This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create tag 'milter-0_8_1-b1'.

Sprout from bmsi 2005-05-31 18:23:49 UTC Stuart Gathman <stuart@gathman.org> 'Development changes since 0.7.2' Cherrypick from master 2005-06-17 02:07:20 UTC Stuart Gathman <stuart@gathman.org> 'Release 0.8.1': COPYING MANIFEST.in Milter/__init__.py Milter/dsn.py Milter/dynip.py NEWS TODO bms.py faq.html milter.cfg milter.html milter.spec miltermodule.c mime.py setup.cfg setup.py softfail.txt spf.py spfquery.py strike3.txt test/zip1 test/ziploop testmime.py
2005-06-17 02:07:21 +00:00
56 changed files with 2692 additions and 4617 deletions
@@ -5,16 +5,10 @@ wrapper (Milter.py) that handles attachments, did lots of testing, packaged
 it with distutils, and generally transformed it from a quick hack to a
 real, usable Python extension.
-Other contributors (in random order):
+Other contributors:
 Dave MacQuigg 
  for noticing that smfi_insheader wasn't supported, and creating
  a template to help first time pymilter users create their own milter.
 Terence Way
  for providing a Python port of SPF
 Scott Kitterman
  for doing lots of testing and debugging of SPF against draft standard,
  and for putting up a web page that validates SPF records using spf.py
 Alexander Kourakos
  for plugging several memory leaks
 George Graf at Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration
@@ -28,9 +22,6 @@ John Draper
  then pointing out that it would be easier to just write the MTA in Python.
 Eric S. Johansson
  for helpful design discussions while working on camram
 Alex Savguira
  for finding bugs with international headers and
  suggesting the scan_zip option.
 Business Management Systems - http://www.bmsi.com
  for hosting the website, and providing paying clients who need milter service
  so I can work on it as part of my day job.
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
 # Revision 1.69  2006/11/04 22:09:39  customdesigned
 # Another lame DSN heuristic.  Block PTR cache poisoning attack.
 #
 # Revision 1.68  2006/10/04 03:46:01  customdesigned
 # Fix defaults.
 #
 # Revision 1.67  2006/10/01 01:44:06  customdesigned
 # case_sensitive_localpart option, more delayed bounce heuristics,
 # optional smart_alias section.
 #
 # Revision 1.66  2006/07/26 16:42:26  customdesigned
 # Support CBV timeout
 #
 # Revision 1.65  2006/06/21 22:22:00  customdesigned
 # Handle multi-line headers in delayed dsns.
 #
 # Revision 1.64  2006/06/21 21:12:04  customdesigned
 # More delayed reject token headers.
 # Don't require HELO pass for CBV.
 #
 # Revision 1.63  2006/05/21 03:41:44  customdesigned
 # Fail dsn
 #
 # Revision 1.61  2006/05/17 21:28:07  customdesigned
 # Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
 #
 # Revision 1.60  2006/05/12 16:14:48  customdesigned
 # Don't require SPF pass for white/black listing mail from trusted relay.
 # Support localpart wildcard for white and black lists.
 #
 # Revision 1.59  2006/04/06 18:14:17  customdesigned
 # Check whitelist/blacklist even when not checking SPF (e.g. trusted relay).
 #
 # Revision 1.58  2006/03/10 20:52:49  customdesigned
 # Use re to recognize failure DSNs.
 #
 # Revision 1.57  2006/03/07 20:50:54  customdesigned
 # Use signed Message-ID in delayed reject to blacklist senders
 #
 # Revision 1.56  2006/02/24 02:12:54  customdesigned
 # Properly report hard PermError (lax mode fails also) by always setting
 # perm_error attribute with PermError exception.  Improve reporting of
 # invalid domain PermError.
 #
 # Revision 1.55  2006/02/17 05:04:29  customdesigned
 # Use SRS sign domain list.
 # Accept but do not use for training whitelisted senders without SPF pass.
 # Immediate rejection of unsigned bounces.
 #
 # Revision 1.54  2006/02/16 02:16:36  customdesigned
 # User specific SPF receiver policy.
 #
 # Revision 1.53  2006/02/12 04:15:01  customdesigned
 # Remove spf dependency for iniplist
 #
 # Revision 1.52  2006/02/12 02:12:08  customdesigned
 # Use CIDR notation for internal connect list.
 #
 # Revision 1.51  2006/02/12 01:13:58  customdesigned
 # Don't check rcpt user list when signed MFROM.
 #
 # Revision 1.50  2006/02/09 20:39:43  customdesigned
 # Use CIDR notation for trusted_relay iplist
 #
 # Revision 1.49  2006/01/30 23:14:48  customdesigned
 # put back eom condition
 #
 # Revision 1.48  2006/01/12 20:31:24  customdesigned
 # Accelerate training via whitelist and blacklist.
 #
 # Revision 1.47  2005/12/29 04:49:10  customdesigned
 # Do not auto-whitelist autoreplys
 #
 # Revision 1.46  2005/12/28 20:17:29  customdesigned
 # Expire and renew AddrCache entries
 #
 # Revision 1.45  2005/12/23 22:34:46  customdesigned
 # Put guessed result in separate header.
 #
 # Revision 1.44  2005/12/23 21:47:07  customdesigned
 # Move Received-SPF header to top.
 #
 # Revision 1.43  2005/12/09 16:54:01  customdesigned
 # Select neutral DSN template for best_guess
 #
 # Revision 1.42  2005/12/01 22:42:32  customdesigned
 # improve gossip support.
 # Initialize srs_domain from srs.srs config property.  Should probably
 # always block unsigned DSN when signing all.
 #
 # Revision 1.41  2005/12/01 18:59:25  customdesigned
 # Fix neutral policy.  pobox.com -> openspf.org
 #
 # Revision 1.40  2005/11/07 21:22:35  customdesigned
 # GOSSiP support, local database only.
 #
 # Revision 1.39  2005/10/31 00:04:58  customdesigned
 # Simple implementation of trusted_forwarder list.  Inefficient for
 # more than 1 or 2 entries.
 #
 # Revision 1.38  2005/10/28 19:36:54  customdesigned
 # Don't check internal_domains for trusted_relay.
 #
 # Revision 1.37  2005/10/28 09:30:49  customdesigned
 # Do not send quarantine DSN when sender is DSN.
 #
 # Revision 1.36  2005/10/23 16:01:29  customdesigned
 # Consider MAIL FROM a match for supply_sender when a subdomain of From or Sender
 #
 # Revision 1.35  2005/10/20 18:47:27  customdesigned
 # Configure auto_whitelist senders.
 #
 # Revision 1.34  2005/10/19 21:07:49  customdesigned
 # access.db stores keys in lower case
 #
 # Revision 1.33  2005/10/19 19:37:50  customdesigned
 # Train screener on whitelisted messages.
 #
 # Revision 1.32  2005/10/14 16:17:31  customdesigned
 # Auto whitelist refinements.
 #
 # Revision 1.31  2005/10/14 01:14:08  customdesigned
 # Auto whitelist feature.
 #
 # Revision 1.30  2005/10/12 16:36:30  customdesigned
 # Release 0.8.3
 #
 # Revision 1.29  2005/10/11 22:50:07  customdesigned
 # Always check HELO except for SPF pass, temperror.
 #
 # Revision 1.28  2005/10/10 23:50:20  customdesigned
 # Use logging module to make logging threadsafe (avoid splitting log lines)
 #
 # Revision 1.27  2005/10/10 20:15:33  customdesigned
 # Configure SPF policy via sendmail access file.
 #
 # Revision 1.26  2005/10/07 03:23:40  customdesigned
 # Banned users option.  Experimental feature to supply Sender when
 # missing and MFROM domain doesn't match From.  Log cipher bits for
 # SMTP AUTH.  Sketch access file feature.
 #
 # Revision 1.25  2005/09/08 03:55:08  customdesigned
 # Handle perverse MFROM quoting.
 #
 # Revision 1.24  2005/08/18 03:36:54  customdesigned
 # Don't innoculate with SCREENED mail.
 #
 # Revision 1.23  2005/08/17 19:35:27  customdesigned
 # Send DSN before adding message to quarantine.
 #
 # Revision 1.22  2005/08/11 22:17:58  customdesigned
 # Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
 #
 # Revision 1.21  2005/08/04 21:21:31  customdesigned
 # Treat fail like softfail for selected (braindead) domains.
 # Treat mail according to extended processing results, but
 # report any PermError that would officially result via DSN.
 #
 # Revision 1.20  2005/08/02 18:04:35  customdesigned
 # Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
 #
 # Revision 1.19  2005/07/20 03:30:04  customdesigned
 # Check pydspam version for honeypot, include latest pyspf changes.
 #
 # Revision 1.18  2005/07/17 01:25:44  customdesigned
 # Log as well as use extended result for best guess.
 #
 # Revision 1.17  2005/07/15 20:25:36  customdesigned
 # Use extended results processing for best_guess.
 #
 # Revision 1.16  2005/07/14 03:23:33  customdesigned
 # Make SES package optional.  Initial honeypot support.
 #
 # Revision 1.15  2005/07/06 04:05:40  customdesigned
 # Initial SES integration.
 #
 # Revision 1.14  2005/07/02 23:27:31  customdesigned
 # Don't match hostnames for internal connects.
 #
 # Revision 1.13  2005/07/01 16:30:24  customdesigned
 # Always log trusted Received and Received-SPF headers.
 #
 # Revision 1.12  2005/06/20 22:35:35  customdesigned
 # Setreply for rejectvirus.
 #
 # Revision 1.11  2005/06/17 02:07:20  customdesigned
 # Release 0.8.1
 #
 # Revision 1.10  2005/06/16 18:35:51  customdesigned
 # Ignore HeaderParseError decoding header
 #
 # Revision 1.9  2005/06/14 21:55:29  customdesigned
 # Check internal_domains for outgoing mail.
 #
 # Revision 1.8  2005/06/06 18:24:59  customdesigned
 # Properly log exceptions from pydspam
 #
 # Revision 1.7  2005/06/04 19:41:16  customdesigned
 # Fix bugs from testing RPM
 #
 # Revision 1.6  2005/06/03 04:57:05  customdesigned
 # Organize config reader by section.  Create defang section.
 #
 # Revision 1.5  2005/06/02 15:00:17  customdesigned
 # Configure banned extensions.  Scan zipfile option with test case.
 #
 # Revision 1.4  2005/06/02 04:18:55  customdesigned
 # Update copyright notices after reading article on /.
 #
 # Revision 1.3  2005/06/02 02:09:00  customdesigned
 # Record timestamp in send_dsn.log
 #
 # Revision 1.2  2005/06/02 01:00:36  customdesigned
 # Support configurable templates for DSNs.
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
 On Sun, 11 Feb 2007, Rick Saul wrote:
 > Stuart I was planning to move to centos4.4 in a couple of weeks anyway... 
 > Your advice of where to go from here. 
 Oh - you are asking for a howto.
 	Step one.  Which DSPAM is right for you?
 The DSPAM project makes dspam part of the LDA (Local Delivery Agent).
 Pydspam puts dspam into the MTA (Mail Transfer Agent - sendmail with pymilter).
 The advantage of doing dspam in the LDA is that any aliasing has already been
 resolved.  You need only configure mailboxes.
 The advantage of doing dspam in the MTA is it can screen an entire 
 company as a gateway with multiple domains.  Unfortunately, this
 means you have to tell it about all the aliases that comprise each
 account.  (Also, pydspam is still uses dspam-2.6.5.2 - the Dspam API
 has changed for newer versions.)
 If the LDA is right for you, you'll want to use the official Dspam 
 package.  http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/
 If the MTA approach is what you want, then pydspam is what you want.
 In either case, you will still want pymilter to block forgeries, Windows 
 executables, etc.
 So, lets assume you want to install pymilter, and may or may not
 wish to install pydspam.
 	Step two.  Obtaining RPMS.
 For basic pymilter you'll need:
 python-2.4
 milter-0.8.7
 sendmail-8.13.x	(with milter support enabled)
 and for SPF you'll need:
 pydns-2.3.0-2.4
 pyspf-2.0.3-2.py24
 and for SRS you'll need:
 pysrs-0.30.11-1.py24
 I'm pretty sure you will want to have SPF and SRS available.
 	Step three.  Activate basic milter.
 Activate the basic milter and pysrs by editing /etc/mail/sendmail.mc and adding:
 define(`NO_SRS_FILE',`/etc/mail/no-srs-mailers')dnl
 dnl define(`NO_SRS_FROM_LOCAL')dnl
 HACK(`pysrs',`/var/run/milter/pysrs')dnl
 INPUT_MAIL_FILTER(`pythonfilter', `S=local:/var/run/milter/pythonsock, F=T, T=C:5m;S:20s;R:5m;E:5m')
 You can then "make sendmail.cf" and restart sendmail.
 Start milter and pysrs with "service milter start", "service pysrs start".
 Tail /var/log/milter/milter.log while SMTP clients connect to your
 sendmail instance.  This should show you what the milter is doing.
 By default, milter-0.8.7 rejects on SPF fail.
 	Step four.  Tweaking the basic config.
 Most pymilter configuration is in /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg.  To activate
 changes, "service milter restart".
 By default, milter scans attachments for executable extensions.  You can
 turn this off by setting banned_exts to the empty list.  There are options
 to scan ZIP attachments and rfc822 attachments.  When it finds a banned
 file type, milter saves the original message in /var/log/milter/save,
 and replaces the attachment with a plain text warning message.
 Configure hello_blacklist with your own helo name and domains - which
 you know cannot legitimately be used by external MTAs.
 Configure trusted_relay with your secondary MX servers, if any.  These
 should also run pymilter with similar policies.  (But this isn't
 needed for initial testing.)
 Configure internal_connect with subnets of your internal SMTP clients.
 Internal connections skip SPF testing and other policies.  You will
 likely need to set this to allow outgoing mail if you have
 an SPF policy already.
 Configure internal_domains with domains used by your internal SMTP clients.
 If they attempt to use any other domain, the attempt is blocked and the
 client is logged as a "zombie".  Conversely, any attempt by an external
 MTA to use one of your internal domains is treated as a forgery and
 blocked (a simplified form of local SPF).
 Adjust porn_words and spam_words - these block emails with a Subject
 containing the listed strings.  They can be empty to disable Subject
 string blocking.
 	Advanced SPF configuration.
 The sendmail access file, or another readonly database with that
 format, can be used for detail spf policy.  SPF access policy
 record are tagged with "SPF-{Result}:".  Results are
 Pass, Neutral, Softfail, Fail, PermError.  Currently supported
 policy keywords are OK, CBV, REJECT.  Currently, TempError always
 results in TEMPFAIL.
 The default policies are set in pymilter.cfg.  The defaults
 if none of the config options are set are as follows:
 SPF-Fail:	REJECT
 SPF-Softfail:	CBV
 SPF-Neutral:	OK
 SPF-PermError:	REJECT
 SPF-Pass:	OK
 The tag may be followed by a specific domain.  For instance, to
 require a Pass from aol.com:
 SPF-Neutral:aol.com	REJECT
 SPF-Softfail:aol.com	REJECT
 The CBV policy requires a valid HELO name.  If the EHLO name is 
 RFC2822 compliant, then a DSN is sent to the alleged sender.  The 
 template for the DSN is selected according to the SPF result:
 Fail:		fail.txt
 SoftFail:	softfail.txt
 Neutral:	neutral.txt
 PermError:	permerror.txt
 None:		strike3.txt
 An SPF-Pass is always accepted by the milter.  Domains can be blacklisted 
 via sendmail in the access file or via a RHS DNS blacklist.
 	To be continued.
 Forthcoming topics:
 SRS config
 pydspam config
 wiretap config
 -- 
 	      Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
    Business Management Systems Inc.  Phone: 703 591-0911 Fax: 703 591-6154
 "Confutatis maledictis, flammis acribus addictis" - background song for
 a Microsoft sponsored "Where do you want to go from here?" commercial.
@@ -1,29 +1,20 @@
 include COPYING
 include TODO
 include NEWS
 include HOWTO
 include CREDITS
 include README
 include ChangeLog
 include MANIFEST.in
 include testsample.py
 include testmime.py
 include testutils.py
 include testbms.py
 include testdspam.py
 include rejects.py
 include report.py
 include bms.py
 include spf.py
 include cid2spf.py
 include spfquery.py
 include test.py
 include sample.py
 include milter-template.py
 include spfmilter.py
 include spfmilter.rc
 include spfmilter.cfg
 include test/*
 include doc/*
 include Milter/*.py
 include *.spec
 include start.sh
@@ -31,5 +22,5 @@ include milter.rc
 include milter.rc7
 include milter.cfg
 include rhsbl.m4
-include *.txt
+include softfail.txt
-include *.html
+include strike3.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
 # Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 # Copyright 2001 Business Management Systems, Inc.
 # This code is under GPL.  See COPYING for details.
 import os
 import milter
 import thread
 from milter import ACCEPT,CONTINUE,REJECT,DISCARD,TEMPFAIL,	\
  set_flags, setdbg, setbacklog, settimeout, \
  ADDHDRS, CHGBODY, ADDRCPT, DELRCPT, CHGHDRS,	\
  V1_ACTS, V2_ACTS, CURR_ACTS
 try: from milter import QUARANTINE
 except: pass
 _seq_lock = thread.allocate_lock()
 _seq = 0
 def uniqueID():
  """Return a sequence number unique to this process.
  """
  global _seq
  _seq_lock.acquire()
  seqno = _seq = _seq + 1
  _seq_lock.release()
  return seqno
 class Milter:
  """A simple class interface to the milter module.
  """
  def _setctx(self,ctx):
    self.__ctx = ctx
    if ctx:
      ctx.setpriv(self)
  # user replaceable callbacks
  def log(self,*msg):
    print 'Milter:',
    for i in msg: print i,
    print
  def connect(self,hostname,unused,hostaddr):
    "Called for each connection to sendmail."
    self.log("connect from %s at %s" % (hostname,hostaddr))
    return CONTINUE
  def hello(self,hostname):
    "Called after the HELO command."
    self.log("hello from %s" % hostname)
    return CONTINUE
  def envfrom(self,f,*str):
    """Called to begin each message.
    f -> string		message sender
    str -> tuple	additional ESMTP parameters
    """
    self.log("mail from",f,str)
    return CONTINUE
  def envrcpt(self,to,*str):
    "Called for each message recipient."
    self.log("rcpt to",to,str)
    return CONTINUE
  def header(self,field,value):
    "Called for each message header."
    self.log("%s: %s" % (field,value))
    return CONTINUE
  def eoh(self):
    "Called after all headers are processed."
    self.log("eoh")
    return CONTINUE
  def body(self,unused):
    "Called to transfer the message body."
    return CONTINUE
  def eom(self):
    "Called at the end of message."
    self.log("eom")
    return CONTINUE
  def abort(self):
    "Called if the connection is terminated abnormally."
    self.log("abort")
    return CONTINUE
  def close(self):
    "Called at the end of connection, even if aborted."
    self.log("close")
    return CONTINUE
  # Milter methods which can be invoked from callbacks
  def getsymval(self,sym):
    return self.__ctx.getsymval(sym)
  # If sendmail does not support setmlreply, then only the
  # first msg line is used.
  def setreply(self,rcode,xcode=None,msg=None,*ml):
    return self.__ctx.setreply(rcode,xcode,msg,*ml)
  # Milter methods which can only be called from eom callback.
  def addheader(self,field,value):
    return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value)
  def chgheader(self,field,idx,value):
    return self.__ctx.chgheader(field,idx,value)
  def addrcpt(self,rcpt):
    return self.__ctx.addrcpt(rcpt)
  def delrcpt(self,rcpt):
    return self.__ctx.delrcpt(rcpt)
  def replacebody(self,body):
    return self.__ctx.replacebody(body)
  # When quarantined, a message goes into the mailq as if to be delivered,
  # but delivery is deferred until the message is unquarantined.
  def quarantine(self,reason):
    return self.__ctx.quarantine(reason)
  def progress(self):
    return self.__ctx.progress()
 factory = Milter
 def connectcallback(ctx,hostname,family,hostaddr):
  m = factory()
  m._setctx(ctx)
  return m.connect(hostname,family,hostaddr)
 def closecallback(ctx):
  m = ctx.getpriv()
  if not m: return CONTINUE
  rc = m.close()
  m._setctx(None)	# release milterContext
  return rc
 def envcallback(c,args):
  """Convert ESMTP parms to keyword parameters.
  Can be used in the envfrom and/or envrcpt callbacks to process
  ESMTP parameters as python keyword parameters."""
  kw = {}
  for s in args[1:]:
    pos = s.find('=')
    if pos > 0:
      kw[s[:pos]] = s[pos+1:]
  return apply(c,args,kw)
 def runmilter(name,socketname,timeout = 0):
  # This bit is here on the assumption that you will be starting this filter
  # before sendmail.  If sendmail is not running and the socket already exists,
  # libmilter will throw a warning.  If sendmail is running, this is still
  # safe if there are no messages currently being processed.  It's safer to
  # shutdown sendmail, kill the filter process, restart the filter, and then
  # restart sendmail.
  pos = socketname.find(':')
  if pos > 1:
    s = socketname[:pos]
    fname = socketname[pos+1:]
  else:
    s = "unix"
    fname = socketname
  if s == "unix" or s == "local":
    print "Removing %s" % fname
    try:
      os.unlink(fname)
    except:
      pass
  # The default flags set include everything
  # milter.set_flags(milter.ADDHDRS)
  milter.set_connect_callback(connectcallback)
  milter.set_helo_callback(lambda ctx, host: ctx.getpriv().hello(host))
  milter.set_envfrom_callback(lambda ctx,*str:
  	ctx.getpriv().envfrom(*str))
 #  	envcallback(ctx.getpriv().envfrom,str))
  milter.set_envrcpt_callback(lambda ctx,*str:
  	ctx.getpriv().envrcpt(*str))
 #  	envcallback(ctx.getpriv().envrcpt,str))
  milter.set_header_callback(lambda ctx,fld,val:
  	ctx.getpriv().header(fld,val))
  milter.set_eoh_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().eoh())
  milter.set_body_callback(lambda ctx,chunk: ctx.getpriv().body(chunk))
  milter.set_eom_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().eom())
  milter.set_abort_callback(lambda ctx: ctx.getpriv().abort())
  milter.set_close_callback(closecallback)
  milter.setconn(socketname)
  if timeout > 0: milter.settimeout(timeout)
  # The name *must* match the X line in sendmail.cf (supposedly)
  milter.register(name)
  start_seq = _seq
  try:
    milter.main()
  except milter.error:
    if start_seq == _seq: raise	# couldn't start
    # milter has been running for a while, but now it can't start new threads
    raise milter.error("out of thread resources")
@@ -9,15 +9,13 @@ import milter
 import thread
 from milter import ACCEPT,CONTINUE,REJECT,DISCARD,TEMPFAIL,	\
-  set_flags, setdbg, setbacklog, settimeout, error,	\
+  set_flags, setdbg, setbacklog, settimeout, \
  ADDHDRS, CHGBODY, ADDRCPT, DELRCPT, CHGHDRS,	\
  V1_ACTS, V2_ACTS, CURR_ACTS
 try: from milter import QUARANTINE
 except: pass
 __version__ = '0.8.5'
 _seq_lock = thread.allocate_lock()
 _seq = 0
@@ -44,7 +42,7 @@ class Milter:
    for i in msg: print i,
    print
-  def connect(self,hostname,family,hostaddr):
+  def connect(self,hostname,unused,hostaddr):
    "Called for each connection to sendmail."
    self.log("connect from %s at %s" % (hostname,hostaddr))
    return CONTINUE
@@ -106,8 +104,8 @@ class Milter:
    return self.__ctx.setreply(rcode,xcode,msg,*ml)
  # Milter methods which can only be called from eom callback.
-  def addheader(self,field,value,idx=-1):
+  def addheader(self,field,value):
-    return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value,idx)
+    return self.__ctx.addheader(field,value)
  def chgheader(self,field,idx,value):
    return self.__ctx.chgheader(field,idx,value)
@@ -217,6 +215,6 @@ def runmilter(name,socketname,timeout = 0):
    raise milter.error("out of thread resources")
 __all__ = globals().copy()
-for priv in ('os','milter','thread','factory','_seq','_seq_lock','__version__'):
+for priv in ('os','milter','thread','factory','_seq','_seq_lock'):
  del __all__[priv]
 __all__ = __all__.keys()
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
 # Email address list with expiration
 #
 # This class acts like a map.  Entries with a value of None are persistent,
 # but disappear after a time limit.  This is useful for automatic whitelists
 # and blacklists with expiration.  The persistent store is a simple ascii
 # file with sender and timestamp on each line.  Entries can be appended
 # to the store, and will be picked up the next time it is loaded.
 #
 # Entries with other values are not persistent.  This is used to hold failed
 # CBV results.
 #
 # $Log$
 # Revision 1.6  2007/01/19 23:31:38  customdesigned
 # Move parse_header to Milter.utils.
 # Test case for delayed DSN parsing.
 # Fix plock when source missing or cannot set owner/group.
 #
 # Revision 1.5  2007/01/11 19:59:40  customdesigned
 # Purge old entries in auto_whitelist and send_dsn logs.
 #
 # Revision 1.4  2007/01/11 04:31:26  customdesigned
 # Negative feedback for bad headers.  Purge cache logs on startup.
 #
 # Revision 1.3  2007/01/08 23:20:54  customdesigned
 # Get user feedback.
 #
 # Revision 1.2  2007/01/05 23:33:55  customdesigned
 # Make blacklist an AddrCache
 #
 # Revision 1.1  2007/01/05 21:25:40  customdesigned
 # Move AddrCache to Milter package.
 #
 # Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 # Copyright 2001,2002,2003,2004,2005 Business Management Systems, Inc.
