c7782addd5
draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto-02
1098 lines
43 KiB
Python
1098 lines
43 KiB
Python
# This software is provided 'as-is', without any express or implied
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# warranty. In no event will the author be held liable for any damages
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# arising from the use of this software.
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#
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# Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose,
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# including commercial applications, and to alter it and redistribute it
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# freely, subject to the following restrictions:
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#
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# 1. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented; you must not
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# claim that you wrote the original software. If you use this software
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# in a product, an acknowledgment in the product documentation would be
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# appreciated but is not required.
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# 2. Altered source versions must be plainly marked as such, and must not be
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# misrepresented as being the original software.
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# 3. This notice may not be removed or altered from any source distribution.
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#
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# Copyright (c) 2008 Greg Hewgill http://hewgill.com
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#
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# This has been modified from the original software.
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# Copyright (c) 2011 William Grant <me@williamgrant.id.au>
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#
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# This has been modified from the original software.
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# Copyright (c) 2016 Google, Inc.
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# Contact: Brandon Long <blong@google.com>
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#
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# This has been modified from the original software.
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# Copyright (c) 2016, 2017 Scott Kitterman <scott@kitterman.com>
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#
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# This has been modified from the original software.
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# Copyright (c) 2017 Valimail Inc
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# Contact: Gene Shuman <gene@valimail.com>
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#
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import logging
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import re
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import time
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from dkim.canonicalization import (
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CanonicalizationPolicy,
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InvalidCanonicalizationPolicyError,
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)
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from dkim.canonicalization import Relaxed as RelaxedCanonicalization
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from dkim.crypto import (
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DigestTooLargeError,
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HASH_ALGORITHMS,
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parse_pem_private_key,
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parse_public_key,
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get_rsa_pubkey,
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RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_sign,
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RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_verify,
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UnparsableKeyError,
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)
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try:
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from dkim.dnsplug import get_txt
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except:
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def get_txt(s):
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raise RuntimeError("DKIM.verify requires DNS or dnspython module")
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from dkim.util import (
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get_default_logger,
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InvalidTagValueList,
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parse_tag_value,
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)
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__all__ = [
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"DKIMException",
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"InternalError",
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"KeyFormatError",
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"MessageFormatError",
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"ParameterError",
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"ValidationError",
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"CV_Pass",
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"CV_Fail",
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"CV_None",
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"Relaxed",
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"Simple",
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"DKIM",
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"ARC",
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"sign",
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"verify",
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"dkim_sign",
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"dkim_verify",
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"arc_sign",
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"arc_verify",
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]
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Relaxed = b'relaxed' # for clients passing dkim.Relaxed
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Simple = b'simple' # for clients passing dkim.Simple
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# for ARC
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CV_Pass = b'pass'
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CV_Fail = b'fail'
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CV_None = b'none'
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class HashThrough(object):
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def __init__(self, hasher):
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self.data = []
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self.hasher = hasher
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self.name = hasher.name
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def update(self, data):
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self.data.append(data)
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return self.hasher.update(data)
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def digest(self):
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return self.hasher.digest()
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def hexdigest(self):
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return self.hasher.hexdigest()
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def hashed(self):
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return b''.join(self.data)
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def bitsize(x):
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"""Return size of long in bits."""
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return len(bin(x)) - 2
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class DKIMException(Exception):
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"""Base class for DKIM errors."""
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pass
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class InternalError(DKIMException):
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"""Internal error in dkim module. Should never happen."""
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pass
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class KeyFormatError(DKIMException):
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"""Key format error while parsing an RSA public or private key."""
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pass
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class MessageFormatError(DKIMException):
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"""RFC822 message format error."""
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pass
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class ParameterError(DKIMException):
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"""Input parameter error."""
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pass
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class ValidationError(DKIMException):
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"""Validation error."""
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pass
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def select_headers(headers, include_headers):
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"""Select message header fields to be signed/verified.
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>>> h = [('from','biz'),('foo','bar'),('from','baz'),('subject','boring')]
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>>> i = ['from','subject','to','from']
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>>> select_headers(h,i)
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[('from', 'baz'), ('subject', 'boring'), ('from', 'biz')]
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>>> h = [('From','biz'),('Foo','bar'),('Subject','Boring')]
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>>> i = ['from','subject','to','from']
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>>> select_headers(h,i)
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[('From', 'biz'), ('Subject', 'Boring')]
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"""
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sign_headers = []
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lastindex = {}
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for h in include_headers:
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assert h == h.lower()
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i = lastindex.get(h, len(headers))
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while i > 0:
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i -= 1
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if h == headers[i][0].lower():
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sign_headers.append(headers[i])
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break
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lastindex[h] = i
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return sign_headers
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# FWS = ([*WSP CRLF] 1*WSP) / obs-FWS ; Folding white space [RFC5322]
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FWS = br'(?:(?:\s*\r?\n)?\s+)?'
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RE_BTAG = re.compile(br'([;\s]b'+FWS+br'=)(?:'+FWS+br'[a-zA-Z0-9+/=])*(?:\r?\n\Z)?')
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def hash_headers(hasher, canonicalize_headers, headers, include_headers,
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sigheader, sig):
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"""Update hash for signed message header fields."""
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sign_headers = select_headers(headers,include_headers)
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# The call to _remove() assumes that the signature b= only appears
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# once in the signature header
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cheaders = canonicalize_headers.canonicalize_headers(
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[(sigheader[0], RE_BTAG.sub(b'\\1',sigheader[1]))])
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# the dkim sig is hashed with no trailing crlf, even if the
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# canonicalization algorithm would add one.
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for x,y in sign_headers + [(x, y.rstrip()) for x,y in cheaders]:
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hasher.update(x)
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hasher.update(b":")
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hasher.update(y)
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return sign_headers
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def validate_signature_fields(sig, mandatory_fields=[b'v', b'a', b'b', b'bh', b'd', b'h', b's'], arc=False):
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"""Validate DKIM or ARC Signature fields.
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Basic checks for presence and correct formatting of mandatory fields.
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Raises a ValidationError if checks fail, otherwise returns None.
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@param sig: A dict mapping field keys to values.
