This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create tag 'pymilter-0_8_12'.

Sprout from master 2008-12-13 21:08:51 UTC Stuart Gathman <stuart@gathman.org> 'Release 0.8.12'
Cherrypick from master 2008-08-25 18:49:13 UTC Stuart Gathman <stuart@gathman.org> 'Release 0.8.10':
    HOWTO
Cherrypick from master 2008-12-14 02:55:42 UTC Stuart Gathman <stuart@gathman.org> 'Release 0.8.12':
    MANIFEST.in
Cherrypick from bmsi 2005-05-31 18:23:49 UTC Stuart Gathman <stuart@gathman.org> 'Development changes since 0.7.2':
    sample.py
    test/amazon
    test/big5
    test/bounce
    test/bounce1
    test/bound
    test/honey
    test/missingboundary
    test/samp1
    test/spam44
    test/spam7
    test/spam8
    test/test1
    test/test8
    test/virus1
    test/virus13
    test/virus2
    test/virus3
    test/virus4
    test/virus5
    test/virus6
    test/virus7
    testsample.py

HOWTO

@@ -35,13 +35,13 @@ wish to install pydspam.
 For basic pymilter you'll need:
 
 python-2.4
-milter-0.8.7
+milter-0.8.10
 sendmail-8.13.x	(with milter support enabled)
 
 and for SPF you'll need:
 
-pydns-2.3.0-2.4
+pydns-2.3.3-2.4
-pyspf-2.0.3-2.py24
+pyspf-2.0.5-1.py24
 
 and for SRS you'll need:
 
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Start milter and pysrs with "service milter start", "service pysrs start".
 Tail /var/log/milter/milter.log while SMTP clients connect to your
 sendmail instance.  This should show you what the milter is doing.
 
-By default, milter-0.8.7 rejects on SPF fail.
+By default, milter-0.8.10 rejects on SPF fail.
 
 	Step four.  Tweaking the basic config.
 

MANIFEST.in

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 include COPYING
 include TODO
 include NEWS
-include HOWTO
 include CREDITS
 include README
 include ChangeLog
@@ -9,27 +8,10 @@ include MANIFEST.in
 include testsample.py
 include testmime.py
 include testutils.py
-include testbms.py
-include rejects.py
-include report.py
-include bms.py
-include spf.py
-include cid2spf.py
-include spfquery.py
 include test.py
 include sample.py
 include milter-template.py
-include spfmilter.py
-include spfmilter.rc
-include spfmilter.cfg
 include test/*
-include doc/*
 include Milter/*.py
 include *.spec
 include start.sh
-include milter.rc
-include milter.rc7
-include milter.cfg
-include rhsbl.m4
-include *.txt
-include *.html

Milter/__init__.py

@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ class Milter:
   def chgheader(self,field,idx,value):
     return self.__ctx.chgheader(field,idx,value)
 
-  def addrcpt(self,rcpt):
+  def addrcpt(self,rcpt,params=None):
-    return self.__ctx.addrcpt(rcpt)
+    return self.__ctx.addrcpt(rcpt,params)
 
   def delrcpt(self,rcpt):
     return self.__ctx.delrcpt(rcpt)
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ class Milter:
   def replacebody(self,body):
     return self.__ctx.replacebody(body)
 
+  def chgfrom(self,sender,params=None):
+    return self.__ctx.chgfrom(sender,params)
+
   # When quarantined, a message goes into the mailq as if to be delivered,
   # but delivery is deferred until the message is unquarantined.
   def quarantine(self,reason):
@@ -184,8 +187,10 @@ def runmilter(name,socketname,timeout = 0):
     print "Removing %s" % fname
     try:
       os.unlink(fname)
-    except:
+    except os.error, x:
-      pass
+      import errno
+      if x.errno != errno.ENOENT:
+        raise milter.error(x)
 
   # The default flags set include everything
   # milter.set_flags(milter.ADDHDRS)

Milter/cache.py

@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@
 # CBV results.
 #
 # $Log$
+# Revision 1.8  2007/09/03 16:18:45  customdesigned
+# Delete unparseable timestamps when loading address cache.  These have
+# arisen because of failure to parse MAIL FROM properly.   Will have to
+# tighten up MAIL FROM parsing to match RFC.
+#
 # Revision 1.7  2007/01/25 22:47:26  customdesigned
 # Persist blacklisting from delayed DSNs.
 #
@@ -89,8 +94,10 @@ class AddrCache(object):
     except IOError:
       lock.unlock()
 
-  def has_key(self,sender):
+  def has_precise_key(self,sender):
-    "True if sender is cached and has not expired."
+    """True if precise sender is cached and has not expired.  Don't
+    try looking up wildcard entries.
+    """
     try:
       lsender = sender and sender.lower()
       ts,res = self.cache[lsender]
@@ -98,16 +105,17 @@ class AddrCache(object):
       if not ts or ts > too_old:
         return True
       del self.cache[lsender]
-      try:
+    except KeyError: pass
-	user,host = sender.split('@',1)
+    return False
-	return self.has_key(host)
+
-      except ValueError:
+  def has_key(self,sender):
-        pass
+    "True if sender is cached and has not expired."
-    except KeyError:
+    if self.has_precise_key(sender):
-      try:
+      return True
-	user,host = sender.split('@',1)
+    try:
-	return self.has_key(host)
+      user,host = sender.split('@',1)
-      except: pass
+      return self.has_precise_key(host)
+    except: pass
     return False
 
   __contains__ = has_key

Milter/config.py

@@ -57,3 +57,8 @@ class MilterConfigParser(ConfigParser):
     if self.has_option(sect,opt):
       return self.get(sect,opt)
     return default
+
+  def getintdefault(self,sect,opt,default=None):
+    if self.has_option(sect,opt):
+      return self.getint(sect,opt)
+    return default

Milter/dns.py

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ class Session(object):
     ('A','A'): None,
     ('AAAA','AAAA'): None,
     ('PTR','PTR'): None,
+    ('NS','NS'): None,
+    ('NS','A'): None,
     ('TXT','TXT'): None,
     ('SPF','SPF'): None
   }

Milter/greylist.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+import time
+import shelve
+import thread
+import logging
+import urllib
+
+log = logging.getLogger('milter.greylist')
+
+def quoteAddress(s):
+  '''Quote an address so that it's safe to store in the file-system.
+  Address can either be a domain name, or local part.
+  Returns the quoted address.'''
+
+  s = urllib.quote(s, '@_-+~!.%')
+  if s.startswith('.'): s = '%2e' + s[1:]
+  return s
+
+class Record(object):
+  __slots__ = ( 'firstseen', 'lastseen', 'umis', 'cnt' )
+
+  def __init__(self):
+    now = time.time()
+    self.firstseen = now
+    self.lastseen = now
+    self.cnt = 0
+    self.umis = None
+
+class Greylist(object):
+
+  def __init__(self,dbname,grey_time=10,grey_expire=4,grey_retain=36):
+    self.ignoreLastByte = False
+    self.greylist_time = grey_time * 60         # minutes
+    self.greylist_expire = grey_expire * 3600   # hours
+    self.greylist_retain = grey_retain * 24 * 3600   # days
+    self.dbp = shelve.open(dbname,'c',protocol=2)
+    self.lock = thread.allocate_lock()
+  
+  def check(self,ip,sender,recipient):
+    "Return number of allowed messages for greylist triple."
+    sender = quoteAddress(sender)
+    recipient = quoteAddress(recipient)
+    key = ip + ':' + sender + ':' + recipient
+    self.lock.acquire()
+    try:
+      dbp = self.dbp
+      try:
+        r = dbp[key]
+        now = time.time()
+        if now > r.lastseen + self.greylist_retain:
+          # expired
+          log.debug('Expired greylist: %s',key)
+          r = Record()
+        elif now < r.firstseen + self.greylist_time:
+          # still greylisted
+          log.debug('Early greylist: %s',key)
+          #r = Record()
+          r.lastseen = now
+        elif r.cnt or now < r.firstseen + self.greylist_expire:
+          # in greylist window or active
+          r.lastseen = now
+          r.cnt += 1
+          log.debug('Active greylist(%d): %s',r.cnt,key)
+        else:
+          # passed greylist window
+          log.debug('Late greylist: %s',key)
+          r = Record()
+        dbp[key] = r
+      except:
+        r = Record()
+        dbp[key] = r
+      dbp.sync()
+    finally:
+      self.lock.release()
+    return r.cnt

Milter/utils.py

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import socket
 import email.Errors
 from fnmatch import fnmatchcase
 from email.Header import decode_header
+#import email.Utils
+import rfc822
 
 ip4re = re.compile(r'^[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*$')
 
@@ -40,6 +42,44 @@ def iniplist(ipaddr,iplist):
       return True
   return False
 
+def parseaddr(t):
+  """Split email into Fullname and address.
+
+  >>> parseaddr('user@example.com')
+  ('', 'user@example.com')
+  >>> parseaddr('"Full Name" <foo@example.com>')
+  ('Full Name', 'foo@example.com')
+  >>> parseaddr('spam@spammer.com <foo@example.com>')
+  ('spam@spammer.com', 'foo@example.com')
+  >>> parseaddr('God@heaven <@hop1.org,@hop2.net:jeff@spec.org>')
+  ('God@heaven', 'jeff@spec.org')
+  >>> parseaddr('Real Name ((comment)) <addr...@example.com>')
+  ('Real Name', 'addr...@example.com')
+  >>> parseaddr('a(WRONG)@b')
+  ('WRONG', 'a@b')
+  """
+  #return email.Utils.parseaddr(t)
+  res = rfc822.parseaddr(t)
+  # dirty fix for some broken cases
+  if not res[0]:
+    pos = t.find('<')
+    if pos > 0 and t[-1] == '>':
+      addrspec = t[pos+1:-1]
+      pos1 = addrspec.rfind(':')
+      if pos1 > 0:
+        addrspec = addrspec[pos1+1:]
+      return rfc822.parseaddr('"%s" <%s>' % (t[:pos].strip(),addrspec))
+  if not res[1]:
+    pos = t.find('<')
+    if pos > 0 and t[-1] == '>':
+      addrspec = t[pos+1:-1]
+      pos1 = addrspec.rfind(':')
+      if pos1 > 0:
+        addrspec = addrspec[pos1+1:]
+      return rfc822.parseaddr('%s<%s>' % (t[:pos].strip(),addrspec))
+  return res
+    
+
 def parse_addr(t):
   """Split email into user,domain.
 

NEWS

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-Here is a history of user visible changes to Python milter.
+See pymilter.spec for recent history.
+
+Here is a history of older changes to Python milter.
 0.8.8	move AddrCache, parse_addr, iniplist, parse_header to Milter package
 	fix plock for missing source and can't change owner/group
 	add sample spfmilter.py milter

TODO

@@ -1,229 +1,6 @@
-Convert DSN to REJECT unless sender gets SPF pass or best guess pass.  Make
+Support smfi_negotiate and auto negotiate only those callbacks for which 
-configurable by SPF result with NOTSPAM policy (reject or deliver without DSN).
+Milter.Milter methods have been overridden.  (Python should be able to
-Maybe policy should be NODSN - still verify sender with CBV.
+do that.)
 