 # This code is under the GNU General Public License.  See COPYING for details.
 import time
 from plock import PLock
 class AddrCache(object):
  time_format = '%Y%b%d %H:%M:%S %Z'
  def __init__(self,renew=7,fname=None):
    self.age = renew
    self.cache = {}
    self.fname = fname
  def load(self,fname,age=0):
    "Load address cache from persistent store."
    if not age:
      age = self.age
    self.fname = fname
    cache = {}
    self.cache = cache
    now = time.time()
    lock = PLock(self.fname)
    wfp = lock.lock()
    changed = False
    try:
      too_old = now - age*24*60*60	# max age in days
      try:
        fp = open(self.fname)
      except OSError:
        fp = ()
      for ln in fp:
 	try:
 	  rcpt,ts = ln.strip().split(None,1)
 	  l = time.strptime(ts,AddrCache.time_format)
 	  t = time.mktime(l)
 	  if t < too_old:
 	    changed = True
 	    continue
 	  cache[rcpt.lower()] = (t,None)
 	except:
 	  cache[ln.strip().lower()] = (now,None)
 	wfp.write(ln)
      if changed:
 	lock.commit(self.fname+'.old')
      else:
        lock.unlock()
    except IOError:
      lock.unlock()
  def has_key(self,sender):
    "True if sender is cached and has not expired."
    try:
      lsender = sender and sender.lower()
      ts,res = self.cache[lsender]
      too_old = time.time() - self.age*24*60*60	# max age in days
      if not ts or ts > too_old:
        return True
      del self.cache[lsender]
      try:
 	user,host = sender.split('@',1)
 	return self.has_key(host)
      except ValueError:
        pass
    except KeyError:
      try:
 	user,host = sender.split('@',1)
 	return self.has_key(host)
      except: pass
    return False
  __contains__ = has_key
  def __getitem__(self,sender):
    try:
      lsender = sender.lower()
      ts,res = self.cache[lsender]
      too_old = time.time() - self.age*24*60*60	# max age in days
      if not ts or ts > too_old:
 	return res
      del self.cache[lsender]
      raise KeyError, sender
    except KeyError,x:
      try:
 	user,host = sender.split('@',1)
 	return self.__getitem__(host)
      except ValueError:
        raise x
  def addperm(self,sender,res=None):
    "Add a permanent sender."
    lsender = sender.lower()
    if self.has_key(lsender):
      ts,res = self.cache[lsender]
      if not ts: return		# already permanent
    self.cache[lsender] = (None,res)
    if not res:
      print >>open(self.fname,'a'),sender
  def __setitem__(self,sender,res):
    lsender = sender.lower()
    now = time.time()
    self.cache[lsender] = (now,res)
    if not res and self.fname:
      s = time.strftime(AddrCache.time_format,time.localtime(now))
      print >>open(self.fname,'a'),sender,s # log refreshed senders
  def __len__(self):
    return len(self.cache)
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
 from ConfigParser import ConfigParser
 class MilterConfigParser(ConfigParser):
  def __init__(self,defaults={}):
    ConfigParser.__init__(self)
    self.defaults = defaults
  # The defaults provided by ConfigParser show up in all sections,
  # which screws up iterating over all options in a section.
  # Worse, passing "defaults" with vars= overrides the config file!
  # So we roll our own defaults.
  def get(self,sect,opt):
    if not self.has_option(sect,opt) and opt in self.defaults:
      return self.defaults[opt]
    return ConfigParser.get(self,sect,opt)
  def getlist(self,sect,opt):
    if self.has_option(sect,opt):
      return [q.strip() for q in self.get(sect,opt).split(',')]
    return []
  def getaddrset(self,sect,opt):
    if not self.has_option(sect,opt):
      return {}
    s = self.get(sect,opt)
    d = {}
    for q in s.split(','):
      q = q.strip()
      if q.startswith('file:'):
        domain = q[5:].lower()
 	d[domain] = d.setdefault(domain,[]) + open(domain,'r').read().split()
      else:
 	user,domain = q.split('@')
 	d.setdefault(domain.lower(),[]).append(user)
    return d
  def getaddrdict(self,sect,opt):
    if not self.has_option(sect,opt):
      return {}
    d = {}
    for q in self.get(sect,opt).split(','):
      q = q.strip()
      if self.has_option(sect,q):
        l = self.get(sect,q)
 	for addr in l.split(','):
 	  addr = addr.strip()
 	  if addr.startswith('file:'):
 	    fname = addr[5:]
 	    for a in open(fname,'r').read().split():
 	      d[a] = q
 	  else:
 	    d[addr] = q
    return d
  def getdefault(self,sect,opt,default=None):
    if self.has_option(sect,opt):
      return self.get(sect,opt)
    return default
@@ -4,54 +4,116 @@
 # Send DSNs, do call back verification,
 # and generate DSN messages from a template
 # $Log$
 # Revision 1.13  2007/01/04 18:01:11  customdesigned
 # Do plain CBV when template missing.
 #
 # Revision 1.12  2006/07/26 16:37:35  customdesigned
 # Support timeout.
 #
 # Revision 1.11  2006/06/21 21:07:11  customdesigned
 # Include header fields in DSN template.
 #
 # Revision 1.10  2006/05/24 20:56:35  customdesigned
 # Remove default templates.  Scrub test.
 #
 import smtplib
 import spf
 import socket
 from email.Message import Message
 import Milter
 import time
-def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None,timeout=600):
+nospf_msg = """Subject: Critical mail server configuration error
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
 	%(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s 
 Someone at IP address %(connectip)s sent an email claiming
 to be from %(sender)s.  
 If that wasn't you, then your domain, %(sender_domain)s,
 was forged - i.e. used without your knowlege or authorization by
 someone attempting to steal your mail identity.  This is a very
 serious problem, and you need to provide authentication for your
 SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
 domain.  The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
 with your Sender Policy.  
 For more information, see: http://spfhelp.net
 I hate to annoy you with a DSN (Delivery Status
 Notification) from a possibly forged email, but since you
 have not published a sender policy, there is no other way
 of bringing this to your attention.
 If it *was* you that sent the email, then your email domain
 or configuration is in error.  If you don't know anything
 about mail servers, then pass this on to your SMTP (mail)
 server administrator.  We have accepted the email anyway, in
 case it is important, but we couldn't find anything about
 the mail submitter at %(connectip)s to distinguish it from a
 zombie (compromised/infected computer - usually a Windows
 PC).  There was no PTR record for its IP address (PTR names
 that contain the IP address don't count).  RFC2821 requires
 that your hello name be a FQN (Fully Qualified domain Name,
 i.e. at least one dot) that resolves to the IP address of
 the mail sender.  In addition, just like for PTR, we don't
 accept a helo name that contains the IP, since this doesn't
 help to identify you.  The hello name you used,
 %(heloname)s, was invalid.
 Furthermore, there was no SPF record for the sending domain
 %(sender_domain)s.  We even tried to find its IP in any A or
 MX records for your domain, but that failed also.  We really
 should reject mail from anonymous mail clients, but in case
 it is important, we are accepting it anyway.
 We are sending you this message to alert you to the fact that
 Either - Someone is forging your domain.
 Or - You have problems with your email configuration.
 Or - Possibly both.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to
 contact me again.
 Kind regards,
 postmaster@%(receiver)s
 """
 softfail_msg = """Subject: SPF softfail (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
       %(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 """
 def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None):
  """Send DSN.  If msg is None, do callback verification.
     Mailfrom is original sender we are sending DSN or CBV to.
     Receiver is the MTA sending the DSN.
     Return None for success or (code,msg) for failure."""
  user,domain = mailfrom.split('@')
  try:
  q = spf.query(None,None,None)
  mxlist = q.dns(domain,'MX')
  except spf.TempError:
    return (450,'DNS Timeout: %s MX'%domain)	# temp error
  if not mxlist:
-    mxlist = (0,domain),	# fallback to A record when no MX
+    mxlist = (0,domain),
  else:
    mxlist.sort()
  smtp = smtplib.SMTP()
  toolate = time.time() + timeout
  for prior,host in mxlist:
    try:
      smtp.connect(host)
      code,resp = smtp.helo(receiver)
      # some wiley spammers have MX records that resolve to 127.0.0.1
-      a = resp.split()
+      if resp.split()[0] == receiver:
-      if not a:
+        return (553,'Fraudulent MX for %s' % domain)
        return (553,'MX for %s has no hostname in banner: %s' % (domain,host))
      if a[0] == receiver:
        return (553,'Fraudulent MX for %s: %s' % (domain,host))
      if not (200 <= code <= 299):
 	raise smtplib.SMTPHeloError(code, resp)
      if msg:
@@ -79,64 +141,48 @@ def send_dsn(mailfrom,receiver,msg=None,timeout=600):
      pass		# any other error, try next MX
    except socket.error:
      pass		# MX didn't accept connections, try next one
    except socket.timeout:
      pass		# MX too slow, try next one
    smtp.close()
    if time.time() > toolate:
      return (450,'No MX response within %f minutes'%(timeout/60.0))
  return (450,'No MX servers available')	# temp error
 def create_msg(q,rcptlist,origmsg=None,template=None):
  "Create a DSN message from a template.  Template must be '\n' separated."
  if not template:
    return None
  heloname = q.h
  sender = q.s
  connectip = q.i
  receiver = q.r
  sender_domain = q.o
  result = q.result
  perm_error = q.perm_error
  rcpt = '\n\t'.join(rcptlist)
  try: subject = origmsg['Subject']
  except: subject = '(none)'
  try:
    spf_result = origmsg['Received-SPF']
    if not spf_result.startswith('softfail'):
      spf_result = None
  except: spf_result = None
  msg = Message()
-  msg.add_header('X-Mailer','PyMilter-'+Milter.__version__)
+  msg.add_header('To',sender)
  msg.add_header('From','postmaster@%s'%receiver)
  msg.add_header('Auto-Submitted','auto-generated (configuration error)')
  msg.set_type('text/plain')
-  hdrs,body = template.split('\n\n',1)
+  if not template:
    if spf_result: template = softfail_msg
    else: template = nospf_msg
  hdrs,body = template.split('\n',1)
  for ln in hdrs.splitlines():
    name,val = ln.split(':',1)
    msg.add_header(name,(val % locals()).strip())
  msg.set_payload(body % locals())
-  # add headers if missing from old template
+
  if 'to' not in msg:
    msg.add_header('To',sender)
  if 'from' not in msg:
    msg.add_header('From','postmaster@%s'%receiver)
  if 'auto-submitted' not in msg:
    msg.add_header('Auto-Submitted','auto-generated')
  return msg
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  q = spf.query('192.168.9.50',
-  'SRS0=pmeHL=RH==stuart@example.com',
+  'SRS0=pmeHL=RH=bmsi.com=stuart@bmsi.com',
-  'red.example.com',receiver='mail.example.com')
+  'bmsred.bmsi.com',receiver='mail.bmsi.com')
-  q.result = 'softfail'
+  msg = create_msg(q,['charlie@jsconnor.com'],None,None)
  q.perm_error = None
  msg = create_msg(q,['charlie@example.com'],None,
 """From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 To: %(sender)s
 Subject: Test
 Test DSN template
 """
  )
  print msg.as_string()
  # print send_dsn(f,msg.as_string())
-  # print send_dsn(q.s,'mail.example.com',msg.as_string())
+  print send_dsn(q.s,'mail.bmsi.com',msg.as_string())
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ def is_dynip(host,addr):
  True
  >>> is_dynip('[1.2.3.4]','1.2.3.4')
  True
  >>> is_dynip('c-71-63-151-151.hsd1.mn.comcast.net','71.63.151.151')
  True
  """
  if host.startswith('[') and host.endswith(']'):
    return True
@@ -56,7 +54,7 @@ def is_dynip(host,addr):
    h = host
    m = ip3.findall(host)
    if m:
-      g = map(int,m)[:4]
+      g = map(int,m)
      ia3 = (ia[1:],ia[:3])
      if g[-3:] in ia3: return True
      if g[0] == ia[3] and g[1:3] == ia[:2]: return True
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
 # Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 # Copyright 2001 Business Management Systems, Inc.
 # This code is under the GNU General Public License.  See COPYING for details.
 import os
 from time import sleep
 class PLock(object):
  "A simple /etc/passwd style lock,update,rename protocol for updating files."
  def __init__(self,basename):
    self.basename = basename
    self.fp = None
  def lock(self,lockname=None,mode=0660,strict_perms=False):
    "Start an update transaction.  Return FILE to write new version."
    self.unlock()
    if not lockname:
      lockname = self.basename + '.lock'
    self.lockname = lockname
    try:
      st = os.stat(self.basename)
      mode |= st.st_mode
    except OSError: pass
    u = os.umask(0002)
    try:
      fd = os.open(lockname,os.O_WRONLY+os.O_CREAT+os.O_EXCL,mode)
    finally:
      os.umask(u)
    self.fp = os.fdopen(fd,'w')
    try:
      os.chown(self.lockname,-1,st.st_gid)
    except:
      if strict_perms:
 	self.unlock()
 	raise
    return self.fp
  def wlock(self,lockname=None):
    "Wait until lock is free, then start an update transaction."
    while True:
      try:
        return self.lock(lockname)
      except OSError:
        sleep(2)
  def commit(self,backname=None):
    "Commit update transaction with optional backup file."
    if not self.fp:
      raise IOError,"File not locked"
    self.fp.close()
    self.fp = None
    if backname:
      try:
 	os.remove(backname)
      except OSError: pass
      os.link(self.basename,backname)
    os.rename(self.lockname,self.basename)
  def unlock(self):
    "Cancel update transaction."
    if self.fp:
      try:
        self.fp.close()
      except: pass
      self.fp = None
      os.remove(self.lockname)
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
 # Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 # Copyright 2005 Business Management Systems, Inc.
 # This code is under the GNU General Public License.  See COPYING for details.
 # The localpart of SMTP return addresses is often signed.  The format
 # of the signing is application specific and doesn't concern us -
 # except that we wish to extract some sort of fixed string from
 # the variable signature which represents the "source" of the message.
 def unsign(s):
  """Attempt to unsign localpart and return original email.
  No attempt is made to verify the signature.
  >>> unsign('SRS0=8Y3CZ=3U=jsconnor.com=bills@bmsi.com')
  'bills@jsconnor.com'
  """
  # not implemented yet
  return s
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
 import re
 import struct
 import socket
 import email.Errors
 from fnmatch import fnmatchcase
 from email.Header import decode_header
 ip4re = re.compile(r'^[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*$')
 # from spf.py
 def addr2bin(str):
  "Convert a string IPv4 address into an unsigned integer."
  return struct.unpack("!L", socket.inet_aton(str))[0]
 MASK = 0xFFFFFFFFL
 def cidr(i,n):
  return ~(MASK >> n) & MASK & i
 def iniplist(ipaddr,iplist):
  """Return whether ip is in cidr list
  >>> iniplist('66.179.26.146',['127.0.0.1','66.179.26.128/26'])
  True
  >>> iniplist('127.0.0.1',['127.0.0.1','66.179.26.128/26'])
  True
  >>> iniplist('192.168.0.45',['192.168.0.*'])
  True
  """
  ipnum = addr2bin(ipaddr)
  for pat in iplist:
    p = pat.split('/',1)
    if ip4re.match(p[0]):
      if len(p) > 1:
 	n = int(p[1])
      else:
        n = 32
      if cidr(addr2bin(p[0]),n) == cidr(ipnum,n):
        return True
    elif fnmatchcase(ipaddr,pat):
      return True
  return False
 def parse_addr(t):
  """Split email into user,domain.
  >>> parse_addr('user@example.com')
  ['user', 'example.com']
  >>> parse_addr('"user@example.com"')
  ['user@example.com']
  >>> parse_addr('"user@bar"@example.com')
  ['user@bar', 'example.com']
  >>> parse_addr('foo')
  ['foo']
  """
  if t.startswith('<') and t.endswith('>'): t = t[1:-1]
  if t.startswith('"'):
    if t.endswith('"'): return [t[1:-1]]
    pos = t.find('"@')
    if pos > 0: return [t[1:pos],t[pos+2:]]
  return t.split('@')
 def parse_header(val):
  """Decode headers gratuitously encoded to hide the content.
  """
  try:
    h = decode_header(val)
    if not len(h) or (not h[0][1] and len(h) == 1): return val
    u = []
    for s,enc in h:
      if enc:
        try:
 	  u.append(unicode(s,enc))
 	except LookupError:
 	  u.append(unicode(s))
      else:
 	u.append(unicode(s))
    u = ''.join(u)
    for enc in ('us-ascii','iso-8859-1','utf8'):
      try:
 	return u.encode(enc)
      except UnicodeError: continue
  except UnicodeDecodeError: pass
  except LookupError: pass
  except email.Errors.HeaderParseError: pass
  return val
@@ -1,65 +1,8 @@
 Here is a history of user visible changes to Python milter.
-0.8.8	move AddrCache, parse_addr, iniplist, parse_header to Milter package
+
 	fix plock for missing source and can't change owner/group
 	add sample spfmilter.py milter
 	private_relay config option
 0.8.7	Move spf module to pyspf
 	Prevent PTR cache poisoning
 	More lame bounce heuristics
 	Do plain CBV when template is missing
 0.8.6	Support CBV timeout
 	Support fail template, headers in templates
 	Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
 	More SPF lax heuristics
 	Don't require SPF pass for white/black listing mail from trusted relay.
 	Support localpart wildcard for white and black lists.
 	Delay reject of unsigned RCPT for postmaster and abuse only
 	Fix dsn reporting of hard permerror
 	Resolve FIXME for wrap_close in miltermodule.c
 	Add Message-ID to DSNs
 	Use signed Message-ID in delayed reject to blacklist senders
 	Auto-train via blacklist and auto-whitelist
 	Don't check userlist for signed MFROM
 	Accept but skip DSPAM training for whitelisted senders without SPF PASS
 	Report GC stats 
 	Support CIDR matching for IP lists
 	Support pysrs sign feature
 	Support localpart specific SPF policy in access file
 0.8.5	Simple trusted_forwarder implementation.
 	Fix access_file neutral policy
 	Move Received-SPF header to beginning of headers
 	Supply keyword info for all results in Received-SPF header.
 	Move guessed SPF result to separate header
 	Activate smfi_insheader only when SMFIR_INSHEADER defined
 	Handle NULL MX in spf.py
 	in-process GOSSiP server support (to be extended later)
 	Expire CBV cache and renew auto-whitelist entries
 0.8.4	Auto-whitelist recipients of outgoing email.
 	Fix SPF policy via sendmail access map (case insensitive keys).
 	Train screener on whitelisted messages
 	Optional idx parameter to addheader to invoke smfi_insheader
 	Activate progress API when SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
 0.8.3   Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
 	spf_accept_fail option for braindead SPF senders 
 	  (treats fail like softfail)
 	Option to set SPF policy via sendmail access map.
 	Option to supply Sender header from MAIL FROM when missing.
 	Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
 	Send DSN for SPF errors corrected by extended processing.
 	Send DSN before SCREENED mail is quarantined
 	Use logging package to keep log lines atomic.
 0.8.2	Strict processing limits per SPF RFC
 	Fixed several parsing bugs under RFC 
 	Support official IANA SPF record (type99)
 	Honeypot support (requires pydspam-1.1.9)
 	Extended SPF processing results beyond strict RFC limits
 	Support original SES for bounce protection (requires pysrs-0.30.10)
 	Callback exception processing option in milter module
 	Handle corrupt ZIP attachments
 0.8.1	Fix zip in zip loop in mime.py
 	Fix HeaderParseError in bms.py header callback
 	Check internal_domains for outgoing mail
 	Fix inconsistent results from send_dsn
 0.8.0	Move Milter module to subpackage.
 	DSN support for Three strikes rule and SPF SOFTFAIL
 	Move /*mime*/ and dynip to Milter subpackage
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Quick Installation
 1. Build and install Sendmail, enabling libmilter (see libmilter/README).
 2. Build and install Python, enabling threading.
 3. Install this module: python setup.py --help
-4. Add these two lines to sendmail.cf[*]:
+4. Add these two lines to sendmail.cf:
 O InputMailFilters=pythonfilter
 Xpythonfilter,        S=local:/home/username/pythonsock
@@ -51,17 +51,9 @@ Xpythonfilter,        S=local:/home/username/pythonsock
 Note that milters should almost certainly not run as root.
 That's it.  Incoming mail will cause the milter to print some things, and
-some email will be rejected (see the "header" method).  Edit and play.  
+some email will be rejected (see the "header" method).  Edit and play.  See
-See spfmilter.py for a functional SPF milter, or see bms.py for an complex
+bms.py for an example milter used in production.
 milter used in production.
 [*] This is for a quick test.  Your sendmail.cf in most distros will get
 overwritten whenever sendmail.mc is updated.  To make a milter permanent,
 add something like:
 INPUT_MAIL_FILTER(`pythonfilter', `S=local:/home/username/pythonsock, F=T, T=C:5m;S:20s;R:5m;E:5m')
 to sendmail.mc instead.
 Not-so-quick Installation
 -------------------------
@@ -98,10 +90,8 @@ some options associated with it.  In this case, we have the "S" option, which
 names the socket that sendmail will use to communicate with this particular
 milter.  This milter's socket is a unix-domain socket in the filesystem.
 See libmilter/README for the definitive list of options.
 NB: The name is specified in two places: here, in sendmail's cf file, and
 in the milter itself.  Make sure the two match.
 NB: The above lines can be added in your .mc file with this line:
 INPUT_MAIL_FILTER(`pythonfilter', `S=local:/home/username/pythonsock')
@@ -1,166 +1,64 @@
 Don't match dynamic ptr in bestguess.
 When content filtering is not installed, reject BLACKLISTed MFROM
 immediately.  There is no use waiting until EOM.
 Configuration is problematic when handling incoming, but not outgoing mail.
 The problem comes when alice@example.com sends mail to bill@example.com,
 and we are the MX for example.com, but alice is sending from some other
 MTA.  The mail is flagged external, so we don't list example.com in
 internal_domains (or we would get "spam from self").  But, if we try to do a
 CBV, we get "fraudulent MX", because the MX is ourself!  So we need to 
 avoid doing CBV on such domains.  Currently, we try to make sure the SPF
 policies don't do CBV.
 We now don't check internal domains for incoming mail if there is an
 SPF record.
 On the other hand, if alice is sending internally, or with SMTP AUTH, she
 *does* need the domain to be in internal_domains.  The solution to that 
 is to use the new SMTP AUTH access configuration to specify which domains
 can be used by smtp AUTH (by user if desired).
 It would be cleaner if CBV would know which domains we have agreed to
 be MX for. Some ideas for external connections:
 a) check access file for To:example.com	RELAY
 b) check mailertable
 c) check mx_domains config list
 d) if there is an SPF record, don't check internal_domains
   (let SPF block unauthorized machines)
 But that still doesn't handle the roaming user, who won't use SMTP
 AUTH, but sends through some hotel MTA.  Maybe we don't want to support
 him?
