
 	key = int(id[1:-1])
      except:
        print >>sys.stderr,'bad id:',line.rstrip()
 	continue
    else: continue
    if op == 'connect':
      ip = a[4].rstrip()
      conn = Connection(dt,tm,id,ip=ip)
      conndict[key] = conn
    elif op in (
 	'DISCARD:','TAG:','CBV:','Large','No',
 	'NOTE:','From:','Sender:','TRAIN:'):
      continue
    else:
      op = op.lower()
      try:
 	conn = conndict[key]
      except KeyError:
        try:
 	  conn = termdict[key]
 	  del termdict[key]
 	  conndict[key] = conn
 	except KeyError:
 	  print >>sys.stderr,'key error:',line.rstrip()
 	  continue
      try:
 	if op == 'subject:':
 	  if len(a) > 4:
 	    conn.subject = a[4].rstrip()
 	elif op == 'innoc:':
 	  conn.innoc.append(a[4].rstrip())
 	elif op == 'whitelist':
 	  conn.whitelist = True
 	elif op == 'x-mailer:':
 	  if len(a) > 4:
 	    conn.mailer = a[4].rstrip()
        elif op == 'x-guessed-spf:':
          conn.spfguess = a[4]
 	elif op == 'received-spf:':
 	  conn.spfres,conn.spfmsg = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op == 'received:':
 	  conn.received = a[4].rstrip()
 	elif op == 'temp':
 	  _,conn.tempfile = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op == 'srs':
 	  _,conn.srsrcpt = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op == 'mail':
 	  _,conn.mfrom = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op == 'rcpt':
 	  _,rcpt = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	  conn.rcpt.append(rcpt)
 	elif op == 'hello':
 	  _,conn.helo = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op in ('eom','dspam','abort'):
 	  del conndict[key]
 	  conn.enddt = dt
 	  conn.endtm = tm
 	  conn.result = op
 	  yield conn
 	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
 	elif op in ('reject:','dspam:','tempfail:','reject','fail:','honeypot:'):
 	  del conndict[key]
 	  conn.enddt = dt
 	  conn.endtm = tm
 	  conn.result = op
 	  conn.resmsg = a[4].rstrip()
 	  yield conn
 	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
 	elif op in ('fp:','spam:'):
 	  del conndict[key]
 	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
 	else:
 	  print >>sys.stderr,'unknown op:',line.rstrip()
      except Exception:
 	print >>sys.stderr,'error:',line.rstrip()
        traceback.print_exc()
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  import gzip
  for fn in sys.argv[1:]:
    if fn.endswith('.gz'):
      fp = gzip.open(fn)
    else:
      fp = open(fn)
    for conn in connections(fp):
      if conn.rcpt and conn.mfrom:
        for r in conn.rcpt:
 	  if r.lower().find('iancarter') > 0: break
 	else:
 	  if conn.mfrom.lower().find('iancarter') < 0: continue
 	print >>sys.stderr,conn.result,conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn.subject,parse_addr(conn.mfrom),
 	for a in conn.rcpt:
 	  print parse_addr(a),
 	print
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 [bdist_rpm]
-python=python2.4
+python=python2
 doc_files=README NEWS TODO
 packager=Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
-release=1
+release=2.4
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ import sys
 from distutils.core import setup, Extension
 # FIXME: on some versions of sendmail, smutil is renamed to sm
 # on slackware and debian, leave it out entirely.  It depends
 # on how libmilter was built by the sendmail package.
 libs = ["milter", "smutil"]
 # patch distutils if it can't cope with the "classifiers" or
@@ -14,14 +12,13 @@ if sys.version < '2.2.3':
  DistributionMetadata.classifiers = None
  DistributionMetadata.download_url = None
-# NOTE: importing Milter to obtain version fails when milter.so not built
+setup(name = "milter", version = "0.8.2",
 setup(name = "milter", version = '0.8.7',
 	description="Python interface to sendmail milter API",
 	long_description="""\
 This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
 attach to sendmail's libmilter functionality.  Additional python
 modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts, and
-sending DSNs or doing CBVs.
+querying SPF records.
 """,
 	author="Jim Niemira",
 	author_email="urmane@urmane.org",
@@ -29,12 +26,11 @@ sending DSNs or doing CBVs.
 	maintainer_email="stuart@bmsi.com",
 	license="GPL",
 	url="http://www.bmsi.com/python/milter.html",
-	py_modules=["mime"],
+	py_modules=["mime","spf"],
 	packages = ['Milter'],
 	ext_modules=[
 	  Extension("milter", ["miltermodule.c"],
 	    libraries=libs,
 	    # set MAX_ML_REPLY to 1 for sendmail < 8.13
 	    define_macros = [ ('MAX_ML_REPLY',32) ]
 	  ),
 	],
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
-To: %(sender)s
+Subject: SPF softfail (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: SPF %(result)s (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
@@ -17,9 +14,7 @@ Subject: %(subject)s
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 Your sender policy indicated that the above email was likely forged and that
-feedback was desired for debugging.  If you are sending from a foreign ISP,
+feedback was desired.
 then you may need to follow your home ISPs instructions for configuring
 your outgoing mail server.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
 #!/usr/bin/python2.3
 # Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 # Copyright 2004 Business Management Systems, Inc.