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@param mandatory_fields: A list of non-optional fields
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@param arc: flag to differentiate between dkim & arc
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"""
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for field in mandatory_fields:
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if field not in sig:
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raise ValidationError("missing %s=" % field)
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if b'a' in sig and not sig[b'a'] in HASH_ALGORITHMS:
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raise ValidationError("unknown signature algorithm: %s" % sig[b'a'])
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if b'b' in sig:
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if re.match(br"[\s0-9A-Za-z+/]+=*$", sig[b'b']) is None:
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raise ValidationError("b= value is not valid base64 (%s)" % sig[b'b'])
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if len(re.sub(br"\s+", b"", sig[b'b'])) % 4 != 0:
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raise ValidationError("b= value is not valid base64 (%s)" % sig[b'b'])
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if b'bh' in sig:
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if re.match(br"[\s0-9A-Za-z+/]+=*$", sig[b'bh']) is None:
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raise ValidationError("bh= value is not valid base64 (%s)" % sig[b'bh'])
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if len(re.sub(br"\s+", b"", sig[b'bh'])) % 4 != 0:
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raise ValidationError("bh= value is not valid base64 (%s)" % sig[b'bh'])
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if b'cv' in sig and sig[b'cv'] not in (CV_Pass, CV_Fail, CV_None):
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raise ValidationError("cv= value is not valid (%s)" % sig[b'cv'])
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# Nasty hack to support both str and bytes... check for both the
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# character and integer values.
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if not arc and b'i' in sig and (
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not sig[b'i'].lower().endswith(sig[b'd'].lower()) or
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sig[b'i'][-len(sig[b'd'])-1] not in ('@', '.', 64, 46)):
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raise ValidationError(
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"i= domain is not a subdomain of d= (i=%s d=%s)" %
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(sig[b'i'], sig[b'd']))
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if b'l' in sig and re.match(br"\d{,76}$", sig[b'l']) is None:
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raise ValidationError(
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"l= value is not a decimal integer (%s)" % sig[b'l'])
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if b'q' in sig and sig[b'q'] != b"dns/txt":
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raise ValidationError("q= value is not dns/txt (%s)" % sig[b'q'])
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if b't' in sig:
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if re.match(br"\d+$", sig[b't']) is None:
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raise ValidationError(
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"t= value is not a decimal integer (%s)" % sig[b't'])
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now = int(time.time())
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slop = 36000 # 10H leeway for mailers with inaccurate clocks
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t_sign = int(sig[b't'])
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if t_sign > now + slop:
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raise ValidationError("t= value is in the future (%s)" % sig[b't'])
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if b'v' in sig and sig[b'v'] != b"1":
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raise ValidationError("v= value is not 1 (%s)" % sig[b'v'])
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if b'x' in sig:
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if re.match(br"\d+$", sig[b'x']) is None:
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raise ValidationError(
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"x= value is not a decimal integer (%s)" % sig[b'x'])
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x_sign = int(sig[b'x'])
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if x_sign < now - slop:
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raise ValidationError(
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"x= value is past (%s)" % sig[b'x'])
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if x_sign < t_sign:
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raise ValidationError(
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"x= value is less than t= value (x=%s t=%s)" %
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(sig[b'x'], sig[b't']))
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def rfc822_parse(message):
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"""Parse a message in RFC822 format.
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@param message: The message in RFC822 format. Either CRLF or LF is an accepted line separator.
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@return: Returns a tuple of (headers, body) where headers is a list of (name, value) pairs.
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The body is a CRLF-separated string.
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"""
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headers = []
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lines = re.split(b"\r?\n", message)
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i = 0
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while i < len(lines):
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if len(lines[i]) == 0:
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# End of headers, return what we have plus the body, excluding the blank line.
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i += 1
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break
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if lines[i][0] in ("\x09", "\x20", 0x09, 0x20):
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headers[-1][1] += lines[i]+b"\r\n"
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else:
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m = re.match(br"([\x21-\x7e]+?):", lines[i])
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if m is not None:
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headers.append([m.group(1), lines[i][m.end(0):]+b"\r\n"])
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elif lines[i].startswith(b"From "):
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pass
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else:
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raise MessageFormatError("Unexpected characters in RFC822 header: %s" % lines[i])
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i += 1
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return (headers, b"\r\n".join(lines[i:]))
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def text(s):
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"""Normalize bytes/str to str for python 2/3 compatible doctests.
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>>> text(b'foo')
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'foo'
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>>> text(u'foo')
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'foo'
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>>> text('foo')
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'foo'
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"""
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if type(s) is str: return s
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s = s.decode('ascii')
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if type(s) is str: return s
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return s.encode('ascii')
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def fold(header, namelen=0):
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"""Fold a header line into multiple crlf-separated lines at column 72.
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>>> text(fold(b'foo'))
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'foo'
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>>> text(fold(b'foo '+b'foo'*24).splitlines()[0])
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'foo '
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>>> text(fold(b'foo'*25).splitlines()[-1])
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' foo'
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>>> len(fold(b'foo'*25).splitlines()[0])
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72
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"""
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i = header.rfind(b"\r\n ")
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if i == -1:
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pre = b""
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else:
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i += 3
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pre = header[:i]
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header = header[i:]
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# 72 is the max line length we actually want, but the header field name
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# has to fit in the first line too (See Debian Bug #863690).
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maxleng = 72 - namelen
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while len(header) > maxleng:
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i = header[:maxleng].rfind(b" ")
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if i == -1:
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j = maxleng
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else:
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j = i + 1
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pre += header[:j] + b"\r\n "
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header = header[j:]
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namelen = 0
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return pre + header
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def load_pk_from_dns(name, dnsfunc=get_txt):
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s = dnsfunc(name)
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if not s:
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raise KeyFormatError("missing public key: %s"%name)
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try:
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if type(s) is str:
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s = s.encode('ascii')
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pub = parse_tag_value(s)
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except InvalidTagValueList as e:
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raise KeyFormatError(e)
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try:
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pk = parse_public_key(base64.b64decode(pub[b'p']))
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keysize = bitsize(pk['modulus'])
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except KeyError:
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raise KeyFormatError("incomplete public key: %s" % s)
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except (TypeError,UnparsableKeyError) as e:
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raise KeyFormatError("could not parse public key (%s): %s" % (pub[b'p'],e))
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return pk, keysize
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#: Abstract base class for holding messages and options during DKIM/ARC signing and verification.