-When content filtering is not installed, reject BLACKLISTed MFROM
+Lookup exact RFC syntax of real name / email and make 
-immediately.  There is no use waiting until EOM.
+Milter.utils.parse_addr() pass all unit tests.
-
-Configuration is problematic when handling incoming, but not outgoing mail.
-The problem comes when alice@example.com sends mail to bill@example.com,
-and we are the MX for example.com, but alice is sending from some other
-MTA.  The mail is flagged external, so we don't list example.com in
-internal_domains (or we would get "spam from self").  But, if we try to do a
-CBV, we get "fraudulent MX", because the MX is ourself!  So we need to 
-avoid doing CBV on such domains.  Currently, we try to make sure the SPF
-policies don't do CBV.
-
-We now don't check internal domains for incoming mail if there is an
-SPF record.
-
-On the other hand, if alice is sending internally, or with SMTP AUTH, she
-*does* need the domain to be in internal_domains.  The solution to that 
-is to use the new SMTP AUTH access configuration to specify which domains
-can be used by smtp AUTH (by user if desired).
-
-It would be cleaner if CBV would know which domains we have agreed to
-be MX for. Some ideas for external connections:
-
-a) check access file for To:example.com	RELAY
-b) check mailertable
-c) check mx_domains config list
-d) if there is an SPF record, don't check internal_domains
-   (let SPF block unauthorized machines)
-
-But that still doesn't handle the roaming user, who won't use SMTP
-AUTH, but sends through some hotel MTA.  Maybe we don't want to support
-him?
-
-When setting up pydspam, both sender and rcpt must resolve to dspam users
-for falsepositive recognition.  Usually, this means adding 
-honeypot@mail.example.com to alias list for honeypot in pymilter.cfg.
-This needs to be documented.  I was caught by it setting up a new site.
-
-Add signature (x-sig=AB7485f=TS) to Received-SPF, so it can be used
-to blacklist sources of delayed DSNs.
-
-rcpt-addr may let us know when a recipient is unknown.  That should count
-against reputation.
-
-Need to use wildcards in blacklist.log: *.madcowsrecord.net
-Need to exclude emails like !*-admin@example.com in whitelist_sender.
-Need to exclude robot users from autowhitelist.  Don't want to have to
-list all users, so implement something like !*-admin@bmsi.com,@bmsi.com.
-
-GOSSiP feedback from user training is ignored because UMIS has already been
-removed from queue.  Maybe keep UMIS in queue, and add method to 
-alter last feedback for ID.
-
-Generate DSNs according to RFC 3464
-
-Get temperror policy from access file.
-
-Reporting explanation for failure should show source if sender
-provided explanation.
-
-Bug in Auto-whitelist.  Recent Auto-whitelist doesn't override expired entry.
-
-SPF permerror diagnostics should include corrected mechanism.
-
-Delay SPF check until RCPT TO.  Cache result to avoid repeating
-for multiple RCPT.  This avoids overhead for invalid RCPT, and
-allows for per RCPT local policy.
-
-Check SPF for outgoing mail (including local policy for internal addresses).
-This could also solve the second part of the mail from relay problem below.
-
-Whitelisted senders from trusted relay get PROBATION.  Need to extracted
-SPF result from headers - and in the case of mail internal to relay
-(e.g. bmsi.com), supply 'pass' result.  
-
-For selected domains, check rcpts via CBV before accepting mail.  Cache
-results.  This will kick out dictonary attacks against a mail domain
-behind a gateway sooner.
-
-Add auto-blacklisted senders to blacklist.log with timestamp.
-Add emails blacklisted via CBV so that they are remembered across milter
-restarts.
-
-Make all dictionaries work like honeypot.  Do not train as ham unless
-whitelisted.  Train on blacklisted messages, or spam feedback.  This
-can be called Train On Error.  Should be possible to startup
-with training on everything to get dictionary built fast, then switch
-to train on error to minimize labor.
-
-Allow unsigned DSNs from selected domains (that don't accept signed MFROM,
-e.g. verizon.net).
-
-Allow verified hostnames for trusted_relay.  E.g. HELO name that
-passes SPF.
-
-Table of sendmail macros for documentation.
-
-When do we get two hello calls?  STARTTLS is one reason.
-
-Option: accept mail from auto-whitelisted senders even with spf-fail,
-but do not update dspam.  This can be done for individual senders or domains 
-using the access file.
-
-pysrs: SRS doesn't get applied to proper recipients when there are
-multiple recipients.  This requires debugging cf scripts - yuk.
-
-auto_whitelist false_positives from quarantine - perhaps only when
-user selects special button (use special header to communicate
-that from dspamcgi.py to milter.)
-
-Use send_dsn.log for blacklist also.  AddrCache needs localpart
-wildcard (e.g. empty localpart).
-
-Quarantined mail is missing headers modified/added by milter after
-checking dspam.
-
-Send DSN for permerror before processing extended result.  An additional
-DSN may be sent based on extended result.  Send permerror DSN to
-postmaster@sending_domain.
-
-Rescind whitelist for banned extensions, in case sender is infected.
-
-Train honeypot on error only.
-
-Find rfc2822 policy for MFROM quoting.
-
-Support explicit errors for SPF policy in access file:
-SPF-Neutral:aol.com	ERROR:"550 AOL mail must get SPF PASS"
-
-Defer TEMPERROR in SPF evaluation - give precedence to security
-(only defer for PASS mechanisms).
-
-Create null config that does nothing - except maybe add Received-SPF
-headers.  Many admins would like to turn features on one at a time.
-
-Can't output messages with malformed rfc822 attachments.
-
-Move milter,Milter,mime,spf modules to pymilter
-milter package will have bms.py application
-
-Web admin interface
-message log for automated stats and blacklisting
-Skip dspam when SPF pass? NO
-Report 551 with rcpt on SPF fail?
-check spam keywords with character classes, e.g.
-	{a}=[a@ãä], {i}=[i1í], {e}=[eë], {o}=[o0ö]
-
-Implement RRS - a backdoor for non-SRS forwarders.  User lists non-SRS 
-forwarder accounts, and a util provides a special local alias for the
-user to give to the forwarder.  (Or user just adds arbitrary alias
-unique to that forwarder to a database.)  Alias only works for mail from that
-forwarder.  Milter gets forwarder domain from alias and uses it to
-SPF check forwarder.
-
-Framework for modular Python milter components within a single VM.
-Python milters can be already be composed through sendmail by running each in
-a separate process.  However, a significant amount of memory is wasted
-for each additional Python VM, and communication between milters
-is cumbersome (e.g., adding mail headers, writing external files).
-
-Copy incoming wiretap mail, even though sendmail alias works perfectly
-for the purpose, to avoid having to change two configs for a wiretap.
-
-Provide a way to reload milter.cfg without stopping/restarting milter.
-
-Allow selected Windows extensions for specific domains via milter.cfg
-
-Fix setup.py so that _FFR_QUARANTINE is automatically defined when
-available in libmilter.
-
-Keep separate ismodified flag for headers and body.  This is important
-when rejecting outgoing mail with viruses removed (so as not to
-embarrass yourself), and also removing Received headers with hidepath.
-
-Need a test module to feed sample messages to a milter though a live 
-sendmail and SMTP.  The mockup currently used is probably not very accurate,
-and doesn't test the threading code.
-
-DONE Require signed MFROM for all incoming bounces when signing all outgoing
-mail - except from trusted relays.
-
-DONE Added Message-ID header to DSN with SRS signed sender.  When seen on
-incoming rfc ignorant failure message, blacklist sender.
-
-DONE Option to add Received-SPF header, but never reject on SPF.
-  I think the above will handle this.
-
-DONE Received-SPF header field should show identity that was checked.
-
-DONE When training with spam, REJECT after data so that mistakenly blacklisted
-senders at least get an error.
-
-DONE Milter won't start when it can't change permissions on *.lock to match
-*.log.  Should maybe ignore that error - the effect will be to set
-the permissions to default.
-
-DONE Milter won't start when a whitelist/blacklist file is missing.
-
-DONE Delayed failure detection should parse From header to find email address.
-
-DONE When bms.py can't find templates, it passes None to dsn.create_msg(),
-which uses local variable as backup, which no longer exist.  Do plain
-CBV in that case instead.
-
-DONE Find and use X-GOSSiP: header for SPAM: and FP: submissions.  Would need
-to keep tags longer.
-
-DONE Parse incoming 3464 DSNs for "Action: failed" to recognize delayed
-failures.  This works regardless of Subject.
-
-DONE Reports PROBATION even when rejecting message (works, but confusing in
-log).
-
-DONE Delayed_failure detection needs to handle multi-line header fields.  
-Also, delayed_failure should be recognized when addressed to
-postmaster@helodomain 
-
-DONE DSN for Permerror shows 'None' for error under some condition.
-
-DONE Allow blacklisted emails as well as domains in blacklist.log.  Use same
-data structure as autowhitelist.log.  
-
-DONE Backup copies for outgoing/incoming mail.
-
-DONE Don't match dynamic ptr in bestguess.

doc/changes.ht

@@ -2,6 +2,47 @@ Title: Recent Changes
 
 <h2> Recent Changes </h2>
 
+<h3> 0.8.10 </h3>
+
+SRS rejections now log the recipient.  
+I have finally implemented plain CBV (no DSN).  The CBV policy
+will do a plain CBV from now on, and the DSN policy is required
+if you want to send a DSN.
+I started checking the MAIL FROM fullname (human readable part
+of an email) for porn keywords.  There is now a banned IP database.
+IPs are banned for too many bad MAIL FROMs or RCPT TOs, and remain banned
+for 7 days.
+
+<h3> 0.8.9 </h3>
+
+I use the <code>%ifarch</code> hack to build milter and milter-spf
+packages as noarch, while pymilter is built as native.
+
+I removed the spf dependency from dsn.py, so pymilter can be used without
+installing pyspf, and added a Milter.dns module to let python milters do
+general DNS lookups without loading pyspf.
+
+<h3> 0.8.8 </h3>
+
+Programs do not belong in the /var/log directory.  I moved the
+milter apps to /usr/lib/pymilter.  Since having the programs and
+data in the same directory is convenient for debugging, it will
+still use an executable present in the datadir.
+
+Several general utility classes and functions are now in the Milter package
+for possible use by other python milters.  In addition to the trivial example
+milter, a simple SPF only milter is included as a realistic example.
+
+The spec file now build 3 RPMs:
+
+<ul>
+<li> pymilter is the milter module and Milter package for use by all python
+     milters.
+<li> milter is the all-singing, all-dancing python milter application, with
+     supporting <code>/etc/init.d</code>, logrotate and other scripts.
+<li> milter-spf is the simple SPF only milter application.
+</ul>
+
 <h3> 0.8.7 </h3>
 
 The spf module has been moved to the 

doc/credits.ht

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Title: Credits
 <a href="mailto:Jim Niemira <urmane@urmane.org>">Jim Niemira</a>
 wrote the original C module and some quick
 and dirty python to use it.  
-<a href="mailto:Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>">Stuart D. Gathman</a>
+<a href="http://gathman.org/vitae">Stuart D. Gathman</a>
 took that kludge and added threading and context objects to it, wrote a proper
 OO wrapper (Milter.py) that handles attachments, did lots of testing, packaged
 it with distutils, and generally transformed it from a quick hack to a

doc/links.h

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 <li><a href="changes.html">Changes</a>
 <li><a href="requirements.html">Requirements</a>
 <li><a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=139894">Download</a>
+<li><a href="RPM-GPG-KEY-bms">GPG-KEY</a>
 <li><a href="faq.html">FAQ</a>
 <li><a href="policy.html">Policies</a>
 <li><a href="logmsgs.html">Log&nbsp;Messages</a>
@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@
 <li><a href="credits.html">CREDITS</a>
 <li><a href="http://sourceforge.net"><img src="http://sflogo.sourceforge.net/sflogo.php?group_id=139894&amp;type=1" width="88" height="31" border="0" alt="SourceForge.net Logo" /></a>
 <h3>Links</h3>
-<li><a href="http://www.milter.org/milter_api/api.html">C&nbsp;API</a>
+<li><a href="https://www.milter.org/developers/api/index">C&nbsp;API</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.milter.org/">Milter.Org</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.python.org/">Python.Org</a>
 <li><a href="http://www.sendmail.org/">Sendmail.Org</a>

doc/milter.ht

@@ -13,14 +13,19 @@ ALT="Viewable With Any Browser" BORDER="0"></A>
 </map>
 </P>
 
-<img src="Maxwells.gif" alt="Maxwell's Daemon: pymilter mascot" align=left>
+<table rules="none">
+<tr><td>
+<img src="Maxwells.gif" alt="Maxwell's Daemon: pymilter mascot" align="top">
+Mascot by <a href="http://alphard.ethz.ch/hafner/lebl.htm">Christian Hafner</a>
+</td>
+<td>
 <h1 align=center>Sendmail Milters in Python</h1>
 <h4 align=center>by <a href="mailto:%75%72%6D%61%6E%65%40%6E%65%75%72%61l%61%63%63%65%73%73%2E%63%6F%6D">Jim Niemira</a>
   and <a href="mailto:%73%74%75%61%72%74%40%62%6D%73%69%2E%63%6F%6D">
   Stuart D. Gathman</a><br>
 This web page is written by Stuart D. Gathman<br>and<br>sponsored by
 <a href="http://www.bmsi.com">Business Management Systems, Inc.</a> <br>
-Last updated Mar 30, 2007</h4>
+Last updated Aug 26, 2008</h4>
 
 See the <a href="faq.html">FAQ</a> | <a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=139894">Download now</a> |
 <a href="http://bmsi.com/mailman/listinfo/pymilter">Subscribe to mailing list</a> |
@@ -31,7 +36,7 @@ See the <a href="faq.html">FAQ</a> | <a href="http://sourceforge.net/project/sho
 <a href="//www.python.org">
 <img src="python55.gif" align=left alt="A Python"></a>
 <a href="//www.sendmail.org/">Sendmail</a> introduced a
-<a href="http://www.milter.org/milter_api/api.html"> new API</a> beginning with version 8.10 -
+<a href="https://www.milter.org/developers/api/index"> new API</a> beginning with version 8.10 -
 libmilter.  The milter module for <a href="//www.python.org">Python</a>
 provides a python interface to libmilter that exploits all its features.
 <p>
@@ -39,7 +44,11 @@ Sendmail 8.12 officially releases libmilter.
 Version 8.12 seems to be more robust, and includes new privilege
 separation features to enhance security.  Even better, sendmail 8.13
 supports socket maps, which makes <a href="pysrs.html">pysrs</a> much more
-efficient and secure.  I recommend upgrading.
+efficient and secure.   Sendmail 8.14 finally supports modifying 
+MAIL FROM via the milter API.  Unfortunately, I haven't gotten around
+to supporting that yet in python milter.
+</td></tr>
+</table>
 
 <h3><a name=overview>Overview</a></h3>
 
@@ -48,7 +57,7 @@ href="#milter">milters</a>, and the beginnings of a general purpose mail
 filtering system written in Python.
 <p>
 At the lowest level, the 'milter' module provides a thin wrapper around the
-<a href="http://www.milter.org/milter_api/api.html">
+<a href="https://www.milter.org/developers/api/index">
 sendmail libmilter API</a>.  This API lets you register callbacks for 
 a number of events in the
 <a href="http://www.cs.concordia.ca/~group/fig/public/email/relay/milter+ruleset-checks.html">process of sendmail receiving a message via SMTP</a>.  
@@ -121,7 +130,7 @@ copy mail.
 <li> For more ideas, check the <a href="//www.milter.org">Milter Web Page</a>.
 </menu>
 
-<a href="http://www.milter.org/milter_api/api.html">
+<a href="https://www.milter.org/developers/api/index">
 Documentation</a> for the C API is provided with sendmail.  Miltermodule
 provides a thin python wrapper for the C API.  Milter.py provides a simple
 OO wrapper on top of that.
@@ -202,60 +211,8 @@ href="http://www.duh.org/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/pmilter/doc/milter-protocol.txt?r
 <h3> Confirmed Installations </h3>
 
 Please <a href="mailto:%73%74%75%61%72%74%40%62%6D%73%69%2E%63%6F%6D">email</a>
-me if you successfully install milter on a system not mentioned below.
+me if you do <i>not</i> successfully install milter.  The confirmed
-<p>
+installations are too numerous to list at this point.
-<table>
-<tr>
-<th>Operating System</th> <th>Compiler</th> <th>Python</th> <th>Sendmail</th>
-<th>milter</th>
-<tr>
-<td>Mandrake 8.0</td><td>gcc-3.0.1</td><td>2.1.1</td><td>8.12.0</td>
-<td>0.3.3</td><tr>
-<td>Mandrake 8.0</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.0</td><td>8.11.2</td>
-<td>0.3.6</td><tr>
-<td>RedHat 6.2</td><td>egcs-1.1.2</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>8.11.6</td>
-<td>0.5.4</td><tr>
-<td>RedHat 7.1</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.1</td>
-<td>0.3.5</td><tr>
-<td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>8.11.6</td>
-<td>0.5.5</td><tr>
-<td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.3.3</td><td>8.13.1</td>
-<td>0.7.2</td><tr>
-<td>RedHat 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.96</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.5</td>
-<td>0.8.4</td><tr>
-<td>RedHat 8.0</td><td>gcc-3.2</td><td>2.2.1</td><td>8.12.6</td>
-<td>0.5.2</td><tr>
-<td>RedHat 9.0</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.1</td>
-<td>0.8.2</td><tr>
-<td>RedHat EL3</td><td>gcc-3.2.3</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.5</td>
-<td>0.8.4</td><tr>
-<td>Debian Linux</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.1</td><td>8.12.0</td>
-<td>0.3.7</td><tr>
-<td>Debian Linux</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>8.12.7</td>
-<td>0.5.4</td><tr>
-<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.1</td><td>8.11.5</td>
-<td>0.3.3</td><tr>
-<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.1</td><td>8.12.1</td>
-<td>0.3.4</td><tr>
-<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.1.3</td><td>8.12.3</td>
-<td>0.4.2</td><tr>
-<td>AIX-4.1.5</td><td>gcc-2.95.2</td><td>2.4.1</td><td>8.13.1</td>
-<td>0.8.4</td><tr>
-<td>Slackware 7.1</td><td>?</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.1</td>
-<td>0.3.8</td><tr>
-<td>Slackware 9.0</td><td>gcc-3.2.2</td><td>2.2.3</td><td>8.12.9</td>
-<td>0.5.4</td><tr>
-<td>OpenBSD</td><td>?</td><td>2.3.3?</td><td>8.13.1?</td>
-<td>0.7.2</td><tr>
-<td>SuSE 7.3</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>2.1.1</td><td>8.12.2</td>
-<td>0.3.9</td><tr>
-<td>FreeBSD</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>2.2.1</td><td>8.12.3</td>
-<td>0.4.0</td><tr>
-<td>FreeBSD</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>2.2.2</td><td>?</td>
-<td>0.5.5</td><tr>
-<td>FreeBSD 4.4</td><td>gcc-2.95.3</td><td>?</td><td>8.12.10</td>
-<td>0.6.6</td>
-</table>
 
 <h2> Enough Already! </h2>
 

doc/policy.ht

@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ Title: Python Milter Mail Policy
 
 These are the policies implemented by the <code>bms.py</code> milter
 application.  The milter and Milter modules do not implement any policies
-by themselves.  Eventually, I'll get the bms.py milter moved to its
+by themselves.  
-own package.
 