 # This code is under the GNU General Public License.  See COPYING for details.
 # $Log$
 # Revision 1.1.1.1  2005/05/31 18:07:19  customdesigned
 # Release 0.6.9
 #
 # Revision 2.3  2004/04/19 22:12:11  stuart
 # Release 0.6.9
 #
 # Revision 2.2  2004/04/18 03:29:35  stuart
 # Pass most tests except -local and -rcpt-to
 #
 # Revision 2.1  2004/04/08 18:41:15  stuart
 # Reject numeric hello names
 #
 # Driver for SPF test system
 import spf
 import sys
 from optparse import OptionParser
 class PerlOptionParser(OptionParser):
    def _process_args (self, largs, rargs, values):
        """_process_args(largs : [string],
                         rargs : [string],
                         values : Values)
        Process command-line arguments and populate 'values', consuming
        options and arguments from 'rargs'.  If 'allow_interspersed_args' is
        false, stop at the first non-option argument.  If true, accumulate any
        interspersed non-option arguments in 'largs'.
        """
        while rargs:
            arg = rargs[0]
            # We handle bare "--" explicitly, and bare "-" is handled by the
            # standard arg handler since the short arg case ensures that the
            # len of the opt string is greater than 1.
            if arg == "--":
                del rargs[0]
                return
            elif arg[0:2] == "--":
                # process a single long option (possibly with value(s))
                self._process_long_opt(rargs, values)
            elif arg[:1] == "-" and len(arg) > 1:
                # process a single perl style long option
 		rargs[0] = '-' + arg
                self._process_long_opt(rargs, values)
            elif self.allow_interspersed_args:
                largs.append(arg)
                del rargs[0]
            else:
 		return
 def format(q):
  res,code,txt = q.check()
  print res
  if res in ('pass','neutral','unknown'): print
  else: print txt
  print 'spfquery:',q.get_header_comment(res)
  print 'Received-SPF:',q.get_header(res,'spfquery')
 def main(argv):
  parser = PerlOptionParser()
  parser.add_option("--file",dest="file")
  parser.add_option("--ip",dest="ip")
  parser.add_option("--sender",dest="sender")
  parser.add_option("--helo",dest="hello_name")
  parser.add_option("--local",dest="local_policy")
  parser.add_option("--rcpt-to",dest="rcpt")
  parser.add_option("--default-explanation",dest="explanation")
  parser.add_option("--sanitize",type="int",dest="sanitize")
  parser.add_option("--debug",type="int",dest="debug")
  opts,args = parser.parse_args(argv)
  if opts.ip:
    q = spf.query(opts.ip,opts.sender,opts.hello_name,local=opts.local_policy)
    if opts.explanation:
      q.set_default_explanation(opts.explanation)
    format(q)
  if opts.file:
    if opts.file == '0':
      fp = sys.stdin
    else:
      fp = open(opts.file,'r')
    for ln in fp:
      ip,sender,helo,rcpt = ln.split(None,3)
      q = spf.query(ip,sender,helo,local=opts.local_policy)
      if opts.explanation:
 	q.set_default_explanation(opts.explanation)
      format(q)
    fp.close()
 if __name__ == "__main__":
  import sys
  main(sys.argv[1:])
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
 To: %(sender)s
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: Critical mail server configuration error
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
@@ -26,7 +23,7 @@ SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
 domain.  The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
 with your Sender Policy.  
-For more information, see: http://openspf.org
+For more information, see: http://openspf.com
 I hate to annoy you with a DSN (Delivery Status
 Notification) from a possibly forged email, but since you
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 import unittest
 import doctest
 import Milter
 import bms
 import mime
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ class TestMilter(bms.bmsMilter):
  def getsymval(self,name):
    if name == 'j': return 'test.milter.org'
-    return ''
+    return bms.bmsMilter.getsymval(self,name)
  def replacebody(self,chunk):
    if self._body:
@@ -238,7 +237,7 @@ class BMSMilterTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
    milter = TestMilter()
    milter.connect('testSmartAlias')
    # test smart alias feature
-    key = ('foo@example.com','baz@bat.com')
+    key = ('foo@bar.com','baz@bat.com')
    bms.smart_alias[key] = ['ham@eggs.com']
    rc = milter.feedMsg('test8',key[0],key[1])
    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
@@ -285,10 +284,7 @@ class BMSMilterTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
 #    self.failUnless(rc == Milter.REJECT)
 #    milter.close();
-def suite(): 
+def suite(): return unittest.makeSuite(BMSMilterTestCase,'test')
  s = unittest.makeSuite(BMSMilterTestCase,'test')
  s.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(bms))
  return s
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  if len(sys.argv) > 1:
@@ -300,5 +296,4 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
      fp = milter._body
      sys.stdout.write(fp.getvalue())
  else:
-    #unittest.main()
+    unittest.main()
    unittest.TextTestRunner().run(suite())