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class DomainSigner(object):
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# NOTE - the first 2 indentation levels are 2 instead of 4
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# to minimize changed lines from the function only version.
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#: @param message: an RFC822 formatted message to be signed or verified
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#: (with either \\n or \\r\\n line endings)
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#: @param logger: a logger to which debug info will be written (default None)
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#: @param signature_algorithm: the signing algorithm to use when signing
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def __init__(self,message=None,logger=None,signature_algorithm=b'rsa-sha256',
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minkey=1024,ktype=b'rsa'):
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self.set_message(message)
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if logger is None:
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logger = get_default_logger()
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self.logger = logger
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if signature_algorithm not in HASH_ALGORITHMS:
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raise ParameterError(
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"Unsupported signature algorithm: "+signature_algorithm)
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self.signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm
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#: Header fields which should be signed. Default as suggested by RFC6376
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self.should_sign = set(DKIM.SHOULD)
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#: Header fields which should not be signed. The default is from RFC6376.
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#: Attempting to sign these headers results in an exception.
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#: If it is necessary to sign one of these, it must be removed
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#: from this list first.
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self.should_not_sign = set(DKIM.SHOULD_NOT)
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#: Header fields to sign an extra time to prevent additions.
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self.frozen_sign = set(DKIM.FROZEN)
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#: Minimum public key size. Shorter keys raise KeyFormatError. The
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#: default is 1024
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self.minkey = minkey
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#: Key type to use. rsa, rsafp (DCRUP)
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self.ktype = ktype
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#: Header fields to protect from additions by default.
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#:
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#: The short list below is the result more of instinct than logic.
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#: @since: 0.5
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FROZEN = (b'from',b'date',b'subject')
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#: The rfc6376 recommended header fields to sign
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#: @since: 0.5
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SHOULD = (
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b'sender', b'reply-to', b'subject', b'date', b'message-id', b'to', b'cc',
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b'mime-version', b'content-type', b'content-transfer-encoding',
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b'content-id', b'content-description', b'resent-date', b'resent-from',
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b'resent-sender', b'resent-to', b'resent-cc', b'resent-message-id',
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b'in-reply-to', b'references', b'list-id', b'list-help', b'list-unsubscribe',
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b'list-subscribe', b'list-post', b'list-owner', b'list-archive'
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)
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#: The rfc6376 recommended header fields not to sign.
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#: @since: 0.5
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SHOULD_NOT = (
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b'return-path',b'received',b'comments',b'keywords',b'bcc',b'resent-bcc',
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b'dkim-signature'
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)
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# Doesn't seem to be used (GS)
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#: The U{RFC5322<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5322#section-3.6>}
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#: complete list of singleton headers (which should
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#: appear at most once). This can be used for a "paranoid" or
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#: "strict" signing mode.
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#: Bcc in this list is in the SHOULD NOT sign list, the rest could
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#: be in the default FROZEN list, but that could also make signatures
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#: more fragile than necessary.
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#: @since: 0.5
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RFC5322_SINGLETON = (b'date',b'from',b'sender',b'reply-to',b'to',b'cc',b'bcc',
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b'message-id',b'in-reply-to',b'references')
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|
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def add_frozen(self,s):
|
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""" Add headers not in should_not_sign to frozen_sign.
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@param s: list of headers to add to frozen_sign
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@since: 0.5
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>>> dkim = DKIM()
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>>> dkim.add_frozen(DKIM.RFC5322_SINGLETON)
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>>> [text(x) for x in sorted(dkim.frozen_sign)]
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['cc', 'date', 'from', 'in-reply-to', 'message-id', 'references', 'reply-to', 'sender', 'subject', 'to']
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"""
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self.frozen_sign.update(x.lower() for x in s
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if x.lower() not in self.should_not_sign)
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|
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#: Load a new message to be signed or verified.
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#: @param message: an RFC822 formatted message to be signed or verified
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#: (with either \\n or \\r\\n line endings)
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#: @since: 0.5
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def set_message(self,message):
|
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if message:
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self.headers, self.body = rfc822_parse(message)
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else:
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self.headers, self.body = [],''
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#: The DKIM signing domain last signed or verified.
|
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self.domain = None
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#: The DKIM key selector last signed or verified.
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self.selector = 'default'
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#: Signature parameters of last sign or verify. To parse
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#: a DKIM-Signature header field that you have in hand,
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#: use L{dkim.util.parse_tag_value}.
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self.signature_fields = {}
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#: The list of headers last signed or verified. Each header
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#: is a name,value tuple. FIXME: The headers are canonicalized.
|
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#: This could be more useful as original headers.
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self.signed_headers = []
|
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#: The public key size last verified.
|
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self.keysize = 0
|
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|
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def default_sign_headers(self):
|
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"""Return the default list of headers to sign: those in should_sign or
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frozen_sign, with those in frozen_sign signed an extra time to prevent
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additions.
|
|
@since: 0.5"""
|
|
hset = self.should_sign | self.frozen_sign
|
|
include_headers = [ x for x,y in self.headers
|
|
if x.lower() in hset ]
|
|
return include_headers + [ x for x in include_headers
|
|
if x.lower() in self.frozen_sign]
|
|
|
|
def all_sign_headers(self):
|
|
"""Return header list of all existing headers not in should_not_sign.