 When setting up pydspam, both sender and rcpt must resolve to dspam users
 for falsepositive recognition.  Usually, this means adding 
 honeypot@mail.example.com to alias list for honeypot in pymilter.cfg.
 This needs to be documented.  I was caught by it setting up a new site.
 Add signature (x-sig=AB7485f=TS) to Received-SPF, so it can be used
 to blacklist sources of delayed DSNs.
 rcpt-addr may let us know when a recipient is unknown.  That should count
 against reputation.
 Need to use wildcards in blacklist.log: *.madcowsrecord.net
 Need to exclude emails like !*-admin@example.com in whitelist_sender.
 Need to exclude robot users from autowhitelist.  Don't want to have to
 list all users, so implement something like !*-admin@bmsi.com,@bmsi.com.
 GOSSiP feedback from user training is ignored because UMIS has already been
 removed from queue.  Maybe keep UMIS in queue, and add method to 
 alter last feedback for ID.
 Generate DSNs according to RFC 3464
 Get temperror policy from access file.
 Reporting explanation for failure should show source if sender
 provided explanation.
 Bug in Auto-whitelist.  Recent Auto-whitelist doesn't override expired entry.
 SPF permerror diagnostics should include corrected mechanism.
 Delay SPF check until RCPT TO.  Cache result to avoid repeating
 for multiple RCPT.  This avoids overhead for invalid RCPT, and
 allows for per RCPT local policy.
 Check SPF for outgoing mail (including local policy for internal addresses).
 This could also solve the second part of the mail from relay problem below.
 Whitelisted senders from trusted relay get PROBATION.  Need to extracted
 SPF result from headers - and in the case of mail internal to relay
 (e.g. bmsi.com), supply 'pass' result.  
 For selected domains, check rcpts via CBV before accepting mail.  Cache
 results.  This will kick out dictonary attacks against a mail domain
 behind a gateway sooner.
 Add auto-blacklisted senders to blacklist.log with timestamp.
 Add emails blacklisted via CBV so that they are remembered across milter
 restarts.
 Make all dictionaries work like honeypot.  Do not train as ham unless
 whitelisted.  Train on blacklisted messages, or spam feedback.  This
 can be called Train On Error.  Should be possible to startup
 with training on everything to get dictionary built fast, then switch
 to train on error to minimize labor.
 Allow unsigned DSNs from selected domains (that don't accept signed MFROM,
 e.g. verizon.net).
 Allow verified hostnames for trusted_relay.  E.g. HELO name that
 passes SPF.
 Table of sendmail macros for documentation.
 When do we get two hello calls?  STARTTLS is one reason.
 Option: accept mail from auto-whitelisted senders even with spf-fail,
 but do not update dspam.  This can be done for individual senders or domains 
 using the access file.
 pysrs: SRS doesn't get applied to proper recipients when there are
 multiple recipients.  This requires debugging cf scripts - yuk.
 auto_whitelist false_positives from quarantine - perhaps only when
 user selects special button (use special header to communicate
 that from dspamcgi.py to milter.)
 Use send_dsn.log for blacklist also.  AddrCache needs localpart
 wildcard (e.g. empty localpart).
 Quarantined mail is missing headers modified/added by milter after
 checking dspam.
 Send DSN for permerror before processing extended result.  An additional
 DSN may be sent based on extended result.  Send permerror DSN to
 postmaster@sending_domain.
 Rescind whitelist for banned extensions, in case sender is infected.
 Train honeypot on error only.
 Find rfc2822 policy for MFROM quoting.
 Support explicit errors for SPF policy in access file:
 SPF-Neutral:aol.com	ERROR:"550 AOL mail must get SPF PASS"
 Defer TEMPERROR in SPF evaluation - give precedence to security
 (only defer for PASS mechanisms).
 Option to add Received-SPF header, but never reject on SPF.
 Create null config that does nothing - except maybe add Received-SPF
 headers.  Many admins would like to turn features on one at a time.
 Checking in mime.py;
 /bms/cvs/milter/mime.py,v  <--  mime.py
 new revision: 1.56; previous revision: 1.55
 done
 Checking in spf.py;
 /bms/cvs/milter/spf.py,v  <--  spf.py
 new revision: 1.18; previous revision: 1.17
 done
 Checking in testmime.py;
 /bms/cvs/milter/testmime.py,v  <--  testmime.py
 new revision: 1.19; previous revision: 1.18
 Auto whitelist based on outgoing email - perhaps with magic subject
 or recipient prefix.
 Can't output messages with malformed rfc822 attachments.
 Example malformed SPF:
 onvunvuvvx.usafisnews.org text "v=spf1 mx ptr ip4:207.44.199.970 -all"
 Move milter,Milter,mime,spf modules to pymilter
 milter package will have bms.py application
 Support SMTP AUTH and disable SPF checks when connection is authorized.
 Web admin interface
 Check valid domains allowed by internal senders to detect PCs infected
 with spam trojans.
 Do CBV (callback verification) for mail with no published SPF record.
 message log for automated stats and blacklisting
-Skip dspam when SPF pass? NO
+Skip dspam when SPF pass?
 Report 551 with rcpt on SPF fail?
 check spam keywords with character classes, e.g.
 	{a}=[a@ãä], {i}=[i1í], {e}=[eë], {o}=[o0ö]
 Implement RRS - a backdoor for non-SRS forwarders.  User lists non-SRS 
 forwarder accounts, and a util provides a special local alias for the
-user to give to the forwarder.  (Or user just adds arbitrary alias
+user to give to the forwarder.  Alias only works for mail from that
 unique to that forwarder to a database.)  Alias only works for mail from that
 forwarder.  Milter gets forwarder domain from alias and uses it to
 SPF check forwarder.
 Another special dspam user, 'honeypot', can be listed in innoculations.
 All email to those addresses is treated as known spam.
 Framework for modular Python milter components within a single VM.
 Python milters can be already be composed through sendmail by running each in
 a separate process.  However, a significant amount of memory is wasted
 for each additional Python VM, and communication between milters
 is cumbersome (e.g., adding mail headers, writing external files).
-Copy incoming wiretap mail, even though sendmail alias works perfectly
+Backup copies for outgoing/incoming mail.
 Allow multiple wiretap groups, each with its own destination.  Perhaps 
 also copy incoming wiretap mail, even though sendmail alias works perfectly
 for the purpose, to avoid having to change two configs for a wiretap.
 Provide a way to reload milter.cfg without stopping/restarting milter.
@@ -174,53 +72,10 @@ Keep separate ismodified flag for headers and body.  This is important
 when rejecting outgoing mail with viruses removed (so as not to
 embarrass yourself), and also removing Received headers with hidepath.
 Wrap smfi_setbacklog(int) - but it is only available in sendmail >= 8.12.3,
  so how can we detect whether to wrap it?
 Need a test module to feed sample messages to a milter though a live 
 sendmail and SMTP.  The mockup currently used is probably not very accurate,
 and doesn't test the threading code.
 DONE Require signed MFROM for all incoming bounces when signing all outgoing
 mail - except from trusted relays.
 DONE Added Message-ID header to DSN with SRS signed sender.  When seen on
 incoming rfc ignorant failure message, blacklist sender.
 DONE Option to add Received-SPF header, but never reject on SPF.
  I think the above will handle this.
 DONE Received-SPF header field should show identity that was checked.
 DONE When training with spam, REJECT after data so that mistakenly blacklisted
 senders at least get an error.
 DONE Milter won't start when it can't change permissions on *.lock to match
 *.log.  Should maybe ignore that error - the effect will be to set
 the permissions to default.
 DONE Milter won't start when a whitelist/blacklist file is missing.
 DONE Delayed failure detection should parse From header to find email address.
 DONE When bms.py can't find templates, it passes None to dsn.create_msg(),
 which uses local variable as backup, which no longer exist.  Do plain
 CBV in that case instead.
 DONE Find and use X-GOSSiP: header for SPAM: and FP: submissions.  Would need
 to keep tags longer.
 DONE Parse incoming 3464 DSNs for "Action: failed" to recognize delayed
 failures.  This works regardless of Subject.
 DONE Reports PROBATION even when rejecting message (works, but confusing in
 log).
 DONE Delayed_failure detection needs to handle multi-line header fields.  
 Also, delayed_failure should be recognized when addressed to
 postmaster@helodomain 
 DONE DSN for Permerror shows 'None' for error under some condition.
 DONE Allow blacklisted emails as well as domains in blacklist.log.  Use same
 data structure as autowhitelist.log.  
 DONE Backup copies for outgoing/incoming mail.
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
 #!/usr/bin/python2.3
 # Convert a MS Caller-ID entry (XML) to a SPF entry
 #
 # (c) 2004 by Ernesto Baschny
 # (c) 2004 Python version by Stuart Gathman
 #
 # Date: 2004-02-25
 # Version: 1.0
 #
 # Usage:
 #  ./cid2spf.pl "<ep xmlns='http://ms.net/1'>...</ep>"
 #
 # Note that the 'include' directives will also have to be checked and
 # "translated". Future versions of this script might be able to get a
 # domain name as an argument and "crawl" the DNS for the necessary
 # information.
 #
 # A complete reverse translation (SPF -> CID) might be impossible, since
 # there are no way to handle:
 # - PTR and EXISTS mechanism 
 # - MX mechanism with an different domain as argument
 # - macros
 # 
 # References:
 # http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/privacy/spam_callerid.mspx
 # http://spf.pobox.com/
 #
 # Known bugs:
 # - Currently it won't handle the exclusions provided in the A and R
 #   tags (prefix '!'). They will show up "as-is" in the SPF record
 # - I really haven't read the MS-CID specs in-depth, so there are probably
 #   other bugs too :)
 #
 # Ernesto Baschny <ernst@baschny.de>
 #
 import xml.sax
 import spf
 # -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 class CIDParser(xml.sax.ContentHandler):
  "Convert a MS Caller-ID entry (XML) to a SPF entry"
  def __init__(self,q=None):
    self.spf = []
    self.action = '-all'
    self.has_servers = None
    self.spf_entry = None
    if q:
      self.spf_query = q
    else:
      self.spf_query = spf.query(i='127.0.0.1', s='localhost', h='unknown')
  def startElement(self,tag,attr):
      if tag == 'm':
 	if self.has_servers != None and not self.has_servers:
 	  raise ValueError(
    "Declared <noMailServers\> and later <m>, this CID entry is not valid."
 	  )
 	self.has_servers = True
      elif tag == 'noMailServers':
 	if self.has_servers:
 	  raise ValueError(
    "Declared <m> and later <noMailServers\>, this CID entry is not valid."
 	  )
 	self.has_servers = False
      elif tag == 'ep':
 	if attr.has_key('testing') and attr.getValue('testing') == 'true':
 	  # A CID with 'testing' found:
 	  # From the MS-specs:
 	  #  "Documents in which such attribute is present with a true
 	  #  value SHOULD be entirely ignored (one should act as if the
 	  #  document were absent)"
 	  # From the SPF-specs:
 	  #  "Neutral (?): The SPF client MUST proceed as if a domain did
 	  #  not publish SPF data."
 	  # So we set SPF action to "neutral":
 	  self.action = '?all'
      elif tag == 'mx':
 	  # The empty MX-tag, same as SPF's MX-mechanism
 	  self.spf.append('mx')
      self.tag = tag
  def characters(self,text):
 	tag = self.tag
 	# Remove starting and trailing spaces from text:
 	text = text.strip()
 	if tag == 'a' or tag == 'r':
 	    # The A and R tags from MS-CID are both handled by the 
 	    # ipv4/6-mechanisms from SPF:
 	    if text.find(':') < 0:
 	      mechanism = 'ip4'
 	    else:
 	      mechanism = 'ip6'
 	    self.spf.append(mechanism + ':' + text)
 	elif tag == 'indirect':
 	    # MS-CID's indirect is "sort of" the include from SPF:
 	    # Not really true, because the <indirect> tag from MS-CID also 
 	    # provides a fallback in case the included domain doesn't provide
 	    # _ep-records: The inbound MX-servers of the included domains
 	    # are added to the list of allowed outgoing mailservers for the
 	    # domain that declared the _ep-record with the <indirect> tag.
 	    # In SPF you would use the 'mx:domain' to handle this, but this
 	    # wouldn't depend on referred domain having or not SPF-records.
 	    cid_xml = self.cid_txt(text)
 	    if cid_xml:
 	      p = CIDParser()
 	      xml.sax.parseString(cid_xml,p)
 	      if p.has_servers != False:
 		self.spf += p.spf
 	    else:
 	      self.spf.append('mx:' + text)
  def cid_txt(self,domain):
    q = self.spf_query
    domain='_ep.' + domain
    a = q.dns_txt(domain)
    if not a: return None
    if a[0].lower().startswith('<ep ') and a[-1].lower().endswith('</ep>'):
      return ''.join(a)
    return None
  def endElement(self,tag):
      if tag == 'ep':
 	# This is the end... assemble what we've got
 	spf_entry = ['v=spf1']
 	if self.has_servers != False:
 	  spf_entry += self.spf
 	spf_entry.append(self.action)
 	self.spf_entry = ' '.join(spf_entry)
  def spf_txt(self,cid_xml):
    if not cid_xml.startswith('<'):
      cid_xml = self.cid_txt(cid_xml)
      if not cid_xml: return None
    # Parse the beast. Any XML-problem will be reported by xlm.sax
    self.spf_entry = None
    xml.sax.parseString(cid_xml,self)
    return self.spf_entry
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  import sys
  if len(sys.argv) < 2:
    print >>sys.stderr, \
      """Usage: %s "<ep xmlns='http://ms.net/1'>...</ep>" """ % sys.argv[0]
    sys.exit(1)
  cid_xml = sys.argv[1]
  p = CIDParser()
  print p.spf_txt(cid_xml)
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
 Title: Recent Changes
 <h2> Recent Changes </h2>
 <h3> 0.8.7 </h3>
 The spf module has been moved to the 
 <a href="http://cheeseshop.python.org/pypi/pyspf">pyspf</a> package.
 Download <a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=139894&package_id=191419">here</a>.
 <h3> 0.8.6 </h3>
 Python milter has been moved to 
 <a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/pymilter/">pymilter Sourceforge
 project</a> for development and release downloads.
 <h3> 0.8.5 </h3>
 Release 0.8.5 fixes some build bugs reported by Stephen Figgins.  It
 fixes many small things, like not auto-whitelisting recipients of
 outgoing mail when the subject contains "autoreply:".  There is a 
 simple trusted forwarder implementation.  If you have more than
 2 or so forwarders, we will need a way to "compile" SPF records into an
 IP set and TTL for it to be efficient (like libspf2 does).
 <h3> GOSSiP </h3>
 An alpha release of <a href="pygossip.html">pygossip</a> has been commited to
 CVS, module pygossip. A version of the bms.py milter has been commited to CVS
 which supports calling GOSSiP to track domain reputation in a local database.
 <h3> New website design </h3>
 Hey, I'm no artist, so I just used the
 <a href="http://ht2html.sourceforge.net/">ht2html</a> package
 by <a href="http://barry.wooz.org/">Barry Warsaw</a>.  The mascot
 is by <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/lebl.htm">Christian Hafner</a>,
 or maybe his wife.  I chose Maxwell's daemon because it tirelessly
 and invisibly sorts molecules, just as milters sort mail.
 Christian has also provided a fun 
 <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/PPS/PPS2002/Maxwell/simulation.htm">
 simulation</a> that lets you try your hand at sorting molecules.
 <h3> 0.8.4 </h3>
 Release 0.8.4 makes configuring SPF policy via access.db actually work.
 The honeypot idea is enhanced by auto-whitelisting recipients of
 email sent from selected domains.  Whitelisted messages are then used
 to train the honeypot.  This makes the honeypot screener entirely self
 training.  The smfi_progress() API is now automatically supported when present.
 An optional idx parameter to milter.addheader() invokes smfi_insheader().
 <h3> 0.8.3 </h3>
 Release 0.8.3 uses the standard logging module, and supports configuring
 more detailed SPF policy via the sendmail access map.  SMTP AUTH connections
 are considered INTERNAL.  Preventing forgery between internal domains is
 just a matter of specifying the user-domain map - I'll define something
 for the next version.  We now send DSNs when mail is quarantined (rejecting
 if DSN fails) and for SPF syntax errors (PermError).  There is an
 experimental option to add a Sender header when it is missing and the From
 domain doesn't match the MAIL FROM domain.  Next release, we may start
 renaming and replacing an existing Sender header when neither it nor the
 From domain matches MAIL FROM.  Since bogus MAIL FROMs are rejected
 (to varying degrees depending on the configured SPF policy), and
 both Sender and From and displayed by default in many email clients,
 this provides some phishing protection without rejecting mail based
 on headers.
 <h3> 0.8.2 </h3>
 Release 0.8.2 has changes to <a href="http://openspf.net">SPF</a> to bring it
 in line with the newly official RFC.  It adds 
 <a href="http://ses.codeshare.ca/">SES</a>
 support (the original SES without body hash) for pysrs-0.30.10, and honeypot
 support for pydspam-1.1.9.  There is a new method in the base milter module.
 milter.set_exception_policy(i) lets you choose a policy of CONTINUE, REJECT, or
 TEMPFAIL (default) for untrapped exceptions encountered in a milter callback.
 <h3> 0.8.0 </h3>
 Release 0.8.0 is the first <a href="http://sourceforge.net/">Sourceforge</a>
 release.  It supports Python-2.4, and provides an option to accept mail
 that gets an SPF softfail or fails the 3 strikes rule, provided the
 alleged sender accepts a DSN explaining the problem.  Python-2.3 is
 no longer supported by the reworked mime.py module, although API changes
 could be backported.  There are too many incompatible changes to the
 python email package.
 <h3> Older Releases </h3>
 Release 0.7.2 tightens the authentication screws with a "3 strikes and
 you're out" policy.  A sender must have a valid PTR, HELO, or SPF record
 to send email.  Specific senders can be whitelisted using the
 "delegate" option in the spf configuration section by adding a
 default SPF record for them.  The PTR and HELO are required
 by RFC anyway, so this is not an unreasonable requirement.
 There is now a coherent policy for an SPF softfail result.  A softfail
 is accepted if there is a valid PTR or HELO, or if the domain
 is listed in the "accept_softfail" option of the spf configuration section.
 A neutral result is accepted by default if there is a valid PTR or
 HELO, (and the SPF record was not guessed), unless the domain is listed in the
 "reject_neutral" option.  Common forms of PTR records for dynamic IPs are
 recognized, and do not count as a valid PTR.  This does not prevent anyone
 from sending mail from a dynamic IP - they just need to configure a
 valid HELO name or publish an SPF record.
 <p>
 As SPF adoption continues to rise, forged spam is not getting through.  So
 spammers are publishing their SPF records as predicted.  The 0.7.2 RPM
 now provides the <code>rhsbl</code> sendmail hack so that spammer domains
 can be blacklisted.  With the RPM installed, add a line like the following
 to your <code>sendmail.mc</code>.
 <pre>
 HACK(rhsbl,`blackholes.example.com',"550 Rejected: " $&{RHS} " has been spamming our customers.")dnl
 </pre>
 <p>
 Of course, spammers are now starting to register
 throwaway domains.  The next thing we need is a custom DNS server,
 in Python, that
 can recognize patterns.  For instance, one spammer registers ded304.com,
 ded305.com, ded306.com, etc.  We also need the custom DNS server to
 let SPF classic clients check SES (which will be part of pysrs).  
 The <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/products/twisted">Twisted Python</a>
 framework provides a custom DNS server - but I
 would like a smaller implementation for our use.
 <p>
 The RPM for release 0.7.0 moves the config file and socket locations to
 /etc/mail and /var/run/milter respectively.  We now parse Microsoft CID records
 - but only hotmail.com uses them.  They seem to have applied for a patent on
 the brilliant idea of examining the mail headers to see who the message is
 from.  We aren't doing that here, so not to worry - but I am not a lawyer, so
 if you are worried, change spf.py around line 626 to return None instead of
 calling CIDParser().  There is a new option to reject mail with no PTR
 and no SPF.
 <p>
 Microsoft is pushing an anti-opensource license for their pending patent
 along with their sender-ID proposal before the IETF.
 It is royalty free - but requires anyone distributing a binary they've
 compiled from source to sign a license agreement.  The Apache Software
 Foundation <a
 href="http://www.apache.org/foundation/docs/sender-id-position.html"> explains
 the problem with sender-ID</a>, and Debian <a
 href="http://www.debian.org/News/2004/20040904">concurs</a>.  Since 
 the <a href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/3/9/439b024b-09fd-44ee-8ff0-10e834004c36/senderid_FAQ.PDF">Microsoft license</a> is
 <a href="http://www.circleid.com/article/732_0_1_0_C/">incompatible with free
 software in general</a> and the <a
 href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-mxcomp/mail-archive/msg03678.html">GPL in
 particular</a>, Python milter will not be able to implement sender-ID in its
 current form.  This was, no doubt, Microsoft's intent all along.
 <p>
 Sender-ID attempts to do for RFC2822 headers what SPF does for RFC2821 headers.
 Unlike SPF, it has never been tried, and is encumbered by a stupid patent.  I
 recommend ignoring it and continuing to implement and improve SPF until a
 working and unencumbered proposal for RFC2822 headers surfaces.
 <p>
 <a href="http://openspf.com">
 <img src="SPF.gif" align=left alt="SPF logo"></a>
 Release 0.6.6 adds support for <a href="http://openspf.com/">SPF</a>,
 a protocol to prevent forging of the envelope from address.  
 SPF support requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">pydns</a>.
 The included spf.py module is an updated version of the original 1.6
 version at <a href="http://www.wayforward.net/spf/">wayforward.net</a>.
 The updated version tracks the draft RFC and test suite.
 <p>
 The FAQ addresses <a href="faq.html#spf">how to get started with SPF</a>.
 <p>
 Release 0.6.1 adds a full milter based dspam application.
 <p>
 I have selected the <a href="http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/">
 dspam bayes filter project</a> and <a href="dspam.html">
 packaged it for python</a>.
 Release 0.6.0 offers a simple application of dspam I call "header triage",
 which rejects messages with spammy headers.  
 To use header triage, you must have <a href="dspam.html">DSPAM</a> installed,
 and select a dictionary that is well moderated by someone who gets
 lots of spam.  That dictionary can be used to block spam that is 
 obvious from the headers (e.g. X-Mailer and Subject) before it ties
 up any more resources.  I have yet to see any false positives from this
 approach (check the milter log), but if there are, the sender will
 get a REJECT with the message "Your message looks spammy."
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
 Title: Credits
 <h1> CREDITS </h1>
 <a href="mailto:Jim Niemira <urmane@urmane.org>">Jim Niemira</a>
 wrote the original C module and some quick
 and dirty python to use it.  
 <a href="mailto:Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>">Stuart D. Gathman</a>
 took that kludge and added threading and context objects to it, wrote a proper
 OO wrapper (Milter.py) that handles attachments, did lots of testing, packaged
 it with distutils, and generally transformed it from a quick hack to a
 real, usable Python extension.
 <h2>Other contributors (in random order):</h2>
 <dl>
 <dt> <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/lebl.htm">Christian Hafner</a>
  <dd>for the pymilter mascot image of 
  <a href="http://maxwelld.netfirms.com/">
  Maxwell's daemon</a>
 <dt>Stephen Figgins
  <dd>for reporting problems building with sendmail-8.12, and when
  building milter.so for the first time.
 <dt>Dave MacQuigg 
  <dd>for noticing that smfi_insheader wasn't supported, and creating
  a template to help first time pymilter users create their own milter.
 <dt>Terence Way
  <dd>for providing a Python port of SPF
 <dt>Scott Kitterman
  <dd>for doing lots of testing and debugging of SPF against draft standard,
  and for putting up a <a href="http://www.kitterman.com/spf/validate.html">
  web page that validates SPF</a> records using spf.py
 <dt>Alexander Kourakos
  <dd>for plugging several memory leaks
 <dt>George Graf at Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration
  <dd>for handling None passed to setreply and chgheader.
 <dt>Deron Meranda
  <dd>for IPv6 patches
 <dt>Jason Erikson
  <dd>for handling NULL hostaddr in connect callback.
 <dt>John Draper
  <dd>for porting Python milter to OpenBSD, and starting to work on tutorials
  then pointing out that it would be easier to just write the MTA in Python.