 <h3> Classify connection </h3>
 
@@ -77,161 +76,174 @@ altered accordingly.
 
 <h2> SPF check </h2>
 
-Finally, the MAIL FROM, connect IP, and HELO name are checked against
+The MAIL FROM, connect IP, and HELO name are checked against
-any SPF records published via DNS for the alleged sender (MAIL FROM).
+any SPF records published via DNS for the alleged sender (MAIL FROM)
-If there is no SPF record, we check for a local substitute under the
+to determine the official SPF policy result.
-domain defined in the <code>[spf]delegate</code> configuration.
+The offical SPF result is then logged in the Received-SPF header field,
-Further checks depend on the result.
+but certain results are subjected to further processing to create
-
+an effective result for policy purposes.
-<table border=1>
+<p>
-<tr><th>NONE</th><td>
+If the official result is 'none', we try to turn it into an effective result of
-If there is no SPF record (official or delegated), then we 
+'pass' or 'fail'.  First, we check for a local substitute SPF record
-initiate a "three strikes and your out" regime, which looks for
+under the domain defined in the <code>[spf]delegate</code> configuration.  
-<b>some</b> form of validated identification.
+It is often useful to add local SPF records for correspondents that are
-<ol>
+too clueless to add their own.  If there is no local substitute, we use a "best
-<li>We try a "best guess" SPF record of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr".  If this
+guess" SPF record of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr" for MAIL FROM or "v=spf1 a/24
-    passes, good.  
+mx/24" for HELO.  In addition, a HELO that is a subdomain of MAIL FROM and
-<li> We try to validate the HELO name. First check for an SPF record.
+resolves to the connect IP results in an effective result of 'pass'.
-   Otherwise, check whether the connect IP matches any A record for
+<p>
-   the HELO name, or any A record for any MX name for the HELO name,
+If there is no local SPF record, and the effective result is still not
-   or is at least in the same /24 subnet as any of the above.
+'pass', we check for either a valid HELO name or a valid PTR record for
-   (In other words, a HELO SPF "best guess" of "v=spf1 a/24 mx/24".)
+the connect IP.  A valid HELO or PTR cannot look like a dynamic name
-   If so, good.  We consider the HELO validated.  If the HELO SPF
+as determined by the heuristic in <code>Milter.dynip</code>.
-   check fails, we reject the email.
+<p>
-</ol>
+If HELO has an SPF record, and the result is anything but pass, we reject
+the connection:
 <pre>
 2005Jul30 19:45:16 [93991] connect from [221.200.41.54] at ('221.200.41.54', 3581) EXTERNAL DYN
 2005Jul30 19:45:18 [93991] hello from adelphia.net
 2005Jul30 19:45:19 [93991] mail from <wendy.stubbsua@link-it.com> ()
 2005Jul30 19:45:19 [93991] REJECT: hello SPF: fail 550 access denied
 </pre>
-<ol>
+Note that HELO does not have any forwarding issues like MAIL FROM, and so
-<li> If there is a validated PTR name, and it doesn't look
+any result other than 'pass' or 'none' should be treated like 'fail'.
-   like a dynamic name, good.  We consider the connection validated.
-</ol>
-If any of the above can be validated, we continue on.
-If none of the above can be validated, and the <code>[SPF]reject_noptr</code>
-option is true, we reject the message immediately with the explanation
-that we need some form of valid identification before we accept an email.
-If <code>[SPF]reject_noptr</code> is false, we flag the message as
-needing Call Back Validation.  
-The Call Back Valildation sends a DSN to the purported sender informing
-them of the lack of identification.  If the message is legitimate, the
-sender needs to know that their email setup is broken and should be corrected.
-If the message is forged, the sender is informed of the forgery, 
-and their need to publish an SPF record or at least use a valid HELO name.
-If the purported sender does not accept the DSN,
-then the message is rejected.  The CBV status is cached to avoid
-annoying the purported sender with too many DSNs.  Currently, the DSN
-is repeated to the same sender once per month.
 <p>
-In this example, although 3com.com has no SPF record, we assume that 
+Only if nothing about the SMTP envelope can be validated does the effective
-any legitimate mail from them will at least have a valid HELO or PTR.
+result remain 'none.  I call this the "3 strikes" rule.
-<pre>
-2005Jul30 23:52:03 [96777] connect from [222.252.233.200] at ('222.252.233.200', 29934) EXTERNAL DYN
-2005Jul30 23:52:03 [96777] hello from 3mail.3com.com
-2005Jul30 23:52:04 [96777] mail from <etec_nic_family@3mail.3com.com> ()
-2005Jul30 23:52:04 [96777] REJECT: no PTR, HELO or SPF
-</pre>
-</td></tr>
-
-<tr><th>PASS</th><td>
-A pass result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is 
-tracked for reputation (and may be blocked), and may skip content scanning if
-it matches a whitelist.
-<pre>
-2005Jul24 17:44:26 [2104] mail from <gnucash-devel-bounces@gnucash.org> ('SIZE=4410',)
-2005Jul24 17:44:26 [2104] Received-SPF: pass (mail.bmsi.com: domain of gnucash.org
-	designates 204.107.200.65 as permitted sender)
-	client-ip=204.107.200.65; envelope-from=gnucash-devel-bounces@gnucash.org; helo=cvs.gnucash.org;
-</pre>
-</td></tr>
-
-<tr><th>NEUTRAL</th><td>
-A neutral result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is not
-tracked for reputation or matched against any whitelists. 
-Highly forged domains listed in <code>[SPF]reject_neutral</code> are
-rejected.
-<pre>
-2005Jul24 17:41:37 [2070] connect from cp500627-a.dbsch1.nb.home.nl at ('84.27.225.3', 3465) EXTERNAL
-2005Jul24 17:41:37 [2070] hello from cp500627-a.dbsch1.nb.home.nl
-2005Jul24 17:41:38 [2070] mail from <nwarjejkw@yahoo.com> ()
-2005Jul24 17:41:38 [2070] REJECT: SPF neutral for nwarjejkw@yahoo.com
-</pre>
-</td></tr>
-
-<tr><th>SOFTFAIL</th><td>
-A softfail result normally lets the email continue on, but the domain is not
-tracked for reputation or matched against any whitelists.  Furthermore,
-the message is flagged as needing Call Back Validation,
-and the highly forged domains listed in <code>[SPF]reject_neutral</code> are
-rejected as well.  
 <p>
-At present, we also require a valid HELO or PTR to avoid rejecting 
+If the official result is 'permerror' (a syntax error in the sender's
-a softfail.  But this should probably change to only require a
+policy), we use the 'lax' option in pyspf to try various heuristics to guess 
-successful CBV.
+what they really meant.  For instance, the invalid mechanism "ip:1.2.3.4" is
+treated as "ip4:1.2.3.4".  The result of lax processing is then used
+as the effective result for policy purposes.
 <p>
-The Call Back Valildation sends a DSN to the purported sender informing
+With an effective SPF result in hand, we consult the sendmail access
-them of the softfail.  If the message is legitimate, the sender needs
+database to find our receiver policy for the sender.  
-to know about the softfail so that their email setup can be corrected.
-If the message is forged, the sender is informed of the forgery, confirming
-that SPF is protecting their reputation and encouraging a rapid transition
-to a strict policy.  If the purported sender does not accept the DSN,
-then the message is rejected.  The CBV status is cached to avoid
-annoying the purported sender with too many DSNs.  Currently, the DSN
-is repeated to the same sender once per month.
-<pre>
-2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] mail from <Aitp@horafeliz.com> ()
-2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] Received-SPF: softfail (mail.bmsi.com: transitioning domain of horafeliz.com
-	does not designate 221.184.83.185 as permitted sender)
-	client-ip=221.184.83.185; envelope-from=Aitp@horafeliz.com;
-	helo=p8185-ipad30funabasi.chiba.ocn.ne.jp;
-2005Jul24 15:41:33 [801] rcpt to <david@example.com> ()
-2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] Subject: Microsoft, Adobe, Macromedia, Corel software. Up to 80% discount.
-2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2605
-2005Jul24 15:41:35 [801] CBV: Aitp@horafeliz.com
-2005Jul24 15:41:38 [801] REJECT: CBV: 550 <Aitp@horafeliz.com>: User unknown
-</pre>
-</td></tr>
 
-<tr><th>FAIL</th><td>
+<table border=1>
-The message is rejected with a reference the SPF why page.
+<tr><th>REJECT</th><td>
-<pre>
+Reject the sender with a 550 5.7.1 SMTP code.  The SMTP rejection
-2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] connect from [212.70.52.16] at ('212.70.52.16', 3192) EXTERNAL DYN
+includes a detailed description of the problem.
-2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] hello from winzip.com
-2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] mail from <dan@winzip.com> ()
-2005Jul30 19:53:27 [94070] REJECT: SPF fail 550 SPF fail:
-	see http://openspf.com/why.html?sender=dan@winzip.com&ip=212.70.52.16
-</pre>
 </td></tr>
-
+<tr><th>CBV</th><td>
-<tr><th>PERMERROR</th><td>
+Do a Call Back Validation by connecting to an MX of the sender
-Permanent errors were called "unknown", and are still show that way
+and checking that using the sender as the RCPT TO is not rejected.
-in the log.  The message is rejected.  Previously, we enabled "lax" parsing
+We quit the CBV connection before actualling sending a message.
-of the SPF record, but rejecting is better because it informs the
+If the CBV is rejected, our SMTP connection is rejected with the
-sender about their problem.  The next milter version will 
+same error code and message.  CBV results are cached.
-look for a local substitute SPF record (as for a missing SPF record)
-before rejecting.  This will inform the sender of their problem, but
-also let the receiver install a temporary workaround.
-<pre>
-2005Jul24 18:05:37 [2312] mail from <b-mihdbcgaacaa-becibijh-000-@msg.euxiphipops.com> () 
-2005Jul24 18:05:37 [2312] REJECT: SPF unknown 550 SPF Permanent Error:
-	include mechanism missing domain: include
-</pre>
-The SPF record for msg.euxiphipops.com looked like this at the time of the
-above error:
-<pre>
-msg.euxiphipops.com	TXT "v=spf1 mx ptr a include"
-</pre>
 </td></tr>
-
+<tr><th>DSN</th><td>
-<tr><th>TEMPERROR</th><td>
+Do a Call Back Validation by connecting to an MX of the sender
-Temporary errors result in a 451 "Try again later" response.  The sender
+and checking that using the sender as the RCPT TO is not rejected.
-should retry the message at a later time.
+Unlike a CBV, we continue on to data and send a detailed message
-<pre>
+explaining the problem.  This can be useful for reporting PermError
-2005Jul24 07:33:13 [29846] mail from <quickenloans@rate.quicken.com> ('SIZE=73775', 'BODY=8BITMIME')
+or SoftFail to the sender.  Keep in mind that for any result other
-2005Jul24 07:33:43 [29846] TEMPFAIL: SPF error 450 SPF Temporary Error: DNS Timeout
+than 'pass', the sender could be forged, and your DSN could annoy the
-</pre>
+wrong person.  However, a SoftFail result is requesting such feedback
+for debugging and a PermError result needs to be fixed by the sender ASAP
+whether forged or not.  DSN results are cached so that senders are
+annoyed only weekly.
+</td></tr>
+<tr><th>OK</th><td>
+Accept the sender.  The message may still be rejected via reputation
+or content filtering.
 </td></tr>
-
 </table>
+
+<h3> SPF policy syntax </h3>
+
+First, the full sender is checked:
+<pre>
+SPF-Fail:abeb@adelphia.net     DSN
+</pre>
+This says to accept mail from that adelphia.net user despite the
+SPF fail, but only after annoying them with a DSN about their ISP's broken
+policy. 
+<p>
+If there is no match on the full sender, the domain is checked:
+<pre>
+SPF-Neutral:aol.com     REJECT
+</pre>
+This says to reject mail from AOL with an SPF result of neutral.
+This means AOL users can't use their AOL address with another mail service
+to send us mail.  This is good because the other mail service is 
+likely a badly configured greeting card site or a virus.
+<p>
+Finally, a default policy for the result is checked.  While there are program
+defaults, you should have defaults in the access database for SPF results:
+<pre>
+SPF-Neutral:            CBV
+SPF-Softfail:           DSN
+SPF-PermError:          DSN
+SPF-TempError:          REJECT
+SPF-None:               REJECT
+SPF-Fail:               REJECT
+SPF-Pass:               OK
+</pre>
+
+<h2> Reputation </h2>
+
+If the sender has not been rejected by this point, and if a GOSSiP server is
+configured, we consult GOSSiP for the reputation score of the sender and
+SPF result.  The score is a number from -100 to 100 with a confidence
+percentage from 0 to 100.  A really bad reputation (less than -50 with
+confidence greater than 3) is rejected.  Note that the reputation is tracked
+independently for each SPF result and sender combination.  So aol.com:neutral
+might have a really bad reputation, while aol.com:pass would be ok.
+Furthermore, when a sender finally publishes an SPF policy and starts
+getting SPF pass, their reputation is effectively reset.
+
+<h2> Whitelists and Blacklists </h2>
+
+The administrator can whitelist or blacklist senders and sending domains by
+appending them to <code>${datadir}/auto_whitelist.log</code> or
+<code>${datadir}/blacklist.log</code> respectively.  In addition,
+recipients of internal senders (except for automatic replies like vacation
+messages and return receipts) are automatically whitelisted for 60 days, and
+senders that fail CBV or DSN checks are automatically blacklisted for 30 days.
+Whitelisted and blacklisted senders are used to automatically train the
+bayesian content filter before being delivered or rejected, respectively.
+<p>
+Real Soon Now users will be able to maintain their own whitelist and
+blacklist that applies only when they are the recipient.
+
+<h2> Content Filter </h2>
+
+Most messages have been rejected or delivered by now, but spammers
+are always finding new places to send their junk from.  For instance,
+we get around 10000 emails a day, of which around 500 are first time
+spam senders.  A bayesian filter is trained by the whitelists and
+blacklists, and scores the message.  What is likely spam is either
+rejected or quarantined.  If the sender is an effective SPF pass,
+then they get a DSN notifying them that their message has been
+quarantined.  (A DSN failure gets the sender auto blacklisted.)
+Else, if the reject_spam option is set, the message is rejected.  
+Otherwise, a CBV is done (failure gets the sender auto blacklisted)
+and the message is silently quarantined.
+<p>
+Normally, you don't want email messages to silently disappear into
+a black hole, so you should set the reject_spam option.  However,
+if you don't want your correspondent's email to get rejected, you can
+check your quarantine frequently instead.
+
+<h3> Honeypot </h3>
+
+You can also blacklist recipients by listing them as aliases of the
+'honeypot' dspam user.  These are collectively called
+the honeypot.  Any email to these recipients is used to train the
+spam filter as spam and chalk up a reputation demerit for the sender, then
+discarded.  It might be a good idea to blacklist the sender if it has SPF pass
+as well, but I'm afraid of accidents.
+
+<h3> Reputation </h3>
+
+Reputation is tracked by sending domain and effective SPF result.
+The GOSSiP server tracks the spam/ham status of the last 1024 messages
+for each domain:result combination.  When the server is queried during
+the SMTP envelope phase (MAIL FROM), it also queries any configured
+peers, and the scores are combined.  Domains with a history of spam for
+a given SPF result are rejected at MAIL FROM.  The GOSSiP system has
+a command line utility to reset (delete) a reputation for cases where a
+sender that was infected with malware is repaired.  In addition,
+the confidence score of a reputation decays with time, so a bad sender
+will eventually be able to try again without manual intervention.