|
|
@since: 0.5"""
|
|
return [x for x,y in self.headers if x.lower() not in self.should_not_sign]
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Abstract helper method to generate a tag=value header from a list of fields
|
|
#: @param fields: A list of key value tuples to be included in the header
|
|
#: @param include_headers: A list message headers to include in the b= signature computation
|
|
#: @param canon_policy: A canonicialization policy for b= & bh=
|
|
#: @param header_name: The name of the generated header
|
|
#: @param pk: The private key used for signature generation
|
|
#: @param standardize: Flag to enable 'standard' header syntax
|
|
def gen_header(self, fields, include_headers, canon_policy, header_name, pk, standardize=False):
|
|
if standardize:
|
|
lower = [(x,y.lower().replace(b' ', b'')) for (x,y) in fields if x != b'bh']
|
|
reg = [(x,y.replace(b' ', b'')) for (x,y) in fields if x == b'bh']
|
|
fields = lower + reg
|
|
fields = sorted(fields, key=(lambda x: x[0]))
|
|
|
|
header_value = b"; ".join(b"=".join(x) for x in fields)
|
|
if not standardize:
|
|
header_value = fold(header_value, namelen=len(header_name))
|
|
header_value = RE_BTAG.sub(b'\\1',header_value)
|
|
header = (header_name, b' ' + header_value)
|
|
h = HashThrough(self.hasher())
|
|
sig = dict(fields)
|
|
|
|
headers = canon_policy.canonicalize_headers(self.headers)
|
|
self.signed_headers = hash_headers(
|
|
h, canon_policy, headers, include_headers, header, sig)
|
|
self.logger.debug("sign %s headers: %r" % (header_name, h.hashed()))
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
sig2 = RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_sign(h, pk)
|
|
except DigestTooLargeError:
|
|
raise ParameterError("digest too large for modulus")
|
|
# Folding b= is explicity allowed, but yahoo and live.com are broken
|
|
#header_value += base64.b64encode(bytes(sig2))
|
|
# Instead of leaving unfolded (which lets an MTA fold it later and still
|
|
# breaks yahoo and live.com), we change the default signing mode to
|
|
# relaxed/simple (for broken receivers), and fold now.
|
|
idx = [i for i in range(len(fields)) if fields[i][0] == b'b'][0]
|
|
fields[idx] = (b'b', base64.b64encode(bytes(sig2)))
|
|
header_value = b"; ".join(b"=".join(x) for x in fields) + b"\r\n"
|
|
|
|
if not standardize:
|
|
header_value = fold(header_value, namelen=len(header_name))
|
|
|
|
return header_value
|
|
|
|
# Abstract helper method to verify a signed header
|
|
#: @param sig: List of (key, value) tuples containing tag=values of the header
|
|
#: @param include_headers: headers to validate b= signature against
|
|
#: @param sig_header: (header_name, header_value)
|
|
#: @param dnsfunc: interface to dns
|
|
def verify_sig(self, sig, include_headers, sig_header, dnsfunc):
|
|
name = sig[b's'] + b"._domainkey." + sig[b'd'] + b"."
|
|
try:
|
|
pk, self.keysize = load_pk_from_dns(name, dnsfunc)
|
|
except KeyFormatError as e:
|
|
self.logger.error("%s" % e)
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
canon_policy = CanonicalizationPolicy.from_c_value(sig.get(b'c', b'relaxed/relaxed'))
|
|
except InvalidCanonicalizationPolicyError as e:
|
|
raise MessageFormatError("invalid c= value: %s" % e.args[0])
|
|
|
|
hasher = HASH_ALGORITHMS[sig[b'a']]
|
|
|
|
# validate body if present
|
|
if b'bh' in sig:
|
|
h = HashThrough(hasher())
|
|
|
|
body = canon_policy.canonicalize_body(self.body)
|
|
if b'l' in sig:
|
|
body = body[:int(sig[b'l'])]
|
|
h.update(body)
|
|
self.logger.debug("body hashed: %r" % h.hashed())
|
|
bodyhash = h.digest()
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug("bh: %s" % base64.b64encode(bodyhash))
|
|
try:
|
|
bh = base64.b64decode(re.sub(br"\s+", b"", sig[b'bh']))
|
|
except TypeError as e:
|
|
raise MessageFormatError(str(e))
|
|
if bodyhash != bh:
|
|
raise ValidationError(
|
|
"body hash mismatch (got %s, expected %s)" %
|
|
(base64.b64encode(bodyhash), sig[b'bh']))
|
|
|
|
# address bug#644046 by including any additional From header
|
|
# fields when verifying. Since there should be only one From header,
|
|
# this shouldn't break any legitimate messages. This could be
|
|
# generalized to check for extras of other singleton headers.
|
|
if b'from' in include_headers:
|
|
include_headers.append(b'from')
|
|
h = HashThrough(hasher())
|
|
|
|
headers = canon_policy.canonicalize_headers(self.headers)
|
|
self.signed_headers = hash_headers(
|
|
h, canon_policy, headers, include_headers, sig_header, sig)
|
|
self.logger.debug("signed for %s: %r" % (sig_header[0], h.hashed()))
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
signature = base64.b64decode(re.sub(br"\s+", b"", sig[b'b']))
|
|
res = RSASSA_PKCS1_v1_5_verify(h, signature, pk)
|
|
self.logger.debug("%s valid: %s" % (sig_header[0], res))
|
|
if res and self.keysize < self.minkey:
|
|
raise KeyFormatError("public key too small: %d" % self.keysize)
|
|
return res
|
|
except (TypeError,DigestTooLargeError) as e:
|
|
raise KeyFormatError("digest too large for modulus: %s"%e)
|
|
|
|
#: Hold messages and options during DKIM signing and verification.
|
|
class DKIM(DomainSigner):
|
|
#: Sign an RFC822 message and return the DKIM-Signature header line.
|
|
#:
|
|
#: The include_headers option gives full control over which header fields
|
|
#: are signed. Note that signing a header field that doesn't exist prevents
|
|
#: that field from being added without breaking the signature. Repeated
|
|
#: fields (such as Received) can be signed multiple times. Instances
|
|
#: of the field are signed from bottom to top. Signing a header field more
|
|
#: times than are currently present prevents additional instances
|
|
#: from being added without breaking the signature.
|
|
#:
|
|
#: The length option allows the message body to be appended to by MTAs
|
|
#: enroute (e.g. mailing lists that append unsubscribe information)
|
|
#: without breaking the signature.
|
|
#:
|
|
#: The default include_headers for this method differs from the backward
|
|
#: compatible sign function, which signs all headers not
|
|
#: in should_not_sign. The default list for this method can be modified
|
|
#: by tweaking should_sign and frozen_sign (or even should_not_sign).