 <dt>Eric S. Johansson
  <dd>for helpful design discussions while working on camram
 <dt>Alex Savguira
  <dd>for finding bugs with international headers and
  suggesting the scan_zip option.
 <dt><a href="http://www.bmsi.com">Business Management Systems</a>
  <dd>for hosting the website, and providing paying clients who need milter
  service so I can work on it as part of my day job.
 </dl>
 If I have left anybody out, send me a reminder: 
 <a href="mailto:Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>">stuart@bmsi.com</a>
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
 <!-- -*- html -*- -->
 <h3>Subsections</h3>
 <li><a href="milter.html">Introduction</a>
 <li><a href="changes.html">Changes</a>
 <li><a href="requirements.html">Requirements</a>
 <li><a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=139894">Download</a>
 <li><a href="faq.html">FAQ</a>
 <li><a href="policy.html">Policies</a>
 <li><a href="logmsgs.html">Log&nbsp;Messages</a>
 <li><a href="http://bmsi.com/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Mailing&nbsp;List</a>
 <li><a href="credits.html">CREDITS</a>
 <li><a href="http://sourceforge.net"><img src="http://sflogo.sourceforge.net/sflogo.php?group_id=139894&amp;type=1" width="88" height="31" border="0" alt="SourceForge.net Logo" /></a>
 <h3>Links</h3>
 <li><a href="http://www.milter.org/milter_api/api.html">C&nbsp;API</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.milter.org/">Milter.Org</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.python.org/">Python.Org</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.sendmail.org/">Sendmail.Org</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.openspf.org/">SPF</a>
 <li><a href="pysrs.html">pysrs</a>
 <li><a href="http://cheeseshop.python.org/pypi/pyspf">pyspf</a>
 <li><a href="http://bmsi.com/python/pygossip.html">pygossip</a>
 <li><a href="http://bmsi.com/python/dspam.html">pydspam</a>
 <li><a href="http://bmsi.com/libdspam/dspam.html">libdspam</a>
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
 Title: Python Milter Log Documentation
 <style>
 DT              { font-weight: bolder; padding-top: 1em }
 </style>
 <h1> Milter Log Documentation </h1>
 The milter log from the bms.py application has a variety of "tags" in it that
 indicate what it did.
 <dl>
 <dt> DSPAM: honeypot SCREENED
 <dd> message was quarantined to the honeypot quarantine
 <dt> REJECT: hello SPF: fail 550 access denied
 <dt> REJECT: hello SPF: softfail 550 domain in transition
 <dt> REJECT: hello SPF: neutral 550 access neither permitted nor denied
 <dd> message was rejected because there was an SPF policy for the
 HELO name, and it did not pass.
 <dt> CBV: sender-17-44662668-643@bluepenmagic.com
 <dd> we performed a call back verification
 <dt> dspam
 <dd> dspam identifier was added to the message
 <dt> REJECT: spam from self: jsconnor.com
 <dd> message was reject because HELO was us (jsconnor.com)
 <dt> INNOC: richh
 <dd> message was used to update richh's dspam dictionary
 <dt> HONEYPOT: pooh@bwicorp.com
 <dd> message was sent to a honeypot address (pooh@bwicorp.com), the 
 message was added to the honeypot dspam dictionary as spam
 <dt> REJECT: numeric hello name: 63.217.19.146
 <dd> message was rejected because helo name was invalid (numeric)
 <dt> eom
 <dd> message was successfully received
 <dt> TEMPFAIL: CBV: 450 No MX servers available
 <dd> we tried to do a call back verification but could not look up 
 MX record, we told the sender to try again later
 <dt> CBV: info@emailpizzahut.com (cached)
 <dd> call back verification was needed, we had already done it recently
 <dt> abort after 0 body chars
 <dd> sender hung up on us
 <dt> REJECT: SPF fail 550 SPF fail: see 
  http://openspf.com/why.html?sender=m.hendersonxk@163.net&ip=213.47.161.100
 <dd> message was reject because its sender's spf policy said to
 <dt> REJECT: Subject: Cialis - No prescription needed!
 <dd> message was rejected because its subject contained a bad expression
 <dt> REJECT: zombie PC at  192.168.3.37  sending MAIL FROM  seajdr@amritind.com
 <dd> message was rejected because the connect ip was internal, but the
 sender was not.  This is usually because a Windows PC is infected with
 malware.
 <dt> X-Guessed-SPF: pass
 <dd> When the SPF result is NONE, we guess a result based on the generic
 SPF policy "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr".
 <dt> DSPAM: tonyc tonyc@example.com
 <dd> message was sent to tonyc@example.com and it was identified as spam 
 and placed in the tonyc dspam quarantine
 <dt> REJECT: CBV: 550 calvinalstonis@ix.netcom.com...User unknown
 <dt> REJECT: CBV: 553 sorry, that domain isn't in my list
 <dt> REJECT: CBV: 554 delivery error: dd This user doesn't have an account 
 <dd> message was rejected because call back verification gave us a fatal
 error
 <dt> Auto-Whitelist: user@example.com
 <dd> recipient has been added to auto_whitelist.log because the message
 was sent from an internal IP and the recipient is not internal.
 <dt> WHITELIST user@example.com
 <dd> message is whitelisted because sender appears in auto_whitelist.log
 <dt> BLACKLIST user@example.com
 <dd> message is blacklisted because sender appears in blacklist.log or
     failed a CBV test.
 <dt> TRAINSPAM: honeypot X-Dspam-Score: 0.002278
 <dd> message was used to train screener dictionary as spam
 <dt> TRAIN: honeypot X-Dspam-Score: 0.980203
 <dd> message was used to train screener dictionary as ham
 </dl>
 <br>
@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
 Title: Python Milter Mail Policy
 <h1> Python Milter Mail Policy </h1>
 These are the policies implemented by the <code>bms.py</code> milter
 application.  The milter and Milter modules do not implement any policies
 by themselves.  Eventually, I'll get the bms.py milter moved to its
 own package.
 <h3> Classify connection </h3>
 When the SMTP client connects, the connection IP address is
 saved for later verification, and the connection
 is classified as INTERNAL or EXTERNAL by matching the ip
 address against the <code>internal_connect</code> configuration.
 IP addresses with no PTR, and PTR names that look like
 the kind assigned to dynamic IPs (as determined by a heuristic
 algorithm) are flagged as DYNAMIC.  IPs that match the
 <code>trusted_relay</code> configuration are flagged as TRUSTED.
 <p>
 Examples from the log file (<i>not</i> the SMTP error message returned):
 <pre>
 2005Jul29 13:56:53 [71207] connect from p50863492.dip0.t-ipconnect.de at ('80.134.52.146', 1858) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74511] connect from foopub at ('1.2.3.4', 46513) EXTERNAL TRUSTED
 2005Jul29 14:41:00 [71805] connect from foobar at ('192.168.0.1', 41205) INTERNAL
 2005Jul29 14:41:15 [71806] connect from cncln.online.ln.cn at ('218.25.240.137', 35992) EXTERNAL
 </pre>
 <p>
 Certain obviously evil PTR names are blocked at this point:
 "localhost" (when IP is not 127.*) and ".".
 <pre>
 2005Jul29 14:49:50 [71918] connect from localhost at ('221.132.0.6', 50507) EXTERNAL
 2005Jul29 14:49:50 [71918] REJECT: PTR is localhost
 </pre>
 <h3> HELO Check </h3>
 The HELO name provided by the client is saved for later verification
 (for example by SPF).  We could validate the HELO at this point
 by verifying that an A record for the HELO name matches the connect ip.
 However, currently we only block certain obvious problems.  
 HELO names that look like an IP4 address 
 and ones that match the <code>hello_blacklist</code> configuration
 are immediately rejected.  The hello_blacklist typically contains
 the current MTAs own HELO name or email domains.
 Clients that attempt to skip HELO are immediately rejected.
 <pre>
 2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74512] hello from example.com
 2005Jul29 18:10:15 [74512] REJECT: spam from self: example.com
 2005Jul29 18:17:09 [74581] hello from 80.191.244.69
 2005Jul29 18:17:09 [74581] REJECT: numeric hello name: 80.191.244.69
 </pre>
 <h3> MAIL FROM Check </h3>
 Before calling our milter, sendmail checks a DNS blacklist to 
 block banned sender domains.  We never see a blocked domain.
 <p>
 The MAIL FROM address is saved for possible use by the smart-alias
 feature.  First, the <code>internal_domains</code> is used for
 a simple screening if defined.  If the MAIL FROM for an INTERNAL connection 
 is NOT in <code>internal_domains</code>, then it is rejected (the
 PC is most likely infected and attempting to send out spam).
 If the MAIL FROM for an EXTERNAL connection IS in
 <code>internal_domains</code>, then the message is immediately rejected.
 This is quick and effective for most small company MTAs.  For more
 complex mail networks, it is too simplistic, and should not be defined.
 SPF will handle the complex cases.
 <h4> wiretap </h4>
 The wiretap feature can screen and/or monitor mail to/from certain
 users.  If the MAIL FROM is being wiretapped, the recipients are
 altered accordingly.
 <!--table-stop-->
 <h2> SPF check </h2>
 Finally, the MAIL FROM, connect IP, and HELO name are checked against
 any SPF records published via DNS for the alleged sender (MAIL FROM).
 If there is no SPF record, we check for a local substitute under the
 domain defined in the <code>[spf]delegate</code> configuration.
 Further checks depend on the result.
 <table border=1>
 <tr><th>NONE</th><td>
 If there is no SPF record (official or delegated), then we 
 initiate a "three strikes and your out" regime, which looks for
 <b>some</b> form of validated identification.
 <ol>
 <li>We try a "best guess" SPF record of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr".  If this
    passes, good.  
 <li> We try to validate the HELO name. First check for an SPF record.
   Otherwise, check whether the connect IP matches any A record for
   the HELO name, or any A record for any MX name for the HELO name,
   or is at least in the same /24 subnet as any of the above.
   (In other words, a HELO SPF "best guess" of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24".)
   If so, good.  We consider the HELO validated.  If the HELO SPF
   check fails, we reject the email.
 </ol>
 <pre>
 2005Jul30 19:45:16 [93991] connect from [221.200.41.54] at ('221.200.41.54', 3581) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul30 19:45:18 [93991] hello from adelphia.net
 2005Jul30 19:45:19 [93991] mail from <wendy.stubbsua@link-it.com> ()
 2005Jul30 19:45:19 [93991] REJECT: hello SPF: fail 550 access denied
 </pre>
 <ol>
 <li> If there is a validated PTR name, and it doesn't look
   like a dynamic name, good.  We consider the connection validated.
 </ol>
 If any of the above can be validated, we continue on.
 If none of the above can be validated, and the <code>[SPF]reject_noptr</code>
 option is true, we reject the message immediately with the explanation
 that we need some form of valid identification before we accept an email.
 If <code>[SPF]reject_noptr</code> is false, we flag the message as
 needing Call Back Validation.  
 The Call Back Valildation sends a DSN to the purported sender informing
 them of the lack of identification.  If the message is legitimate, the
 sender needs to know that their email setup is broken and should be corrected.
 If the message is forged, the sender is informed of the forgery, 
 and their need to publish an SPF record or at least use a valid HELO name.
 If the purported sender does not accept the DSN,
 then the message is rejected.  The CBV status is cached to avoid
 annoying the purported sender with too many DSNs.  Currently, the DSN
 is repeated to the same sender once per month.
 <p>
 In this example, although 3com.com has no SPF record, we assume that 
 any legitimate mail from them will at least have a valid HELO or PTR.
 <pre>
 2005Jul30 23:52:03 [96777] connect from [222.252.233.200] at ('222.252.233.200', 29934) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul30 23:52:03 [96777] hello from 3mail.3com.com
 2005Jul30 23:52:04 [96777] mail from <etec_nic_family@3mail.3com.com> ()
 2005Jul30 23:52:04 [96777] REJECT: no PTR, HELO or SPF
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>PASS</th><td>
 A pass result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is 
 tracked for reputation (and may be blocked), and may skip content scanning if
 it matches a whitelist.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 17:44:26 [2104] mail from <gnucash-devel-bounces@gnucash.org> ('SIZE=4410',)
 2005Jul24 17:44:26 [2104] Received-SPF: pass (mail.bmsi.com: domain of gnucash.org
 	designates 204.107.200.65 as permitted sender)
 	client-ip=204.107.200.65; envelope-from=gnucash-devel-bounces@gnucash.org; helo=cvs.gnucash.org;
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>NEUTRAL</th><td>
 A neutral result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is not
 tracked for reputation or matched against any whitelists. 
 Highly forged domains listed in <code>[SPF]reject_neutral</code> are
 rejected.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 17:41:37 [2070] connect from cp500627-a.dbsch1.nb.home.nl at ('84.27.225.3', 3465) EXTERNAL
 2005Jul24 17:41:37 [2070] hello from cp500627-a.dbsch1.nb.home.nl
 2005Jul24 17:41:38 [2070] mail from <nwarjejkw@yahoo.com> ()
 2005Jul24 17:41:38 [2070] REJECT: SPF neutral for nwarjejkw@yahoo.com
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>SOFTFAIL</th><td>
 A softfail result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is not
 tracked for reputation or matched against any whitelists.  Furthermore,
 the message is flagged as needing Call Back Validation,
 and the highly forged domains listed in <code>[SPF]reject_neutral</code> are
 rejected as well.  
 <p>
 At present, we also require a valid HELO or PTR to avoid rejecting 
 a softfail.  But this should probably change to only require a
 successful CBV.
 <p>
 The Call Back Valildation sends a DSN to the purported sender informing
 them of the softfail.  If the message is legitimate, the sender needs
 to know about the softfail so that their email setup can be corrected.
 If the message is forged, the sender is informed of the forgery, confirming
 that SPF is protecting their reputation and encouraging a rapid transition
 to a strict policy.  If the purported sender does not accept the DSN,
 then the message is rejected.  The CBV status is cached to avoid
 annoying the purported sender with too many DSNs.  Currently, the DSN
 is repeated to the same sender once per month.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] mail from <Aitp@horafeliz.com> ()
 2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] Received-SPF: softfail (mail.bmsi.com: transitioning domain of horafeliz.com
 	does not designate 221.184.83.185 as permitted sender)
 	client-ip=221.184.83.185; envelope-from=Aitp@horafeliz.com;
 	helo=p8185-ipad30funabasi.chiba.ocn.ne.jp;
 2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] rcpt to <david@example.com> ()
 2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] Subject: Microsoft, Adobe, Macromedia, Corel software. Up to 80% discount.
 2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2605
 2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] CBV: Aitp@horafeliz.com
 2005Jul24 15:41:38 [801] REJECT: CBV: 550 <Aitp@horafeliz.com>: User unknown
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>FAIL</th><td>
 The message is rejected with a reference the SPF why page.
 <pre>
 2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] connect from [212.70.52.16] at ('212.70.52.16', 3192) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] hello from winzip.com
 2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] mail from <dan@winzip.com> ()
 2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] REJECT: SPF fail 550 SPF fail:
 	see http://openspf.com/why.html?sender=dan@winzip.com&ip=212.70.52.16
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>PERMERROR</th><td>
 Permanent errors were called "unknown", and are still show that way
 in the log.  The message is rejected.  Previously, we enabled "lax" parsing
 of the SPF record, but rejecting is better because it informs the
 sender about their problem.  The next milter version will 
 look for a local substitute SPF record (as for a missing SPF record)
 before rejecting.  This will inform the sender of their problem, but
 also let the receiver install a temporary workaround.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 18:05:37 [2312] mail from <b-mihdbcgaacaa-becibijh-000-@msg.euxiphipops.com> () 
 2005Jul24 18:05:37 [2312] REJECT: SPF unknown 550 SPF Permanent Error:
 	include mechanism missing domain: include
 </pre>
 The SPF record for msg.euxiphipops.com looked like this at the time of the
 above error:
 <pre>
 msg.euxiphipops.com	TXT "v=spf1 mx ptr a include"
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 <tr><th>TEMPERROR</th><td>
 Temporary errors result in a 451 "Try again later" response.  The sender
 should retry the message at a later time.
 <pre>
 2005Jul24 07:33:13 [29846] mail from <quickenloans@rate.quicken.com> ('SIZE=73775', 'BODY=8BITMIME')
 2005Jul24 07:33:43 [29846] TEMPFAIL: SPF error 450 SPF Temporary Error: DNS Timeout
 </pre>
 </td></tr>
 </table>
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
 Title: Requirements
 <h2> Requirements </h2>
 <menu>
 <li> While the miltermodule will work with python 1.5, you probably
 want to use python 2.0 or better.  The python code uses a number of
 python 2 features.  The email support requires python 2.4.
 <li> Python must be configured with thread support.  This is because
 pymilter uses sendmail's libmilter which requires thread support.
 <li> You must compile sendmail with libmilter enabled.  In versions of
 sendmail prior to 8.12 libmilter is marked FFR (For Future Release) and
 is not installed by default.  
 Sendmail 8.12 still does not enable libmilter by default.  You must 
 explicitly select the "MILTER" option when compiling.  
 <li> When compiling Python milter against sendmail versions earlier than
 8.13, you must set MAX_ML_REPLY to 1 in setup.py.  There is no way to tell from
 the libmilter includes that smfi_setmlreply is not supported.
 <li> You probably want to use sendmail-8.13, since that supports multi-line
 SMTP error descriptions and SOCKETMAP.  You want SOCKETMAP for use with
 pysrs.
 <li> Python milter has been tested against sendmail-8.11 through sendmail-8.13.
 <li> Python milter must be compiled for the specific version of sendmail
 it will run with.  (Since the result is dynamically loaded, there could 
 conceivably be multiple versions available and selected at startup - but
 that will have to wait.)  This situation may only exist for sendmail
 versions prior to 8.12.  The protocol seems designed for backward 
 compatibility - and 8.12 is the first official milter release.
 <li> Mea Culpa!  After reading the Python Style guide, I realize that
 my Python code is not up to snuff.  Apparently mixed tabs and spaces
 are anathema to those using Windows editors, where tabs can be expanded using
 any arbitrary algorithm.  Other than that, my
 intuition matched Guido's pretty well - although I like to indent by 2
 rather than 4.  I will arrange to have tabs expanded to spaces when
 exporting new versions.  Until then, beware!
 </menu>
 <h3> <a name="aix4"> AIX 4.1.5 Requirements </a> </h3>
 To create sendmail RPMs for AIX, you can download my AIX 4.1.5 spec files 
 for <a href="/aix/sendmail.spec">sendmail-8.11.5</a> 
 or <a href="/aix/sendmail12.spec">sendmail-8.12.3</a>.  If you have
 not already set it up, I use a <a href="/aix/aix.spec">dummy RPM package</a>
 to represent the stuff that comes with AIX.  You might also want
 my <a href="/aix/python.spec">python-2.1.1</a> spec file for AIX.  It
 does not include Tk or curses modules, sorry.  If y'all trust me, you can
 download rpms for AIX 4.x from my <a href="/aix">AIX RPM directory</a>.
 <p>
 Sendmail-8.12 renames 
 libsmutil.a to libsm.a.  Unfortunately, libsm.a is an important AIX system
 shared library.  Therefore, I rename libsm.a back to libsmutil.a for
 AIX.  This presents a problem for setup.py.
 <h3> <a name="rh72"> RedHat 7.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
 If you are running Redhat 7.2, the distributed version of sendmail
 now enables libmilter by default.  RedHat 7.2 bundles
 the development libraries with the main sendmail package, so
 there is no sendmail-devel package.  However, they forgot to include the
 headers!  So you'll have to get the SRPM and modify it.  I suggest
 moving the static libs to a devel package and adding the headers.  If
 this is too much trouble, you can get the <a href="mfapi.h">mfapi.h</a>
 header for sendmail-8.6.11 from here and manually install it as
 <code>/usr/include/libmilter/mfapi.h</code>.
 <p>
 If you do modify the SRPM, I suggest renaming libsmutil.a
 to libsm.a - just like sendmail-8.12 will.  If you manually install
 mfapi.h or don't rename libsmutil.a, you'll
 need to force <code>libs = ["milter", "smutil"]</code> in setup.py.
 <p>
 If you have installed python2, and want
 python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
 and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.   
 <h3> <a name="rh62"> Redhat 6.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
 If you are running Redhat 6.2, the distributed version of sendmail
 does not enable libmilter.  You can download the Redhat 7.2 sendmail.spec
 modified to compile on RedHat 6.2:
 <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62/sendmail-rhmilter.spec">
 sendmail-rhmilter.spec</a>.  The <a
 href="ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/SRPMS/sendmail-8.11.6-1.7.0.src.rpm">
 SRPM for sendmail-8.11.6</a> is available from
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com">Redhat</a> under 
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-106.html">
 Errata for RH6.2</a>.  But that doesn't include the latest security
 patches since RH6.2 is no longer supported.
 <p>
 If y'all trust me, you can pick up source and binary sendmail RPMs for RH6.2
 from my <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62">linux downloads</a> directory.
 The lastest RPMs were built by taking a RH7.2 SRPMS and removing some
 RPM features from the spec file that RH6.2 doesn't support, then
 recompiling on RH6.2.  You can check this by installing the RH7.2 SRPM,
 then diffing my sendmail.spec with theirs.  Then run
 "rpm -bb sendmail-rhmilter.spec" when you are satisfied.
 <p>
 If you have installed python2, and want
 python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
 and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.
 You'll need to install the sendmail-devel package to compile milter.
@@ -1,25 +1,13 @@
-Title: Python Milter FAQ
+<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">
 <html>
 <head>
 <title>Python Milter FAQ</title>
 </head><body>
 <h1> Python Milter <a name=faq>FAQ</a> </h1>
 <menu>
 <li> <a href="#compiling">Compiling Python Milter</a>
 <li> <a href="#running">Running Python Milter</a>
 <li> <a href="#spf">Using SPF</a>
 <li> <a href="#srs">Using SRS</a>
 </menu>
 <ol>
-
+<h3> Compiling Python Milter </h3>
 <h3> <a name="compiling">Compiling Python Milter </a> </h3>
 <li> Q. I have tried to download the current milter code and my virus scan
 traps several viruses in the download.
 <p>  A. The milter source includes a number of deactivated viruses in
 the test directory.  All but the first and last lines of the base64
 encoded virus data has been removed.  I suppose I should randomize
 the first and last lines as well, since pymilter just deletes executables,
 and doesn't look for signatures.
 <li> Q. I have installed sendmail from source, but Python milter won't
 compile.
 <p>  A. Even though libmilter is officially supported in sendmail-8.12, 
@@ -34,25 +22,10 @@ shows you how to install libmilter with a separate invocation of make.
 <li> Q. Why is mfapi.h not found when I try to compile Python milter on
 RedHat 7.2?
 <p>  A. RedHat forgot to include the header in the RPM.  See the
-<a href="requirements.html#rh72">RedHat 7.2 requirements</a>.
+<a href="milter.html#rh72">RedHat 7.2 requirements</a>.
 <p>
 <li> Q. Python milter compiles ok, but I get an error like this when
 	I try to import the milter module:
 <pre>
 ImportError: /usr/lib/python2.4/site-packages/milter.so: undefined symbol: smfi_setmlreply
 </pre>
 <p>  A. Your libmilter.a is from sendmail-8.12 or earlier.  You need
 	sendmail-8.13 or later to support setmlreply.  You can disable
 	setmlreply by changing setup.py.  Change:
 <pre>
            define_macros = [ ('MAX_ML_REPLY',32) ]
 </pre>
 in setup.py to
 <pre>
            define_macros = [ ('MAX_ML_REPLY',1) ]
 </pre>
-<h3> <a name="running">Running Python Milter </a></h3>
+<h3> Running Python Milter </h3>
 <li> Q. The sample.py milter prints a message, then just sits there.
 <pre>
@@ -130,14 +103,13 @@ If you are running bms.py, then the block_chinese option in
 <li> Q. Why does sendmail coredump with milters on OpenBSD?
 <p>  A. Sendmail has a problem with unix sockets on old versions of OpenBSD.
-OpenBSD users report that this problem has been fixed, so upgrading
+Use an internet domain socket instead.  For example, in
 OpenBSD will fix this.  Otherwise, you can
 use an internet domain socket instead.  For example, in
 <code>sendmail.cf</code> use
 <pre>
 Xpythonfilter, S=inet:1234@localhost
 </pre>
 and change sample.py accordingly.