milter-template.py

@@ -12,25 +12,8 @@ import StringIO
 import time
 import email
 from socket import AF_INET, AF_INET6
+from Milter import parse_addr
 
-def parse_addr(t):
-  """Split email into user,domain.
-
-  >>> parse_addr('user@example.com')
-  ['user', 'example.com']
-  >>> parse_addr('"user@example.com"')
-  ['user@example.com']
-  >>> parse_addr('"user@bar"@example.com')
-  ['user@bar', 'example.com']
-  >>> parse_addr('foo')
-  ['foo']
-  """
-  if t.startswith('<') and t.endswith('>'): t = t[1:-1]
-  if t.startswith('"'):
-    if t.endswith('"'): return [t[1:-1]]
-    pos = t.find('"@')
-    if pos > 0: return [t[1:pos],t[pos+2:]]
-  return t.split('@')
 
 class myMilter(Milter.Milter):
 

milter.cfg

@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
-[milter]
-# the socket used to communicate with sendmail.  Must match sendmail.cf
-socket=/var/run/milter/pythonsock
-# where to save original copies of defanged and failed messages
-tempdir = /var/log/milter/save
-# how long to wait for a response from sendmail before giving up 
-;timeout=600
-log_headers = 0
-# Connection ips and hostnames are matched against this glob style list
-# to recognize internal senders.  You probably need to change this.
-# The default is a good guess to try and prevent newbie frustration.
-internal_connect = 192.168.0.0/16,127.*
-
-# mail that is not an internal_connect and claims to be from an
-# internal domain is rejected.  Furthermore, internal mail that
-# does not claim to be from an internal domain is rejected.
-# You should enable SPF instead if you can.  SPF is much more comprehensive and
-# flexible.  However, SPF is not currently checked for outgoing
-# (internal_connect) mail because it doesn't yet handle authorizing 
-# internal IPs locally.
-;internal_domains = mycorp.com,localhost.localdomain
-
-# connections from a trusted relay can trust the first Received header
-# SPF checks are bypassed for internal connections and trusted relays.
-;trusted_relay = 1.2.3.4, 66.12.34.56
-
-# Relaying to these domains is allowed from internal connections only.
-;private_relay = mycorp.com
-
-# Reject external senders with hello names no legit external sender would use.
-# SPF will do this also, but listing your own domain and mailserver here
-# will save some DNS lookups when rejecting certain viruses.
-;hello_blacklist = mycorp.com, 66.12.34.56
-
-# Reject mail for domains mentioned unless user is mentioned here also
-;check_user = joe@mycorp.com, mary@mycorp.com, file:bigcorp.com
-
-# Treat localparts in milter.cfg as case-insensitive
-case_sensitive_localpart = true
-
-# features intended to filter or block incoming mail
-[defang]
-
-# do virus scanning on attached messages also
-scan_rfc822 = 0
-# do virus scanning on attached zipfiles also
-scan_zip = 0
-# Comment out scripts in HTML attachments.  Can be CPU intensive.
-scan_html = 0
-# reject messages with asian fonts because we can't read them
-block_chinese = 0
-# list users who hate forwarded mail
-;block_forward = egghead@mycorp.com, busybee@mycorp.com
-# reject mail with these case insensitive strings in the subject
-porn_words = penis, breast, pussy, horse cock, porn, xenical, diet pill, d1ck,
-	vi*gra, vi-a-gra, viag, tits, p0rn, hunza, horny, sexy, c0ck, xanaax,
-	p-e-n-i-s, hydrocodone, vicodin, xanax, vicod1n, x@nax, diazepam,
-	v1@gra, xan@x, cialis, ci@lis, frëe, xãnax, valíum, vãlium, via-gra,
-	x@n3x, vicod3n, penís, c0d1n, phentermine, en1arge, dip1oma, v1codin,
-	valium, rolex, sexual, fuck, adv1t
-# reject mail with these case sensitive strings in the subject
-spam_words = $$$, !!!, XXX, FREE, HGH
-# attachments with these extensions will be replaced with a warning
-# message.  A copy of the original will be saved. 
-banned_exts = ade,adp,asd,asx,asp,bas,bat,chm,cmd,com,cpl,crt,dll,exe,hlp,hta,
-	inf,ins,isp,js,jse,lnk,mdb,mde,msc,msi,msp,mst,ocx,pcd,pif,reg,scr,sct,
-	shs,url,vb,vbe,vbs,wsc,wsf,wsh 
-
-# See http://bmsi.com/python/pysrs.html for details
-[srs]
-config=/etc/mail/pysrs.cfg
-# SRS options can be set here also, but must match the sendmail plugin
-;secret="shhhh!"
-;maxage=21
-;hashlength=4
-;database=/var/log/milter/srsdata
-;fwdomain = mydomain.com
-# turn this on after a grace period to reject spoofed DSNs
-reject_spoofed = 0
-# Many braindead MTAs send DSNs with a non-DSN MFROM (e.g. to report that
-# some virus claiming to be sent by you).  This heuristic
-# refuses mail from user names commonly abused in that way.
-;banned_users = postmaster, mailer-daemon, clamav
-
-# See http://www.openspf.com for more info on SPF.
-[spf]
-# namespace where SPF records can be supplied for domains without one
-# records are searched for under _spf.domain.com
-;delegate = domain.com
-# domains where a neutral SPF result should cause mail to be rejected
-;reject_neutral = aol.com
-# use a default (v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr) when no SPF records are published
-;best_guess = 0
-# Reject senders that have neither PTR nor valid HELO nor SPF records, or send
-# DSN otherwise
-;reject_noptr = 0
-# always accept softfail from these domains, or send DSN otherwise
-;accept_softfail = bounces.amazon.com
-# Treat fail from these domains like softfail: because their SPF record
-# or an important sender is screwed up.  Must have valid HELO, however.
-;accept_fail = custhelp.com
-# Use sendmail access map or similar format for detailed spf policy.
-# SPF entries in the access map will override any defaults set above.
-;access_file = /etc/mail/access.db
-# Add MAIL FROM as Sender when Sender is missing and From domain
-# doesn't match MAIL FROM.  Outlook and other email clients will then display
-# something like: "Sent by sender@domain.com on behalf of from@example.com"
-;supply_sender = 0
-# Connections that get an SPF pass for a pretend MAIL FROM of 
-# postmaster@sometrustedforwarder.com skip SPF checks for the real MAIL FROM.
-# This is for non-SRS forwarders.  It is a simple implementation that
-# is inefficient for more than a few entries.
-;trusted_forwarder = careerbuilder.com
-
-# features intended to clean up outgoing mail
-[scrub]
-# domains that block visible private nodes
-;hide_path = jcpenney.com	
-# reject, don't just replace with warning, viruses from these domains
-;reject_virus_from = mycorp.com
-
-# features intended for spying on users and coworkers
-[wiretap]
-blind = 1
-#
-# wiretap lets you surreptitiously monitor a users outgoing email
-# (sendmail aliases let you monitor incoming mail)
-#
-;users = disloyal@bigcorp.com, bigmouth@bigcorp.com
-# multiple destinations can use smart_alias
-;dest = spy@bigcorp.com
-# discard outgoing mail without alerting sender
-# can be used in conjunction with wiretap to censor outgoing mail
-;discard_users = canned@bigcorp.com
-# archive copies all delivered mail to a file
-;mail_archive = /var/log/mail_archive
-
-#
-# smart aliases trigger on both sender and recipient
-#   alias = sender, recipient[, destination]
-#
-[smart_alias]
-# multiple wiretap monitors.  Smart aliases are applied after wiretap.
-;spy1 = disloyal@bigcorp.com,spy@bigcorp.com
-;spy2 = bigmouth@bigcorp.com,spy@bigcorp.com
-# mail from client@clientcorp.com to sue@bigcorp.com is redirected to 
-# local alias copycust
-;copycust = client@clientcorp.com,sue@bigcorp.com
-# mail from cust@othercorp.com to walter@bigcorp.com is redirected to
-# boss@bigcorp.com
-;walter = cust@othercorp.com,walter@bigcorp.com,boss@bigcorp.com
-# additional copies can be added
-;walter1 = cust@othercorp.com,walter@bigcorp.com,boss@bigcorp.com,
-;	walter@bigcorp.com
-;bulk = soruce@telex.com,bob@jsconnor.com
-;bulk1 = soruce@telex.com,larry@jsconnor.com,bulk
-
-# See http://bmsi.com/python/dspam.html
-[dspam]
-# Select a well moderated dspam dictionary to reject spammy headers.
-# To filter on the entire message, use the full setup below.
-# only EXTERNAL messages are dspam filtered
-;dspam_dict=/var/lib/dspam/moderator.dict
-
-# Recipients of mail sent from these senders are added to the auto_whitelist.
-# Auto_whitelisted senders with an SPF PASS are never rejected by dspam, and
-# messages from auto_whitelisted senders will be used to train screener
-# dictionaries as innocent mail.
-;whitelist_senders = @mycorp.com
-
-# Opt-out recipients entirely from dspam screening and header triage
-;dspam_exempt=getitall@mycorp.com
-# Do not scan mail (ostensibly) from these senders
-;dspam_whitelist=getitall@sender.com
-# Reject spam to these domains instead of quarantining it.
-;dspam_reject=othercorp.com
-# Scan internal mail - often a good source of stats on legit mail.
-;dspam_internal=1
-
-# directory for dspam user quarantine, signature db, and dictionaries
-# defining this activates the dspam application
-# dspam and dspam-python must be installed
-;dspam_userdir=/var/lib/dspam
-# do not dspam messages larger than this
-;dspam_sizelimit=180000
-
-# Map email addresses and aliases to dspam users
-;dspam_users=david,goliath,spam,falsepositive
-;david=david@foocorp.com,david.yelnetz@foocorp.com,david@bar.foocorp.com
-;goliath=giant@foocorp.com,goliath.philistine@foocorp.com
-# address to forward spam to.  milter will process these and not deliver
-;spam=spam@foocorp.com
-# address to forward false positives to.  milter will process and not deliver
-;falsepositive=ham@foocorp.com
-# account which receives only spam: all received messages are marked as spam.
-;honeypot=spam-me@example.com
-# the dspam_screener is a list of dspam users who screen mail for all
-# recipients who are not dspam_users.  Spam goes to the screeners quarantine,
-# and the original recipients are saved so that false positives can be properly
-# delivered.
-;dspam_screener=david,goliath
-# The dspam CGI can also be used: logins must match dspam users
-
-# Optional pygossip interface
-#
-# GOSSiP tracks reputation of domain:qualifier pairs.  For instance,
-# the reputation of example.com:SPF is tracked separately from
-# example.com:neutral.  Currently qualifiers are
-# SPF,neutral,softfail,fail,permerror,GUESS,HELO
-[gossip]
-# Use a dedicated GOSSiP server.  If not specified, a local database
-# will be used.
-;server=host:11900
-# If a local database is used, also consult these GOSSiP servers about 
-# domains.  Peer reputation is also tracked as to how often they
-# agree with us, and weighted accordingly.
-;peers=host1:port,host2

milter.rc

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# milter	This shell script takes care of starting and stopping milter.
-#
-# chkconfig: 2345 80 30
-# description: Milter is a process that filters messages sent through sendmail.
-# processname: milter
-# config: /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
-# pidfile: /var/run/milter/milter.pid
-
-python="python2.4"
-
-pidof() {
-	set - ""
-	if set - `ps -e -o pid,cmd | grep "${python} bms.py"` &&
-	  [ "$2" != "grep" ]; then
-	  echo $1
-	  return 0
-	fi
-	return 1
-}
-
-# Source function library.
-. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
-
-[ -x /usr/lib/pymilter/start.sh ] || exit 0
-
-RETVAL=0
-prog="milter"
-
-start() {
-	# Start daemons.
-
-	echo -n "Starting $prog: "
-        if ! test -d /var/run/milter; then
-		mkdir -p /var/run/milter
-		chown mail:mail /var/run/milter
-	fi
-	daemon --check milter --user mail /usr/lib/pymilter/start.sh milter bms
-	RETVAL=$?
-	echo
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/milter
-	return $RETVAL
-}
-
-stop() {
-	# Stop daemons.
-	echo -n "Shutting down $prog: "
-	killproc milter
-	RETVAL=$?
-	echo
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/milter
-	return $RETVAL
-}
-
-# See how we were called.
-case "$1" in
-  start)
-	start
-	;;
-  stop)
-	stop
-	;;
-  restart|reload)
-	stop
-	start
-	RETVAL=$?
-	;;
-  condrestart)
-	if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/milter ]; then
-	    stop
-	    start
-	    RETVAL=$?
-	fi
-	;;
-  status)
-	status milter
-	RETVAL=$?
-	;;
-  *)
-	echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|condrestart|status}"
-	exit 1
-esac
-
-exit $RETVAL

milter.rc7

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# milter	This shell script takes care of starting and stopping milter.
-#
-# chkconfig: 2345 80 30
-# description: Milter is a process that filters messages sent through sendmail.
-# processname: milter
-# config: /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
-# pidfile: /var/run/milter/milter.pid
-
-python="python2.4"
-
-pidof() {
-	set - ""
-	if set - `ps -e -o pid,wchan,cmd | grep "rt_sig ${python} bms.py"` &&
-	  [ "$3" != "grep" ]; then
-	  echo $1
-	  return 0
-	fi
-	return 1
-}
-
-# Source function library.
-. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
-
-[ -x /usr/lib/pymilter/start.sh ] || exit 0
-
-RETVAL=0
-prog="milter"
-
-start() {
-	# Start daemons.
-
-	echo -n "Starting $prog: "
-        if ! test -d /var/run/milter; then
-		mkdir -p /var/run/milter
-		chown mail:mail /var/run/milter
-	fi
-	daemon --check milter --user mail /usr/lib/pymilter/start.sh milter bms
-	RETVAL=$?
-	echo
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/milter
-	return $RETVAL
-}
-
-stop() {
-	# Stop daemons.
-	echo -n "Shutting down $prog: "
-	killproc milter
-	RETVAL=$?
-	echo
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/milter
-	return $RETVAL
-}
-
-# See how we were called.
-case "$1" in
-  start)
-	start
-	;;
-  stop)
-	stop
-	;;
-  restart|reload)
-	stop
-	start
-	RETVAL=$?
-	;;
-  condrestart)
-	if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/milter ]; then
-	    stop
-	    start
-	    RETVAL=$?
-	fi
-	;;
-  status)
-	status milter
-	RETVAL=$?
-	;;
-  *)
-	echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|condrestart|status}"
-	exit 1
-esac
-
-exit $RETVAL

miltermodule.c

@@ -35,6 +35,18 @@ $ python setup.py help
      libraries=["milter","smutil","resolv"]
 