|
|
#: It is only necessary to pass an include_headers list when precise control
|
|
#: is needed.
|
|
#:
|
|
#: @param selector: the DKIM selector value for the signature
|
|
#: @param domain: the DKIM domain value for the signature
|
|
#: @param privkey: a PKCS#1 private key in base64-encoded text form
|
|
#: @param identity: the DKIM identity value for the signature
|
|
#: (default "@"+domain)
|
|
#: @param canonicalize: the canonicalization algorithms to use
|
|
#: (default (Simple, Simple))
|
|
#: @param include_headers: a list of strings indicating which headers
|
|
#: are to be signed (default rfc4871 recommended headers)
|
|
#: @param length: true if the l= tag should be included to indicate
|
|
#: body length signed (default False).
|
|
#: @return: DKIM-Signature header field terminated by '\r\n'
|
|
#: @raise DKIMException: when the message, include_headers, or key are badly
|
|
#: formed.
|
|
def sign(self, selector, domain, privkey, identity=None,
|
|
canonicalize=(b'relaxed',b'simple'), include_headers=None,
|
|
length=False):
|
|
try:
|
|
pk = parse_pem_private_key(privkey)
|
|
except UnparsableKeyError as e:
|
|
raise KeyFormatError(str(e))
|
|
if self.ktype == b'rsafp':
|
|
pubkey = get_rsa_pubkey(privkey)
|
|
else:
|
|
pubkey = False
|
|
if identity is not None and not identity.endswith(domain):
|
|
raise ParameterError("identity must end with domain")
|
|
|
|
canon_policy = CanonicalizationPolicy.from_c_value(b'/'.join(canonicalize))
|
|
|
|
if include_headers is None:
|
|
include_headers = self.default_sign_headers()
|
|
|
|
include_headers = tuple([x.lower() for x in include_headers])
|
|
# record what verify should extract
|
|
self.include_headers = include_headers
|
|
|
|
# rfc4871 says FROM is required
|
|
if b'from' not in include_headers:
|
|
raise ParameterError("The From header field MUST be signed")
|
|
|
|
# raise exception for any SHOULD_NOT headers, call can modify
|
|
# SHOULD_NOT if really needed.
|
|
for x in set(include_headers).intersection(self.should_not_sign):
|
|
raise ParameterError("The %s header field SHOULD NOT be signed"%x)
|
|
|
|
body = canon_policy.canonicalize_body(self.body)
|
|
|
|
self.hasher = HASH_ALGORITHMS[self.signature_algorithm]
|
|
h = self.hasher()
|
|
h.update(body)
|
|
bodyhash = base64.b64encode(h.digest())
|
|
if self.ktype == b'rsafp':
|
|
atag = b'rsafp-sha256'
|
|
else:
|
|
atag = self.signature_algorithm
|
|
sigfields = [x for x in [
|
|
(b'v', b"1"),
|
|
(b'a', atag),
|
|
(b'c', canon_policy.to_c_value()),
|
|
(b'd', domain),
|
|
(b'i', identity or b"@"+domain),
|
|
length and (b'l', str(len(body)).encode('ascii')),
|
|
(b'q', b"dns/txt"),
|
|
(b's', selector),
|
|
(b't', str(int(time.time())).encode('ascii')),
|
|
(b'h', b" : ".join(include_headers)),
|
|
pubkey and (b'k', pubkey),
|
|
(b'bh', bodyhash),
|
|
# Force b= to fold onto it's own line so that refolding after
|
|
# adding sig doesn't change whitespace for previous tags.
|
|
(b'b', b'0'*60),
|
|
] if x]
|
|
|
|
res = self.gen_header(sigfields, include_headers, canon_policy,
|
|
b"DKIM-Signature", pk)
|
|
|
|
self.domain = domain
|
|
self.selector = selector
|
|
self.signature_fields = dict(sigfields)
|
|
return b'DKIM-Signature: ' + res
|
|
|
|
#: Verify a DKIM signature.
|
|
#: @type idx: int
|
|
#: @param idx: which signature to verify. The first (topmost) signature is 0.
|
|
#: @type dnsfunc: callable
|
|
#: @param dnsfunc: an option function to lookup TXT resource records
|
|
#: for a DNS domain. The default uses dnspython or pydns.
|
|
#: @return: True if signature verifies or False otherwise
|
|
#: @raise DKIMException: when the message, signature, or key are badly formed
|
|
def verify(self,idx=0,dnsfunc=get_txt):
|
|
sigheaders = [(x,y) for x,y in self.headers if x.lower() == b"dkim-signature"]
|
|
if len(sigheaders) <= idx:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
# By default, we validate the first DKIM-Signature line found.
|
|
try:
|
|
sig = parse_tag_value(sigheaders[idx][1])
|
|
self.signature_fields = sig
|
|
except InvalidTagValueList as e:
|
|
raise MessageFormatError(e)
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug("sig: %r" % sig)
|
|
|
|
validate_signature_fields(sig)
|
|
self.domain = sig[b'd']
|
|
self.selector = sig[b's']
|
|
|
|
include_headers = [x.lower() for x in re.split(br"\s*:\s*", sig[b'h'])]
|
|
self.include_headers = tuple(include_headers)
|
|
|
|
return self.verify_sig(sig, include_headers, sigheaders[idx], dnsfunc)
|
|
|
|
#: Hold messages and options during ARC signing and verification.