 <p> OpenBSD users report that this problem has been fixed.
 <p>
 <li> Q. How can I change the bounce message for an invalid recipient?
@@ -169,49 +141,8 @@ is a milter declaration for sendmail.cf with all timeouts specified:
 <pre>
 Xpythonfilter, S=local:/var/log/milter/pythonsock, F=T, T=C:5m;S:20s;R:60s;E:5m
 </pre>
 <li> Q. There is a Python traceback in the log file!  What happened to
 	my email?
 <p>  A. By default, when the milter fails with an untrapped exception, a
 TEMPFAIL result (451) is returned to the sender.  The sender will then retry
 every hour or so for several days.  Hopefully, someone will notice the 
 traceback, and workaround or fix the problem.  Beginning with milter-0.8.2,
 you can call <code>milter.set_exception_policy(milter.CONTINUE)</code>
 to cause an untrapped exception to continue processing with the
 next callback or milter instead.  For
 completeness, you can also set the exception policy to
 <code>milter.REJECT</code>.
 <li> Q. I read some notes such as "Check valid domains allowed by internal
 	senders to detect PCs infected with spam trojans." but could not
 	understand the idea. Could you clarify the content ?
 <p>  A. The <code>internal_domains</code> configuration specifies which
 MAIL FROM domains are used by internal connections.  If an internal
 PC tries to use some other domain, it is assumed to be a "Zombie".
 <p>
 Here is a sample log line:
 <pre>
 2005Jun22 12:01:04 [12430] REJECT: zombie PC at  192.168.100.171  sending MAIL FROM  debby@fedex.com
 </pre>
 No, fedex.com does not use pymilter, and there is no one named debby at my
 client.  But the idiot using the PC at 192.168.100.171 has downloaded and
 installed some stupid weatherbar/hotbar/aquariumscreensaver that is actually a
 spam bot.
 <p>
 The <code>internal_domains</code> option is simplistic, it assumes all
 valid senders of the domains are internal.  SPF provides a much more general
 check of IP and MAIL FROM for external email.  Pymilter should soon
 have a local policy feature for more general checking of internal mail.
 <li> Q. <code>mail_archive</code> isn't working.  Or I don't understand how
 	it's suppose to work.  I have
 	<code>mail_archive = /var/mail/mail_archive</code>
 	in <code>pymilter.cfg</code> but nothing ever gets dumped into
 	<code>/var/mail/mail_archive</code>.
 <p>  A. The 'mail' user needs to have write access.  Permission failures
 	should be logged as a traceback in milter.log if it doesn't.
 <h3> <a name="spf">Using SPF </a></h3>
 <a name="spf">
 <li> Q. So how do I use the SPF support?  The sample.py milter doesn't seem
        to use it.
 <p>  A. The bms.py milter supports spf.  The RedHat RPMs will set almost
@@ -231,63 +162,6 @@ everything up for you.  For other systems:
     logfiles and a simple cron script using <code>find</code> to clean
     <code>tempdir</code>.
 </ol>
 	In CVS, there is <code>spfmilter.py</code>.  Run that as a service,
 	and it does just SPF.  It uses the sendmail <code>access</code>
 	file to configure SPF responses just like <code>bms.py</code>, but
 	supports only REJECT and OK.
 <li> Q. The SPF DSN is sent at least once for domains that don't publish a SPF.
 	How do I stop this behavior?
 <p>  A. The SPF response is controlled by <code>/etc/mail/access</code>
 	(actually the file you specify with <code>access_file</code> in
 	the <code>[spf]</code> section of <code>pymilter.cfg</code>).  
 	Responses are OK, CBV, and REJECT.  CBV sends the DSN.
 <p>
 You can change the defaults.  For instance, I have:
 <pre>
 SPF-None:	REJECT
 SPF-Neutral:	CBV
 SPF-Softfail:	CBV
 SPF-Permerror:	CBV
 </pre>
 I have best_guess = 1, so SPF none is converted to PASS/NEUTRAL for policy
 lookup, and 3 strikes (no PTR, no HELO, no SPF) becomes "SPF NONE" for local
 policy purposes (the Received-SPF header always shows the official SPF
 result.)
 <p>
 You can change the default for specific domains:
 <pre>
 # these guys aren't going to pay attention to CBVs anyway...
 SPF-None:cia.gov	REJECT
 SPF-None:fbi.gov	REJECT
 SPF-Neutral:aol.com	REJECT
 SPF-Softfail:ebay.com	REJECT
 </pre>
 <h3> <a name="srs">Using SRS </a></h3>
 <li> Q. The SRS part doesn't seem to work as whenever I try to start
 	<code>/etc/init.d/pysrs</code>, I get this in
 	<code>/var/log/milter/pysrs.log</code>:
 <pre>
 ConfigParser.NoOptionError: No option 'fwdomain' in section: 'srs'
 </pre>
 <p>  A. You need to specify the forward domain - i.e. the domain you want
 	SRS to rewrite stuff too.
 <p>
 For instance, I have:
 <pre>
 # sample SRS configuration
 [srs]
 secret = don't you wish
 maxage = 8
 hashlength = 5
 ;database=/var/log/milter/srs.db
 fwdomain = bmsi.com
 sign=bmsi.com,mail.bmsi.com,gathman.org
 srs=bmsaix.bmsi.com,bmsred.bmsi.com,stl.gathman.org,bampa.gathman.org
 </pre>
 The <code>sign</code> is for local domains which are signed.
 The <code>srs</code> list is for other domains which you are relaying,
 and which need to have SRS checked/undone for bounces.
 </ol>
 </html>
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
 ## To roll your own milter, create a class that extends Milter.  
 #  See the pymilter project at http://bmsi.com/python/milter.html
 #  based on Sendmail's milter API http://www.milter.org/milter_api/api.html
 #  This code is open-source on the same terms as Python.
 ## Milter calls methods of your class at milter events.
 ## Return REJECT,TEMPFAIL,ACCEPT to short circuit processing for a message.
 ## You can also add/del recipients, replacebody, add/del headers, etc.
 import Milter
 import StringIO
 import time
 import email
 from socket import AF_INET, AF_INET6
 def parse_addr(t):
  """Split email into user,domain.
  >>> parse_addr('user@example.com')
  ['user', 'example.com']
  >>> parse_addr('"user@example.com"')
  ['user@example.com']
  >>> parse_addr('"user@bar"@example.com')
  ['user@bar', 'example.com']
  >>> parse_addr('foo')
  ['foo']
  """
  if t.startswith('<') and t.endswith('>'): t = t[1:-1]
  if t.startswith('"'):
    if t.endswith('"'): return [t[1:-1]]
    pos = t.find('"@')
    if pos > 0: return [t[1:pos],t[pos+2:]]
  return t.split('@')
 class myMilter(Milter.Milter):
  def __init__(self):  # A new instance with each new connection.
    self.id = Milter.uniqueID()  # Integer incremented with each call.
  # each connection runs in its own thread and has its own myMilter
  # instance.  Python code must be thread safe.  This is trivial if only stuff
  # in myMilter instances is referenced.
  def connect(self, IPname, family, hostaddr):
    # (self, 'ip068.subnet71.example.com', AF_INET, ('215.183.71.68', 4720) )
    # (self, 'ip6.mxout.example.com', AF_INET6,
    #	('3ffe:80e8:d8::1', 4720, 1, 0) )
    self.IP = hostaddr[0]
    self.port = hostaddr[1]
    if family == AF_INET6:
      self.flow = hostaddr[2]
      self.scope = hostaddr[3]
    else:
      self.flow = None
      self.scope = None
    self.IPname = IPname  # Name from a reverse IP lookup
    self.H = None
    self.fp = None
    self.receiver = self.getsymval('j')
    self.log("connect from %s at %s" % (IPname, hostaddr) )
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  ##  def hello(self,hostname):
  def hello(self, heloname):
    # (self, 'mailout17.dallas.texas.example.com')
    self.H = heloname
    self.log("HELO %s" % heloname)
    if heloname.find('.') < 0:	# illegal helo name
      # NOTE: example only - too many real braindead clients to reject on this
      self.setreply('550','5.7.1','Sheesh people!  Use a proper helo name!')
      return Milter.REJECT
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  ##  def envfrom(self,f,*str):
  def envfrom(self, mailfrom, *str):
    self.F = mailfrom
    self.R = []  # list of recipients
    self.fromparms = Milter.dictfromlist(str)	# ESMTP parms
    self.user = self.getsymval('{auth_authen}')	# authenticated user
    self.log("mail from:", mailfrom, *str)
    self.fp = StringIO.StringIO()
    self.canon_from = '@'.join(parse_addr(mailfrom))
    self.fp.write('From %s %s\n' % (self.canon_from,time.ctime()))
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  ##  def envrcpt(self, to, *str):
  def envrcpt(self, recipient, *str):
    rcptinfo = to,Milter.dictfromlist(str)
    self.R.append(rcptinfo)
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def header(self, name, hval):
    self.fp.write("%s: %s\n" % (name,hval))	# add header to buffer
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def eoh(self):
    self.fp.write("\n")				# terminate headers
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def body(self, chunk):
    self.fp.write(chunk)
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def eom(self):
    self.fp.seek(0)
    msg = email.message_from_file(self.fp)
    self.setreply('250','2.5.1','Grokked by pymilter')
    # many milter functions can only be called from eom()
    # example of adding a Bcc:
    self.addrcpt('<%s>' % 'spy@example.com')
    return Milter.ACCEPT
  def close(self):
    # always called, even when abort is called.  Clean up
    # any external resources here.
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def abort(self):
    # client disconnected prematurely
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  ## === Support Functions ===
  def log(self,*msg):
    print "%s [%d]" % (time.strftime('%Y%b%d %H:%M:%S'),self.id),
    # 2005Oct13 02:34:11 [1] msg1 msg2 msg3 ...
    for i in msg: print i,
    print
 ## ===
 def main():
  # Register to have the Milter factory create instances of your class:
  Milter.factory = myMilter
  flags = Milter.CHGBODY + Milter.CHGHDRS + Milter.ADDHDRS
  flags += Milter.ADDRCPT
  flags += Milter.DELRCPT
  Milter.set_flags(flags)       # tell Sendmail which features we use
  print "%s milter startup" % time.strftime('%Y%b%d %H:%M:%S')
  sys.stdout.flush()
  Milter.runmilter("pythonfilter",socketname,timeout)
  print "%s bms milter shutdown" % time.strftime('%Y%b%d %H:%M:%S')
 if __name__ == "__main__":
  main()
@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@ tempdir = /var/log/milter/save
 # how long to wait for a response from sendmail before giving up 
 ;timeout=600
 log_headers = 0
-# Connection ips and hostnames are matched against this glob style list
+# connection ips and hostnames are matched against this glob style list
-# to recognize internal senders.  You probably need to change this.
+# to recognize internal senders.
-# The default is a good guess to try and prevent newbie frustration.
+;internal_connect = 192.168.*.*
 internal_connect = 192.168.0.0/16,127.*
 # mail that is not an internal_connect and claims to be from an
 # internal domain is rejected.  Furthermore, internal mail that
@@ -18,15 +17,12 @@ internal_connect = 192.168.0.0/16,127.*
 # flexible.  However, SPF is not currently checked for outgoing
 # (internal_connect) mail because it doesn't yet handle authorizing 
 # internal IPs locally.
-;internal_domains = mycorp.com,localhost.localdomain
+;internal_domains = mycorp.com
 # connections from a trusted relay can trust the first Received header
 # SPF checks are bypassed for internal connections and trusted relays.
 ;trusted_relay = 1.2.3.4, 66.12.34.56
 # Relaying to these domains is allowed from internal connections only.
 ;private_relay = mycorp.com
 # Reject external senders with hello names no legit external sender would use.
 # SPF will do this also, but listing your own domain and mailserver here
 # will save some DNS lookups when rejecting certain viruses.
@@ -35,20 +31,17 @@ internal_connect = 192.168.0.0/16,127.*
 # Reject mail for domains mentioned unless user is mentioned here also
 ;check_user = joe@mycorp.com, mary@mycorp.com, file:bigcorp.com
 # Treat localparts in milter.cfg as case-insensitive
 case_sensitive_localpart = true
 # features intended to filter or block incoming mail
 [defang]
 # do virus scanning on attached messages also
-scan_rfc822 = 0
+scan_rfc822 = 1
 # do virus scanning on attached zipfiles also
 scan_zip = 0
 # Comment out scripts in HTML attachments.  Can be CPU intensive.
 scan_html = 0
 # reject messages with asian fonts because we can't read them
-block_chinese = 0
+block_chinese = 1
 # list users who hate forwarded mail
 ;block_forward = egghead@mycorp.com, busybee@mycorp.com
 # reject mail with these case insensitive strings in the subject
@@ -57,7 +50,7 @@ porn_words = penis, breast, pussy, horse cock, porn, xenical, diet pill, d1ck,
 	p-e-n-i-s, hydrocodone, vicodin, xanax, vicod1n, x@nax, diazepam,
 	v1@gra, xan@x, cialis, ci@lis, frëe, xãnax, valíum, vãlium, via-gra,
 	x@n3x, vicod3n, penís, c0d1n, phentermine, en1arge, dip1oma, v1codin,
-	valium, rolex, sexual, fuck, adv1t
+	valium, rolex, sexual, fuck
 # reject mail with these case sensitive strings in the subject
 spam_words = $$$, !!!, XXX, FREE, HGH
 # attachments with these extensions will be replaced with a warning
@@ -77,12 +70,8 @@ config=/etc/mail/pysrs.cfg
 ;fwdomain = mydomain.com
 # turn this on after a grace period to reject spoofed DSNs
 reject_spoofed = 0
 # Many braindead MTAs send DSNs with a non-DSN MFROM (e.g. to report that
 # some virus claiming to be sent by you).  This heuristic
 # refuses mail from user names commonly abused in that way.
 ;banned_users = postmaster, mailer-daemon, clamav
-# See http://www.openspf.com for more info on SPF.
+# See http://spf.pobox.com for more info on SPF.
 [spf]
 # namespace where SPF records can be supplied for domains without one
 # records are searched for under _spf.domain.com
@@ -96,21 +85,6 @@ reject_spoofed = 0
 ;reject_noptr = 0
 # always accept softfail from these domains, or send DSN otherwise
 ;accept_softfail = bounces.amazon.com
 # Treat fail from these domains like softfail: because their SPF record
 # or an important sender is screwed up.  Must have valid HELO, however.
 ;accept_fail = custhelp.com
 # Use sendmail access map or similar format for detailed spf policy.
 # SPF entries in the access map will override any defaults set above.
 ;access_file = /etc/mail/access.db
 # Add MAIL FROM as Sender when Sender is missing and From domain
 # doesn't match MAIL FROM.  Outlook and other email clients will then display
 # something like: "Sent by sender@domain.com on behalf of from@example.com"
 ;supply_sender = 0
 # Connections that get an SPF pass for a pretend MAIL FROM of 
 # postmaster@sometrustedforwarder.com skip SPF checks for the real MAIL FROM.
 # This is for non-SRS forwarders.  It is a simple implementation that
 # is inefficient for more than a few entries.
 ;trusted_forwarder = careerbuilder.com
 # features intended to clean up outgoing mail
 [scrub]
@@ -127,22 +101,14 @@ blind = 1
 # (sendmail aliases let you monitor incoming mail)
 #
 ;users = disloyal@bigcorp.com, bigmouth@bigcorp.com
 # multiple destinations can use smart_alias
 ;dest = spy@bigcorp.com
 # discard outgoing mail without alerting sender
 # can be used in conjunction with wiretap to censor outgoing mail
 ;discard_users = canned@bigcorp.com
 # archive copies all delivered mail to a file
 ;mail_archive = /var/log/mail_archive
 #
 # smart aliases trigger on both sender and recipient
 #   alias = sender, recipient[, destination]
 #
-[smart_alias]
+;smart_alias = copycust,walter
 # multiple wiretap monitors.  Smart aliases are applied after wiretap.
 ;spy1 = disloyal@bigcorp.com,spy@bigcorp.com
 ;spy2 = bigmouth@bigcorp.com,spy@bigcorp.com
 # mail from client@clientcorp.com to sue@bigcorp.com is redirected to 
 # local alias copycust
 ;copycust = client@clientcorp.com,sue@bigcorp.com
@@ -153,7 +119,7 @@ blind = 1
 ;walter1 = cust@othercorp.com,walter@bigcorp.com,boss@bigcorp.com,
 ;	walter@bigcorp.com
 ;bulk = soruce@telex.com,bob@jsconnor.com
-;bulk1 = soruce@telex.com,larry@jsconnor.com,bulk
+;bulk = soruce@telex.com,larry@jsconnor.com
 # See http://bmsi.com/python/dspam.html
 [dspam]
@@ -162,13 +128,7 @@ blind = 1
 # only EXTERNAL messages are dspam filtered
 ;dspam_dict=/var/lib/dspam/moderator.dict
-# Recipients of mail sent from these senders are added to the auto_whitelist.
+# Opt-opt recipients from dspam screening and header triage
 # Auto_whitelisted senders with an SPF PASS are never rejected by dspam, and
 # messages from auto_whitelisted senders will be used to train screener
 # dictionaries as innocent mail.
 ;whitelist_senders = @mycorp.com
 # Opt-out recipients entirely from dspam screening and header triage
 ;dspam_exempt=getitall@mycorp.com
 # Do not scan mail (ostensibly) from these senders
 ;dspam_whitelist=getitall@sender.com
@@ -192,26 +152,9 @@ blind = 1
 ;spam=spam@foocorp.com
 # address to forward false positives to.  milter will process and not deliver
 ;falsepositive=ham@foocorp.com
 # account which receives only spam: all received messages are marked as spam.
 ;honeypot=spam-me@example.com
 # the dspam_screener is a list of dspam users who screen mail for all
 # recipients who are not dspam_users.  Spam goes to the screeners quarantine,
 # and the original recipients are saved so that false positives can be properly
 # delivered.
 ;dspam_screener=david,goliath
 # The dspam CGI can also be used: logins must match dspam users
 # Optional pygossip interface
 #
 # GOSSiP tracks reputation of domain:qualifier pairs.  For instance,
 # the reputation of example.com:SPF is tracked separately from
 # example.com:neutral.  Currently qualifiers are
 # SPF,neutral,softfail,fail,permerror,GUESS,HELO
 [gossip]
 # Use a dedicated GOSSiP server.  If not specified, a local database
 # will be used.
 ;server=host:11900
 # If a local database is used, also consult these GOSSiP servers about 
 # domains.  Peer reputation is also tracked as to how often they
 # agree with us, and weighted accordingly.
 ;peers=host1:port,host2
@@ -1,29 +1,33 @@
-Title: Python Milters
+<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
 <title>Python Milters</title>
 </head><body>
 <P ALIGN="CENTER"><A HREF="http://www.anybrowser.org/campaign/">
-<IMG SRC="http://bmsi.com/art/brain1.gif"
+<IMG SRC="/art/brain1.gif"
 ALT="Viewable With Any Browser" BORDER="0"></A>
-<img src="http://bmsi.com/art/banner_4.gif" width="468" height="60" border="0"
+<img src="/art/banner_4.gif" width="468" height="60" border="0"
 	usemap="#banner_4" alt="Your vote?">
 <map name="banner_4">
  <area shape="rect" coords="330,25,426,59"
  	href="http://education-survey.org/" alt="I Disagree">
  <area shape="rect" coords="234,28,304,57" href="http://www.honestEd.com/" alt="I Agree">
 </map>
 </P>
-<img src="Maxwells.gif" alt="Maxwell's Daemon: pymilter mascot" align=left>
+</P>
 <h1 align=center>Sendmail Milters in Python</h1>
 <h4 align=center>by <a href="mailto:%75%72%6D%61%6E%65%40%6E%65%75%72%61l%61%63%63%65%73%73%2E%63%6F%6D">Jim Niemira</a>
  and <a href="mailto:%73%74%75%61%72%74%40%62%6D%73%69%2E%63%6F%6D">
  Stuart D. Gathman</a><br>
 This web page is written by Stuart D. Gathman<br>and<br>sponsored by
 <a href="http://www.bmsi.com">Business Management Systems, Inc.</a> <br>
-Last updated Mar 30, 2007</h4>
+Last updated Jun 09, 2005</h4>
 See the <a href="faq.html">FAQ</a> | <a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=139894">Download now</a> |
-<a href="http://bmsi.com/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Subscribe to mailing list</a> |
+<a href="/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Subscribe to mailing list</a> |
 <a href="#overview">Overview</a> |
 <a href="/python/dspam.html">pydspam</a> |
 <a href="/libdspam/dspam.html">libdspam</a>
@@ -41,6 +45,151 @@ separation features to enhance security.  Even better, sendmail 8.13
 supports socket maps, which makes <a href="pysrs.html">pysrs</a> much more
 efficient and secure.  I recommend upgrading.
 <h2> Recent Changes </h2>
 Python milter is being moved to 
 <a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/pymilter/">pymilter Sourceforge
 project</a> for development.
 <p>
 Release 0.8.0 is the first <a href="http://sourceforge.net/">Sourceforge</a>
 release.  It supports Python-2.4, and provides an option to accept mail
 that gets an SPF softfail or fails the 3 strikes rule, provided the
 alleged sender accepts a DSN explaining the problem.  Python-2.3 is
 no longer supported by the reworked mime.py module, although API changes
 could be backported.  There are too many incompatible changes to the
 python email package.
 <p>
 Release 0.7.2 tightens the authentication screws with a "3 strikes and
 you're out" policy.  A sender must have a valid PTR, HELO, or SPF record
 to send email.  Specific senders can be whitelisted using the
 "delegate" option in the spf configuration section by adding a
 default SPF record for them.  The PTR and HELO are required
 by RFC anyway, so this is not an unreasonable requirement.
 There is now a coherent policy for an SPF softfail result.  A softfail
 is accepted if there is a valid PTR or HELO, or if the domain
 is listed in the "accept_softfail" option of the spf configuration section.
 A neutral result is accepted by default if there is a valid PTR or
 HELO, (and the SPF record was not guessed), unless the domain is listed in the
 "reject_neutral" option.  Common forms of PTR records for dynamic IPs are
 recognized, and do not count as a valid PTR.  This does not prevent anyone
 from sending mail from a dynamic IP - they just need to configure a
 valid HELO name or publish an SPF record.
 <p>
 As SPF adoption continues to rise, forged spam is not getting through.  So
 spammers are publishing their SPF records as predicted.  The 0.7.2 RPM
 now provides the <code>rhsbl</code> sendmail hack so that spammer domains
 can be blacklisted.  With the RPM installed, add a line like the following
 to your <code>sendmail.mc</code>.
 <pre>
 HACK(rhsbl,`blackholes.example.com',"550 Rejected: " $&{RHS} " has been spamming our customers.")dnl
 </pre>
 <p>
 Of course, spammers are now starting to register
 throwaway domains.  The next thing we need is a custom DNS server,
 in Python, that
 can recognize patterns.  For instance, one spammer registers ded304.com,
 ded305.com, ded306.com, etc.  We also need the custom DNS server to
 let SPF classic clients check SES (which will be part of pysrs).  
 The <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/products/twisted">Twisted Python</a>
 framework provides a custom DNS server - but I
 would like a smaller implementation for our use.
 <p>
 The RPM for release 0.7.0 moves the config file and socket locations to
 /etc/mail and /var/run/milter respectively.  We now parse Microsoft CID records
 - but only hotmail.com uses them.  They seem to have applied for a patent on
 the brilliant idea of examining the mail headers to see who the message is
 from.  We aren't doing that here, so not to worry - but I am not a lawyer, so
 if you are worried, change spf.py around line 626 to return None instead of
 calling CIDParser().  There is a new option to reject mail with no PTR
 and no SPF.
 <p>
 Microsoft is pushing an anti-opensource license for their pending patent
 along with their sender-ID proposal before the IETF.
 It is royalty free - but requires anyone distributing a binary they've
 compiled from source to sign a license agreement.  The Apache Software
 Foundation <a
 href="http://www.apache.org/foundation/docs/sender-id-position.html"> explains
 the problem with sender-ID</a>, and Debian <a
 href="http://www.debian.org/News/2004/20040904">concurs</a>.  Since 
 the <a href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/3/9/439b024b-09fd-44ee-8ff0-10e834004c36/senderid_FAQ.PDF">Microsoft license</a> is
 <a href="http://www.circleid.com/article/732_0_1_0_C/">incompatible with free
 software in general</a> and the <a
 href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-mxcomp/mail-archive/msg03678.html">GPL in
 particular</a>, Python milter will not be able to implement sender-ID in its
 current form.  This was, no doubt, Microsoft's intent all along.