  * $Log$
+ * Revision 1.14  2008/12/04 19:43:00  customdesigned
+ * Doc updates.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.13  2008/11/23 03:06:47  customdesigned
+ * Milter support for chgfrom.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.12  2008/11/21 20:42:52  customdesigned
+ * Support smfi_chgfrom and smfi_addrcpt_par.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.11  2007/09/25 02:26:29  customdesigned
+ * Update license.
+ *
  * Revision 1.10  2006/02/12 02:00:42  customdesigned
  * Resolve FIXME for wrap_close.
  *
@@ -179,10 +191,10 @@ $ python setup.py help
 #endif
 #define _FFR_MULTILINE (MAX_ML_REPLY > 1)
 
-#include <pthread.h>
+//#include <pthread.h>	// shouldn't be needed - use Python API
-#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <Python.h>		// Python C API
-#include <Python.h>
+#include <libmilter/mfapi.h>	// libmilter API
-#include <libmilter/mfapi.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>		// socket API
 
 
 /* See if we have IPv4 and/or IPv6 support in this OS and in
@@ -249,10 +261,10 @@ typedef struct {
   PyThreadState *t;	/* python thread state */
 } milter_ContextObject;
 
-/* Return a borrowed reference to the python Context.  Create a
+/* Return a borrowed reference to the python Context.  Called by callbacks
-   new Context if needed.  The new Python Context is owned by
+   invoked by libmilter.  Create a new Context if needed.  The new
-   the SMFICTX. The python interpreter is locked on successful
+   Python Context is owned by the SMFICTX. The python interpreter is locked on
-   return, otherwise not. */
+   successful return, otherwise not. */
 static milter_ContextObject *
 _get_context(SMFICTX *ctx) {
   milter_ContextObject *self = smfi_getpriv(ctx);
@@ -286,7 +298,8 @@ _get_context(SMFICTX *ctx) {
   return self;
 }
 
-/* Find the SMFICTX from a Python Context. The interpreter must be locked. */
+/* Find the SMFICTX from a Python Context.  Called by context methods invoked
+   from python.  The interpreter must be locked. */ 
 static SMFICTX *
 _find_context(PyObject *c) {
   SMFICTX *ctx = NULL;
@@ -339,6 +352,7 @@ static char milter_set_flags__doc__[] =
 Set flags for filter capabilities; OR of one or more of:\n\
 ADDHDRS - filter may add headers\n\
 CHGBODY - filter may replace body\n\
+CHGFROM - filter may replace body\n\
 ADDRCPT - filter may add recipients\n\
 DELRCPT - filter may delete recipients\n\
 CHGHDRS - filter may change/delete headers";
@@ -1013,6 +1027,30 @@ milter_addheader(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
 #endif
 }
 
+#ifdef SMFIF_CHGFROM
+static char milter_chgfrom__doc__[] =
+"chgfrom(sender,params) -> None\n\
+Change the envelope sender (MAIL From) of the current message.\n\
+A filter which calls smfi_chgfrom must have set the CHGFROM flag\n\
+in set_flags() before calling register.\n\
+This function can only be called from the EOM callback.";
+static PyObject *
+milter_chgfrom(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
+  char *sender;
+  char *params;
+  SMFICTX *ctx;
+  PyThreadState *t;
+  
+  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|z:chgfrom", &sender, &params))
+    return NULL;
+  ctx = _find_context(self);
+  if (ctx == NULL) return NULL;
+  t = PyEval_SaveThread();
+  return _thread_return(t,smfi_chgfrom(ctx, sender, params),
+			 "cannot change sender");
+}
+#endif
+
 static char milter_chgheader__doc__[] =
 "chgheader(field, int, value) -> None\n\
 Change/delete a header in the message. \n\
@@ -1042,22 +1080,33 @@ milter_chgheader(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
 }
 
 static char milter_addrcpt__doc__[] =
-"addrcpt(string) -> None\n\
+"addrcpt(string,params=None) -> None\n\
 Add a recipient to the envelope.  It must be in the same format\n\
 as is passed to the envrcpt callback in the first tuple element.\n\
+If params is used, you must pass ADDRCPT_PAR to set_flags().\n\
 This function can only be called from the EOM callback.";
 
 static PyObject *
 milter_addrcpt(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
   char *rcpt;
+  char *params = 0;
   SMFICTX *ctx;
   PyThreadState *t;
+  int rc;
   
-  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s:addrcpt", &rcpt)) return NULL;
+  if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|z:addrcpt", &rcpt)) return NULL;
   ctx = _find_context(self);
   if (ctx == NULL) return NULL;
   t = PyEval_SaveThread();
-  return _thread_return(t,smfi_addrcpt(ctx, rcpt), "cannot add recipient");
+  if (params)
+#ifdef SMFIF_ADDRCPT_PAR
+    rc = smfi_addrcpt_par(ctx,rcpt,params);
+#else
+    rc = MI_FAILURE;
+#endif
+  else
+    rc = smfi_addrcpt(ctx,rcpt);
+  return _thread_return(t,rc, "cannot add recipient");
 }
 
 static char milter_delrcpt__doc__[] =
@@ -1198,6 +1247,9 @@ static PyMethodDef context_methods[] = {
 #endif
 #ifdef SMFIR_PROGRESS
   { "progress",  milter_progress,  METH_VARARGS, milter_progress__doc__},
+#endif
+#ifdef SMFIF_CHGFROM
+  { "chgfrom",  milter_chgfrom,  METH_VARARGS, milter_chgfrom__doc__},
 #endif
   { NULL, NULL }
 };
@@ -1299,6 +1351,9 @@ initmilter(void) {
    setitem(d,"CHGBODY",  SMFIF_CHGBODY);
    setitem(d,"MODBODY",  SMFIF_MODBODY);
    setitem(d,"ADDRCPT",  SMFIF_ADDRCPT);
+#ifdef SMFIF_ADDRCPT_PAR
+   setitem(d,"ADDRCPT_PAR",  SMFIF_ADDRCPT_PAR);
+#endif
    setitem(d,"DELRCPT",  SMFIF_DELRCPT);
    setitem(d,"CHGHDRS",  SMFIF_CHGHDRS);
    setitem(d,"V1_ACTS",  SMFI_V1_ACTS);
@@ -1306,6 +1361,9 @@ initmilter(void) {
    setitem(d,"CURR_ACTS",  SMFI_CURR_ACTS);
 #ifdef SMFIF_QUARANTINE
    setitem(d,"QUARANTINE",SMFIF_QUARANTINE);
+#endif
+#ifdef SMFIF_CHGFROM
+   setitem(d,"CHGFROM",SMFIF_CHGFROM);
 #endif
    setitem(d,"CONTINUE",  SMFIS_CONTINUE);
    setitem(d,"REJECT",  SMFIS_REJECT);

neutral.txt

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-To: %(sender)s
-From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
-Subject: SPF %(result)s (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
-Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (sender verification)
-
-This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
-
-THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
-
-YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
-
-Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
-
-       %(rcpt)s
-
-Subject: %(subject)s
-Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
-
-Your sender policy (or lack thereof) indicated that the above email was not
-sent via an authorized SMTP server, but may still be legitimate.  Since there
-is no positive confirmation that the message is really from you, we have
-to give it extra scrutiny - including verifying that the sender really
-exists by sending you this DSN.  We will remember this sender and not
-bother you again for a while.  You can avoid this message entirely for
-legitimate mail by using an authorized SMTP server.  Contact your mail
-administrator and ask how to configure your email client to use an
-authorized server.
-
-If you never sent the above message, then your domain has been forged.
-Your mail admin needs to publish a strict SPF record so that I can reject
-those forgeries instead of bugging you about them.  
-
-See http://openspf.org for details.
-
-If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
-
-Kind regards,
-
-postmaster@%(receiver)s

permerror.txt

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-To: %(sender)s
-From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
-Subject: Critical SPF configuration error
-Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
-
-This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
-
-THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
-
-YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
-
-Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
-
-	%(rcpt)s
-
-Subject: %(subject)s 
-Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
-
-Your spf record has a permanent error.  The error was:
-
-	%(perm_error)s
-
-We will reinterpret your record using "lax" processing heuristics
-which may result in your mail being accepted anyway.  But you or your
-mail administrator need to fix your SPF record as soon as possible.
-
-We are sending you this message to alert you to the fact that
-you have problems with your email configuration.
-
-If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to
-contact me again.
-
-Kind regards,
-
-postmaster@%(receiver)s

pymilter.spec

@@ -1,237 +1,23 @@
-%define version 0.8.9
+%define __python python2.4
-%define release 1
+%define version 0.8.12
-# what version of RH are we building for?
+%define release 1%{?dist}.py24
+%define libdir %{_libdir}/pymilter
+%define name pymilter
 %define redhat7 0
 
-# Options for Redhat version 6.x:
-# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh7 1"
-%{?rh7:%define redhat7 1}
-
-# some systems dont have initrddir defined
-%{?_initrddir:%define _initrddir /etc/rc.d/init.d}
-
-%if %{redhat7} 
-# Redhat 7.x and earlier (multiple ps lines per thread)
-%define sysvinit milter.rc7
-%else	
-%define sysvinit milter.rc
-%endif
-# RH9, other systems (single ps line per process)
-%ifos Linux	# whether to use system default python?
-%define python python
-#define python python2.4
-%else
-%define python python
-%endif
-%ifos aix4.1
-%define libdir /var/log/milter
-%else
-%define libdir /usr/lib/pymilter
-%endif
-
-# This spec file contains 2 noarch packages in addition to the pymilter
-# module.  To compile all three, use:
-# rpmbuild -ba --target=i386,noarch pymilter.spec
-
-%ifarch noarch
-Name: milter
-Group: Applications/System
-Summary:  BMS spam and reputation milter
-Version: %{version}
-Release: %{release}
-Source: pymilter-%{version}.tar.gz
-#Patch: %{name}-%{version}.patch
-License: GPL
-Group: Development/Libraries
-BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-buildroot
-Prefix: %{_prefix}
-Vendor: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
-Packager: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
-Url: http://www.bmsi.com/python/milter.html
-Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, pyspf >= 2.0.4, pymilter
-%ifos Linux
-Requires: chkconfig
-%endif
-
-%description -n milter
-A complex but effective spam filtering, SPF checking, and reputation tracking
-mail application.  It uses pydspam if installed for bayesian filtering.
-
-%package spf
-Group: Applications/System
-Summary:  BMS spam and reputation milter
-Requires: pyspf >= 2.0.4, pymilter
-Obsoletes: pymilter-spf
-
-%description spf
-A simple mail filter to add Received-SPF headers and reject forged mail.
-Rejection policy is configured via sendmail access file.
-
-%prep
-%setup -n pymilter-%{version}
-#patch -p0 -b .bms
-
-%install
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail
-mkdir $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter/save
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}
-cp *.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/log/milter
-cp bms.py spfmilter.py $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}
-cp milter.cfg $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
-cp spfmilter.cfg $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/mail
-
-# logfile rotation
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/logrotate.d
-cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/logrotate.d/milter <<'EOF'
-/var/log/milter/milter.log {
-  copytruncate
-  compress
-}
-/var/log/milter/banned_ips {
-  rotate 3
-  daily
-  copytruncate
-}
-EOF
-
-# purge saved defanged message copies
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/cron.daily
-%ifos aix4.1
-R=
-%else
-R='-r'
-%endif
-cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/cron.daily/milter <<'EOF'
-#!/bin/sh
-
-find /var/log/milter/save -mtime +7 | xargs $R rm
-# work around memory leak
-/etc/init.d/milter condrestart
-EOF
-chmod a+x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/cron.daily/milter
-
-%ifos aix4.1
-cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh <<'EOF'
-#!/bin/sh
-cd /var/log/milter
-# uncomment to enable sgmlop if installed
-#export PYTHONPATH=/usr/local/lib/python2.1/site-packages
-exec /usr/local/bin/python bms.py >>milter.log 2>&1
-EOF
-%else # not aix4.1
-cp start.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
-cp %{sysvinit} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/milter
-cp spfmilter.rc $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/spfmilter
-ed $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/milter <<'EOF'
-/^python=/
-c
-python="%{python}"
-.
-w
-q
-EOF
-ed $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/spfmilter <<'EOF'
-/^python=/
-c
-python="%{python}"
-.
-w
-q
-EOF
-ed $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh <<'EOF'
-/^python=/
-c
-python="%{python}"
-.
-w
-q
-EOF
-%endif	# aix4.1
-chmod a+x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh
-
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/run/milter
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack
-cp -p rhsbl.m4 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack
-
-%ifos aix4.1
-%post
-mkssys -s milter -p %{libdir}/start.sh -u 25 -S -n 15 -f 9 -G mail || :
-
-%preun
-if [ $1 = 0 ]; then
-  rmssys -s milter || :
-fi
-%else # not aix4.1
-%post -n milter
-#echo "pythonsock has moved to /var/run/milter, update /etc/mail/sendmail.cf"
-/sbin/chkconfig --add milter
-
-%preun -n milter
-if [ $1 = 0 ]; then
-  /sbin/chkconfig --del milter
-fi
-%post spf
-#echo "pythonsock has moved to /var/run/milter, update /etc/mail/sendmail.cf"
-/sbin/chkconfig --add spfmilter
-
-%preun spf
-if [ $1 = 0 ]; then
-  /sbin/chkconfig --del spfmilter
-fi
-%endif # aix4.1
-
-%files 
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%config %{libdir}/start.sh
-/etc/logrotate.d/milter
-/etc/cron.daily/milter
-%{libdir}/bms.py?
-%ifos aix4.1
-%defattr(-,smmsp,mail)
-%else
-/etc/rc.d/init.d/milter
-%defattr(-,mail,mail)
-%endif
-%dir /var/log/milter
-%dir /var/log/milter/save
-%config %{libdir}/bms.py
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/strike3.txt
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/softfail.txt
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/fail.txt
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/neutral.txt
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/quarantine.txt
-%config(noreplace) /var/log/milter/permerror.txt
-%config(noreplace) /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
-/usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack/rhsbl.m4
-
-%files spf
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%dir /var/log/milter
-%{libdir}/spfmilter.py*
-%config(noreplace) /etc/mail/spfmilter.cfg
-/etc/rc.d/init.d/spfmilter
-
-%else # not noarch
-
-%define name pymilter
 Summary: Python interface to sendmail milter API
 Name: %{name}
 Version: %{version}
 Release: %{release}
 Source: %{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 #Patch: %{name}-%{version}.patch
-License: GPL
+License: GPLv2+
 Group: Development/Libraries
 BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-buildroot
-Prefix: %{_prefix}
 Vendor: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
-Packager: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
 Url: http://www.bmsi.com/python/milter.html
-Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.13
+Requires: %{__python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.13
-BuildRequires: %{python}-devel >= 2.4, sendmail-devel >= 8.13
+BuildRequires: %{__python}-devel >= 2.4, sendmail-devel >= 8.13
 
 %description
 This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
@@ -240,7 +26,7 @@ modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts, sending
 DSNs, and doing CBV.
 