|
|
class ARC(DomainSigner):
|
|
#: Header fields used by ARC
|
|
ARC_HEADERS = (b'arc-seal', b'arc-message-signature', b'arc-authentication-results')
|
|
|
|
#: Regex to extract i= value from ARC headers
|
|
INSTANCE_RE = re.compile(br'[\s;]?i\s*=\s*(\d+)', re.MULTILINE | re.IGNORECASE)
|
|
|
|
def sorted_arc_headers(self):
|
|
headers = []
|
|
# Use relaxed canonicalization to unfold and clean up headers
|
|
relaxed_headers = RelaxedCanonicalization.canonicalize_headers(self.headers)
|
|
for x,y in relaxed_headers:
|
|
if x.lower() in ARC.ARC_HEADERS:
|
|
m = ARC.INSTANCE_RE.search(y)
|
|
if m is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
i = int(m.group(1))
|
|
headers.append((i, (x, y)))
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
self.logger.debug("invalid instance number %s: '%s: %s'" % (m.group(1), x, y))
|
|
else:
|
|
self.logger.debug("not instance number: '%s: %s'" % (x, y))
|
|
|
|
if len(headers) == 0:
|
|
return 0, []
|
|
|
|
def arc_header_key(a):
|
|
return [a[0], a[1][0].lower(), a[1][1].lower()]
|
|
|
|
headers = sorted(headers, key=arc_header_key)
|
|
headers.reverse()
|
|
return headers[0][0], headers
|
|
|
|
#: Sign an RFC822 message and return the list of ARC set header lines
|
|
#:
|
|
#: The include_headers option gives full control over which header fields
|
|
#: are signed for the ARC-Message-Signature. Note that signing a header
|
|
#: field that doesn't exist prevents
|
|
#: that field from being added without breaking the signature. Repeated
|
|
#: fields (such as Received) can be signed multiple times. Instances
|
|
#: of the field are signed from bottom to top. Signing a header field more
|
|
#: times than are currently present prevents additional instances
|
|
#: from being added without breaking the signature.
|
|
#:
|
|
#: The default include_headers for this method differs from the backward
|
|
#: compatible sign function, which signs all headers not
|
|
#: in should_not_sign. The default list for this method can be modified
|
|
#: by tweaking should_sign and frozen_sign (or even should_not_sign).
|
|
#: It is only necessary to pass an include_headers list when precise control
|
|
#: is needed.
|
|
#:
|
|
#: @param selector: the DKIM selector value for the signature
|
|
#: @param domain: the DKIM domain value for the signature
|
|
#: @param privkey: a PKCS#1 private key in base64-encoded text form
|
|
#: @param auth_results: RFC 7601 Authentication-Results header value for the message
|
|
#: @param chain_validation_status: CV_Pass, CV_Fail, CV_None
|
|
#: @param include_headers: a list of strings indicating which headers
|
|
#: are to be signed (default rfc4871 recommended headers)
|
|
#: @return: list of ARC set header fields
|
|
#: @raise DKIMException: when the message, include_headers, or key are badly
|
|
#: formed.
|
|
def sign(self, selector, domain, privkey, auth_results, chain_validation_status,
|
|
include_headers=None, timestamp=None, standardize=False):
|
|
try:
|
|
pk = parse_pem_private_key(privkey)
|
|
except UnparsableKeyError as e:
|
|
raise KeyFormatError(str(e))
|
|
|
|
# Setup headers
|
|
if include_headers is None:
|
|
include_headers = self.default_sign_headers()
|
|
|
|
if b'arc-authentication-results' not in include_headers:
|
|
include_headers.append(b'arc-authentication-results')
|
|
|
|
include_headers = tuple([x.lower() for x in include_headers])
|
|
|
|
# record what verify should extract
|
|
self.include_headers = include_headers
|
|
|
|
# rfc4871 says FROM is required
|
|
if b'from' not in include_headers:
|
|
raise ParameterError("The From header field MUST be signed")
|
|
|
|
# raise exception for any SHOULD_NOT headers, call can modify
|
|
# SHOULD_NOT if really needed.
|
|
for x in set(include_headers).intersection(self.should_not_sign):
|
|
raise ParameterError("The %s header field SHOULD NOT be signed"%x)
|
|
|
|
max_instance, arc_headers_w_instance = self.sorted_arc_headers()
|
|
instance = 1
|
|
if len(arc_headers_w_instance) != 0:
|
|
instance = max_instance + 1
|
|
|
|
if instance == 1 and chain_validation_status != CV_None:
|
|
raise ParameterError("No existing chain found on message, cv should be none")
|
|
elif instance != 1 and chain_validation_status == CV_None:
|
|
raise ParameterError("cv=none not allowed on instance %d" % instance)
|
|
|
|
new_arc_set = []
|
|
arc_headers = [y for x,y in arc_headers_w_instance]
|
|
|
|
# Compute ARC-Authentication-Results
|
|
aar_value = ("i=%d; " % instance).encode('utf-8') + auth_results
|
|
if aar_value[-1] != b'\n': aar_value += b'\r\n'
|
|
|
|
new_arc_set.append(b"ARC-Authentication-Results: " + aar_value)
|
|
self.headers.insert(0, (b"arc-authentication-results", aar_value))
|
|
arc_headers.insert(0, (b"ARC-Authentication-Results", aar_value))
|
|
|
|
# Compute bh=
|
|
canon_policy = CanonicalizationPolicy.from_c_value(b'relaxed/relaxed')
|
|
|
|
self.hasher = HASH_ALGORITHMS[self.signature_algorithm]
|
|
h = HashThrough(self.hasher())
|
|
h.update(canon_policy.canonicalize_body(self.body))
|
|
self.logger.debug("sign ams body hashed: %r" % h.hashed())
|
|
bodyhash = base64.b64encode(h.digest())
|
|
|
|
# Compute ARC-Message-Signature
|
|
timestamp = str(timestamp or int(time.time())).encode('ascii')
|
|
ams_fields = [x for x in [
|
|
(b'i', str(instance).encode('ascii')),
|
|
(b'a', self.signature_algorithm),
|
|
(b'c', b'relaxed/relaxed'),
|
|
(b'd', domain),
|
|
(b's', selector),
|
|
(b't', timestamp),
|
|
(b'h', b" : ".join(include_headers)),
|
|
(b'bh', bodyhash),
|
|
# Force b= to fold onto it's own line so that refolding after
|
|
# adding sig doesn't change whitespace for previous tags.
|
|
(b'b', b'0'*60),
|
|
] if x]
|
|
|
|
res = self.gen_header(ams_fields, include_headers, canon_policy,
|
|
b"ARC-Message-Signature", pk, standardize)
|
|
|
|
new_arc_set.append(b"ARC-Message-Signature: " + res)
|
|
self.headers.insert(0, (b"ARC-Message-Signature", res))
|
|
arc_headers.insert(0, (b"ARC-Message-Signature", res))