 <p>
 Sender-ID attempts to do for RFC2822 headers what SPF does for RFC2821 headers.
 Unlike SPF, it has never been tried, and is encumbered by a stupid patent.  I
 recommend ignoring it and continuing to implement and improve SPF until a
 working and unencumbered proposal for RFC2822 headers surfaces.
 <p>
 <a href="http://spf.pobox.com">
 <img src="SPF.gif" align=left alt="SPF logo"></a>
 Release 0.6.6 adds support for <a href="http://spf.pobox.com/">SPF</a>,
 a protocol to prevent forging of the envelope from address.  
 SPF support requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">pydns</a>.
 The included spf.py module is an updated version of the original 1.6
 version at <a href="http://www.wayforward.net/spf/">wayforward.net</a>.
 The updated version tracks the draft RFC and test suite.
 <p>
 The FAQ addresses <a href="faq.html#spf">how to get started with SPF</a>.
 <p>
 Release 0.6.1 adds a full milter based dspam application.
 <p>
 I have selected the <a href="http://www.nuclearelephant.com/projects/dspam/">
 dspam bayes filter project</a> and <a href="dspam.html">
 packaged it for python</a>.
 Release 0.6.0 offers a simple application of dspam I call "header triage",
 which rejects messages with spammy headers.  
 To use header triage, you must have <a href="dspam.html">DSPAM</a> installed,
 and select a dictionary that is well moderated by someone who gets
 lots of spam.  That dictionary can be used to block spam that is 
 obvious from the headers (e.g. X-Mailer and Subject) before it ties
 up any more resources.  I have yet to see any false positives from this
 approach (check the milter log), but if there are, the sender will
 get a REJECT with the message "Your message looks spammy."
 <h2> Enough Already! </h2>
 Nearly a dozen people have emailed me begging for a feature to copy
 outgoing and/or incoming mail to a backup directory by user.  Ok, it
 looks like this is a most requested feature for 0.5.6.  In the meantime,
 here are some things to consider:
 <ul>
 <li> If you want to equivalent of a Bcc added to each message, this
 is very easy to do in the python code for bms.py.   See below.
 <li> If you want to copy to a file in a directory (thus avoiding having to
 set up aliases), this is slightly more involved.  The bms.py milter already
 copies the message to a temporary file for use in replacing the message body
 when banned attachments are found.  You have to open a file, and copy the
 Mesage object to it in eom().
 <li> Finally, you are probably aware that most email clients already
 keep a copy of outgoing mail?  Presumably there is a good reason for
 keeping another copy on the server.
 </ul>
 <p>
 To Bcc a message, call <code>self.add_recipient(rcpt)</code> in envfrom after
 determining whether you want to copy (e.g. whether the sender is local).  For
 example,
 <pre>
  def envfrom(...
    ...
    if len(t) == 2:
      self.rejectvirus = t[1] in reject_virus_from
      if t[0] in wiretap_users.get(t[1],()):
 	self.add_recipient(wiretap_dest)
      if t[1] == 'mydomain.com':
        self.add_recipient('&lt;copy-%s&gt;' % t[0])
      ...
 </pre>
 <p>
 To make this a generic feature requires thinking about how the configuration
 would look.  Feel free to make specific suggestions about config file
 entries.  Be sure to handle both Bcc and file copies, and designating what
 mail should be copied.  How should "outgoing" be defined?  Implementing it is
 easy once the configuration is designed.
 <h3><a name=overview>Overview</a></h3>
 This package provides a robust toolkit for Python <a
@@ -73,7 +222,7 @@ methods that
 do nothing, and also provides wrappers for the libmilter methods to mutate
 the message.
 <p>
-The 'spf' module provides an implementation of <a href="http://openspf.com">
+The 'spf' module provides an implementation of <a href="http://spf.pobox.com">
 SPF</a> useful for detecting email forgery.
 <p>
 The 'mime' module provides a wrapper for the Python email package that
@@ -88,8 +237,6 @@ content filtering.  SPF checking
 requires <a href="http://pydns.sourceforge.net/">
 pydns</a>.  Configuration documentation is currently included as comments
 in the <a href="milter.cfg">sample config file</a> for the bms.py milter.
 See also the <a href="HOWTO">HOWTO</a> and <a href="logmsgs.html">
 Milter Log Message Tags</a>.
 <p>
 Python milter is under GPL.  The authors can probably be convinced to
 change this to LGPL if needed.
@@ -221,14 +368,8 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
 <td>0.5.5</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.3.3</td><td>8.13.1</td>
 <td>0.7.2</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.5</td>
 <td>0.8.4</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat 8.0</td><td>gcc-3.2</td><td>2.2.1</td><td>8.12.6</td>
 <td>0.5.2</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat 9.0</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.1</td>
 <td>0.8.2</td><tr>
 <td>RedHat EL3</td><td>gcc-3.2.3</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.5</td>
 <td>0.8.4</td><tr>
 <td>Debian Linux</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.1</td><td>8.12.0</td>
 <td>0.3.7</td><tr>
 <td>Debian Linux</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>8.12.7</td>
@@ -239,8 +380,8 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
 <td>0.3.4</td><tr>
 <td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.3</td><td>8.12.3</td>
 <td>0.4.2</td><tr>
-<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.1</td>
+<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.2.3</td><td>8.13.1</td>
-<td>0.8.4</td><tr>
+<td>0.7.1</td><tr>
 <td>Slackware 7.1</td><td>?</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.1</td>
 <td>0.3.8</td><tr>
 <td>Slackware 9.0</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.2.3</td><td>8.12.9</td>
@@ -254,54 +395,108 @@ me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
 <td>FreeBSD</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>?</td>
 <td>0.5.5</td><tr>
 <td>FreeBSD 4.4</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.10</td>
-<td>0.6.6</td>
+<td>0.6.6</td><tr>
 </table>
-<h2> Enough Already! </h2>
+<h3> Requirements </h3>
-Nearly a dozen people have emailed me begging for a feature to copy
+<menu>
-outgoing and/or incoming mail to a backup directory by user.  Ok, it
+<li> While the miltermodule will work with python 1.5, you probably
-looks like this is a most requested feature for 0.5.6.  In the meantime,
+want to use python 2.0 or better.  The python code uses a number of
-here are some things to consider:
+python 2 features.
-<ul>
+<li> Python must be configured with thread support.  This is because
-<li> If you want to equivalent of a Bcc added to each message, this
+sendmail's libmilter requires thread support.
-is very easy to do in the python code for bms.py.   See below.
+<li> You must compile sendmail with libmilter enabled.  In versions of
-<li> If you want to copy to a file in a directory (thus avoiding having to
+sendmail prior to 8.12 libmilter is marked FFR (For Future Release) and
-set up aliases), this is slightly more involved.  The bms.py milter already
+is not installed by default.  
-copies the message to a temporary file for use in replacing the message body
+Sendmail 8.12 still does not enable libmilter by default.  You must 
-when banned attachments are found.  You have to open a file, and copy the
+explicitly select the "MILTER" option when compiling.  
-Mesage object to it in eom().
+<li> Python milter has been tested against sendmail-8.11 and sendmail-8.12.
-<li> Finally, you are probably aware that most email clients already
+<li> Python milter must be compiled for the specific version of sendmail
-keep a copy of outgoing mail?  Presumably there is a good reason for
+it will run with.  (Since the result is dynamically loaded, there could 
-keeping another copy on the server.
+conceivably be multiple versions available and selected at startup - but
-</ul>
+that will have to wait.)  This situation may only exist for sendmail
-<p>
+versions prior to 8.12.  The protocol seems designed for backward 
-To Bcc a message, call <code>self.add_recipient(rcpt)</code> in envfrom after
+compatibility - and 8.12 is the first official milter release.
-determining whether you want to copy (e.g. whether the sender is local).  For
+<li> Mea Culpa!  After reading the Python Style guide, I realize that
-example,
+my Python code is not up to snuff.  Apparently mixed tabs and spaces
-<pre>
+are anathema to those using Windows editors, where tabs can be expanded using
-  def envfrom(...
+any arbitrary algorithm.  Other than that, my
-    ...
+intuition matched Guido's pretty well - although I like to indent by 2
-    if len(t) == 2:
+rather than 4.  I will arrange to have tabs expanded to spaces when
-      self.rejectvirus = t[1] in reject_virus_from
+exporting new versions.  Until then, beware!
-      if t[0] in wiretap_users.get(t[1],()):
+</menu>
 	self.add_recipient(wiretap_dest)
      if t[1] == 'mydomain.com':
        self.add_recipient('&lt;copy-%s&gt;' % t[0])
      ...
 </pre>
 <p>
 To make this a generic feature requires thinking about how the configuration
 would look.  Feel free to make specific suggestions about config file
 entries.  Be sure to handle both Bcc and file copies, and designating what
 mail should be copied.  How should "outgoing" be defined?  Implementing it is
 easy once the configuration is designed.
 <h3> <a name="aix4"> AIX 4.1.5 Requirements </a> </h3>
 To create sendmail RPMs for AIX, you can download my AIX 4.1.5 spec files 
 for <a href="/aix/sendmail.spec">sendmail-8.11.5</a> 
 or <a href="/aix/sendmail12.spec">sendmail-8.12.3</a>.  If you have
 not already set it up, I use a <a href="/aix/aix.spec">dummy RPM package</a>
 to represent the stuff that comes with AIX.  You might also want
 my <a href="/aix/python.spec">python-2.1.1</a> spec file for AIX.  It
 does not include Tk or curses modules, sorry.  If y'all trust me, you can
 download rpms for AIX 4.x from my <a href="/aix">AIX RPM directory</a>.
 <p>
 Sendmail-8.12 renames 
 libsmutil.a to libsm.a.  Unfortunately, libsm.a is an important AIX system
 shared library.  Therefore, I rename libsm.a back to libsmutil.a for
 AIX.  This presents a problem for setup.py.
 <h3> <a name="rh72"> RedHat 7.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
 If you are running Redhat 7.2, the distributed version of sendmail
 now enables libmilter by default.  RedHat 7.2 bundles
 the development libraries with the main sendmail package, so
 there is no sendmail-devel package.  However, they forgot to include the
 headers!  So you'll have to get the SRPM and modify it.  I suggest
 moving the static libs to a devel package and adding the headers.  If
 this is too much trouble, you can get the <a href="mfapi.h">mfapi.h</a>
 header for sendmail-8.6.11 from here and manually install it as
 <code>/usr/include/libmilter/mfapi.h</code>.
 <p>
 If you do modify the SRPM, I suggest renaming libsmutil.a
 to libsm.a - just like sendmail-8.12 will.  If you manually install
 mfapi.h or don't rename libsmutil.a, you'll
 need to force <code>libs = ["milter", "smutil"]</code> in setup.py.
 <p>
 If you have installed python2, and want
 python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
 and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.   
 <h3> <a name="rh62"> Redhat 6.2 Requirements </a> </h3>
 If you are running Redhat 6.2, the distributed version of sendmail
 does not enable libmilter.  You can download the Redhat 7.2 sendmail.spec
 modified to compile on RedHat 6.2:
 <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62/sendmail-rhmilter.spec">
 sendmail-rhmilter.spec</a>.  The <a
 href="ftp://updates.redhat.com/7.0/en/os/SRPMS/sendmail-8.11.6-1.7.0.src.rpm">
 SRPM for sendmail-8.11.6</a> is available from
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com">Redhat</a> under 
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-106.html">
 Errata for RH6.2</a>.  But that doesn't include the latest security
 patches since RH6.2 is no longer supported.
 <p>
 If y'all trust me, you can pick up source and binary sendmail RPMs for RH6.2
 from my <a href="http://www.bmsi.com/linux/rh62">linux downloads</a> directory.
 The lastest RPMs were built by taking a RH7.2 SRPMS and removing some
 RPM features from the spec file that RH6.2 doesn't support, then
 recompiling on RH6.2.  You can check this by installing the RH7.2 SRPM,
 then diffing my sendmail.spec with theirs.  Then run
 "rpm -bb sendmail-rhmilter.spec" when you are satisfied.
 <p>
 If you have installed python2, and want
 python-milter to use python2, add <code>python=python2</code> to setup.cfg
 and build with <code>python2 setup.py bdist_rpm</code>.
 You'll need to install the sendmail-devel package to compile milter.
 <hr>
 <p>
 <a href="http://validator.w3.org/check/referer">
-<img border=0 src="http://bmsi.com/vh32.png" alt=" [ Valid HTML 3.2! ] " height=31 width=88></a>
+<img border=0 src="/vh32.png" alt=" [ Valid HTML 3.2! ] " height=31 width=88></a>
 <a href="http://www.redhat.com">
-<img src="http://bmsi.com/art/powered_by.gif" width="88" height="31" alt=" [ Powered By Red Hat Linux ] " border="0"></a>
+<img src="/art/powered_by.gif" width="88" height="31" alt=" [ Powered By Red Hat Linux ] " border="0"></a>
 </p>
 </body></html>
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@
 # chkconfig: 2345 80 30
 # description: Milter is a process that filters messages sent through sendmail.
 # processname: milter
-# config: /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
+# config: /var/log/milter/bms.py
 # pidfile: /var/run/milter/milter.pid
-python="python2.4"
+python="python2.3"
 pidof() {
 	set - ""
@@ -32,11 +32,7 @@ start() {
 	# Start daemons.
 	echo -n "Starting $prog: "
-        if ! test -d /var/run/milter; then
+	daemon --check milter --user mail /var/log/milter/start.sh
 		mkdir -p /var/run/milter
 		chown mail:mail /var/run/milter
 	fi
 	daemon --check milter --user mail /var/log/milter/start.sh milter bms
 	RETVAL=$?
 	echo
 	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/milter
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@
 # chkconfig: 2345 80 30
 # description: Milter is a process that filters messages sent through sendmail.
 # processname: milter
-# config: /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
+# config: /var/log/milter/bms.py
 # pidfile: /var/run/milter/milter.pid
-python="python2.4"
+python="python2.3"
 pidof() {
 	set - ""
@@ -32,11 +32,7 @@ start() {
 	# Start daemons.
 	echo -n "Starting $prog: "
-        if ! test -d /var/run/milter; then
+	daemon --check milter --user mail /var/log/milter/start.sh
 		mkdir -p /var/run/milter
 		chown mail:mail /var/run/milter
 	fi
 	daemon --check milter --user mail /var/log/milter/start.sh milter bms
 	RETVAL=$?
 	echo
 	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/milter
@@ -1,33 +1,30 @@
-%define name pymilter
+%define name milter
-%define version 0.8.8
+%define version 0.8.1
-%define release 1
+%define release 1.RH7
 # what version of RH are we building for?
-%define redhat7 0
+%define redhat9 0
 %define redhat7 1
 %define redhat6 0
 # Options for Redhat version 6.x:
-# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh7 1"
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh6 1"
-%{?rh7:%define redhat7 1}
+%{?rh6:%define redhat7 0}
 %{?rh6:%define redhat6 1}
 # some systems dont have initrddir defined
 %{?_initrddir:%define _initrddir /etc/rc.d/init.d}
-%if %{redhat7} 
+%if %{redhat9}
 # Redhat 7.x and earlier (multiple ps lines per thread)
 %define sysvinit milter.rc7
 %else	
 %define sysvinit milter.rc
 %else	# Redhat 7.x and earlier (multiple ps lines per thread)
 %define sysvinit milter.rc7
 %endif
 # RH9, other systems (single ps line per process)
 %ifos Linux
-%define python python
+%define python python2.4
 %else
 %define python python
 %endif
 %ifos aix4.1
 %define libdir /var/log/milter
 %else
 %define libdir /usr/lib/pymilter
 %endif
 Summary: Python interface to sendmail milter API
 Name: %{name}
@@ -35,67 +32,39 @@ Version: %{version}
 Release: %{release}
 Source: %{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 #Patch: %{name}-%{version}.patch
-License: GPL
+Copyright: GPL
 Group: Development/Libraries
 BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-buildroot
 Prefix: %{_prefix}
 Vendor: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 Packager: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 Url: http://www.bmsi.com/python/milter.html
-Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.13
+Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.12.10
 %ifos Linux
 Requires: chkconfig
 %endif
-BuildRequires: %{python}-devel >= 2.4, sendmail-devel >= 8.13
+BuildRequires: %{python}-devel , sendmail-devel >= 8.12.10
 %description
 This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
 attach to sendmail's libmilter functionality.  Additional python
-modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts, sending
+modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts.
 DSNs, and doing CBV.
 %package -n milter
 Group: Applications/System
 Summary:  BMS spam and reputation milter
 Requires: pyspf >= 2.0.4
 %description -n milter
 A complex but effective spam filtering, SPF checking, and reputation tracking
 mail application.  It uses pydspam if installed for bayesian filtering.
 %package spf
 Group: Applications/System
 Summary:  BMS spam and reputation milter
 Requires: pyspf >= 2.0.4
 %description spf
 A simple mail filter to add Received-SPF headers and reject forged mail.
 Rejection policy is configured via sendmail access file.
 %prep
 %setup
-#patch -p0 -b .bms
+#%patch -p1
 %build
-%if %{redhat7}
+env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" %{python} setup.py build
  LDFLAGS="-s"
 %else # Redhat builds debug packages after 7.3
  LDFLAGS="-g"
 %endif
 env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" %{python} setup.py build
 %install
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %{python} setup.py install --root=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT --record=INSTALLED_FILES
 grep '.pyc$' INSTALLED_FILES | sed -e 's/c$/o/' >>INSTALLED_FILES
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail
 mkdir $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter/save
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}
+cp bms.py strike3.txt softfail.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
 cp *.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
 cp bms.py spfmilter.py $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}
 cp milter.cfg $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
 cp spfmilter.cfg $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail
 # logfile rotation
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/logrotate.d
@@ -104,11 +73,6 @@ cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/logrotate.d/milter <<'EOF'
  copytruncate
  compress
 }
 /var/log/milter/banned_ips {
  rotate 3
  daily
  copytruncate
 }
 EOF
 # purge saved defanged message copies
@@ -122,13 +86,11 @@ cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/cron.daily/milter <<'EOF'
 #!/bin/sh
 find /var/log/milter/save -mtime +7 | xargs $R rm
 # work around memory leak
 /etc/init.d/milter condrestart
 EOF
 chmod a+x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/cron.daily/milter
 %ifos aix4.1
-cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh <<'EOF'
+cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter/start.sh <<'EOF'
 #!/bin/sh
 cd /var/log/milter
 # uncomment to enable sgmlop if installed
@@ -136,10 +98,15 @@ cd /var/log/milter
 exec /usr/local/bin/python bms.py >>milter.log 2>&1
 EOF
 %else
-cp start.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}
+cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter/start.sh <<'EOF'
 #!/bin/sh
 cd /var/log/milter
 exec >>milter.log 2>&1
 %{python} bms.py &
 echo $! >/var/run/milter/milter.pid
 EOF
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
 cp %{sysvinit} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/milter
 cp spfmilter.rc $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/spfmilter
 ed $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/milter <<'EOF'
 /^python=/
 c
@@ -148,24 +115,8 @@ python="%{python}"
 w
 q
 EOF
 ed $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/spfmilter <<'EOF'
 /^python=/
 c
 python="%{python}"
 .
 w
 q
 EOF
 ed $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh <<'EOF'
 /^python=/
 c
 python="%{python}"
 .
 w
 q
 EOF
 %endif
-chmod a+x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh
+chmod a+x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter/start.sh
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/run/milter
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack
@@ -173,29 +124,21 @@ cp -p rhsbl.m4 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack
 %ifos aix4.1
 %post
-mkssys -s milter -p %{libdir}/start.sh -u 25 -S -n 15 -f 9 -G mail || :
+mkssys -s milter -p /var/log/milter/start.sh -u 25 -S -n 15 -f 9 -G mail || :
 %preun
 if [ $1 = 0 ]; then
  rmssys -s milter || :
 fi
 %else
-%post -n milter
+%post
 #echo "pythonsock has moved to /var/run/milter, update /etc/mail/sendmail.cf"
 /sbin/chkconfig --add milter
-%preun -n milter
+%preun
 if [ $1 = 0 ]; then
  /sbin/chkconfig --del milter
 fi
 %post spf
 #echo "pythonsock has moved to /var/run/milter, update /etc/mail/sendmail.cf"
 /sbin/chkconfig --add spfmilter
 %preun spf
 if [ $1 = 0 ]; then
  /sbin/chkconfig --del spfmilter
 fi
 %endif
 %clean
@@ -203,11 +146,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %files -f INSTALLED_FILES
 %defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc README HOWTO ChangeLog NEWS TODO CREDITS sample.py milter-template.py
+%doc README NEWS TODO CREDITS sample.py
 %config %{libdir}/start.sh
 %files -n milter
 %defattr(-,root,root)
 /etc/logrotate.d/milter
 /etc/cron.daily/milter
 %ifos aix4.1
@@ -217,108 +156,20 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %defattr(-,mail,mail)
 %endif
 %dir /var/log/milter
 %dir /var/run/milter
 %dir /var/log/milter/save
-%config %{libdir}/bms.py
+%config /var/log/milter/start.sh
-%{libdir}/bms.py?
+%config /var/log/milter/bms.py
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/strike3.txt
+%config /var/log/milter/strike3.txt
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/softfail.txt
+%config /var/log/milter/softfail.txt
 %config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/fail.txt
 %config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/neutral.txt
 %config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/quarantine.txt
 %config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/permerror.txt
 %config(noreplace) /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
 /usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack/rhsbl.m4
 %files spf
 %defattr(-,root,root)
 %dir /var/log/milter
 %{libdir}/spfmilter.py*
 %config(noreplace) /etc/mail/spfmilter.cfg
 /etc/rc.d/init.d/spfmilter
 %changelog
 * Fri Jan 05 2007 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.8-1
 - move AddrCache, parse_addr, iniplist to Milter package
 - move parse_header to Milter.utils
 - fix plock for missing source and can't change owner/group
 - add sample spfmilter.py milter
 - private_relay config option
 - persist delayed DSN blacklisting
 - handle gossip server restart without disabling gossip
 - split out pymilter and pymilter-spf packages
 - move milter apps to /usr/lib/pymilter
 * Sat Nov 04 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.7-1
 - More lame bounce heuristics
 - SPF moved to pyspf RPM
 - wiretap archive option
 - Do plain CBV if missing template
 * Tue May 23 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.6-2
 - Support CBV timeout
 - Support fail template, headers in templates
 - Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
 - More SPF lax heuristics
 - Don't require SPF pass for white/black listing mail from trusted relay.
 - Support localpart wildcard for white and black lists.
 * Thu Feb 23 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.6-1
 - Delay reject of unsigned RCPT for postmaster and abuse only
 - Fix dsn reporting of hard permerror
 - Resolve FIXME for wrap_close in miltermodule.c
 - Add Message-ID to DSNs
 - Use signed Message-ID in delayed reject to blacklist senders
 - Auto-train via blacklist and auto-whitelist
 - Don't check userlist for signed MFROM
 - Accept but skip DSPAM and training for whitelisted senders without SPF PASS
 - Report GC stats 
 - Support CIDR matching for IP lists
 - Support pysrs sign feature
 - Support localpart specific SPF policy in access file
 * Thu Dec 29 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.5-1
 - Simple trusted_forwarder implementation.
 - Fix access_file neutral policy
 - Move Received-SPF header to beginning of headers
 - Supply keyword info for all results in Received-SPF header.
 - Move guessed SPF result to separate header
 - Activate smfi_insheader only when SMFIR_INSHEADER defined
 - Handle NULL MX in spf.py
 - in-process GOSSiP server support (to be extended later)
 - Expire CBV cache and renew auto-whitelist entries
 * Fri Oct 21 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.4-2
 - Don't supply sender when MFROM is subdomain of header from/sender.
 - Don't send quarantine DSN for DSNs
 - Skip dspam for replies/DSNs to signed MFROM
 * Thu Oct 20 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.4-1
 - Fix SPF policy via sendmail access map (case insensitive keys).