 %prep
-%setup
+%setup -q
 #patch -p0 -b .bms
 
 %build
@@ -249,192 +35,66 @@ DSNs, and doing CBV.
 %else # Redhat builds debug packages after 7.3
   LDFLAGS="-g"
 %endif
-env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" %{python} setup.py build
+env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" %{__python} setup.py build
 
 %install
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-%{python} setup.py install --root=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT --record=INSTALLED_FILES
+%{__python} setup.py install --root=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT --record=INSTALLED_FILES
+mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/run/milter
+mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}
+%ifos aix4.1
+cat >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/sh
+cd /var/log/milter
+exec /usr/local/bin/python bms.py >>milter.log 2>&1
+EOF
+%else # not aix4.1
+cp start.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}
+ed $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh <<'EOF'
+/^python=/
+c
+python="%{__python}"
+.
+w
+q
+EOF
+%endif
+chmod a+x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{libdir}/start.sh
 %if !%{redhat7}
-grep '.pyc$' INSTALLED_FILES | sed -e 's/c$/o/' >>INSTALLED_FILES
+#grep '.pyc$' INSTALLED_FILES | sed -e 's/c$/o/' >>INSTALLED_FILES
 %endif
 
+# start.sh is used by spfmilter and milter, and could be used by
+# other milters running on redhat
 %files -f INSTALLED_FILES
 %defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc README HOWTO ChangeLog NEWS TODO CREDITS sample.py milter-template.py
+%doc README ChangeLog NEWS TODO CREDITS sample.py milter-template.py
-
+%config %{libdir}/start.sh
-%endif # noarch
+%dir %attr(0755,mail,mail) /var/run/milter
 
 %clean
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Nov 24 2008 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.12-1
+- Split pymilter into its own CVS module
+- Support chgfrom and addrcpt_par
+- Support NS records in Milter.dns
+* Mon Aug 25 2008 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.10-2
+- /var/run/milter directory must be owned by mail
+* Mon Aug 25 2008 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.10-1
+- improved parsing into email and fullname (still 2 self test failures)
+- implement no-DSN CBV, reduce full DSNs
 * Mon Sep 24 2007 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.9-1
-- Use %ifarch hack to build milter and milter-spf packages as noarch
+- Use ifarch hack to build milter and milter-spf packages as noarch
 - Remove spf dependency from dsn.py, add dns.py
 * Fri Jan 05 2007 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.8-1
 - move AddrCache, parse_addr, iniplist to Milter package
 - move parse_header to Milter.utils
 - fix plock for missing source and can't change owner/group
-- add sample spfmilter.py milter
-- private_relay config option
-- persist delayed DSN blacklisting
-- handle gossip server restart without disabling gossip
 - split out pymilter and pymilter-spf packages
 - move milter apps to /usr/lib/pymilter
 * Sat Nov 04 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.7-1
-- More lame bounce heuristics
 - SPF moved to pyspf RPM
-- wiretap archive option
-- Do plain CBV if missing template
 * Tue May 23 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.6-2
 - Support CBV timeout
-- Support fail template, headers in templates
-- Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
-- More SPF lax heuristics
-- Don't require SPF pass for white/black listing mail from trusted relay.
-- Support localpart wildcard for white and black lists.
-* Thu Feb 23 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.6-1
-- Delay reject of unsigned RCPT for postmaster and abuse only
-- Fix dsn reporting of hard permerror
-- Resolve FIXME for wrap_close in miltermodule.c
-- Add Message-ID to DSNs
-- Use signed Message-ID in delayed reject to blacklist senders
-- Auto-train via blacklist and auto-whitelist
-- Don't check userlist for signed MFROM
-- Accept but skip DSPAM and training for whitelisted senders without SPF PASS
-- Report GC stats 
-- Support CIDR matching for IP lists
-- Support pysrs sign feature
-- Support localpart specific SPF policy in access file
-* Thu Dec 29 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.5-1
-- Simple trusted_forwarder implementation.
-- Fix access_file neutral policy
-- Move Received-SPF header to beginning of headers
-- Supply keyword info for all results in Received-SPF header.
-- Move guessed SPF result to separate header
-- Activate smfi_insheader only when SMFIR_INSHEADER defined
-- Handle NULL MX in spf.py
-- in-process GOSSiP server support (to be extended later)
-- Expire CBV cache and renew auto-whitelist entries
-* Fri Oct 21 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.4-2
-- Don't supply sender when MFROM is subdomain of header from/sender.
-- Don't send quarantine DSN for DSNs
-- Skip dspam for replies/DSNs to signed MFROM
-* Thu Oct 20 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.4-1
-- Fix SPF policy via sendmail access map (case insensitive keys).
-- Auto whitelist senders, train screener on whitelisted messages
-- Optional idx parameter to addheader to invoke smfi_insheader
-- Activate progress when SMFIR_PROGRESS defined
-* Wed Oct 12 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.3-1
-- Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
-- spf_accept_fail option for braindead SPF senders (treats fail like softfail)
-- Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
-- Send DSN for SPF errors corrected by extended processing.
-- Send DSN before SCREENED mail is quarantined
-- Option to set SPF policy via sendmail access map.
-- Option to supply Sender header from MAIL FROM when missing.
-- Use logging package to keep log lines atomic.
-* Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-4
-- Limit each CNAME chain independently like PTR and MX
-* Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-3
-- Limit CNAME lookups (regression)
-* Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-2
-- Handle corrupt ZIP attachments
-* Fri Jul 15 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.2-1
-- Strict processing limits per SPF RFC
-- Fixed several parsing bugs under RFC 
-- Support official IANA SPF record (type99)
-- Honeypot support (requires pydspam-1.1.9)
-- Extended SPF processing results beyond strict RFC limits
-- Support original SES for local bounce protection (requires pysrs-0.30.10)
-- Callback exception processing option in milter module
-* Thu Jun 16 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.1-1
-- Fix zip in zip loop in mime.py
-- Fix HeaderParseError in bms.py header callback
-- Check internal_domains for outgoing mail
-- Fix inconsistent results from send_dsn
-* Mon Jun 06 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.0-3
-- properly log pydspam exceptions
-* Sat Jun 04 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.0-2
-- Include default softfail, strike3 templates
-* Wed May 25 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.0-1
-- Move Milter module to subpackage.
-- DSN support for Three strikes rule and SPF SOFTFAIL
-- Move /*mime*/ and dynip to Milter subpackage
-- Fix SPF unknown mechanism list not cleared
-- Make banned extensions configurable.
-- Option to scan zipfiles for bad extensions.
-* Tue Feb 08 2005 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.7.3-1.EL3
-- Support EL3 and Python2.4 (some scanning/defang support broken)
-* Mon Aug 30 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.7.2-1
-- Fix various SPF bugs
-- Recognize dynamic PTR names, and don't count them as authentication.
-- Three strikes and yer out rule.
-- Block softfail by default unless valid PTR or HELO
-- Return unknown for null mechanism
-- Return unknown for invalid ip address in mechanism
-- Try best guess on HELO also
-- Expand setreply for common errors
-- make rhsbl.m4 hack available for sendmail.mc
-* Sun Aug 22 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.7.1-1
-- Handle modifying mislabeled multipart messages without an exception
-- Support setbacklog, setmlreply
-- allow multi-recipient CBV
-- return TEMPFAIL for SPF softfail
-* Fri Jul 23 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.7.0-1
-- SPF check hello name
-- Move pythonsock to /var/run/milter
-- Move milter.cfg to /etc/mail/pymilter.cfg
-- Check M$ style XML CID records by converting to SPF
-- Recognize, but never match ip6 until we properly support it.
-- Option to reject when no PTR and no SPF
-* Fri Apr 09 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.9-1
-- Validate spf.py against test suite, and add Received-SPF support to spf.py
-- Support best_guess for SPF
-- Reject numeric hello names
-- Preserve case of local part in sender
-- Make libmilter timeout a config option
-- Fix setup.py to work with python < 2.2.3
-* Tue Apr 06 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.8-3
-- Reject invalid SRS immediately for benefit of callback verifiers
-- Fix include bug in spf.py
-* Tue Apr 06 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.8-2
-- Bug in check_header
-* Mon Apr 05 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.8-1
-- Don't report spoofed unless rcpt looks like SRS
-- Check for bounce with multiple rcpts
-- Make dspam see Received-SPF headers
-- Make sysv init work with RH9
-* Thu Mar 25 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.7-3
-- Forgot to make spf_reject_neutral global in bms.py
-* Wed Mar 24 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.7-2
-- Defang message/rfc822 content_type with boundary 
-- Support SPF delegation
-- Reject neutral SPF result for selected domains
-* Tue Mar 23 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.7-1
-- SRS forgery check.  Detect thread resource starvation.
-- Properly remove local socket with explicit type.
-- Decode obfuscated subject headers.
-* Wed Mar 11 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.6-2
-- init script bug with python2.3
-* Wed Mar 10 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.6-1
-- SPF checking, hello blacklist
-* Mon Mar 08 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.5-2
-- memory leak in envfrom and envrcpt
-* Mon Mar 01 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.5-1
-- progress notification
-- memory leak in connect
-- trusted relay
-* Thu Feb 19 2004 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.4-2
-- smart alias wildcard patch, compile for sendmail-8.12
-* Thu Dec 04 2003 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.4-1
-- many fixes for dspam support
-* Wed Oct 22 2003 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.3
-- dspam SCREEN feature
-- streamline dspam false positive handling
-* Mon Sep 01 2003 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.6.1
-- Full dspam support added
-* Mon Aug 26 2003 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
-- Use New email module
-* Fri Jun 27 2003 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
-- Add dspam module

quarantine.txt

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-To: %(sender)s
-From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
-Subject: DELIVERY STATUS (POSSIBLE SPAM)
-Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (content analysis)
-
-This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
-
-THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
-
-YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
-
-Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
-
-       %(rcpt)s
-
-Subject: %(subject)s
-Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
-
-A statistical analysis of your message has classified it as junk mail,
-and it has been quarantined.  Eventually, the recipients will review
-their quarantined mail and may notice your message.  If your message is
-important, please contact them via other means.  You may also try sending
-them a simple plain text message.
-
-If you never sent the above message, then your domain, %(sender_domain)s,
-was forged - i.e. used without your knowlege or authorization by
-someone attempting to steal your mail identity.  This is a very
-serious problem, and you need to provide authentication for your
-SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
-domain.  The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
-with your Sender Policy.  
-
-For more information, see: http://www.openspf.org
-
-Your mail admin needs to publish a strict SPF record so that I can reject
-those forgeries instead of bugging you with them.
-
-If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
-
-Kind regards,
-
-postmaster@%(receiver)s

rejects.py

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-# Analyze milter log to find abusers
-
-fp = open('/var/log/milter/milter.log','r')
-subdict = {}
-ipdict = {}
-spamcnt = {}
-for line in fp:
-  a = line.split(None,4)
-  if len(a) < 4: continue
-  dt,tm,id,op = a[:4]
-  if op == 'Subject:':
-    if len(a) > 4: subdict[id] = a[4].rstrip()
-  elif op == 'connect':
-    ipdict[id] = a[4].rstrip()
-  elif op in ('eom','dspam'):
-    if id in subdict: del subdict[id]
-    if id in ipdict: del ipdict[id]
-  elif op in ('REJECT:','DSPAM:','SPAM:','abort'):
-    if id in subdict:
-      if id in ipdict:
-        ip = ipdict[id]
-	del ipdict[id]
-	f,host,raw = ip.split(None,2)
-	if host in spamcnt:
-	  spamcnt[host] += 1
-	else:
-	  spamcnt[host] = 1
-      else: ip = ''
-      print dt,tm,op,a[4].rstrip(),subdict[id]
-      del subdict[id]
-    else:
-      print line.rstrip()
-print len(subdict),'leftover entries'
-
-spamlist = filter(lambda x: x[1] > 1,spamcnt.items())
-spamlist.sort(lambda x,y: x[1] - y[1])
-for ip,cnt in spamlist:
-  print cnt,ip