|
|
|
|
# Compute ARC-Seal
|
|
as_fields = [x for x in [
|
|
(b'i', str(instance).encode('ascii')),
|
|
(b'cv', chain_validation_status),
|
|
(b'a', self.signature_algorithm),
|
|
(b'd', domain),
|
|
(b's', selector),
|
|
(b't', timestamp),
|
|
# Force b= to fold onto it's own line so that refolding after
|
|
# adding sig doesn't change whitespace for previous tags.
|
|
(b'b', b'0'*60),
|
|
] if x]
|
|
|
|
as_include_headers = [x[0].lower() for x in arc_headers]
|
|
as_include_headers.reverse()
|
|
|
|
res = self.gen_header(as_fields, as_include_headers, canon_policy,
|
|
b"ARC-Seal", pk, standardize)
|
|
|
|
new_arc_set.append(b"ARC-Seal: " + res)
|
|
self.headers.insert(0, (b"ARC-Seal", res))
|
|
arc_headers.insert(0, (b"ARC-Seal", res))
|
|
|
|
new_arc_set.reverse()
|
|
|
|
return new_arc_set
|
|
|
|
#: Verify an ARC set.
|
|
#: @type instance: int
|
|
#: @param instance: which ARC set to verify, based on i= instance.
|
|
#: @type dnsfunc: callable
|
|
#: @param dnsfunc: an optional function to lookup TXT resource records
|
|
#: for a DNS domain. The default uses dnspython or pydns.
|
|
#: @return: True if signature verifies or False otherwise
|
|
#: @return: three-tuple of (CV Result (CV_Pass, CV_Fail or CV_None), list of
|
|
#: result dictionaries, result reason)
|
|
#: @raise DKIMException: when the message, signature, or key are badly formed
|
|
def verify(self,dnsfunc=get_txt):
|
|
result_data = []
|
|
max_instance, arc_headers_w_instance = self.sorted_arc_headers()
|
|
if max_instance == 0:
|
|
return CV_None, result_data, "Message is not ARC signed"
|
|
for instance in range(max_instance, 0, -1):
|
|
try:
|
|
result = self.verify_instance(arc_headers_w_instance, instance, dnsfunc=dnsfunc)
|
|
result_data.append(result)
|
|
except DKIMException as e:
|
|
self.logger.error("%s" % e)
|
|
return CV_Fail, result_data, "%s" % e
|
|
|
|
# Most recent instance must ams-validate
|
|
if not result_data[0]['ams-valid']:
|
|
return CV_Fail, result_data, "Most recent ARC-Message-Signature did not validate"
|
|
for result in result_data:
|
|
if not result['as-valid']:
|
|
return CV_Fail, result_data, "ARC-Seal[%d] did not validate" % result['instance']
|
|
if result['cv'] == CV_Fail:
|
|
return CV_Fail, result_data, "ARC-Seal[%d] reported failure" % result['instance']
|
|
elif (result['instance'] == 1) and (result['cv'] != CV_None):
|
|
return CV_Fail, result_data, "ARC-Seal[%d] reported invalid status %s" % (result['instance'], result['cv'])
|
|
elif (result['instance'] != 1) and (result['cv'] == CV_None):
|
|
return CV_Fail, result_data, "ARC-Seal[%d] reported invalid status %s" % (result['instance'], result['cv'])
|
|
return CV_Pass, result_data, "success"
|
|
|
|
#: Verify an ARC set.
|
|
#: @type arc_headers_w_instance: list
|
|
#: @param arc_headers_w_instance: list of tuples, (instance, (name, value)) of
|
|
#: ARC headers
|
|
#: @type instance: int
|
|
#: @param instance: which ARC set to verify, based on i= instance.
|
|
#: @type dnsfunc: callable
|
|
#: @param dnsfunc: an optional function to lookup TXT resource records
|
|
#: for a DNS domain. The default uses dnspython or pydns.
|
|
#: @return: True if signature verifies or False otherwise
|
|
#: @raise DKIMException: when the message, signature, or key are badly formed
|
|
def verify_instance(self,arc_headers_w_instance,instance,dnsfunc=get_txt):
|
|
if (instance == 0) or (len(arc_headers_w_instance) == 0):
|
|
raise ParameterError("request to verify instance %d not present" % (instance))
|
|
|
|
aar_value = None
|
|
ams_value = None
|
|
as_value = None
|
|
arc_headers = []
|
|
output = { 'instance': instance }
|
|
|
|
for i, arc_header in arc_headers_w_instance:
|
|
if i > instance: continue
|
|
arc_headers.append(arc_header)
|
|
if i == instance:
|
|
if arc_header[0].lower() == b"arc-authentication-results":
|
|
if aar_value is not None:
|
|
raise MessageFormatError("Duplicate ARC-Authentication-Results for instance %d" % instance)
|
|
aar_value = arc_header[1]
|
|
elif arc_header[0].lower() == b"arc-message-signature":
|
|
if ams_value is not None:
|
|
raise MessageFormatError("Duplicate ARC-Message-Signature for instance %d" % instance)
|
|
ams_value = arc_header[1]
|
|
elif arc_header[0].lower() == b"arc-seal":
|
|
if as_value is not None:
|
|
raise MessageFormatError("Duplicate ARC-Seal for instance %d" % instance)
|
|
as_value = arc_header[1]
|
|
|
|
if (aar_value is None) or (ams_value is None) or (as_value is None):
|
|
raise MessageFormatError("Incomplete ARC set for instance %d" % instance)
|
|
|
|
output['aar-value'] = aar_value
|
|
|
|
# Validate Arc-Message-Signature
|
|
try:
|
|
sig = parse_tag_value(ams_value)
|
|
except InvalidTagValueList as e:
|
|
raise MessageFormatError(e)
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug("ams sig[%d]: %r" % (instance, sig))
|
|
|
|
validate_signature_fields(sig, [b'i', b'a', b'b', b'c', b'bh', b'd', b'h', b's'], True)
|
|
output['ams-domain'] = sig[b'd']
|
|
output['ams-selector'] = sig[b's']
|
|
|
|
include_headers = [x.lower() for x in re.split(br"\s*:\s*", sig[b'h'])]
|
|
if b'arc-seal' in include_headers:
|
|
raise ParameterError("The Arc-Message-Signature MUST NOT sign ARC-Seal")
|
|
|
|
ams_header = (b'ARC-Message-Signature', b' ' + ams_value)
|
|
ams_valid = self.verify_sig(sig, include_headers, ams_header, dnsfunc)
|
|
|
|
output['ams-valid'] = ams_valid
|
|
self.logger.debug("ams valid: %r" % ams_valid)
|
|
|
|
# Validate Arc-Seal
|
|
try:
|
|
sig = parse_tag_value(as_value)
|
|
except InvalidTagValueList as e:
|
|
raise MessageFormatError(e)
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug("as sig[%d]: %r" % (instance, sig))
|
|
|
|
validate_signature_fields(sig, [b'i', b'a', b'b', b'cv', b'd', b's', b't'], True)
|
|
output['as-domain'] = sig[b'd']
|
|
output['as-selector'] = sig[b's']
|
|
output['cv'] = sig[b'cv']
|
|
|
|
as_include_headers = [x[0].lower() for x in arc_headers]
|
|
as_include_headers.reverse()
|
|
as_header = (b'ARC-Seal', b' ' + as_value)
|
|
as_valid = self.verify_sig(sig, as_include_headers[:-1], as_header, dnsfunc)
|
|
|
|
output['as-valid'] = as_valid
|
|
self.logger.debug("as valid: %r" % as_valid)
|
|
return output
|
|
|
|
def sign(message, selector, domain, privkey, identity=None,
|
|
canonicalize=(b'relaxed', b'simple'),
|
|
signature_algorithm=b'rsa-sha256',
|
|
include_headers=None, length=False, logger=None):
|
|
"""Sign an RFC822 message and return the DKIM-Signature header line.