 - Auto whitelist senders, train screener on whitelisted messages
 - Optional idx parameter to addheader to invoke smfi_insheader
 - Activate progress when SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
 * Wed Oct 12 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.3-1
 - Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
 - spf_accept_fail option for braindead SPF senders (treats fail like softfail)
 - Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
 - Send DSN for SPF errors corrected by extended processing.
 - Send DSN before SCREENED mail is quarantined
 - Option to set SPF policy via sendmail access map.
 - Option to supply Sender header from MAIL FROM when missing.
 - Use logging package to keep log lines atomic.
 * Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-4
 - Limit each CNAME chain independently like PTR and MX
 * Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-3
 - Limit CNAME lookups (regression)
 * Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-2
 - Handle corrupt ZIP attachments
 * Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-1
 - Strict processing limits per SPF RFC
 - Fixed several parsing bugs under RFC 
 - Support official IANA SPF record (type99)
 - Honeypot support (requires pydspam-1.1.9)
 - Extended SPF processing results beyond strict RFC limits
 - Support original SES for local bounce protection (requires pysrs-0.30.10)
 - Callback exception processing option in milter module
 * Thu Jun 16 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.1-1
 - Fix zip in zip loop in mime.py
 - Fix HeaderParseError in bms.py header callback
 - Check internal_domains for outgoing mail
 - Fix inconsistent results from send_dsn
 * Mon Jun 06 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.0-3
 - properly log pydspam exceptions
 * Sat Jun 04 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.0-2
@@ -34,30 +34,6 @@ $ python setup.py help
     libraries=["milter","smutil","resolv"]
 * $Log$
 * Revision 1.9  2005/12/23 21:46:36  customdesigned
 * Compile on sendmail-8.12 (ifdef SMFIR_INSHEADER)
 *
 * Revision 1.8  2005/10/20 23:23:36  customdesigned
 * Include smfi_progress is SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
 *
 * Revision 1.7  2005/10/20 23:04:46  customdesigned
 * Add optional idx for position of added header.
 *
 * Revision 1.6  2005/07/15 22:18:17  customdesigned
 * Support callback exception policy
 *
 * Revision 1.5  2005/06/24 04:20:07  customdesigned
 * Report context allocation error.
 *
 * Revision 1.4  2005/06/24 04:12:43  customdesigned
 * Remove unused name argument to generic wrappers.
 *
 * Revision 1.3  2005/06/24 03:57:35  customdesigned
 * Handle close called before connect.
 *
 * Revision 1.2  2005/06/02 04:18:55  customdesigned
 * Update copyright notices after reading article on /.
 *
 * Revision 1.1.1.2  2005/05/31 18:09:06  customdesigned
 * Release 0.7.1
 *
@@ -218,7 +194,7 @@ $ python setup.py help
 /* Yes, these are static.  If you need multiple different callbacks, */
-/* it's cleaner to use multiple filters, or convert to OO method calls. */
+/* it's cleaner to use multiple filters. */
 static PyObject *connect_callback = NULL;
 static PyObject *helo_callback    = NULL;
 static PyObject *envfrom_callback = NULL;
@@ -263,11 +239,8 @@ _get_context(SMFICTX *ctx) {
    PyEval_AcquireThread(t);	/* lock interp */
    self = PyObject_New(milter_ContextObject,&milter_ContextType);
    if (!self) {
-      /* Report and clear exception since we are called from libmilter */
+      /* Can't pass on exception since we are called from libmilter */
      if (PyErr_Occurred()) {
 	PyErr_Print();
      PyErr_Clear();
      }
      PyThreadState_Clear(t);
      PyEval_ReleaseThread(t);
      PyThreadState_Delete(t);
@@ -289,7 +262,7 @@ _find_context(PyObject *c) {
  if (c->ob_type == &milter_ContextType) {
    milter_ContextObject *self = (milter_ContextObject *)c;
    ctx = self->ctx;
-    if (ctx != NULL && smfi_getpriv(ctx) != self)
+    if (smfi_getpriv(ctx) != self)
      ctx = NULL;
  }
  if (ctx == NULL)
@@ -297,6 +270,23 @@ _find_context(PyObject *c) {
  return ctx;
 }
 /* Release the Python Context for a SMFICTX.  */
 static void
 _clear_context(SMFICTX *ctx) {
  milter_ContextObject *self = smfi_getpriv(ctx);
  if (self) {
    PyThreadState *t = self->t;
    PyEval_AcquireThread(t);
    self->t = 0;
    self->ctx = 0;
    smfi_setpriv(ctx,0);
    Py_DECREF(self);
    PyThreadState_Clear(t);
    PyEval_ReleaseThread(t);
    PyThreadState_Delete(t);
  }
 }
 static void
 milter_Context_dealloc(PyObject *s) {
  milter_ContextObject *self = (milter_ContextObject *)s;
@@ -341,8 +331,7 @@ CHGHDRS - filter may change/delete headers";
 static PyObject *
 milter_set_flags(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
-  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i:set_flags", &description.xxfi_flags))
+  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i", &description.xxfi_flags)) return NULL;
    return NULL;
  Py_INCREF(Py_None);
  return Py_None;
 }
@@ -508,52 +497,17 @@ milter_set_close_callback(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
  return generic_set_callback(args, "O:set_close_callback", &close_callback);
 }
 static int exception_policy = SMFIS_TEMPFAIL;
 static char milter_set_exception_policy__doc__[] =
 "set_exception_policy(i) -> None\n\
 Sets the policy for untrapped Python exceptions during a callback.\n\
 Must be one of TEMPFAIL,REJECT,CONTINUE";
 static PyObject *
 milter_set_exception_policy(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
  int i;
  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i:set_exception_policy", &i))
    return NULL;
  switch (i) {
  case SMFIS_REJECT: case SMFIS_TEMPFAIL: case SMFIS_CONTINUE:
    exception_policy = i;
    Py_INCREF(Py_None);
    return Py_None;
  }
  PyErr_SetString(MilterError,"invalid exception policy");
  return NULL;
 }
 static void
 _release_thread(PyThreadState *t) {
  if (t != NULL)
    PyEval_ReleaseThread(t);
 }
 /** Report and clear any python exception before returning to libmilter. 
  The interpreter is locked when we are called, and we unlock it.  */
 static int _report_exception(milter_ContextObject *self) {
  if (PyErr_Occurred()) {
    PyErr_Print();
    PyErr_Clear();	/* must clear since not returning to python */
-    _release_thread(self->t);
+    PyEval_ReleaseThread(self->t);
    switch (exception_policy) {
      case SMFIS_REJECT:
 	smfi_setreply(self->ctx, "554", "5.3.0", "Filter failure");
 	return SMFIS_REJECT;
      case SMFIS_TEMPFAIL:
    smfi_setreply(self->ctx, "451", "4.3.0", "Filter failure");
    return SMFIS_TEMPFAIL;
  }
-    return SMFIS_CONTINUE;
+  PyEval_ReleaseThread(self->t);
  }
  _release_thread(self->t);
  return SMFIS_CONTINUE;
 }
@@ -572,7 +526,7 @@ _generic_wrapper(milter_ContextObject *self, PyObject *cb, PyObject *arglist) {
  retval = PyInt_AsLong(result);
  Py_DECREF(result);
  if (PyErr_Occurred()) return _report_exception(self);
-  _release_thread(self->t);
+  PyEval_ReleaseThread(self->t);
  return retval;
 }
@@ -662,7 +616,7 @@ milter_wrap_helo(SMFICTX *ctx, char *helohost) {
 }
 static int
-generic_env_wrapper(SMFICTX *ctx, PyObject*cb, char **argv) {
+generic_env_wrapper(SMFICTX *ctx, PyObject*cb, char **argv, const char *name) {
   PyObject *arglist;
   milter_ContextObject *self;
   int count = 0;
@@ -699,12 +653,12 @@ generic_env_wrapper(SMFICTX *ctx, PyObject*cb, char **argv) {
 static int
 milter_wrap_envfrom(SMFICTX *ctx, char **argv) {
-  return generic_env_wrapper(ctx,envfrom_callback,argv);
+  return generic_env_wrapper(ctx,envfrom_callback,argv,"milter_wrap_envfrom");
 }
 static int
 milter_wrap_envrcpt(SMFICTX *ctx, char **argv) {
-  return generic_env_wrapper(ctx,envrcpt_callback,argv);
+  return generic_env_wrapper(ctx,envrcpt_callback,argv,"milter_wrap_envrcpt");
 }    
 static int
@@ -720,7 +674,7 @@ milter_wrap_header(SMFICTX *ctx, char *headerf, char *headerv) {
 }
 static int
-generic_noarg_wrapper(SMFICTX *ctx,PyObject *cb) {
+generic_noarg_wrapper(SMFICTX *ctx,PyObject *cb,const char *name) {
   PyObject *arglist;
   milter_ContextObject *c;
   if (cb == NULL) return SMFIS_CONTINUE;
@@ -732,7 +686,7 @@ generic_noarg_wrapper(SMFICTX *ctx,PyObject *cb) {
 static int
 milter_wrap_eoh(SMFICTX *ctx) {
-  return generic_noarg_wrapper(ctx,eoh_callback);
+  return generic_noarg_wrapper(ctx,eoh_callback,"milter_wrap_eoh");
 }   
 static int
@@ -750,42 +704,23 @@ milter_wrap_body(SMFICTX *ctx, u_char *bodyp, size_t bodylen) {
 static int
 milter_wrap_eom(SMFICTX *ctx) {
-  return generic_noarg_wrapper(ctx,eom_callback);
+  return generic_noarg_wrapper(ctx,eom_callback,"milter_wrap_eom");
 }
 static int
 milter_wrap_abort(SMFICTX *ctx) {
  /* libmilter still calls close after abort */
-  return generic_noarg_wrapper(ctx,abort_callback);
+  return generic_noarg_wrapper(ctx,abort_callback,"milter_wrap_abort");
 }
 static int
 milter_wrap_close(SMFICTX *ctx) {
-  /* xxfi_close can be called out of order - even before connect.  
+  int r = generic_noarg_wrapper(ctx,close_callback,"milter_wrap_close");
-   * There may not yet be a private context pointer.  To avoid
+  /* FIXME: It is inefficient to have released the interp lock only to
-   * creating a ThreadContext and allocating a milter context only
+     acquire it again in _clear_context.  We can tell _generic_return and
-   * to destroy them, and to avoid invoking the python close_callback when
+     friends not to release the lock by, for instance, setting self->t to NULL.
-   * connect has never been called, we don't use generic_noarg_wrapper here. */
+     However, first we make it work. */
-  PyObject *cb = close_callback;
+  _clear_context(ctx);
  milter_ContextObject *self = smfi_getpriv(ctx);
  int r = SMFIS_CONTINUE;
  if (self != NULL) {
    PyThreadState *t = self->t;
    PyEval_AcquireThread(t);
    self->t = 0;
    if (cb != NULL && self->ctx == ctx) {
      PyObject *arglist = Py_BuildValue("(O)", self);
      /* Call python close callback, but do not ReleaseThread, because
       * self->t is NULL */
      r = _generic_wrapper(self, cb, arglist);
    }
    self->ctx = 0;
    smfi_setpriv(ctx,0);
    Py_DECREF(self);
    PyThreadState_Clear(t);
    PyEval_ReleaseThread(t);
    PyThreadState_Delete(t);
  }
  return r;
 }
@@ -974,39 +909,28 @@ milter_setreply(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
 }
 static char milter_addheader__doc__[] =
-"addheader(field, value, idx=-1) -> None\n\
+"addheader(field, value) -> None\n\
 Add a header to the message. This header is not passed to other\n\
 filters. It is not checked for standards compliance;\n\
 the mail filter must ensure that no protocols are violated\n\
 as a result of adding this header.\n\
 field - header field name\n\
 value - header field value\n\
 idx - optional position in internal header list to insert new header\n\
 Both are strings.  This function can only be called from the EOM callback.";
 static PyObject *
 milter_addheader(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
  char *headerf;
  char *headerv;
  int idx = -1;
  SMFICTX *ctx;
  PyThreadState *t;
-  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "ss|i:addheader", &headerf, &headerv, &idx))
+  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "ss:addheader", &headerf, &headerv)) return NULL;
    return NULL;
  ctx = _find_context(self);
  if (ctx == NULL) return NULL;
  t = PyEval_SaveThread();
-#ifdef SMFIR_INSHEADER
+  return _thread_return(t,smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv),
  return _thread_return(t, (idx < 0) ? smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv) :
      smfi_insheader(ctx, idx, headerf, headerv), "cannot add header");
 #else
  if (idx < 0)
    return _thread_return(t, smfi_addheader(ctx, headerf, headerv),
 			 "cannot add header");
  PyErr_SetString(MilterError, "insheader not supported");
  return NULL;
 #endif
 }
 static char milter_chgheader__doc__[] =
@@ -1161,7 +1085,7 @@ milter_quarantine(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
 }
 #endif
-#ifdef SMFIR_PROGRESS
+#if _FFR_SMFI_PROGRESS
 static char milter_progress__doc__[] =
 "progress() -> None\n\
 Notify the MTA that we are working on a message so it will reset timeouts.";
@@ -1192,7 +1116,7 @@ static PyMethodDef context_methods[] = {
 #ifdef SMFIF_QUARANTINE
  { "quarantine",  milter_quarantine,  METH_VARARGS, milter_quarantine__doc__},
 #endif
-#ifdef SMFIR_PROGRESS
+#if _FFR_SMFI_PROGRESS
  { "progress",  milter_progress,  METH_VARARGS, milter_progress__doc__},
 #endif
  { NULL, NULL }
@@ -1231,8 +1155,6 @@ static PyMethodDef milter_methods[] = {
   { "set_eom_callback",     milter_set_eom_callback,     METH_VARARGS, milter_set_eom_callback__doc__},
   { "set_abort_callback",   milter_set_abort_callback,   METH_VARARGS, milter_set_abort_callback__doc__},
   { "set_close_callback",   milter_set_close_callback,   METH_VARARGS, milter_set_close_callback__doc__},
   { "set_exception_policy",   milter_set_exception_policy,METH_VARARGS, milter_set_exception_policy__doc__},
   { "register",             milter_register,             METH_VARARGS, milter_register__doc__},
   { "register",             milter_register,             METH_VARARGS, milter_register__doc__},
   { "main",                 milter_main,                 METH_VARARGS, milter_main__doc__},
   { "setdbg",               milter_setdbg,               METH_VARARGS, milter_setdbg__doc__},
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
 # $Log$
 # Revision 1.4  2005/06/17 01:49:39  customdesigned
 # Handle zip within zip.
 #
 # Revision 1.3  2005/06/02 15:00:17  customdesigned
 # Configure banned extensions.  Scan zipfile option with test case.
 #
@@ -196,7 +193,6 @@ class MimeMessage(Message):
      for key,name in tuple(names):	# copy by converting to tuple
 	if name and name.lower().endswith('.zip'):
 	  txt = self.get_payload(decode=True)
 	  if txt.strip():
 	  names += zipnames(txt)
    return names
@@ -308,25 +304,19 @@ See your administrator.
 def check_name(msg,savname=None,ckname=check_ext,scan_zip=False):
  "Replace attachment with a warning if its name is suspicious."
  try:
  for key,name in msg.getnames(scan_zip):
    badname = ckname(name)
    if badname:
      hostname = socket.gethostname()
      if key == 'zipname':
        badname = msg.get_filename()
 	break
    else:
      return Milter.CONTINUE
  except zipfile.BadZipfile:
    # a ZIP that is not a zip is very suspicious
    badname = msg.get_filename()
  hostname = socket.gethostname()
      msg.set_payload(virus_msg % (badname,hostname,savname))
      del msg["content-type"]
      del msg["content-disposition"]
      del msg["content-transfer-encoding"]
      name = "WARNING.TXT"
      msg["Content-Type"] = "text/plain; name="+name
      break
  return Milter.CONTINUE
 import email.Iterators
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
 To: %(sender)s
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: SPF %(result)s (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (sender verification)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
       %(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 Your sender policy (or lack thereof) indicated that the above email was not
 sent via an authorized SMTP server, but may still be legitimate.  Since there
 is no positive confirmation that the message is really from you, we have
 to give it extra scrutiny - including verifying that the sender really
 exists by sending you this DSN.  We will remember this sender and not
 bother you again for a while.  You can avoid this message entirely for
 legitimate mail by using an authorized SMTP server.  Contact your mail
 administrator and ask how to configure your email client to use an
 authorized server.
 If you never sent the above message, then your domain has been forged.
 Your mail admin needs to publish a strict SPF record so that I can reject
 those forgeries instead of bugging you about them.  
 See http://openspf.org for details.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
 Kind regards,
 postmaster@%(receiver)s
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
 To: %(sender)s
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: Critical SPF configuration error
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
 	%(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s 
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 Your spf record has a permanent error.  The error was:
 	%(perm_error)s
 We will reinterpret your record using "lax" processing heuristics
 which may result in your mail being accepted anyway.  But you or your
 mail administrator need to fix your SPF record as soon as possible.
 We are sending you this message to alert you to the fact that
 you have problems with your email configuration.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to
 contact me again.
 Kind regards,
 postmaster@%(receiver)s
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
 To: %(sender)s
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: DELIVERY STATUS (POSSIBLE SPAM)
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (content analysis)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
 THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
 YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
 Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
       %(rcpt)s
 Subject: %(subject)s
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 A statistical analysis of your message has classified it as junk mail,
 and it has been quarantined.  Eventually, the recipients will review
 their quarantined mail and may notice your message.  If your message is
 important, please contact them via other means.  You may also try sending
 them a simple plain text message.
 If you never sent the above message, then your domain, %(sender_domain)s,
 was forged - i.e. used without your knowlege or authorization by
 someone attempting to steal your mail identity.  This is a very
 serious problem, and you need to provide authentication for your
 SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
 domain.  The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
 with your Sender Policy.  
 For more information, see: http://www.openspf.org
 Your mail admin needs to publish a strict SPF record so that I can reject
 those forgeries instead of bugging you with them.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
 Kind regards,
 postmaster@%(receiver)s
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
 # Analyze milter log to find abusers
 import traceback
 import sys
 def parse_addr(a):
  beg = a.find('<')
  end = a.find('>')
  if beg >= 0:
    if end > beg: return a[beg+1:end]
  return a
 class Connection(object):
  def __init__(self,dt,tm,id,ip=None,conn=None):
    self.dt = dt
    self.tm = tm
    self.id = id
    if ip:
      _,self.host,self.ip = ip.split(None,2)
    elif conn:
      self.ip = conn.ip
      self.host = conn.host
      self.helo = conn.helo
    self.subject = None
    self.rcpt = []
    self.mfrom = None
    self.helo = None
    self.innoc = []
    self.whitelist = False
 def connections(fp):
  conndict = {}
  termdict = {}
  for line in fp:
    if line.startswith('{'): continue
    a = line.split(None,4)
    if len(a) < 4: continue
    dt,tm,id,op = a[:4]
    if (id,op) == ('bms','milter'):
      # FIXME: optionally yield all partial connections in conndict
      conndict = {}
      termdict = {}
      continue
    if id[0] == '[' and id[-1] == ']':
      try:
 	key = int(id[1:-1])
      except:
        print >>sys.stderr,'bad id:',line.rstrip()
 	continue
    else: continue
    if op == 'connect':
      ip = a[4].rstrip()
      conn = Connection(dt,tm,id,ip=ip)
      conndict[key] = conn
    elif op in (
 	'DISCARD:','TAG:','CBV:','Large','No',
 	'NOTE:','From:','Sender:','TRAIN:'):
      continue
    else:
      op = op.lower()
      try:
 	conn = conndict[key]
      except KeyError:
        try:
 	  conn = termdict[key]
 	  del termdict[key]
 	  conndict[key] = conn
 	except KeyError:
 	  print >>sys.stderr,'key error:',line.rstrip()
 	  continue
      try:
 	if op == 'subject:':
 	  if len(a) > 4:
 	    conn.subject = a[4].rstrip()
 	elif op == 'innoc:':
 	  conn.innoc.append(a[4].rstrip())
 	elif op == 'whitelist':
 	  conn.whitelist = True
 	elif op == 'x-mailer:':
 	  if len(a) > 4:
 	    conn.mailer = a[4].rstrip()
        elif op == 'x-guessed-spf:':
          conn.spfguess = a[4]
 	elif op == 'received-spf:':
 	  conn.spfres,conn.spfmsg = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op == 'received:':
 	  conn.received = a[4].rstrip()
 	elif op == 'temp':
 	  _,conn.tempfile = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op == 'srs':
 	  _,conn.srsrcpt = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op == 'mail':
 	  _,conn.mfrom = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op == 'rcpt':
 	  _,rcpt = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	  conn.rcpt.append(rcpt)
 	elif op == 'hello':
 	  _,conn.helo = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
 	elif op in ('eom','dspam','abort'):
 	  del conndict[key]
 	  conn.enddt = dt
 	  conn.endtm = tm
 	  conn.result = op
 	  yield conn
 	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
 	elif op in ('reject:','dspam:','tempfail:','reject','fail:','honeypot:'):
 	  del conndict[key]
 	  conn.enddt = dt
 	  conn.endtm = tm
 	  conn.result = op
 	  conn.resmsg = a[4].rstrip()
 	  yield conn
 	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
 	elif op in ('fp:','spam:'):
 	  del conndict[key]
 	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
 	else:
 	  print >>sys.stderr,'unknown op:',line.rstrip()
      except Exception:
 	print >>sys.stderr,'error:',line.rstrip()
        traceback.print_exc()
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  import gzip
  for fn in sys.argv[1:]:
    if fn.endswith('.gz'):
      fp = gzip.open(fn)
    else:
      fp = open(fn)
    for conn in connections(fp):
      if conn.rcpt and conn.mfrom:
        for r in conn.rcpt:
 	  if r.lower().find('iancarter') > 0: break
 	else:
 	  if conn.mfrom.lower().find('iancarter') < 0: continue
 	print >>sys.stderr,conn.result,conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn.subject,parse_addr(conn.mfrom),
 	for a in conn.rcpt:
 	  print parse_addr(a),
 	print
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 [bdist_rpm]
-python=python2.4
+python=python2
 doc_files=README NEWS TODO
 packager=Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
-release=1
+release=2.4
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ import sys
 from distutils.core import setup, Extension
 # FIXME: on some versions of sendmail, smutil is renamed to sm
 # on slackware and debian, leave it out entirely.  It depends
 # on how libmilter was built by the sendmail package.
 libs = ["milter", "smutil"]
 # patch distutils if it can't cope with the "classifiers" or
@@ -14,14 +12,13 @@ if sys.version < '2.2.3':
  DistributionMetadata.classifiers = None
  DistributionMetadata.download_url = None
-# NOTE: importing Milter to obtain version fails when milter.so not built
+setup(name = "milter", version = "0.8.1",
 setup(name = "pymilter", version = '0.8.8',
 	description="Python interface to sendmail milter API",
 	long_description="""\
 This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
 attach to sendmail's libmilter functionality.  Additional python
 modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts, and
-sending DSNs or doing CBVs.
+querying SPF records.
 """,
 	author="Jim Niemira",
 	author_email="urmane@urmane.org",
@@ -29,12 +26,11 @@ sending DSNs or doing CBVs.
 	maintainer_email="stuart@bmsi.com",
 	license="GPL",
 	url="http://www.bmsi.com/python/milter.html",
-	py_modules=["mime"],
+	py_modules=["mime","spf"],
 	packages = ['Milter'],
 	ext_modules=[
 	  Extension("milter", ["miltermodule.c"],
 	    libraries=libs,
 	    # set MAX_ML_REPLY to 1 for sendmail < 8.13
 	    define_macros = [ ('MAX_ML_REPLY',32) ]
 	  ),
 	],
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
-To: %(sender)s
+Subject: SPF softfail (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: SPF %(result)s (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
@@ -17,9 +14,7 @@ Subject: %(subject)s
 Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
 Your sender policy indicated that the above email was likely forged and that
-feedback was desired for debugging.  If you are sending from a foreign ISP,
+feedback was desired.
 then you may need to follow your home ISPs instructions for configuring
 your outgoing mail server.
