Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 in dkim.crypto, and use that in verify() and sign(). Move str2int/int2str into dkim.crypto. Verification no longer does a constant-time string compare; there is no private key involved on which a timing attack could be performed.
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+7
-46
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ from dkim.crypto import (
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EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_encode,
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parse_private_key,
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parse_public_key,
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RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_sign,
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RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_verify,
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)
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__all__ = [
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@@ -152,38 +154,10 @@ def validate_signature_fields(sig, debuglog=None):
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return False
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return True
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def perform_rsa(input, exponent, modulus, modlen):
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return int2str(pow(str2int(input), exponent, modulus), modlen)
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# These values come from RFC 3447, section 9.2 Notes, page 43.
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HASHID_SHA1 = "\x2b\x0e\x03\x02\x1a"
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HASHID_SHA256 = "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01"
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def str2int(s):
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"""Convert an octet string to an integer. Octet string assumed to represent a positive integer."""
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r = 0
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for c in s:
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r = (r << 8) | ord(c)
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return r
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def int2str(n, length = -1):
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"""Convert an integer to an octet string. Number must be positive.
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@param n: Number to convert.
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@param length: Minimum length, or -1 to return the smallest number of bytes that represent the integer.
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"""
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assert n >= 0
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r = []
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while length < 0 or len(r) < length:
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r.append(chr(n & 0xff))
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n >>= 8
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if length < 0 and n == 0: break
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r.reverse()
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assert length < 0 or len(r) == length
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return r
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def rfc822_parse(message):
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"""Parse a message in RFC822 format.
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@@ -316,9 +290,8 @@ def sign(message, selector, domain, privkey, identity=None, canonicalize=(Simple
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if debuglog is not None:
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print >>debuglog, "sign digest:", " ".join("%02x" % ord(x) for x in d)
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modlen = len(int2str(pk['modulus']))
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encoded = EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_encode(d, modlen, HASHID_SHA256)
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sig2 = perform_rsa(encoded, pk['privateExponent'], pk['modulus'], modlen)
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sig2 = RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_sign(
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d, HASHID_SHA256, pk['privateExponent'], pk['modulus'])
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sig += base64.b64encode(''.join(sig2))
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return sig + "\r\n"
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@@ -430,9 +403,6 @@ def verify(message, debuglog=None, dnsfunc=dnstxt):
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print >>debuglog, "invalid format in _domainkey txt record"
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return False
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pk = parse_public_key(base64.b64decode(pub['p']))
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modlen = len(int2str(pk['modulus']))
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if debuglog is not None:
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print >>debuglog, "modlen:", modlen
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include_headers = re.split(r"\s*:\s*", sig['h'])
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h = hasher()
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@@ -441,18 +411,9 @@ def verify(message, debuglog=None, dnsfunc=dnstxt):
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d = h.digest()
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if debuglog is not None:
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print >>debuglog, "verify digest:", " ".join("%02x" % ord(x) for x in d)
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signature = base64.b64decode(re.sub(r"\s+", "", sig['b']))
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try:
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sig2 = EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_encode(d, modlen, hashid)
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return RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_verify(
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d, hashid, signature, pk['publicExponent'], pk['modulus'])
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except ParameterError:
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return False
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if debuglog is not None:
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print >>debuglog, "sig2:", " ".join("%02x" % ord(x) for x in sig2)
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print >>debuglog, sig['b']
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print >>debuglog, re.sub(r"\s+", "", sig['b'])
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signature = base64.b64decode(re.sub(r"\s+", "", sig['b']))
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v = perform_rsa(signature, pk['publicExponent'], pk['modulus'], modlen)
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if debuglog is not None:
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print >>debuglog, "v:", " ".join("%02x" % ord(x) for x in v)
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assert len(v) == len(sig2)
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# Byte-by-byte compare of signatures
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return not [1 for x in zip(v, sig2) if x[0] != x[1]]
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@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ __all__ = [
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'EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_encode',
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'parse_private_key',
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'parse_public_key',
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'RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_sign',
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'RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_verify',
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]
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from dkim.asn1 import (
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@@ -108,3 +110,51 @@ def EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_encode(digest, modlen, hashid):
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raise Exception("Hash too large for modulus") # XXX: DKIMException
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return "\x00\x01"+"\xff"*(modlen-len(dinfo)-3)+"\x00"+dinfo
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def str2int(s):
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"""Convert an octet string to an integer.
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Octet string assumed to represent a positive integer.
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"""
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r = 0
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for c in s:
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r = (r << 8) | ord(c)
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return r
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def int2str(n, length = -1):
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"""Convert an integer to an octet string. Number must be positive.
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@param n: Number to convert.
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@param length: Minimum length, or -1 to return the smallest number of
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bytes that represent the integer.
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"""
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assert n >= 0
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r = []
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while length < 0 or len(r) < length:
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r.append(chr(n & 0xff))
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n >>= 8
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if length < 0 and n == 0:
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break
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r.reverse()
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assert length < 0 or len(r) == length
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return ''.join(r)
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def perform_rsa(input, exponent, modulus, modlen):
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return int2str(pow(str2int(input), exponent, modulus), modlen)
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def RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_sign(digest, hashid, private_exponent, modulus):
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modlen = len(int2str(modulus))
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encoded_digest = EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_encode(digest, modlen, hashid)
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return perform_rsa(encoded_digest, private_exponent, modulus, modlen)
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def RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_verify(digest, hashid, signature, public_exponent,
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modulus):
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modlen = len(int2str(modulus))
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encoded_digest = EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_encode(digest, modlen, hashid)
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signed_digest = perform_rsa(signature, public_exponent, modulus, modlen)
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return encoded_digest == signed_digest
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