report.py

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-# Analyze milter log to find abusers
-import traceback
-import sys
-
-def parse_addr(a):
-  beg = a.find('<')
-  end = a.find('>')
-  if beg >= 0:
-    if end > beg: return a[beg+1:end]
-  return a
-
-class Connection(object):
-  def __init__(self,dt,tm,id,ip=None,conn=None):
-    self.dt = dt
-    self.tm = tm
-    self.id = id
-    if ip:
-      _,self.host,self.ip = ip.split(None,2)
-    elif conn:
-      self.ip = conn.ip
-      self.host = conn.host
-      self.helo = conn.helo
-    self.subject = None
-    self.rcpt = []
-    self.mfrom = None
-    self.helo = None
-    self.innoc = []
-    self.whitelist = False
-
-def connections(fp):
-  conndict = {}
-  termdict = {}
-  for line in fp:
-    if line.startswith('{'): continue
-    a = line.split(None,4)
-    if len(a) < 4: continue
-    dt,tm,id,op = a[:4]
-    if (id,op) == ('bms','milter'):
-      # FIXME: optionally yield all partial connections in conndict
-      conndict = {}
-      termdict = {}
-      continue
-    if id[0] == '[' and id[-1] == ']':
-      try:
-	key = int(id[1:-1])
-      except:
-        print >>sys.stderr,'bad id:',line.rstrip()
-	continue
-    else: continue
-    if op == 'connect':
-      ip = a[4].rstrip()
-      conn = Connection(dt,tm,id,ip=ip)
-      conndict[key] = conn
-    elif op in (
-	'DISCARD:','TAG:','CBV:','Large','No',
-	'NOTE:','From:','Sender:','TRAIN:'):
-      continue
-    else:
-      op = op.lower()
-      try:
-	conn = conndict[key]
-      except KeyError:
-        try:
-	  conn = termdict[key]
-	  del termdict[key]
-	  conndict[key] = conn
-	except KeyError:
-	  print >>sys.stderr,'key error:',line.rstrip()
-	  continue
-      try:
-	if op == 'subject:':
-	  if len(a) > 4:
-	    conn.subject = a[4].rstrip()
-	elif op == 'innoc:':
-	  conn.innoc.append(a[4].rstrip())
-	elif op == 'whitelist':
-	  conn.whitelist = True
-	elif op == 'x-mailer:':
-	  if len(a) > 4:
-	    conn.mailer = a[4].rstrip()
-        elif op == 'x-guessed-spf:':
-          conn.spfguess = a[4]
-	elif op == 'received-spf:':
-	  conn.spfres,conn.spfmsg = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
-	elif op == 'received:':
-	  conn.received = a[4].rstrip()
-	elif op == 'temp':
-	  _,conn.tempfile = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
-	elif op == 'srs':
-	  _,conn.srsrcpt = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
-	elif op == 'mail':
-	  _,conn.mfrom = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
-	elif op == 'rcpt':
-	  _,rcpt = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
-	  conn.rcpt.append(rcpt)
-	elif op == 'hello':
-	  _,conn.helo = a[4].rstrip().split(None,1)
-	elif op in ('eom','dspam','abort'):
-	  del conndict[key]
-	  conn.enddt = dt
-	  conn.endtm = tm
-	  conn.result = op
-	  yield conn
-	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
-	elif op in ('reject:','dspam:','tempfail:','reject','fail:','honeypot:'):
-	  del conndict[key]
-	  conn.enddt = dt
-	  conn.endtm = tm
-	  conn.result = op
-	  conn.resmsg = a[4].rstrip()
-	  yield conn
-	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
-	elif op in ('fp:','spam:'):
-	  del conndict[key]
-	  termdict[key] = Connection(conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn=conn)
-	else:
-	  print >>sys.stderr,'unknown op:',line.rstrip()
-      except Exception:
-	print >>sys.stderr,'error:',line.rstrip()
-        traceback.print_exc()
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  import gzip
-  for fn in sys.argv[1:]:
-    if fn.endswith('.gz'):
-      fp = gzip.open(fn)
-    else:
-      fp = open(fn)
-    for conn in connections(fp):
-      if conn.rcpt and conn.mfrom:
-        for r in conn.rcpt:
-	  if r.lower().find('iancarter') > 0: break
-	else:
-	  if conn.mfrom.lower().find('iancarter') < 0: continue
-	print >>sys.stderr,conn.result,conn.dt,conn.tm,conn.id,conn.subject,parse_addr(conn.mfrom),
-	for a in conn.rcpt:
-	  print parse_addr(a),
-	print

rhsbl.m4

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-divert(-1)
-#
-# Copyright (c) 2002 Derek J. Balling
-#	All rights reserved.
-#
-# Permission to use granted for all purposes. If modifications are made
-# they are requested to be sent to <dredd@megacity.org> for inclusion in future
-# versions 
-#
-# Allows (hopefully) for checking of access.db whitelisting now. This ONLY
-# works on sendmail-8.12.x ... use on any other version may require tinkering
-# by you the downloader.
-#
-# Incorporates many changes by Sergey S. Mokryshev <mokr@mokr.net>
-#
-#
-
-divert(0)
-ifdef(`_RHSBL_R_',`dnl',`dnl
-VERSIONID(`$Id$')
-define(`_RHSBL_R_',`')
-ifdef(`_DNSBL_R_',`dnl',`dnl
-LOCAL_CONFIG
-# map for DNS based blacklist lookups based on the sender RHS
-Kdnsbl host -T<TMP>')')
-divert(-1)
-define(`_RHSBL_SRV_', `_ARG_')dnl
-define(`_RHSBL_MSG_', `ifelse(len(X`'_ARG2_),`1',`"550 Mail from " $`'&{RHS} " refused by blackhole site '_RHSBL_SRV_`"',`_ARG2_')')dnl
-define(`_RHSBL_MSG_TMP_', `ifelse(_ARG3_,`t',`"451 Temporary lookup failure of " $`'&{RHS} " at '_RHSBL_SRV_`"',`_ARG3_')')dnl
-
-MAILER_DEFINITIONS
-
-SLocal_check_mail
-# DNS based RHS spam list blackholes.bmsi.com
-R$*			$: <?> $>CanonAddr $1
-R<?> $*<@$+.>		$: <?> $1<@$2.> $| $>SearchList <+ rhs> $| <F:$1@$2> <D:$2> <>
-R<?> $* $| <$={Accept}>	$: OKSOFAR
-R<?> $*<@$+.> $| $*	$: <?> $(dnsbl $2._RHSBL_SRV_. $: OK $) $(macro {RHS} $@ $2 $)
-R<?> OK			$: OKSOFAR
-R<?> $*<@$*>		$: OKSOFAR
-ifelse(len(X`'_ARG3_),`1',
-`R<?>$+<TMP>		$: TMPOK',
-`R<?>$+<TMP>		$#error $@ 4.7.1 $: _RHSBL_MSG_TMP_')
-R<?>$+			$#error $@ 5.7.1 $: _RHSBL_MSG_

setup.py

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ if sys.version < '2.2.3':
   DistributionMetadata.download_url = None
 
 # NOTE: importing Milter to obtain version fails when milter.so not built
-setup(name = "pymilter", version = '0.8.9',
+setup(name = "pymilter", version = '0.8.12',
 	description="Python interface to sendmail milter API",
 	long_description="""\
 This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to

softfail.txt

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-To: %(sender)s
-From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
-Subject: SPF %(result)s (POSSIBLE FORGERY)
-Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
-
-This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
-
-THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
-
-YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
-
-Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
-
-       %(rcpt)s
-
-Subject: %(subject)s
-Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
-
-Your sender policy indicated that the above email was likely forged and that
-feedback was desired for debugging.  If you are sending from a foreign ISP,
-then you may need to follow your home ISPs instructions for configuring
-your outgoing mail server.
-
-If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
-
-Kind regards,
-
-postmaster@%(receiver)s

spfmilter.cfg

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-[milter]
-# The socket used to communicate with sendmail
-socketname = /var/run/milter/spfmiltersock
-# Name of the milter given to sendmail
-name = pyspffilter
-# Trusted relays such as secondary MXes that should not have SPF checked.
-;trusted_relay =
-# Internal networks that should not have SPF checked.
-internal_connect = 127.0.0.1,192.168.0.0/16,10.0.0.0/8
-
-# See http://www.openspf.com for more info on SPF.
-[spf]
-# Use sendmail access map or similar format for detailed spf policy.
-# SPF entries in the access map will override defaults.
-access_file = /etc/mail/access.db
-# Connections that get an SPF pass for a pretend MAIL FROM of 
-# postmaster@sometrustedforwarder.com skip SPF checks for the real MAIL FROM.
-# This is for non-SRS forwarders.  It is a simple implementation that
-# is inefficient for more than a few entries.
-;trusted_forwarder = careerbuilder.com

spfmilter.py

@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
-# A simple SPF milter.
-# You must install pyspf for this to work.
-
-# http://www.sendmail.org/doc/sendmail-current/libmilter/docs/installation.html
-
-# Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
-# Copyright 2007 Business Management Systems, Inc.
-# This code is under GPL.  See COPYING for details.
-
-import sys
-import Milter
-import spf
-import syslog
-import anydbm
-from Milter.config import MilterConfigParser
-from Milter.utils import iniplist,parse_addr
-
-syslog.openlog('spfmilter',0,syslog.LOG_MAIL)
-
-class Config(object):
-  "Hold configuration options."
-  pass
-
-def read_config(list):
-  "Return new config object."
-  cp = MilterConfigParser()
-  cp.read(list)
-  if cp.has_option('milter','datadir'):
-        os.chdir(cp.get('milter','datadir'))
-  conf = Config()
-  conf.socketname = cp.getdefault('milter','socketname', '/tmp/spfmiltersock')
-  conf.miltername = cp.getdefault('milter','name','pyspffilter')
-  conf.trusted_relay = cp.getlist('milter','trusted_relay')
-  conf.internal_connect = cp.getlist('milter','internal_connect')
-  conf.trusted_forwarder = cp.getlist('spf','trusted_relay')
-  conf.access_file = cp.getdefault('spf','access_file',None)
-  return conf
-
-class SPFPolicy(object):
-  "Get SPF policy by result from sendmail style access file."
-  def __init__(self,sender,access_file=None):
-    self.sender = sender
-    self.domain = sender.split('@')[-1].lower()
-    if access_file:
-      try: acf = anydbm.open(access_file,'r')
-      except: acf = None
-    else: acf = None
-    self.acf = acf
-
-  def getPolicy(self,pfx):
-    acf = self.acf
-    if not acf: return None
-    try:
-      return acf[pfx + self.sender]
-    except KeyError:
-      try:
-	return acf[pfx + self.domain]
-      except KeyError:
-	try:
-	  return acf[pfx]
-	except KeyError:
-	  return None
-  
-class spfMilter(Milter.Milter):
-  "Milter to check SPF.  Each connection gets its own instance."
-
-  def log(self,*msg):
-    syslog.syslog('[%d] %s' % (self.id,' '.join([str(m) for m in msg])))
-
-  def __init__(self):
-    self.mailfrom = None
-    self.id = Milter.uniqueID()
-    # we don't want config used to change during a connection
-    self.conf = config
-
-  # addheader can only be called from eom().  This accumulates added headers
-  # which can then be applied by alter_headers()
-  def add_header(self,name,val,idx=-1):
-    self.new_headers.append((name,val,idx))
-    self.log('%s: %s' % (name,val))
-
-  def connect(self,hostname,unused,hostaddr):
-    self.internal_connection = False
-    self.trusted_relay = False
-    self.hello_name = None
-    # sometimes people put extra space in sendmail config, so we strip
-    self.receiver = self.getsymval('j').strip()
-    if hostaddr and len(hostaddr) > 0:
-      ipaddr = hostaddr[0]
-      if iniplist(ipaddr,self.conf.internal_connect):
-	self.internal_connection = True
-      if iniplist(ipaddr,self.conf.trusted_relay):
-        self.trusted_relay = True
-    else: ipaddr = ''
-    self.connectip = ipaddr
-    if self.internal_connection:
-      connecttype = 'INTERNAL'
-    else:
-      connecttype = 'EXTERNAL'
-    if self.trusted_relay:
-      connecttype += ' TRUSTED'
-    self.log("connect from %s at %s %s" % (hostname,hostaddr,connecttype))
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-  def hello(self,hostname):
-    self.hello_name = hostname
-    self.log("hello from %s" % hostname)
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-  # multiple messages can be received on a single connection
-  # envfrom (MAIL FROM in the SMTP protocol) seems to mark the start
-  # of each message.
-  def envfrom(self,f,*str):
-    self.log("mail from",f,str)
-    if not self.hello_name:
-      self.log('REJECT: missing HELO')
-      self.setreply('550','5.7.1',"It's polite to say helo first.")
-      return Milter.REJECT
-    self.mailfrom = f
-    self.new_headers = []
-    t = parse_addr(f)
-    if len(t) == 2: t[1] = t[1].lower()
-    self.canon_from = '@'.join(t)
-    if not (self.internal_connection or self.trusted_relay) and self.connectip:
-      rc = self.check_spf()
-      if rc != Milter.CONTINUE: return rc
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-  def envrcpt(self,f,*str):
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-  def header(self,name,hval):
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-  def eoh(self):
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-  def eom(self):
-    for name,val,idx in self.new_headers:
-      try:
-	self.addheader(name,val,idx)
-      except:
-	self.addheader(name,val)	# older sendmail can't insheader
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-  def close(self):
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-  def check_spf(self):
-    receiver = self.receiver
-    for tf in self.conf.trusted_forwarder:
-      q = spf.query(self.connectip,'',tf,receiver=receiver,strict=False)
-      res,code,txt = q.check()
-      if res == 'pass':
-        self.log("TRUSTED_FORWARDER:",tf)
-        break
-    else:
-      q = spf.query(self.connectip,self.canon_from,self.hello_name,
-	  receiver=receiver,strict=False)
-      q.set_default_explanation(
-	'SPF fail: see http://openspf.org/why.html?sender=%s&ip=%s' % (q.s,q.i))
-      res,code,txt = q.check()
-    if res not in ('pass','temperror'):
-      if self.mailfrom != '<>':
-	# check hello name via spf unless spf pass
-	h = spf.query(self.connectip,'',self.hello_name,receiver=receiver)
-	hres,hcode,htxt = h.check()
-	if hres in ('deny','fail','neutral','softfail'):
-	  self.log('REJECT: hello SPF: %s 550 %s' % (hres,htxt))
-	  self.setreply('550','5.7.1',htxt,
-	    "The hostname given in your MTA's HELO response is not listed",
-	    "as a legitimate MTA in the SPF records for your domain.  If you",
-	    "get this bounce, the message was not in fact a forgery, and you",
-	    "should IMMEDIATELY notify your email administrator of the problem."
-	  )
-	  return Milter.REJECT
-      else:
-        hres,hcode,htxt = res,code,txt
-    else: hres = None
-
-    p = SPFPolicy(q.s,self.conf.access_file)
-
-    if res == 'fail':
-      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-fail:')
-      if not policy or policy == 'REJECT':
-	self.log('REJECT: SPF %s %i %s' % (res,code,txt))
-	self.setreply(str(code),'5.7.1',txt)
-	# A proper SPF fail error message would read:
-	# forger.biz [1.2.3.4] is not allowed to send mail with the domain
-	# "forged.org" in the sender address.  Contact <postmaster@forged.org>.
-	return Milter.REJECT
-    if res == 'softfail':
-      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-softfail:')
-      if policy and policy == 'REJECT':
-	self.log('REJECT: SPF %s %i %s' % (res,code,txt))
-	self.setreply(str(code),'5.7.1',txt)
-	# A proper SPF fail error message would read:
-	# forger.biz [1.2.3.4] is not allowed to send mail with the domain
-	# "forged.org" in the sender address.  Contact <postmaster@forged.org>.
-	return Milter.REJECT
-    elif res == 'permerror':
-      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-permerror:')
-      if not policy or policy == 'REJECT':
-	self.log('REJECT: SPF %s %i %s' % (res,code,txt))
-	# latest SPF draft recommends 5.5.2 instead of 5.7.1
-	self.setreply(str(code),'5.5.2',txt,
-	  'There is a fatal syntax error in the SPF record for %s' % q.o,
-	  'We cannot accept mail from %s until this is corrected.' % q.o
-	)
-	return Milter.REJECT
-    elif res == 'temperror':
-      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-temperror:')
-      if not policy or policy == 'REJECT':
-	self.log('TEMPFAIL: SPF %s %i %s' % (res,code,txt))
-	self.setreply(str(code),'4.3.0',txt)
-	return Milter.TEMPFAIL
-    elif res == 'neutral' or res == 'none':
-      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-neutral:')
-      if policy and policy == 'REJECT':
-        self.log('REJECT NEUTRAL:',q.s)
-	self.setreply('550','5.7.1',
-  "%s requires and SPF PASS to accept mail from %s. [http://openspf.org]"
-	  % (receiver,q.s))
-	return Milter.REJECT
-    elif res == 'pass':
-      policy = p.getPolicy('spf-pass:')
-      if policy and policy == 'REJECT':
-        self.log('REJECT PASS:',q.s)
-	self.setreply('550','5.7.1',
-		"%s has been blacklisted by %s." % (q.s,receiver))
-	return Milter.REJECT
-    self.add_header('Received-SPF',q.get_header(res,receiver),0)
-    if hres and q.h != q.o:
-      self.add_header('X-Hello-SPF',hres,0)
-    return Milter.CONTINUE
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-  Milter.factory = spfMilter
-  Milter.set_flags(Milter.CHGHDRS + Milter.ADDHDRS)
-  global config
-  config = read_config(['spfmilter.cfg','/etc/mail/spfmilter.cfg'])
-  miltername = config.miltername
-  socketname = config.socketname
-  print """To use this with sendmail, add the following to sendmail.cf:
-
-O InputMailFilters=%s
-X%s,        S=local:%s
-
-See the sendmail README for libmilter.
-sample spfmilter startup""" % (miltername,miltername,socketname)
-  sys.stdout.flush()
-  Milter.runmilter("pyspffilter",socketname,240)
-  print "sample spfmilter shutdown"