 If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 [milter]
 # The socket used to communicate with sendmail
 socketname = /var/run/milter/spfmiltersock
 # Name of the milter given to sendmail
 name = pyspffilter
 # Trusted relays such as secondary MXes that should not have SPF checked.
 ;trusted_relay =
 # Internal networks that should not have SPF checked.
 internal_connect = 127.0.0.1,192.168.0.0/16,10.0.0.0/8
 # See http://www.openspf.com for more info on SPF.
 [spf]
 # Use sendmail access map or similar format for detailed spf policy.
 # SPF entries in the access map will override defaults.
 access_file = /etc/mail/access.db
 # Connections that get an SPF pass for a pretend MAIL FROM of 
 # postmaster@sometrustedforwarder.com skip SPF checks for the real MAIL FROM.
 # This is for non-SRS forwarders.  It is a simple implementation that
 # is inefficient for more than a few entries.
 ;trusted_forwarder = careerbuilder.com
@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
 # A simple SPF milter.
 # You must install pyspf for this to work.
 # http://www.sendmail.org/doc/sendmail-current/libmilter/docs/installation.html
 # Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 # Copyright 2007 Business Management Systems, Inc.
 # This code is under GPL.  See COPYING for details.
 import sys
 import Milter
 import spf
 import syslog
 import anydbm
 from Milter.config import MilterConfigParser
 from Milter.utils import iniplist,parse_addr
 syslog.openlog('spfmilter',0,syslog.LOG_MAIL)
 class Config(object):
  "Hold configuration options."
  pass
 def read_config(list):
  "Return new config object."
  cp = MilterConfigParser()
  cp.read(list)
  if cp.has_option('milter','datadir'):
        os.chdir(cp.get('milter','datadir'))
  conf = Config()
  conf.socketname = cp.getdefault('milter','socketname', '/tmp/spfmiltersock')
  conf.miltername = cp.getdefault('milter','name','pyspffilter')
  conf.trusted_relay = cp.getlist('milter','trusted_relay')
  conf.internal_connect = cp.getlist('milter','internal_connect')
  conf.trusted_forwarder = cp.getlist('spf','trusted_relay')
  conf.access_file = cp.getdefault('spf','access_file',None)
  return conf
 class SPFPolicy(object):
  "Get SPF policy by result from sendmail style access file."
  def __init__(self,sender,access_file=None):
    self.sender = sender
    self.domain = sender.split('@')[-1].lower()
    if access_file:
      try: acf = anydbm.open(access_file,'r')
      except: acf = None
    else: acf = None
    self.acf = acf
  def getPolicy(self,pfx):
    acf = self.acf
    if not acf: return None
    try:
      return acf[pfx + self.sender]
    except KeyError:
      try:
 	return acf[pfx + self.domain]
      except KeyError:
 	try:
 	  return acf[pfx]
 	except KeyError:
 	  return None
 class spfMilter(Milter.Milter):
  "Milter to check SPF.  Each connection gets its own instance."
  def log(self,*msg):
    syslog.syslog('[%d] %s' % (self.id,' '.join([str(m) for m in msg])))
  def __init__(self):
    self.mailfrom = None
    self.id = Milter.uniqueID()
    # we don't want config used to change during a connection
    self.conf = config
  # addheader can only be called from eom().  This accumulates added headers
  # which can then be applied by alter_headers()
  def add_header(self,name,val,idx=-1):
    self.new_headers.append((name,val,idx))
    self.log('%s: %s' % (name,val))
  def connect(self,hostname,unused,hostaddr):
    self.internal_connection = False
    self.trusted_relay = False
    self.hello_name = None
    # sometimes people put extra space in sendmail config, so we strip
    self.receiver = self.getsymval('j').strip()
    if hostaddr and len(hostaddr) > 0:
      ipaddr = hostaddr[0]
      if iniplist(ipaddr,self.conf.internal_connect):
 	self.internal_connection = True
      if iniplist(ipaddr,self.conf.trusted_relay):
        self.trusted_relay = True
    else: ipaddr = ''
    self.connectip = ipaddr
    if self.internal_connection:
      connecttype = 'INTERNAL'
    else:
      connecttype = 'EXTERNAL'
    if self.trusted_relay:
      connecttype += ' TRUSTED'
    self.log("connect from %s at %s %s" % (hostname,hostaddr,connecttype))
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def hello(self,hostname):
    self.hello_name = hostname
    self.log("hello from %s" % hostname)
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  # multiple messages can be received on a single connection
  # envfrom (MAIL FROM in the SMTP protocol) seems to mark the start
  # of each message.
  def envfrom(self,f,*str):
    self.log("mail from",f,str)
    if not self.hello_name:
      self.log('REJECT: missing HELO')
      self.setreply('550','5.7.1',"It's polite to say helo first.")
      return Milter.REJECT
    self.mailfrom = f
    self.new_headers = []
    t = parse_addr(f)
    if len(t) == 2: t[1] = t[1].lower()
    self.canon_from = '@'.join(t)
    if not (self.internal_connection or self.trusted_relay) and self.connectip:
      rc = self.check_spf()
      if rc != Milter.CONTINUE: return rc
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def envrcpt(self,f,*str):
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def header(self,name,hval):
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def eoh(self):
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def eom(self):
    for name,val,idx in self.new_headers:
      try:
 	self.addheader(name,val,idx)
      except:
 	self.addheader(name,val)	# older sendmail can't insheader
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def close(self):
    return Milter.CONTINUE
  def check_spf(self):
    receiver = self.receiver
    for tf in self.conf.trusted_forwarder:
      q = spf.query(self.connectip,'',tf,receiver=receiver,strict=False)
      res,code,txt = q.check()
      if res == 'pass':
        self.log("TRUSTED_FORWARDER:",tf)
        break
    else:
      q = spf.query(self.connectip,self.canon_from,self.hello_name,
 	  receiver=receiver,strict=False)
      q.set_default_explanation(
 	'SPF fail: see http://openspf.org/why.html?sender=%s&ip=%s' % (q.s,q.i))
      res,code,txt = q.check()
    if res not in ('pass','temperror'):
      if self.mailfrom != '<>':
 	# check hello name via spf unless spf pass
 	h = spf.query(self.connectip,'',self.hello_name,receiver=receiver)
 	hres,hcode,htxt = h.check()
 	if hres in ('deny','fail','neutral','softfail'):
 	  self.log('REJECT: hello SPF: %s 550 %s' % (hres,htxt))
 	  self.setreply('550','5.7.1',htxt,
 	    "The hostname given in your MTA's HELO response is not listed",
 	    "as a legitimate MTA in the SPF records for your domain.  If you",
 	    "get this bounce, the message was not in fact a forgery, and you",
 	    "should IMMEDIATELY notify your email administrator of the problem."
 	  )
 	  return Milter.REJECT
      else:
        hres,hcode,htxt = res,code,txt
    else: hres = None
    p = SPFPolicy(q.s,self.conf.access_file)
    if res == 'fail':
      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-fail:')
      if not policy or policy == 'REJECT':
 	self.log('REJECT: SPF %s %i %s' % (res,code,txt))
 	self.setreply(str(code),'5.7.1',txt)
 	# A proper SPF fail error message would read:
 	# forger.biz [1.2.3.4] is not allowed to send mail with the domain
 	# "forged.org" in the sender address.  Contact <postmaster@forged.org>.
 	return Milter.REJECT
    if res == 'softfail':
      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-softfail:')
      if policy and policy == 'REJECT':
 	self.log('REJECT: SPF %s %i %s' % (res,code,txt))
 	self.setreply(str(code),'5.7.1',txt)
 	# A proper SPF fail error message would read:
 	# forger.biz [1.2.3.4] is not allowed to send mail with the domain
 	# "forged.org" in the sender address.  Contact <postmaster@forged.org>.
 	return Milter.REJECT
    elif res == 'permerror':
      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-permerror:')
      if not policy or policy == 'REJECT':
 	self.log('REJECT: SPF %s %i %s' % (res,code,txt))
 	# latest SPF draft recommends 5.5.2 instead of 5.7.1
 	self.setreply(str(code),'5.5.2',txt,
 	  'There is a fatal syntax error in the SPF record for %s' % q.o,
 	  'We cannot accept mail from %s until this is corrected.' % q.o
 	)
 	return Milter.REJECT
    elif res == 'temperror':
      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-temperror:')
      if not policy or policy == 'REJECT':
 	self.log('TEMPFAIL: SPF %s %i %s' % (res,code,txt))
 	self.setreply(str(code),'4.3.0',txt)
 	return Milter.TEMPFAIL
    elif res == 'neutral' or res == 'none':
      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-neutral:')
      if policy and policy == 'REJECT':
        self.log('REJECT NEUTRAL:',q.s)
 	self.setreply('550','5.7.1',
  "%s requires and SPF PASS to accept mail from %s. [http://openspf.org]"
 	  % (receiver,q.s))
 	return Milter.REJECT
    elif res == 'pass':
      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-pass:')
      if policy and policy == 'REJECT':
        self.log('REJECT PASS:',q.s)
 	self.setreply('550','5.7.1',
 		"%s has been blacklisted by %s." % (q.s,receiver))
 	return Milter.REJECT
    self.add_header('Received-SPF',q.get_header(res,receiver),0)
    if hres and q.h != q.o:
      self.add_header('X-Hello-SPF',hres,0)
    return Milter.CONTINUE
 if __name__ == "__main__":
  Milter.factory = spfMilter
  Milter.set_flags(Milter.CHGHDRS + Milter.ADDHDRS)
  global config
  config = read_config(['spfmilter.cfg','/etc/mail/spfmilter.cfg'])
  miltername = config.miltername
  socketname = config.socketname
  print """To use this with sendmail, add the following to sendmail.cf:
 O InputMailFilters=%s
 X%s,        S=local:%s
 See the sendmail README for libmilter.
 sample spfmilter startup""" % (miltername,miltername,socketname)
  sys.stdout.flush()
  Milter.runmilter("pyspffilter",socketname,240)
  print "sample spfmilter shutdown"
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 #
 # spfmilter	This shell script takes care of starting and stopping spfmilter.
 #
 # chkconfig: 2345 80 30
 # description: a process that checks SPF for messages sent through sendmail.
 # processname: spfmilter
 # config: /etc/mail/spfmilter.cfg
 # pidfile: /var/run/milter/spfmilter.pid
 python="python2.4"
 pidof() {
 	set - ""
 	if set - `ps -e -o pid,cmd | grep "${python} spfmilter.py"` &&
 	  [ "$2" != "grep" ]; then
 	  echo $1
 	  return 0
 	fi
 	return 1
 }
 # Source function library.
 . /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
 [ -x /usr/lib/pymilter/start.sh ] || exit 0
 RETVAL=0
 prog="spfmilter"
 start() {
 	# Start daemons.
 	echo -n "Starting $prog: "
        if ! test -d /var/run/milter; then
 		mkdir -p /var/run/milter
 		chown mail:mail /var/run/milter
 	fi
 	daemon --check milter --user mail /usr/lib/pymilter/start.sh spfmilter
 	RETVAL=$?
 	echo
 	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/spfmilter
 	return $RETVAL
 }
 stop() {
 	# Stop daemons.
 	echo -n "Shutting down $prog: "
 	killproc milter
 	RETVAL=$?
 	echo
 	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/spfmilter
 	return $RETVAL
 }
 # See how we were called.
 case "$1" in
  start)
 	start
 	;;
  stop)
 	stop
 	;;
  restart|reload)
 	stop
 	start
 	RETVAL=$?
 	;;
  condrestart)
 	if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/spfmilter ]; then
 	    stop
 	    start
 	    RETVAL=$?
 	fi
 	;;
  status)
 	status spfmilter
 	RETVAL=$?
 	;;
  *)
 	echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|condrestart|status}"
 	exit 1
 esac
 exit $RETVAL
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
 #!/usr/bin/python2.3
 # Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 # Copyright 2004 Business Management Systems, Inc.
 # This code is under the GNU General Public License.  See COPYING for details.
 # $Log$
 # Revision 1.1.1.1  2005/05/31 18:07:19  customdesigned
 # Release 0.6.9
 #
 # Revision 2.3  2004/04/19 22:12:11  stuart
 # Release 0.6.9
 #
 # Revision 2.2  2004/04/18 03:29:35  stuart
 # Pass most tests except -local and -rcpt-to
 #
 # Revision 2.1  2004/04/08 18:41:15  stuart
 # Reject numeric hello names
 #
 # Driver for SPF test system
 import spf
 import sys
 from optparse import OptionParser
 class PerlOptionParser(OptionParser):
    def _process_args (self, largs, rargs, values):
        """_process_args(largs : [string],
                         rargs : [string],
                         values : Values)
        Process command-line arguments and populate 'values', consuming
        options and arguments from 'rargs'.  If 'allow_interspersed_args' is
        false, stop at the first non-option argument.  If true, accumulate any
        interspersed non-option arguments in 'largs'.
        """
        while rargs:
            arg = rargs[0]
            # We handle bare "--" explicitly, and bare "-" is handled by the
            # standard arg handler since the short arg case ensures that the
            # len of the opt string is greater than 1.
            if arg == "--":
                del rargs[0]
                return
            elif arg[0:2] == "--":
                # process a single long option (possibly with value(s))
                self._process_long_opt(rargs, values)
            elif arg[:1] == "-" and len(arg) > 1:
                # process a single perl style long option
 		rargs[0] = '-' + arg
                self._process_long_opt(rargs, values)
            elif self.allow_interspersed_args:
                largs.append(arg)
                del rargs[0]
            else:
 		return
 def format(q):
  res,code,txt = q.check()
  print res
  if res in ('pass','neutral','unknown'): print
  else: print txt
  print 'spfquery:',q.get_header_comment(res)
  print 'Received-SPF:',q.get_header(res,'spfquery')
 def main(argv):
  parser = PerlOptionParser()
  parser.add_option("--file",dest="file")
  parser.add_option("--ip",dest="ip")
  parser.add_option("--sender",dest="sender")
  parser.add_option("--helo",dest="hello_name")
  parser.add_option("--local",dest="local_policy")
  parser.add_option("--rcpt-to",dest="rcpt")
  parser.add_option("--default-explanation",dest="explanation")
  parser.add_option("--sanitize",type="int",dest="sanitize")
  parser.add_option("--debug",type="int",dest="debug")
  opts,args = parser.parse_args(argv)
  if opts.ip:
    q = spf.query(opts.ip,opts.sender,opts.hello_name,local=opts.local_policy)
    if opts.explanation:
      q.set_default_explanation(opts.explanation)
    format(q)
  if opts.file:
    if opts.file == '0':
      fp = sys.stdin
    else:
      fp = open(opts.file,'r')
    for ln in fp:
      ip,sender,helo,rcpt = ln.split(None,3)
      q = spf.query(ip,sender,helo,local=opts.local_policy)
      if opts.explanation:
 	q.set_default_explanation(opts.explanation)
      format(q)
    fp.close()
 if __name__ == "__main__":
  import sys
  main(sys.argv[1:])
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 appname="$1"
 script="${2:-${appname}}"
 datadir=/var/log/milter
 python="python2.4"
 exec >>${datadir}/${appname}.log 2>&1
 if test -s ${datadir}/${script}.py; then
  cd ${datadir} # use version in log dir if it exists for debugging
 else
  cd /usr/lib/pymilter
 fi
 cd /var/log/milter
 exec >>${appname}.log 2>&1
 ${python} ${appname}.py &
 echo $! >/var/run/milter/${appname}.pid
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
 To: %(sender)s
 From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
 Subject: Critical mail server configuration error
 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
 This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
@@ -26,7 +23,7 @@ SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
 domain.  The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
 with your Sender Policy.  
-For more information, see: http://openspf.org
+For more information, see: http://spf.pobox.com
 I hate to annoy you with a DSN (Delivery Status
 Notification) from a possibly forged email, but since you
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import unittest
 import testbms
 import testmime
 import testsample
 import testutils
 import os
 def suite(): 
@@ -10,7 +9,6 @@ def suite():
  s.addTest(testbms.suite())
  s.addTest(testmime.suite())
  s.addTest(testsample.suite())
  s.addTest(testutils.suite())
  return s
 if __name__ == '__main__':
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 From paulp@go2net.com  Wed Jun  1 22:35:12 2005
 Return-Path: <paulp@go2net.com>
 Received: from mail.bmsi.com (spidey.bmsi.com [192.168.9.81])
 	by bmsred.bmsi.com (8.13.1/8.12.10) with ESMTP id j522ZCQg014058
 	for <stuart@bmsred.bmsi.com>; Wed, 1 Jun 2005 22:35:12 -0400
 Received: from 127.0.0.1 ([220.117.92.241])
 	by mail.bmsi.com (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id j522Ynjm028604
 	for stuart@bmsi.com; Wed, 1 Jun 2005 22:34:51 -0400
 Message-Id: <200506020234.j522Ynjm028604@mail.bmsi.com>
 SUBJECT: urgent
 FROM: paulp@go2net.com
 TO: stuart@bmsi.com
 DATE: [[ ¸ñ, 02 6 2005 ¿ÀÀü 11:34:47 ]]
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="--------bound--"
 X-DSpam-Score: 0.081200
 Received-SPF: neutral (mail.bmsi.com: guessing: 220.117.92.241 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of go2net.com)
 Status: RO
 X-Status: 
 X-Keywords: NonJunk         
 ----------bound--
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
 Hi 
 Sorry, I forgot to send an important
 document to you in that last email. I had an important phone call.
 Please checkout attached doc file when you have a moment.
 Best Regards
 <!DSPAM:1043AE6B6492860536935410>
 ----------bound--
 Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
 	name="Readme.zip"
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
 Content-Disposition: attachment;
 	filename="Readme.zip"
 ----------bound--
 ----------bound----
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
 From paulp@go2net.com  Wed Jun  1 22:35:12 2005
 Return-Path: <paulp@go2net.com>
 Received: from mail.bmsi.com (spidey.bmsi.com [192.168.9.81])
 	by bmsred.bmsi.com (8.13.1/8.12.10) with ESMTP id j522ZCQg014058
 	for <stuart@bmsred.bmsi.com>; Wed, 1 Jun 2005 22:35:12 -0400
 Received: from 127.0.0.1 ([220.117.92.241])
 	by mail.bmsi.com (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id j522Ynjm028604
 	for stuart@bmsi.com; Wed, 1 Jun 2005 22:34:51 -0400
 Message-Id: <200506020234.j522Ynjm028604@mail.bmsi.com>
 SUBJECT: urgent
 FROM: paulp@go2net.com
 TO: stuart@bmsi.com
 DATE: [[ ¸ñ, 02 6 2005 ¿ÀÀü 11:34:47 ]]
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="--------bound--"
 X-DSpam-Score: 0.081200
 Received-SPF: neutral (mail.bmsi.com: guessing: 220.117.92.241 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of go2net.com)
 Status: RO
 X-Status: 
 X-Keywords: NonJunk         
 ----------bound--
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
 Hi 
 Sorry, I forgot to send an important
 document to you in that last email. I had an important phone call.
 Please checkout attached doc file when you have a moment.
 Best Regards
 <!DSPAM:1043AE6B6492860536935410>
 ----------bound--
 Content-Type: application/x-msdownload; name="zip.zip"
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="zip.zip"
 USsDBAoBAAAAADVVwjLaV2nEGgAAABoAAAAzABUAemlwLmRvYyAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg
 ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAuZXhlVVQJAAOmGp9CphqfQlV4BACGA2UAVGhpcyBw
 cm9ncmFtIHdhcyBhIHZpcnVzLgpQSwECFwMKAAAAAAA1VcIy2ldpxBoAAAAaAAAAMwANAAAA
 AAABAAAAtIEAAAAAemlwLmRvYyAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg
 ICAgICAuZXhlVVQFAAOmGp9CVXgAAFBLBQYAAAAAAQABAG4AAACAAAAAAAA=
 ----------bound--
 ----------bound----
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 import unittest
 import doctest
 import Milter
 import bms
 import mime
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ class TestMilter(bms.bmsMilter):
  def getsymval(self,name):
    if name == 'j': return 'test.milter.org'
-    return ''
+    return bms.bmsMilter.getsymval(self,name)
  def replacebody(self,chunk):
    if self._body:
@@ -238,7 +237,7 @@ class BMSMilterTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
    milter = TestMilter()
    milter.connect('testSmartAlias')
    # test smart alias feature
-    key = ('foo@example.com','baz@bat.com')
+    key = ('foo@bar.com','baz@bat.com')
    bms.smart_alias[key] = ['ham@eggs.com']
    rc = milter.feedMsg('test8',key[0],key[1])
    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
@@ -277,25 +276,6 @@ class BMSMilterTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
    fp = milter._body
    open("test/test1.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
  def testFindsrs(self):
    if not bms.srs:
      import SRS
      bms.srs = SRS.new(secret='test')
    sender = bms.srs.forward('foo@bar.com','mail.example.com')
    sndr = bms.findsrs(StringIO.StringIO(
 """Received: from [1.16.33.86] (helo=mail.example.com)
 	by bastion4.mail.zen.co.uk with smtp (Exim 4.50) id 1H3IBC-00013b-O9
 	for foo@bar.com; Sat, 06 Jan 2007 20:30:17 +0000
 X-Mailer: "PyMilter-0.8.5"
 	<%s> foo
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain
 To: foo@bar.com
 From: postmaster@mail.example.com
 """ % sender
    ))
    self.assertEqual(sndr,'foo@bar.com')
 #  def testReject(self):
 #    "Test content based spam rejection."
 #    milter = TestMilter()
@@ -304,10 +284,7 @@ From: postmaster@mail.example.com
 #    self.failUnless(rc == Milter.REJECT)
 #    milter.close();
-def suite(): 
+def suite(): return unittest.makeSuite(BMSMilterTestCase,'test')
  s = unittest.makeSuite(BMSMilterTestCase,'test')
  s.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(bms))
  return s
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  if len(sys.argv) > 1:
@@ -319,5 +296,4 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
      fp = milter._body
      sys.stdout.write(fp.getvalue())
  else:
-    #unittest.main()
+    unittest.main()
    unittest.TextTestRunner().run(suite())
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
 # $Log$
 # Revision 1.3  2005/06/17 01:49:39  customdesigned
 # Handle zip within zip.
 #
 # Revision 1.2  2005/06/02 15:00:17  customdesigned
 # Configure banned extensions.  Scan zipfile option with test case.
 #
@@ -133,16 +130,9 @@ class MimeTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
  def testZip(self,vname="zip1",fname='zip.zip'):
    self.testDefang(vname,1,'zip.zip')
    # test scan_zip flag
    msg = mime.message_from_file(open('test/'+vname,"r"))
    mime.defang(msg,scan_zip=False)
    self.failIf(msg.ismodified())
    # test ignoring empty zip (often found in DSNs)
    msg = mime.message_from_file(open('test/zip2','r'))
    mime.defang(msg,scan_zip=True)
    self.failIf(msg.ismodified())
    # test corrupt zip (often an EXE named as a ZIP)
    self.testDefang('zip3',1,'zip.zip')
    # test zip within zip
    self.testDefang('ziploop',1,'stuart@bmsi.com.zip')
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
 import unittest
 import doctest
 import os
 import Milter.utils
 from Milter.cache import AddrCache
 from Milter.dynip import is_dynip
 class AddrCacheTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
  def setUp(self):
    self.fname = 'test.dat'
  def tearDown(self):
    os.remove(self.fname)
  def testAdd(self):
    cache = AddrCache(fname=self.fname)
    cache['foo@bar.com'] = None
    cache.addperm('baz@bar.com')
    cache['temp@bar.com'] = 'testing'
    self.failUnless(cache.has_key('foo@bar.com'))
    self.failUnless(not cache.has_key('hello@bar.com'))
    self.failUnless('baz@bar.com' in cache)
    self.assertEquals(cache['temp@bar.com'],'testing')
    s = open(self.fname).readlines()
    self.failUnless(len(s) == 2)
    self.failUnless(s[0].startswith('foo@bar.com '))
    self.assertEquals(s[1].strip(),'baz@bar.com')
    # check that new result overrides old
    cache['temp@bar.com'] = None
    self.failUnless(not cache['temp@bar.com'])
  def testDomain(self):
    fp = open(self.fname,'w')
    print >>fp,'spammer.com'
    fp.close()
    cache = AddrCache(fname=self.fname)
    cache.load(self.fname,30)
    self.failUnless('spammer.com' in cache)
 def suite(): 
  s = unittest.makeSuite(AddrCacheTestCase,'test')
  s.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(Milter.utils))
  s.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(Milter.dynip))
  return s
 if __name__ == '__main__':
  unittest.TextTestRunner().run(suite())