|
|
@param message: an RFC822 formatted message (with either \\n or \\r\\n line endings)
|
|
@param selector: the DKIM selector value for the signature
|
|
@param domain: the DKIM domain value for the signature
|
|
@param privkey: a PKCS#1 private key in base64-encoded text form
|
|
@param identity: the DKIM identity value for the signature (default "@"+domain)
|
|
@param canonicalize: the canonicalization algorithms to use (default (Simple, Simple))
|
|
@param signature_algorithm: the signing algorithm to use when signing
|
|
@param include_headers: a list of strings indicating which headers are to be signed (default all headers not listed as SHOULD NOT sign)
|
|
@param length: true if the l= tag should be included to indicate body length (default False)
|
|
@param logger: a logger to which debug info will be written (default None)
|
|
@return: DKIM-Signature header field terminated by \\r\\n
|
|
@raise DKIMException: when the message, include_headers, or key are badly formed.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
d = DKIM(message,logger=logger,signature_algorithm=signature_algorithm)
|
|
return d.sign(selector, domain, privkey, identity=identity, canonicalize=canonicalize, include_headers=include_headers, length=length)
|
|
|
|
def verify(message, logger=None, dnsfunc=get_txt, minkey=1024):
|
|
"""Verify the first (topmost) DKIM signature on an RFC822 formatted message.
|
|
@param message: an RFC822 formatted message (with either \\n or \\r\\n line endings)
|
|
@param logger: a logger to which debug info will be written (default None)
|
|
@return: True if signature verifies or False otherwise
|
|
"""
|
|
d = DKIM(message,logger=logger,minkey=minkey)
|
|
try:
|
|
return d.verify(dnsfunc=dnsfunc)
|
|
except DKIMException as x:
|
|
if logger is not None:
|
|
logger.error("%s" % x)
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
# For consistency with ARC
|
|
dkim_sign = sign
|
|
dkim_verify = verify
|
|
|
|
def arc_sign(message, selector, domain, privkey,
|
|
auth_results, chain_validation_status,
|
|
signature_algorithm=b'rsa-sha256',
|
|
include_headers=None, timestamp=None,
|
|
logger=None, standardize=False):
|
|
"""Sign an RFC822 message and return the ARC set header lines for the next instance
|
|
@param message: an RFC822 formatted message (with either \\n or \\r\\n line endings)
|
|
@param selector: the DKIM selector value for the signature
|
|
@param domain: the DKIM domain value for the signature
|
|
@param privkey: a PKCS#1 private key in base64-encoded text form
|
|
@param auth_results: the RFC 7601 authentication-results header field value for this instance
|
|
@param chain_validation_status: the validation status of the existing chain on the message (P (pass), F (fail)) or N (none) for no existing chain
|
|
@param signature_algorithm: the signing algorithm to use when signing
|
|
@param include_headers: a list of strings indicating which headers are to be signed (default all headers not listed as SHOULD NOT sign)
|
|
@param logger: a logger to which debug info will be written (default None)
|
|
@return: A list containing the ARC set of header fields for the next instance
|
|
@raise DKIMException: when the message, include_headers, or key are badly formed.
|
|
"""
|
|
a = ARC(message,logger=logger,signature_algorithm=signature_algorithm)
|
|
if not include_headers:
|
|
include_headers = a.default_sign_headers()
|
|
return a.sign(selector, domain, privkey, auth_results, chain_validation_status,
|
|
include_headers=include_headers, timestamp=timestamp, standardize=standardize)
|
|
|
|
def arc_verify(message, logger=None, dnsfunc=get_txt, minkey=1024):
|
|
"""Verify the ARC chain on an RFC822 formatted message.
|
|
@param message: an RFC822 formatted message (with either \\n or \\r\\n line endings)
|
|
@param logger: a logger to which debug info will be written (default None)
|
|
@param dnsfunc: an optional function to lookup TXT resource records
|
|
@param minkey: the minimum key size to accept
|
|
@return: three-tuple of (CV Result (CV_Pass, CV_Fail or CV_None), list of
|
|
result dictionaries, result reason)
|
|
"""
|
|
a = ARC(message,logger=logger,minkey=minkey)
|
|
try:
|
|
return a.verify(dnsfunc=dnsfunc)
|
|
except DKIMException as x:
|
|
if logger is not None:
|
|
logger.error("%s" % x)
|
|
return CV_Fail, [], "%s" % x
|