spfmilter.rc

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# spfmilter	This shell script takes care of starting and stopping spfmilter.
-#
-# chkconfig: 2345 80 30
-# description: a process that checks SPF for messages sent through sendmail.
-# processname: spfmilter
-# config: /etc/mail/spfmilter.cfg
-# pidfile: /var/run/milter/spfmilter.pid
-
-python="python2.4"
-
-pidof() {
-	set - ""
-	if set - `ps -e -o pid,cmd | grep "${python} spfmilter.py"` &&
-	  [ "$2" != "grep" ]; then
-	  echo $1
-	  return 0
-	fi
-	return 1
-}
-
-# Source function library.
-. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
-
-[ -x /usr/lib/pymilter/start.sh ] || exit 0
-
-RETVAL=0
-prog="spfmilter"
-
-start() {
-	# Start daemons.
-
-	echo -n "Starting $prog: "
-        if ! test -d /var/run/milter; then
-		mkdir -p /var/run/milter
-		chown mail:mail /var/run/milter
-	fi
-	daemon --check milter --user mail /usr/lib/pymilter/start.sh spfmilter
-	RETVAL=$?
-	echo
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/spfmilter
-	return $RETVAL
-}
-
-stop() {
-	# Stop daemons.
-	echo -n "Shutting down $prog: "
-	killproc milter
-	RETVAL=$?
-	echo
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/spfmilter
-	return $RETVAL
-}
-
-# See how we were called.
-case "$1" in
-  start)
-	start
-	;;
-  stop)
-	stop
-	;;
-  restart|reload)
-	stop
-	start
-	RETVAL=$?
-	;;
-  condrestart)
-	if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/spfmilter ]; then
-	    stop
-	    start
-	    RETVAL=$?
-	fi
-	;;
-  status)
-	status spfmilter
-	RETVAL=$?
-	;;
-  *)
-	echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|condrestart|status}"
-	exit 1
-esac
-
-exit $RETVAL

strike3.txt

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-To: %(sender)s
-From: postmaster@%(receiver)s
-Subject: Critical mail server configuration error
-Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (configuration error)
-
-This is an automatically generated Delivery Status Notification.
-
-THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY.
-
-YOU DO *NOT* NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE.
-
-Delivery to the following recipients has been delayed.
-
-	%(rcpt)s
-
-Subject: %(subject)s 
-
-Someone at IP address %(connectip)s sent an email claiming
-to be from %(sender)s.  
-
-If that wasn't you, then your domain, %(sender_domain)s,
-was forged - i.e. used without your knowlege or authorization by
-someone attempting to steal your mail identity.  This is a very
-serious problem, and you need to provide authentication for your
-SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
-domain.  The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
-with your Sender Policy.  
-
-For more information, see: http://openspf.org
-
-I hate to annoy you with a DSN (Delivery Status
-Notification) from a possibly forged email, but since you
-have not published a sender policy, there is no other way
-of bringing this to your attention.
-
-If it *was* you that sent the email, then your email domain
-or configuration is in error.  If you don't know anything
-about mail servers, then pass this on to your SMTP (mail)
-server administrator.  We have accepted the email anyway, in
-case it is important, but we couldn't find anything about
-the mail submitter at %(connectip)s to distinguish it from a
-zombie (compromised/infected computer - usually a Windows
-PC).  There was no PTR record for its IP address (PTR names
-that contain the IP address don't count).  RFC2821 requires
-that your hello name be a FQN (Fully Qualified domain Name,
-i.e. at least one dot) that resolves to the IP address of
-the mail sender.  In addition, just like for PTR, we don't
-accept a helo name that contains the IP, since this doesn't
-help to identify you.  The hello name you used,
-%(heloname)s, was invalid.
-
-Furthermore, there was no SPF record for the sending domain
-%(sender_domain)s.  We even tried to find its IP in any A or
-MX records for your domain, but that failed also.  We really
-should reject mail from anonymous mail clients, but in case
-it is important, we are accepting it anyway.
-
-We are sending you this message to alert you to the fact that
-
-Either - Someone is forging your domain.
-Or - You have problems with your email configuration.
-Or - Possibly both.
-
-If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to
-contact me again.
-
-Kind regards,
-
-postmaster@%(receiver)s

test.py

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 import unittest
-import testbms
 import testmime
 import testsample
 import testutils
@@ -7,7 +6,6 @@ import os
 
 def suite(): 
   s = unittest.TestSuite()
-  s.addTest(testbms.suite())
   s.addTest(testmime.suite())
   s.addTest(testsample.suite())
   s.addTest(testutils.suite())

testbms.py

@@ -1,323 +0,0 @@
-import unittest
-import doctest
-import Milter
-import bms
-import mime
-import rfc822
-import StringIO
-import email
-import sys
-#import pdb
-
-class TestMilter(bms.bmsMilter):
-
-  def __init__(self):
-    bms.bmsMilter.__init__(self)
-    self.logfp = open("test/milter.log","a")
-    self._delrcpt = []	# record deleted rcpts for testing
-    self._addrcpt = []	# record added rcpts for testing
-
-  def log(self,*msg):
-    for i in msg: print >>self.logfp, i,
-    print >>self.logfp
-
-  def getsymval(self,name):
-    if name == 'j': return 'test.milter.org'
-    return ''
-
-  def replacebody(self,chunk):
-    if self._body:
-      self._body.write(chunk)
-      self.bodyreplaced = True
-    else:
-      raise IOError,"replacebody not called from eom()"
-
-  # FIXME: rfc822 indexing does not really reflect the way chg/add header
-  # work for a milter
-  def chgheader(self,field,idx,value):
-    if not self._body:
-      raise IOError,"chgheader not called from eom()"
-    self.log('chgheader: %s[%d]=%s' % (field,idx,value))
-    if value == '':
-      del self._msg[field]
-    else:
-      self._msg[field] = value
-    self.headerschanged = True
-
-  def addheader(self,field,value):
-    if not self._body:
-      raise IOError,"addheader not called from eom()"
-    self.log('addheader: %s=%s' % (field,value))
-    self._msg[field] = value
-    self.headerschanged = True
-
-  def delrcpt(self,rcpt):
-    if not self._body:
-      raise IOError,"delrcpt not called from eom()"
-    self._delrcpt.append(rcpt)
-
-  def addrcpt(self,rcpt):
-    if not self._body:
-      raise IOError,"addrcpt not called from eom()"
-    self._addrcpt.append(rcpt)
-
-  def setreply(self,rcode,xcode,msg):
-    self.reply = (rcode,xcode,msg)
-
-  def feedFile(self,fp,sender="spam@adv.com",rcpt="victim@lamb.com"):
-    self._body = None
-    self.bodyreplaced = False
-    self.headerschanged = False
-    self.reply = None
-    msg = rfc822.Message(fp)
-    rc = self.envfrom('<%s>'%sender)
-    if rc != Milter.CONTINUE: return rc
-    rc = self.envrcpt('<%s>'%rcpt)
-    if rc != Milter.CONTINUE: return rc
-    line = None
-    for h in msg.headers:
-      if h[:1].isspace():
-	line = line + h
-	continue
-      if not line:
-	line = h
-	continue
-      s = line.split(': ',1)
-      if len(s) > 1: val = s[1].strip()
-      else: val = ''
-      rc = self.header(s[0],val)
-      if rc != Milter.CONTINUE: return rc
-      line = h
-    if line:
-      s = line.split(': ',1)
-      rc = self.header(s[0],s[1])
-      if rc != Milter.CONTINUE: return rc
-    rc = self.eoh()
-    if rc != Milter.CONTINUE: return rc
-    while 1:
-      buf = fp.read(8192)
-      if len(buf) == 0: break
-      rc = self.body(buf)
-      if rc != Milter.CONTINUE: return rc
-    self._msg = msg
-    self._body = StringIO.StringIO()
-    rc = self.eom()
-    if self.bodyreplaced:
-      body = self._body.getvalue()
-    else:
-      msg.rewindbody()
-      body = msg.fp.read()
-    self._body = StringIO.StringIO()
-    self._body.writelines(msg.headers)
-    self._body.write('\n')
-    self._body.write(body)
-    return rc
-
-  def feedMsg(self,fname,sender="spam@adv.com",rcpt="victim@lamb.com"):
-    fp = open('test/'+fname,'r')
-    rc = self.feedFile(fp,sender,rcpt)
-    fp.close()
-    return rc
-
-  def connect(self,host='localhost'):
-    self._body = None
-    self.bodyreplaced = False
-    rc =  bms.bmsMilter.connect(self,host,1,('1.2.3.4',1234)) 
-    if rc != Milter.CONTINUE and rc != Milter.ACCEPT:
-      self.close()
-      return rc
-    rc = self.hello('spamrelay')
-    if rc != Milter.CONTINUE:
-      self.close()
-    return rc
-
-class BMSMilterTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
-
-  def testDefang(self,fname='virus1'):
-    milter = TestMilter()
-    rc = milter.connect('testDefang')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.CONTINUE)
-    rc = milter.feedMsg(fname)
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open('test/'+fname+".tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-    #self.failUnless(fp.getvalue() == open("test/virus1.out","r").read())
-    fp.seek(0)
-    msg = mime.message_from_file(fp)
-    str = msg.get_payload(1).get_payload()
-    milter.log(str)
-    milter.close()
-
-  # test some spams that crashed our parser
-  def testParse(self,fname='spam7'):
-    milter = TestMilter()
-    milter.connect('testParse')
-    rc = milter.feedMsg(fname)
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Milter needlessly replaced body.")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open('test/'+fname+".tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-    milter.connect('pro-send.com')
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('spam8')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Milter needlessly replaced body.")
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('bounce')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Milter needlessly replaced body.")
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('bounce1')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Milter needlessly replaced body.")
-    milter.close()
-
-  def testDefang2(self):
-    milter = TestMilter()
-    milter.connect('testDefang2')
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('samp1')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Milter needlessly replaced body.")
-    rc = milter.feedMsg("virus3")
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/virus3.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-    #self.failUnless(fp.getvalue() == open("test/virus3.out","r").read())
-    rc = milter.feedMsg("virus6")
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    self.failUnless(milter.headerschanged,"Message headers not adjusted")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/virus6.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-    milter.close()
-
-  def testDefang3(self):
-    milter = TestMilter()
-    milter.connect('testDefang3')
-    # test script removal on complex HTML attachment
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('amazon')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/amazon.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-    # test defanging Klez virus
-    rc = milter.feedMsg("virus13")
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/virus13.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-    # test script removal on quoted-printable HTML attachment
-    # sgmllib can't handle the <![if cond]> syntax
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('spam44')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/spam44.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-    milter.close()
- 
-  def testRFC822(self):
-    milter = TestMilter()
-    milter.connect('testRFC822')
-    # test encoded rfc822 attachment
-    #pdb.set_trace()
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('test8')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    # python2.4 doesn't scan encoded message attachments
-    if sys.hexversion < 0x02040000:
-      self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    #self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/test8.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('virus7')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    #self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/virus7.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-
-  def testSmartAlias(self):
-    milter = TestMilter()
-    milter.connect('testSmartAlias')
-    # test smart alias feature
-    key = ('foo@example.com','baz@bat.com')
-    bms.smart_alias[key] = ['ham@eggs.com']
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('test8',key[0],key[1])
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    self.failUnless(milter._delrcpt == ['<baz@bat.com>'])
-    self.failUnless(milter._addrcpt == ['<ham@eggs.com>'])
-    # python2.4 email does not decode message attachments, so script
-    # is not replaced
-    if sys.hexversion < 0x02040000:
-      self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-
-  def testBadBoundary(self):
-    milter = TestMilter()
-    milter.connect('testBadBoundary')
-    # test rfc822 attachment with invalid boundaries
-    #pdb.set_trace()
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('bound')
-    if sys.hexversion < 0x02040000:
-      # python2.4 adds invalid boundaries to decects list and makes
-      # payload a str
-      self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.REJECT)
-      self.assertEqual(milter.reply[0],'554')
-    #self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/bound.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-
-  def testCompoundFilename(self):
-    milter = TestMilter()
-    milter.connect('testCompoundFilename')
-    # test rfc822 attachment with invalid boundaries
-    #pdb.set_trace()
-    rc = milter.feedMsg('test1')
-    self.assertEqual(rc,Milter.ACCEPT)
-    #self.failUnless(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body not replaced")
-    self.failIf(milter.bodyreplaced,"Message body replaced")
-    fp = milter._body
-    open("test/test1.tstout","w").write(fp.getvalue())
-
-  def testFindsrs(self):
-    if not bms.srs:
-      import SRS
-      bms.srs = SRS.new(secret='test')
-    sender = bms.srs.forward('foo@bar.com','mail.example.com')
-    sndr = bms.findsrs(StringIO.StringIO(
-"""Received: from [1.16.33.86] (helo=mail.example.com)
-	by bastion4.mail.zen.co.uk with smtp (Exim 4.50) id 1H3IBC-00013b-O9
-	for foo@bar.com; Sat, 06 Jan 2007 20:30:17 +0000
-X-Mailer: "PyMilter-0.8.5"
-	<%s> foo
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain
-To: foo@bar.com
-From: postmaster@mail.example.com
-""" % sender
-    ))
-    self.assertEqual(sndr,'foo@bar.com')
-
-#  def testReject(self):
-#    "Test content based spam rejection."
-#    milter = TestMilter()
-#    milter.connect('gogo-china.com')
-#    rc = milter.feedMsg('big5');
-#    self.failUnless(rc == Milter.REJECT)
-#    milter.close();
-
-def suite(): 
-  s = unittest.makeSuite(BMSMilterTestCase,'test')
-  s.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(bms))
-  return s
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  if len(sys.argv) > 1:
-    for fname in sys.argv[1:]:
-      milter = TestMilter()
-      milter.connect('main')
-      fp = open(fname,'r')
-      rc = milter.feedFile(fp)
-      fp = milter._body
-      sys.stdout.write(fp.getvalue())
-  else:
-    #unittest.main()
-    unittest.TextTestRunner().run(suite())